The Obtuseness and Length of Privacy Policies - Essay Example

Q5. John Stuart Mill is one of the foremost advocates of free speech, whereby he presented what is today presumed to be the first recorded defense offree speech, from which the ensuing analysis will be based. Mills argues that everyone should have the right to express their opinion irrespective of how illogical and immoral it may be considered. According to him if the whole world save for one person was of one view save for an individual, they have no more right to silence him than he would if he had the power to do so. He argues that this liberty should be allowed to bring about the absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on practical, speculative theoretical scientist or moral subjects (Bennet, 2008). The freedom of expression is indispensable in attempting to drive different viewpoints to their logical conclusions as opposed limiting them because of the social embarrassment they may cause. This argument is inspired in part by the fact that in the attempt to save face, certain comments or opinion that are considered to be in bad taste tend to be discouraged without being objectify considered. Nevertheless, despite the bold claims, he proposes that there should be some rules to govern the action of politicians, which he refers to as the harm principle (Bennet, 2008). On the face value, one may imagine that Mill is agitating for people to have leave to use their opinions to cause others harm perhaps by inciting them to violence. While the argument has merit in that supports the freedom of expression, his insistence that all opinions should be tolerable lacks moral ground given that some of the opinions can cause harm even if they are not carried out. For example, if someone voices an opinion that Jews deserved to be victimized in the Holocaust through print media or in a paper, which Mills would consider acceptable, it would probably have a negative psychological effect on survivors or their families. Clearly, although the contention for freedom of speech is well intended, if pursued to its logical conclusion, it would be very misleading. Ultimately, those who defend the right to Mills version of freedom of speech often find it difficult to support their position when it is proved that this freedom even in the abstract can harm others. However, he makes a very valid point in stating that dissenting voices should never be silenced since as history has proven in many occasions, the fact that an opinion is held by many people does not necessarily make it correct. By emphasizing that all opinions should be considered irrespective of numerical inferiority, he effectively fights the myth popularized by democracies that the majority must always be right. It can therefore be concluded that Mill’s assertions while being fundamentally justified in the interest of freedom and transparency can only be practically applied in very controlled settings. Freedom of speech in both important and dangerous and its import on the society is mostly determined by the intentions of those using it. Q2 Helen Nissebbaum outlines her approach in as far as online privacy is concerned in the March 8 Liberation technologies Seminar discussing the conflict between moral and political imperatives as they try to get in touch with technology. In her opinion, there can be no collective set of rules governing universal online privacy owing to the divergent content and social political contexts (Nissenbaum, 2011). She proposes what is required is a proactive and productive and approach in assessing the privacy norms that should be adopted. Further, she proposes that the best way to approach online privacy is by making the policies transparent and designed such that the user can opt to or not to apply them. Achieving transparency implies that people should get all the information they need about a product or service; however, when all this data is provided, it is often too complicated to read and the product may even loose its time utility. According to her, corporations have applied such practices in an effort to better understand their communities. However, these fail to work because of the transparency paradox; defined as the underlying tension between the divulgence of privacy practices in detail and coming up with policies that are actually practical for users to read. This usually works against consumers more so in respect to online content and privacy, for example after downloading freeware the customer will be confronted with an option of reading the contract document or simply ticking a box that shows the acquiesce to whatever terms are in it. This document may have stated that the user’s privacy rights may have to be waived if they use the particular software but given the length and complexity, it is unlikely they would even have spotted that precise aspect had the bothered to read it in the first place. Ergo, of companies need to do is insert such clauses in their contract knowing that when the user discovers the breach of privacy, they cannot sue since they agreed, albeit without knowing to the contract. On the other hand, by scaling down the details to ensure the users can understand the content, the value of information is compromised and one ends up will incomplete data. At the end of the day, none of these two extremes can be achieved making them mutually exclusive since by realizing one, the other is lost. Society, in her view is used to norms that dictate the flow of information among people acting in various capacities and society expects there should be specific transmission principle that determine the informational flow. She cites a personal example in which she has to sign a consent form in hospital, whereby the write-up was very long and appeared complicated but she signed it anyway choosing to trust her care provider. She suggest that the obtuseness and length of privacy policies has resulted in several loopholes which can result in the user being unaware of how information they provide will be used. She contends that the only place such polices should be used are grey areas so they can explicate and advocate the contextual approach to general online privacy issues. She recommends an alternative mode of online policy taking to account informational norms given that technology has radically disrupted traditional flows through which information was distributed stored and utilized. Q1 Adam Moore argues that individuals have a moral right to control who can access their private information just as they have the right to limit access to their body capability and physical or privacy rights. More has defined privacy as the control one has over access to their information, which is a necessary constituent of human wellbeing. He condemns policies that have been put in place to sanction the capture, storage and trading of personal data by third parties claiming it is a threat to everyone’s privacy. However, Moore does not exclude situations whereby there may be tension between privacy and security; nevertheless, he insists that even in such situations procedural protocols should be followed. This way even when authorities invade one’s privacy because they are suspected of a crime they authorities should have a warrant to access this data and respect the privacy of the data they get. At present, it is a widely known fact that companies like Google amazon and Yahoo store significant amounts of information about those who use their search tools and services. During the Bush administration, it emerged that there was a great deal of data mining by the government, which was accessing people’s private information ostensibly in the quest to gather intelligence. Even at present, the issue of access to privacy is still controversial as the US government has been accused of spying on citizens and even other governments under the guise of securing national interests. Adam Moore (2011) is categorical that for a theory of privacy to be developed, there must be just as much respect allowed for information privacy as there is for physical and spatial privacies. He is one of those who claim that right to privacy should be considered and d respected just as much as the human rights such as food and security. While the idea appears very radical, it is quite practical given that the main reason information security is so commonly breached is because of the ease of access. As argued by Moore (2011), data privacy is just important as psychical privacy, when the state wants to access ones physical space say a house they need to get a warrant and for this they must have a valid cause. Online privacy is however not as appreciated since it is considerably easier to access and in some cases without the knowledge of the owner. However, from a moral point of view ease of access should not be used to justify invasion of privacy. Parties that wish to access data from individual should either ask for permission or if it is a matter of security follow the right legal channels; otherwise, the sanctity of privacy in the highly digitalizing world will be significantly watered down. Q4 Barlow is one of the many that argue against the modern legal and moral intellectual rights claiming that the non-rivalrous nature of such works provides a prima facie case against restriction. He holds that since one does not diminish intellectual work by consuming it the fact that someone makes a copy of another’s work does not interfere in any way with the creator’s enjoyment of the work. From a formal view point, the argument is grounded on the following points in addition to the non-rivalrous factor; works that fall under copyright patent and trade secret are also not rivalrous. Therefore, it follows that there is a direct Prima facie against the copyright or in cases where maximum access to intellectual works is allowed (Barlow, 1997). On the other hand, Stallman is of the opinion that owners of online copyright should instead of selling a copy of a work simply offer licensing agreements through shrink-wrap, which restricts the use of the woks to specific uses (Stallman, 2002). These are relatively new approaches, although they are apparently building on the already existing rules as exemplified by the use of licensing agreements to promote downstream access and creative commons. This provides that one may use the work of others even if it is protected on condition the subsequent works is just as accessible or suable as the first one. Moore takes a more combative and hardliner position more so against Barlow’s argument by claiming that anyone that produces intellectual works has a right to profit from them. He rubbishes the claim that consuming a work does not affect the way other consume it on the basis that one does not create works to enjoy them but rather profit from them (Moore, 2003). He also contends the claim that unauthorized copying does not harm the owner, since it actually does injure them economically by denying them the compensation they would otherwise receive. Logically speaking Barlow position does is severally weekend by Moore’s argument and it is clear that if it was implemented the production of intellectual works would greatly suffer. Without compensation, many writers would be forced to look for other means to support themselves and this would significantly deplete the volume of works produced. In addition, it would discourage new writers from writing since they have no guarantee that their efforts will not be simply enjoyed by other people without the creator making a profit out of it. It is not unlike claiming that even after a Hollywood film has cost millions to make that the audience will not reduce its value by watching its qualifies for it to be screened away free of charge. Ultimately, Stallman and Moore are clearly articulating reasonable points of view which attempt to allow consumers to enjoy the content while protecting the interest of the creator. However, Barlow must be seen as being on the wrong since his ideas are essentially populist and especially audience centered and in practice they would benefit neither the consumer nor creators in the long run. References Barlow. J. (1997). The Economy of Ideas: Everything You Know about Intellectual Property is Wrong,” in Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 359. Bennet, J. (2008) Liberty; John Stuart Mill. Retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/mill1859_1.pdf Moore, A. (2011). Intellectual Property. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/intellectual-property Nissenbaum, H. (2011). A contextual approach to privacy online. Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences,140(4), 32-48. Stallman, R. (2002). Free software, free society: Selected essays of Richard M. Stallman. 2nd Ed. Boston: Free Software Foundation. Moore, A. (2003) Privacy: Its Meaning and Value. American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 215-227 Read More