The Nature of the Immediate Environment - Essay Example

Jackson’s argument. Introduction The knowledge argument also known as Mary the super scientist is a philosophical thought that was crafted by Frank Jackson in 1982 and he advanced it later in 1986 under the title of what Mary did not know. He argued against the fact that the universe with everything in it including mental ideas revolved around physical knowledge as was the basis upon which physicalism was propagated (Nida-Rümelin, 9). Marys Room was a thought provoking experiment that made attempts to establish the fact that there exist non –physical attributes and attainable knowledge which can only be realized by means of conscious experience. It endeavors to dispute the theory that all knowledge is physical knowledge Mary that Jackson uses in his experiment is a renowned scientist who has a fully-fledged awareness of color but has never had the opportunity to experience color. The question of utmost interest here is whether upon realizing color she will be able to learn something new. In this experiment, the major assumption is the fact that she has prior physical knowledge of color before her release from the black and white room. When she was released from the black and white room she obtained new knowledge. Based on this premise, it was justifiable to conclude that knowledge in its entirety is not physical (Nida-Rümelin, 13). The fact that Mary acquired new knowledge upon her alteration of the environment is proof enough that “qualia” is valid and exists. Qualia refer to the subjective, qualitative characteristics of experiences that are deemed to be free from the influence of behavior and disposition (Jackson, 7). Jackson asserts that the quale are real and that there is glaring distinction between an individual who has access to a particular quale and one who is not privy to the same. The knowledge argument propagates that if indeed Mary evidently learned something new when she experienced color, then the theory of physicalism is a fallacy. According to the knowledge argument, one is only capable of the experience of color if she gets to have a visual contact with it. The premise here is that despite the fact that Mary was proficient in the science of color perception, she learned something new through experiencing it. In his seminal article, Jackson differs with other proponents of knowledge theory by analyzing the case of a person, Fred, who is capable of seeing color which is unknown to normal human perceivers (Jackson, 17). The knowledge argument is based on the premise that a person, who has a complete physical knowledge on another conscious being, has a very high chance of not being aware of how it feels to have the experiences of that being. The polemical strength of the knowledge argument rests on the fact that it is not as easy to refute the claim that one can have all the physical information, but still fall short of all the information that can be held onto. Jackson advances the modal argument which delves about deductive logic. It is categorically stated in this argument that there is no amount of physical information about another being that logically embraces the fact that he is conscious. This may mean that there exists a possibility of the existence of another world with organisms just like us in the physical aspects but with a glaring distinction in terms of their lack of conscious mentality. Physicalists direct their claim to only some possible worlds especially ours which is refuted by the modal reasoning (Jackson, 23). However, the premise, on which modal argument is advanced, has a drawback of being disputed. What is most obviously contested is the existence of our physical replicas in the other possible worlds. There is the argument of what is it likely to be is conceived not to be ideal because no amount of information can be used to conclude what it to be another organism is. It is not easy to be in somebody’s experience. However much the efforts that you put in finding out what is it like to be another organism, you have to be ignorant of the other aspects of their lives. This idea explains why it was not easy to comprehend the person of Fred. One can only know much about a person but not what it is to be like him. Physicalists and qualia proponents should together concur that regardless of how much is known about Fred, this will not amount to claiming knowledge of him. No one can be the “I myself” of another being (Nida-Rümelin, 9). If physicalism was a fact then, the physical information about Fred would have been adequate to provide information about his innate ability in color experiences (Nida-Rümelin, 11). Jackson also advances the argument that, with respect to the physical world, qualia are non-productive. Mental states are inefficient to depict the physical world. Certain properties of some mental states that Jackson refers to as qualia are insignificant to the physical world. Mental is equally causally inefficacious. It is noteworthy that the instantiation associated with qualia influences the other mental states but not physically (Jackson, 22). It is imperative that people try to evade pain due to its hurtfulness. However, anything can fail to cause anything. It is also possible that the hurtfulness may not necessarily cause pain, and the converse may also be true. The cause and effect relationship is also governed by the state of the mind and possible happenings in the brain. The second reason is derived from the Darwin’s theory of evolution. This states as per the view of natural selection that traits, which take time to evolve, are better adapted for physical survival. However, there are situations when having some traits that take time to develop can be counterproductive. The case of polar bears is typical of this. Having developed to heavy coat which is an appropriate adaptation to cold weather, it has been proved that this also works counter to their motion as it slows the animal down. The epiphenomenalist holds that qualia are a by-product of certain brain processes that are very crucial to the survival (Nida-Rümelin, 28). The third point to this is the fact that we are privy to other minds by knowing other behavior. However, this has been subjected to abuse due to misinterpretation of facts. That is why we can claim to claim authoritatively that stones do not feel while dogs do. There seems to be concurrence that qualia are the effects of what transpires in the brain and can cause nothing physical, but can be caused by something physical (Jackson, 35). The Jackson experiment however meets criticisms that are based on the modalities of the experiment. This is because the exposure of the subject to the monochromatic light did not prevent the subject from experiencing the different colors that the environment could offer. In this case, its believed that in Oder for her to be color blind, and not vision the colors, she would stay longer in the cellar. However, the objections to the color experience are not without course. The proponents of the same believe that for Mary’s case the ability to perceive colors could be due to a medical procedure that is enforced by the twenty-first-century medical procedures that can be practical. In fact, due to this one might say that the thought experiment conducted by Jackson is invalid and clarifies no compatibility with visual science (Nida-Rümelin, 21). About physical color knowledge, the proponents of the doubt on the experiment have since advanced the knowledge that the physical knowledge of the colors and materials would have propelled the knowledge of the subject in the experiment (Jackson, 13). According to the proponents of the same, the Jackson experiment fails in the fact that the subject would have experienced the colors despite being color blind or else not recognizing the colors (Nida-Rümelin, 13). In this argument, the person who has a visual impairment to color or is confined to a monochromatic environment still has the physical knowledge about the environment in which they formally existed. Due to this fact, the knowledge about colors could not be lost, and the recognition of color is still viable. As the individual can still retain such the knowledge of color (Nida-Rümelin, 15). The ability to hypothesis is another factor that casts doubt on the experiment carried out by Jackson. This is because, as an individual, the guessing power would on certain occasions be correct or factual. If the experiment subject guessed the color correctly based on the previous knowledge, then the results of the experiment would be compromised (Nida-Rümelin, 9). Frank Jackson in his argument about the nature of the world would be faulted due to the fact that if one tells you about the nature, and the specifics about the world and you did not have the facts it’s not a must that you believe that person (Jackson, 26). However, one could be selective and adopt ideologies that fit within their mentality or the environment. In Jackson (39), the discussion that is advanced is based on the fact that one has to acquire the ability to know from experiences. In this study, the main objective is to prove that an individual only has the capability to learn or gain knowledge from experiences that the same person has had. The support for this thought majorly believes that the propositional knowledge needs not only to be accessed through learning, but there are other means through which it could be accessed. The means that is advanced in this school of thought is based on experienced and as such the subject might have had previous experiences that would have natured her knowledge about the colors. The ability hypothesis has received numerous critics. The first of these critics believe that that despite an individual being color blind, the possibility of the same individual experiencing the colors is still viable and could change their perception of the colors. For what these individuals are told, they experience and believe due to their ability to remember the same ideas that have been imparted to them. According to Nida-Rümelin (22), the possibility of the subject of the experiment receiving the knowledge through acquaintance with the colors stands a higher chance of success than the possibility of the experiment receiving a level of success. In this perspective, the knowledge, that the subject appears to know within the controls of the experiment, is from known acquaintances and are directly as a result of the same acquaintances. Conclusion Jackson’s knowledge argument shows that survival requires natural powers. In order to come up with the survival techniques, one need to comprehend that the physical world is interpreted based on the nature of the immediate environment. However, science has been developed which tend to operate surprisingly well in these curtailed conditions (Jackson, 11). The physicalists admit that their theory lacks some important aspects. The fact that no slugist has ever succeeded to spell out in absolute terms how the mysterious remnants feature in the sophisticated view that is evident in their sciences and the way their world operates. The Jackson argument succinctly explains the fact that the world did not revolve around only the physical items. The perception of the world, he elucidates, requires some element of mental awareness that is innate and only peculiar to an individual. The criticism of the Jackson study holds some ground and can be relevant to the discussion of the same subject. However, the criticisms advance positions that only seek to provide a negative perspective to the study. Due to this aspect of the criticism, the advancement of the research into this point of view that is discussed in the criticism should be looked into in order to make conclusive remarks into the subject. In Nida-Rümelin (28), for instance, the subject of discussion about the Jackson study is based on the fact that the experiment could have erred due to the level of acquaintance with the subject. In this perspective, the standard of control of the experiment should be limited and focused on the way to avoid the error level of the next study of the same. Works cited Jackson, Frank. Epiphenomenal Qualia. The philosophical quarterly. Vol. 32, No. 127. 1982. Print. Nida-Rümelin, Martine, "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Jim.pryor@nyu.edu http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html Updated: 6-Sep-12 11:35 AM. Read More