The Abilities of the Human Mind and Psychological Theories - Essay Example

Is functionalism true? Functionalism is an ontological doctrine about the nature of mental elucidations. It faces various troubles similar to those ascribed to behaviorism and physicalism. As a result, the true functionalism is tainted, and cannot be true. Functionalism individuates mental states in terms of the causal relation to other mental states. Physicalism excludes creatures without brains but have minds. However, this same exclusion that functionalism condemns physicalism are equally applicable to functionalism. This is because when functionalism avoids liberalism, it falls into chauvinism like physicalism. It follows that functionalism is not true because like physicalism it is guilty of liberalism. Fascinatingly, functionalism holds that mental states such as desires, beliefs, and pain are instituted by their functional role. As a theory that currently dominates research in the field of cognitive science, the theory is facing massive criticism and controversy. This paper shall candidly and comprehensively elucidate on the concept of functionalism, using various illustrations with the intention of indicating that functionalism is not true. The functionalism suggestion of manifold realizability, where hardware operation is irrelevant because only the functional level is imperative, is quite unrealistic and illogical. The "Chinese nation" or "China brain" experiment exclusively endeavors to indicate what would happen if the entire Chinese nation methodically organizes itself to operate similar to the brain with each person performing as a neuron that will ultimately form a "Blockhead" (Searle, 1984). In lieu of this, functionalism presupposes that as long as people perform the proper functional roles, with proper causal relations between outputs and inputs, then the system will be a real mind with consciousness and mental states. Outrageously, functionalism allows this to be a legitimate description of the mind, something that is patently absurd and candidly indicate that there is something erroneous with the proposition of functionalism. Apparently, some functionalists strongly believe that were it not for its size (that hampers it from being conscious) china would have qualia. Indeed, humanity is constrained by its theory of mind and people might never understand how the conscious of China is or how it works. Does qualia exist in the Chinese nation? Certainly no but it exists in other states. “If functionalism is true, therefore, either qualia would exists across all hardware or would not exist at all but will just be a mere delusion” (Searle, 1984). The Searle’s Chinese Room experiment accentuates on intentional mental states such as understanding and belief. From the experiment, I strongly concur that functionalism is a perfect theory of intentional states. However, it fails since it cannot explicate most of the mental states including cognizant mental states and sensations. This is clearly indicated in the Searle’s Chinese Room where in some sense, the entire system comprehends Chinese and produces the anticipated responses (Putnam, 2003). However, the whole system is ostensibly not enjoying what it does; it does not feel agony or pleasure, and it does not experience excitements or sensations. However, being within the system, Searle, as a conscious human being, has sensations and experiences. Clearly, although functionalism might function for intentional states it terribly fails to work for perception. If functionalism exists, would it be conceivable to have a robot-twin (clone) who functions just as a real individual, but has no mental states? From the current technological advancements that have been witnessed, there can be two creatures that are functionally or physically identical, but differ in their mental states. The first creature, the real creature has typical conscious emotional states while the second creature, the philosophical zombie, or doppelgänger has none at all. The zombie could be behaviorally and functionally alike in any capricious sense of function. Since it is possible for one to have a zombie twin, it, therefore, follows that functionalism is false, since it does not hold when subjected to critical scrutiny, taking into account the broader perspective. Through the pessimistic argument, functionalists prove that alternatives to functionalism hamper individuals’ ability to know and explain the mental states of creatures. Apparently, if two creatures have isomorphic internal states, functions in identical ways, and achieve similar results, then there is no way that one can prove to the world that one creature has mental states while the other one does not. According to functionalism, being is doing. Systems that are functionally the same are also similar in their mental states. Fallaciously, since various systems function in an identical way, people believe that they also have same mental states and thus functionalism is true. However, it is true that machines such as the robots created by humanity can perform the very functions that human beings perform. Simply having a program cannot be an appropriate condition for intentionality since that program can be implemented on machines made of crummy materials. However, according to Searle, the programs that have been written so far do not portray understanding even though they reason and function similar to the human mind. I concur with this since it is clear that human beings are not finished with building machines that understand; they are still restricted and incomplete. They are partial validations of the abilities of the human mind. However, Searle seems to purport that the programs being created will never explain and/or understand human abilities (Searle, 1984). Programs have provided efficacious incarnations of psychological theories on human subjects that were later tested. Although the current strides to create computers with minds like ours is seemingly on the right truck, there are many functions and/or experiences that these computers cannot perform/experience hence functionality is not entirely correct (Putnam, 2003). Although the mind is just a program, according to the strong A.I., having a mind is more than just having the right kind of programs. Hence, all computers have the right programs that function similar to the human mind, there are various intentional/contentful states that computers fail to display, but human beings display denoting that functionalism is not true (Searle, 1984). Mental states are functional states and impinge on physical states. The mental states are realized through physical states. The functionalists object absent qualia. Although many people strongly believe that zombies are plausible, functionalists contend the conceivability of zombies. While zombies might seem conceivable in the contemporary world, empirical growth of knowledge will eventually prove that zombies are inconceivable just as it was found that it is impossible to have water without H20. In lieu of the above scenario, there are biological and non-biological creatures that do not possess our course neural properties but functionally equivalent to us. They share in our mental states hence functionalism cannot be challenged. Additionally, it does not suggest token physicalism since non-physical physical mental states are conceivable. The above elucidations outspokenly indicate that although some concepts and ideation held by functionalists are true, upon a critical analysis, one realizes that functionalism overly fails in explaining some mental states. Its axioms are highly challenged a factor that makes it almost indecorous. From the elucidations and for the reasons presented above, the best conclusion is that functionalism is not true. References Putnam, H. (2003). Mind, language, and reality. Cambridge [Eng.: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. R. (1984). Minds, brains, and science. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Read More