Theory and Practice in the Ethics Field - Essay Example

The Naturalistic Fallacy Essay Naturalistic fallacy has been controversial in the field of ethics, yet it does not receive substantial attention from scholars. Naturalistic fallacy was defined by G.E. Moore as an attempt to verify an argument about ethics by referring to a ‘description’ of the concept of ‘good’ in relation to several natural aspects, like ‘desired’ and ‘pleasant’. Naturalistic fallacy has been essential in the field of ethics, Moore adds, especially for the intuitionists. In using naturalistic fallacy as a defense, the intuitionists apply it as though it were a rational fallacy in perfect harmony with the fallacy of composition; the exposure of such eliminates metaphysical and naturalistic ethics and makes the arguments of intuitionists correct. However, on a deeper analysis, naturalistic fallacy is an assumption, not a tool to resolve the debate. The concept of a naturalistic fallacy has been related to the idea of a split between the descriptive and the normative and between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. However when the intuitionists confirm the split of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, they suggest more than the idea that ethical principles cannot be inferred from non-ethical principles. As pointed out by Moore, ‘pleasantness’ and ‘yellow’ cannot be defined in non-ethical ways, yet they are natural aspects and part of ‘is’ concept. . It is evident that the naturalistic fallacy cannot be considered a logical fallacy, because it could be included even if the premise is true. Introduction Of the fallacies known and recognized in philosophy the naturalistic fallacy is the most popular or widely used. For scholars of a given type of ethical theory, which is widespread in the Americas and Europe, and which is diversely referred to as ‘intuitionism’, ‘non-naturalism’, or ‘objectivism’, have often criticized their rivals for perpetrating the naturalistic fallacy (Foot, 2002, 51). Several of these rivals have intensely rejected the accusation of fallacy, others have reacted to it briefly, and in all the concept of a naturalistic fallacy had a major importance in ethical texts. However, despite its popularity and controversy, the naturalistic fallacy has been largely ignored (Foot, 2002), and, thus, this paper analyzes this concept. Specifically, this paper argues that naturalistic fallacy is essential, especially in the field of ethical theory and practice. The Essence of the Naturalistic Fallacy The naturalistic fallacy was defined and coined in 1903 by G.E. Moore, a British philosopher. According to him, a naturalistic fallacy is perpetrated every time a philosopher tries to verify an argument about ethics by referring to a ‘description’ of the concept of ‘good’ in relation to several ‘natural’ aspects, like ‘desired’ and ‘pleasant’ (Moran, 2008). Arthur Prior gives a lengthy, but useful definition (Ladd, 1965, 118): … the assumption that because some quality or combination of qualities invariably and necessarily accompanies the quality of goodness, or is invariably and necessarily accompanied by it, or both, this quality or combination of qualities is identical with goodness. If, for example, it is believed that whatever is pleasant is and must be good, or that whatever is good is and must be pleasant, or both, it is committing the naturalistic fallacy to infer from this that goodness and pleasantness are one and the same quality. The naturalistic fallacy is the assumption that because the words ‘good’ and, say ‘pleasant’ necessarily describe the same objects, they must attribute the same quality to them. Basically, the concept of naturalistic fallacy is applied to denote the argument that all things ‘natural’ are innately ‘right’, and those that are ‘unnatural’ is innately ‘wrong’. The popularity of the notion of a naturalistic fallacy in contemporary moral philosophy is one proof to the huge impact of Principia Ethica of G.E. Moore and of Cambridge philosophy. Moore introduced the concept of the naturalistic fallacy in his argument against metaphysical and naturalistic perspectives of ethics (Moran, 2008). He says, “The naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy and it must not be committed” (Hutchinson, 2007, 138). Nevertheless, every metaphysical and naturalistic theory of ethics “is based on the naturalistic fallacy, in the sense that the commission of this fallacy has been the main cause of their wide acceptance” (Moore, 2012, 38). The ideal technique of getting rid of them, therefore, is to reveal such fallacy. However it is not completely definite what is the position of the naturalistic fallacy in the arguments of the ‘intuitionists’. At times it is applied as a defense (Hutchinson, 2007). In using naturalistic fallacy as a defense, the intuitionists apply it as though it were a rational fallacy in perfect harmony with the fallacy of composition; the exposure of such eliminates metaphysical and naturalistic ethics and makes the arguments of intuitionists correct. Specifically, it is considered as a fallacy beforehand, for application to the controversy (Cahn & Haber, 1995). However there are suggestions in Principia Ethica which show that the naturalistic fallacy has a somewhat special position in the intuitionist perspective, and must not be applied as a defense in the least. In view of this, the naturalistic fallacy should be verified to be a fallacy. It should not be applied to resolve the controversy, yet can merely be claimed to be a fallacy when the consequences of the controversy has disappeared (Moran, 2008). Take into consideration these statements (Moran, 2008, 186): (1) ‘the naturalistic fallacy consists in the contention that good means nothing but some simple or complex notion that can be defined in terms of natural qualities’; (2) ‘the point that good is indefinable and that to deny this involves a fallacy is a point capable of strict proof’. These statements appear to suggest that the naturalistic fallacy’s falsity is exactly what is under debate between the intuitionists and their rivals, and should not be used as a defense in that dispute (Moran, 2008). What this essay is trying to argue, then, is that the accusation of perpetrating the naturalistic fallacy can be given, if possible, merely as an assumption from the debate and not as a tool to resolve it. The concept of a naturalistic fallacy has been related to the idea of a split between the descriptive and the normative and between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. Hence D.C. Williams argue that several moralists have believed that it is correct to criticize as the naturalistic fallacy the effort to base the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’ (Foot, 2002). Intuitionists accept Hume’s idea that naturalistic fallacy undermines every bad-mannered perspective of morality, yet, obviously, they refute that it helps in proving that the difference between good and bad is not based on the connections of objects, and also not recognized by reason. The argument of Hume is that ethical assumptions cannot be derived reliably from principles which are not related to ethics (Foot, 2002). However when the intuitionists confirm the split of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, they suggest more than the idea that ethical principles cannot be inferred from non-ethical principles. This is because the problem in the negative perspectives of morality may be corrected by the use of descriptions of ethical principles in non-ethical ways (Hutchinson, 2007). They suggest, additionally, that these descriptions of ethical concepts in non-ethical ways are not possible. Laird argues that “the essential point is the irreducibility of values to non-values” (Cahn & Haber, 1995, 131). However they suggest further ideas. As pointed out by Moore, ‘pleasantness’ and ‘yellow’ cannot be defined in non-ethical ways, yet they are natural aspects and part of ‘is’ concept (Hutchinson, 2007). Nevertheless, ethical principles are not, in his opinion, only indescribable natural attributes, explanatory or descriptive. They are principles of a distinct form—non-natural or non-explanatory. The intuitionist split is composed of three principles (Foot, 2002, 55): (1) Ethical propositions are not deducible from non-ethical ones. (2) Ethical characteristics are not definable in terms of non-ethical ones. (3) Ethical characteristics are different in kind from non-ethical ones. It does not include arguing that any ethical aspects are completely indescribable. What, then, is the connection of naturalistic fallacy to the split between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’? Primarily, the link is as follows—numerous metaphysical and naturalistic moralists carry on as though ethical assumptions can be inferred from ideas all of which are not ethics-based (Foot, 2002). It may be emphasized all together that, even when the interpretation of ethical assumptions from non-ethical principles is never a fallacy, Mill definitely did perpetrate a fallacy in making a correlation between ‘desirability’ and ‘visibility’ in his theory of hedonism; and possibly his falling into such fallacy is mainly the reason for the concept of naturalistic fallacy (Foot, 2002). However is it a fallacy to derive ethical assumptions non-ethical ideas? Take into consideration the Epicurean perspective of hedonism which Mill quite rashly tried to overdo: seeking pleasure is ‘good’, for it is desired by all human beings. At this point an ethical assumption is being based on a non-ethical principle. And, in fact, the theory, interpreted exactingly as it is, is erroneous. Yet it is not fallacious since an ethical concept arises in the assumption which does not arise in the idea (Foot, 2002). It is fallacious since all arguments of the premise “A is B, therefore A is C” (Foot, 2002, 54) is illogical, if interpreted precisely as it is. For instance, it is illogical to claim that a person is affluent because s/he is prosperous. Nevertheless, these claims are not given to be understood precisely as they are. They hold a subdued premise. Then, if this subdued premise is exposed, they are logical and contain no valid fallacy (Moran, 2008). Hence the Epicurean perspective of hedonism, from psychological to ethical, is logical when the subdued premise is enhanced to the point that what is desired by all human beings is good. Therefore, the last question is whether the arguments are valid or true. It is evident that the naturalistic fallacy cannot be considered a logical fallacy, because it could be included even if the premise is true. How does the naturalistic fallacy fall into these ‘mixed ethical arguments’? (Adams, 1960, 88). The answer depends on the characteristic of the subdued premise. This could be a deduction, an intuition, or an induction from a ‘pure ethical argument’ (Foot, 2002, 54-55). Conclusions The field of ethics is fundamentally characterized by ‘naturalistic fallacy’. However, as mentioned in the essay, naturalistic fallacy should be exposed. There should be a more thorough analysis of the concept of ‘good’. Moore’s theory of naturalistic fallacy has essential repercussions both for theory and practice in the ethics field. In terms of theory, if Moore is correct then the concept of ‘good’ is indefinable; in terms of practice, there should be more caution in analyzing and accepting what is ‘right’ or ‘good’. References Adams, E.M. (1960). Ethical Naturalism and the Modern Worldview. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Cahn, S. & Haber, J. (1995). Twentieth century ethical theory. New York: Prentice Hall. Foot, P. (2002). Theories of Ethics. London: Oxford University Press. Hutchinson, B. (2007). G.E. Moore’s Ethical Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ladd, R. (1965). Readings in the Problems of Ethics. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Moore, G.E. (2012). Principia Ethica. New York: Courier Dover Publications. Moran, D. (2008). The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. Read More