Zizeks Concept Of Two Revolutions - Essay Example

ZIZEK’S CONCEPT OF TWO REVOLUTIONS Slavoj Zizek is a leading Marxist sociology academic, whose work is well publicised as utilising the works of leading French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in reinterpreting contemporary socio-political trends (Parker, p.120). Moreover, it has been posited that it was with Zizek’s “The sublime object of ideology” that his work was elevated to international academic recognition in socio-political theory with Eagleton describing Zizek “as the most formidably brilliant exponent of psychoanalysis, indeed of cultural theory in general, to have emerged from Europe in some decades (Eagleton, 1997: 4). However, Zizek’s work has been criticised for inconsistency and Parker argues that “there is no Zizekian system of philosophy because Zizek, with all his inconsistencies, is trying to make us think much harder about what we are willing to believe and accept from a single writer” (Parker, 2004, p.120). Indeed, to this end Zizek argues himself that we should constantly challenge our ideologies and philosophies. This is particularly evident with Zizek’s extrapolations pertaining to the concept of the two revolutions as highlighted by his discussion in “Revolution at the Gates, A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917” (Edited by Zizek, 2002). To this end, it is submitted at the outset that at the heart of Zizek’s argument for the necessity of two revolutions is the idea that the first revolution challenges the pre-existing form and the second revolution ensures that the form itself is revolutionised to attain the true purpose of the intended objectives of the “revolution” in what Zizek terms the “utopia”. Directly correlated to Zizek’s perception of the two revolutions is the use of Lenin as a symbol to highlight the flaws of traditional social theory highlighting historical circumstance and context as the significant causal triggers for revolution. To this end, Zizek highlights the fact that Lenin was planning a revolution prior to the ripe circumstances which facilitated the revolution, which further correlates to Zizek’s central social theory proposition that we should constantly challenge pre-existing ideologies and philosophies. Indeed Ryder comments that “Zizek seizes upon Lenin as the most scandalous symbol for what he would like to achieve- a true revolutionary moment, an actual shift in power relations and economic organisation, and the eventual overthrow of capitalism itself” (Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). Accordingly, the focus of this analysis is to critically evaluate the pros and cons of Zizek’s arguments regarding the two revolutions with specific reference to Zizek’s edited “Revolution at the Gates, A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917” (Zizek, 2002). To this end, I shall consider why Zizek posits that there is a necessity for two revolutions with a critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments. Firstly, in considering Zizek’s arguments for the two revolutions, it is submitted at the outset that that it is necessary to evaluate the key theories of Zizek. For example, Zizek is a key proponent of the concept of subjectivity and psychology as informing political theory and the social roles assigned to people (Myers, 2003 p.15). Moreover, Myers comments that Zizek “takes psychoanalysis and philosophy by the scruff of their necks and forces them to confront everyday life” (Myers, 2003, p.1). At the centre of Zizek’s theory is that we should not accept what “exists as given… but raise the question of how is what we encounter as actual also possible” (Zizek, quoted in Myers, 2003 at p.2). Moreover, it is further submitted that directly correlated to this essence of Zizek’s philosophy is the rationale for his explanation of the two revolutions. Rather than accepting the historical account of contextual circumstances providing the backdrop to the revolution, Zizek considers a different perspective through his focus on Lenin. Moreover, Zizek’s view of postmodernism and present society is based upon the demise in the authority of the Lacanian “Big other”, which is what Zizek views as the symbolic order as experienced by individual subjects (Myers, 2003 at p.23). Zizek argues that converse arguments ignore the reflexivity at the heart of the subject and that lack the prohibitions of the “Big other,” and argues the need for a political act or revolution to alter conditions of the possibility of post-modernity (such as capitalism) to give effect to a new type of political order (Myers, 2003 at p.23). This line of discussion is further highlighted by Zizek’s reference to throughout to the “law” in context of the “Big Other” as the principles upon which society are based, and the proposition that the rule of law itself hides the inherent unruliness which is precisely the violence by which it is established itself as law in the first place (Myers, at p.35). As such, Zizek focuses on what he terms the internal reflexivity and subjective basis influencing the psychology of politics, which he posits leads to the resulting disintegration of the “Big other,” the communal network of social institutions, customs and laws (Myers, 2003 at p.44). On this basis, Zizek argues that the big other is effectively always dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first place and is therefore simply symbolic in terms of viewing revolutions and new symbolic political orders (In Myers, 2003 at p.49). Moreover, it is precisely this theory which further underpins Zizek’s argument for the necessity of the two revolutions as the two revolutions ultimately result in the new symbolic political order, which relates to the symbolism utilised through Zizek’s reference to the “Other”. Moreover, Zizek’s argument highlights the need to question existing philosophies by focusing on the need to address the and that the “perception of our reality as only one of the possible outcomes of an open situation, the notion that other possible outcomes continue to haunt our “true reality” conferring on it an extreme fragility and contingency is by no means alien to Marxism. Indeed, the felt urgency of the revolutionary act relies on it” (Zizek at www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n16/zize01_.html accessed 27 April 2009 ). In the introduction to “Revolution at the Gates: Introduction: Between the two revolutions” Zizek firstly compares the Marx with Lenin. Firstly, Zizek comments that “Doesn’t Lenin stand precisely for the failure to part Marxism into practice, for the big catastrophe which left its mark on the whole of twentieth century world politics for the Real Socialist experiment, which culminated in an economically inefficient dictatorship?” (Zizek, 2002 at p.3) This further relates to Zizek’s central criticisms of the Left in contemporary politics throughout. Zizek further refers to the argument that theories should ignore Leninist legacy if the “Left is to have any chance in the conditions of the post industrial late capitalism?” (Zizek, 2002 at p.3). However, he argues that the inherent flaw in this is that it supports the idea that Lenin was a wise revolutionary leader, however in referring to the contemporary left’s requirement for reinvention, Zizek argues that that this is analogous to Lenin’s revolution and that “it was an exactly homologous experience that gave birth to Leninism” (Zizek, 2002 at p.3). For example, Zizek in considering the historical backdrop specifically refers to the “patriotic line” adopted by the European Social Democratic parties, which fuelled military conflict in a divided Russia and how this undermined the bourgeoisie and the socialist movement: “Lenin himself lost the ground under his feet, in his desperate reaction there is no satisfaction, no “I told you so!” (Zizek, 2002, p.4). As such, Zizek argues that the Lenin was able to discern the unique chance for revolution. To this end, in respect of the first revolution Zizek does not denounce the importance of historical trends and circumstance. Indeed, to this end, Zizek argues that the contextual backdrop is clearly fundamental to the concept of “revolution” and contrasts this proposition with what he views as Chomsky’s overemphasis on theoretical context for discussion of political struggle (Zizek, 2002, p.4). To this end, Zizek comments that “is it not that we are dealing either with obvious facts (which simply have to be made public, as Chomsky is doing in his numerous political texts) or with such an incomprehensible complexity that we cannot understand anything” (Zizek, 2002, p.4). As such, Zizek’s view of revolution is extrapolated thus “what is arguably more important is how, today, perhaps for the first time in the history of humankind, our daily experience (of biogenetics, ecology, cyberspace and virtual reality) compels all of us to confront basic philosophical issues of the nature of freedom and human identity, and so on” (Zizek, 2002, p.4) As such, this roots back to Zizek’s social psychoanalytical theory, which focuses on the psychology of politics impacting revolution and shaping political order and social norms. He further supports the latter by referring to Lenin’s express writings in State and Revolution, where Lenin states “if they kill me, I ask you to publish my notebook “Marxism & the State” ….. I consider it important not only for Plekhanov but also Kautsky got it wrong. Condition: all this is entre nous” (Zizek, 2002, at p.5). In further support of his explanation for the two revolutions, Zizek highlights the fact that Lenin’s revolution stemmed from the “1914 catastrophe” and that Lenin’s project to destroy the bourgeoisie and invent a communal social form was not merely a theoretical project for some distant future (Zizek, 2002 at p.4). On this basis, Zizek suggests that the first revolution cannot simply be attributed to opportunism, but rather was premeditated. This argument is further utilised to support Zizek’s argument of the necessity for two revolutions as the first revolution was according to Zizek premeditated and waited for the opportunity to exploit the ripe circumstance, whereas the second revolution was required to implement the objectives of the first revolution. Indeed, Zizek refers to the fact that Lenin asserted that “we can at once set in motion a state apparatus constituting of ten if not twenty million people” (Zizek, 2002 at p.5) Zizek utilises this statement to highlight his concept of revolution as that “this urge of the moment is the true utopia” (Zizek, 2002 at p.5) Indeed, this is further evidenced by the fact that in 1917, Lenin’s proposals for revolution were rebuffed by the party and as such “Lenin was far from being an opportunist flattering and exploiting the prevailing mood of the populace; his views were highly idiosyncratic. Bogandoc characterised the April Theses as “the delirium of the madman” (Zizek, 2002 at p.5). Accordingly, Lenin symbolises the basis for Zizek’s views on the necessity for the two revolutions and argues that Lenin provides the prime evidence of questioning existing philosophies as reiterated by Zizek’s psychoanalytical social theory: “This is the Lenin from whom we still have something to learn. The greatness of Lenin was that in this catastrophic situation, he wasn’t afraid to succeed – in contrast to the negative pathos discernible in Rosa Luzemburg and Adorno, for whom the ultimate authentic act is the admission of the failure which brings the truth of the situation to light. In 1917, instead of waiting until the time was ripe” (Zizek, 2002 at p.6) This is further evidenced by Zizek’s discussion that Lenin’s strategy was pre-emptive, which is further evidenced by the creation of a state and Zizek comments that “nowhere is this greatness more evident than in Lenin’s writings which covered the time span from February 1917, when the first revolution abolished tsarism and installed a democratic regime, to the second revolution in October (Zizek, 2002 at p.6). Moreover, Zizek points to the fact that in February 1917 “Lenin was an almost anonymous political emigrant, stranded in Zurich, with no reliable contacts to Russia, mostly learning about the events from the Swiss Press; in October 1917 he led the first successful socialist revolution, so what happened in between?” (Zizek, 2002 at p.6) This observation further goes to the crux of Zizek’s arguments rebutting simple opportunism and exploitation of historical circumstance as an explanation for the first revolution. To this end, Zizek highlights the combination of factors contributing to Lenin’s rise. Namely, in the current scenario the contingent circumstances were appropriate and if the moment was not seized, the chance for the revolution would be foregone yet Lenin remained undeterred. Zizek posits that it is precisely this persistence which is fundamental in understanding Lenin’s success as his appeal found an “an echo in what I am tempted to call revolutionary micropolitics: the incredible explosion of grass roots democracy, of local committees sprouting up all around Russia’s big cities and, ignoring the authority of the “legitimate” government – this is the untold story of the October revolution, the obverse myth of the tiny group of ruthless dedicated revolutionaries which accomplished a coup d’etat” (Zizek, 2002 p.7) Indeed, in the first revolution, whilst the state had been toppled, Zizek highlights the point that Russia became the most democratic country in Europe “yet this freedom made the situation non-transparent, thoroughly ambiguous”(Zizek, 2002 p.7), which clearly begs the question as to why the second revolution followed in such a relatively short space of time. Zizek further argues that Lenin highlighted the need for a gap which separates explicit political struggles and other political subjects from the actual social stakes and that “this gap is the gap between revolution qua the imaginary explosion of freedom in sublime enthusiasm, the magic movement of universal solidarity when everything seems possible” (Zizek, 2002, p.7). To this end, Zizek refers to the fact that the gap in the revolutions is akin to the gaps in the French Revolution is “the very space of Lenin’s unique intervention: the fundamental lesson of revolutionary materialism is that revolution must strike twice and for essential reasons” (Zizek, 2002 at p.7). This lies at the heart of Zizek’s theorem in placing emphasis on the interrelationship between circumstance and psychology as fundamental in understanding causation of and the necessity for the two revolutions. Moreover, Zizek argues that the gap is the first revolution misses the form itself to the extent of being rooted in the notion of freedom and justice and then poses the question that “what if the good party wins the free elections and legally implements socialist transformation” (Zizek, 2002 at p.7). He further utilises the analogy with the “Church ideological hegemony first articulated itself in the very form of another religious ideology as a heresy: along the same lines, the partisans of the first revolution, want to subvert capitalist domination in the very political form of capitalist democracy” (Zizek, 2002 at p.8). On this basis, in explaining the necessity for the two revolutions, Zizek appears to argue that whilst the first revolution may have been borne from the interrelationship between psychology and circumstance in overthrowing the tsarist regime, the replacement was a theoretically democratic political system. However, Zizek argues that the first revolution succeeded in only replacing the previous norms, which ties in with the concept of the fictional “big other” referred to above. As such, the precipitous nature of the second revolution was related to the need to put Lenin’s ideologies into practice to ensure true revolution, which in turn relates to Zizek’s “utopia paradigm” (Zizek, 2002 at p.8). As such, Zizek posits that the first “old order is negated with its own form then the form itself has to be negated” (Zizek, 2002 at p.8), which is the fundamental basis of Zizek’s arguments for the two revolutions: “this it the Hegelian “negation of negation” (Zizek, 2002 at p.8). On this basis, Zizek criticises the concept of revolution that prior to a revolution, it should get permission from some figure of the “big Other”, which Lenin negates as opportunism and the premise that “opportunism is a position which is in itself, inherently, false, masking a fear of accomplishing the act with the protective screen of objective facts, laws, norms, which is why the first step in combating it is to announce it clearly and as such Lenin’s argument mirrors Rosa Luxemburg’s views against Kautsky that “those who wait for objective conditions of the revolution to arrive will wait for over, which in itself is the central obstacle to the revolution” (Zizek, 2002 at pp.8-9). Accordingly, the essence of Zizek’s argument for the necessity of the two revolutions relies on Lenin’s argument of not waiting for the opportunity, but pre-planning. As such, Zizek posits that Lenin’s view was effectively a psychoanalytical notion as evidenced by Lenin’s initial warnings against the “implantation of Communism – under no circumstances must this be understood in the sense that we should immediately propagate purely in strictly communist ideas in the countryside. As long as our countryside lacks the material basis for communism, it will be, I should say, harmful, in fact, I should say, fatal for communism to do so” (Zizek, 2002 at p.9). He further criticises the converse explanations for revolution thus: “Here we have two models, two incompatible logics, of the revolution: those who wait for the ripe teleological moment of the financial crisis when revolution will explode at its own proper time according to the necessity of the historical evolution; and those who are aware that revolution has no proper time…. Lenin is not a voluntarist “subjectivist” - what he insists on is that the exception offers a way to undermine the norm itself” (Zizek, 2002 at p.9). Zizek argues that this is further evidenced by the political climate of contemporary politics and refers to Le Carre’s arguments that “politicians are ignoring the real problems of the world” (Zizek, 2002 at p.11) and as such, refers to the illusion of the first revolution in Russia by analogy that toppling the tsarist regime would simply be resolved by a legal parliamentary format and that the second revolution exploited the political change brought about by the first revolution, which according to Zizek’s extrapolations was orchestrated by Lenin. Accordingly, Zizek’s focus is Lenin’s work between the overthrow of the Tsar in the February revolution and the decisive seizing of power by the Soviets in October 1917. In referring to the Stalin disaster, Zizek further comments that Lenin terminated the war for Russia and “who demonstrated a real and effective means of social organisation outside of rule by the economic elite” (Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). Zizek’s arguments for the two revolutions significantly undermines what he terms as “pseudo-radical academic leftists” (Ryder at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009) whose own theories he argues lacks substance and that this is rooted in the problem of political correctness, which feels has permeated contemporary leftist evolution in the modern political framework. In criticising this, the essence of Zizek’s argument appears to be that Lenin’s success in orchestrating revolution was that not rooted in a minority coup d’etat but rather by a comprehensive and calculated understanding of social economic organisation norms and how these could be altered. To a degree this is further supported by Brighenti’s arguments regarding revolution in “Revolution and Diavolution: What’s the Difference? (available at www.eprints.biblio.unitn.it.archive/00001482/01/CRS_34_6_Andrea_Mubi_Brighenti.pdf accessed 28 April 2009) who argues that “whereas revolution has often been viewed as contrary to organisation, it in fact requires the overcoming of a present organisation in the promise of achieving of another superior organisation (Brighenti, p.1) This clearly is in line with Zizek’s arguments regarding the necessity of the two revolutions, on the basis that the first revolution overcomes the present organisation and the second revolution achieves the “superior organisation” as extrapolated by Brighenti. Moreover, Brighenti’s paper further supports Zizek’s arguments of looking beyond mere historical reflection in considering revolution (Brighenti, p.1). However, whilst Zizek’s extrapolations can appear dogmatic and represented as fact by shooting down any views to the contrary, Brighenti’s commentary is arguably more cohesive in attempting to explain the interrelationship between organisation and revolution and introduces a theoretical concept of “diavolution”, which Brighenti highlights as a “neologism which is introduced to….. be described as a form of transformative resistance to the organisational present ( Brighenti p.2). To this end, Brighenti supports the Zizekian importance attached to “organisation” in revolution and indeed refers to Lenin’s assertions that “the less the organisational experience of the Russian people, the more resolutely must we proceed to organisational development by people themselves, and not merely by bourgeois politicians and well-placed bureaucrats” (Lenin, 1917 in Brightenti at p.6). However, whilst Zizek’s theory in criticising existing ideologies pertaining to the necessity of the two revolutions is not without merit, there appears to be consistent inconsistency in his work where the “widening narrative fails to elaborate connections implied by his argument” (Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). Moreover, in seeking to propound radical theories to undermine conventional argument, Zizek is often leftist in attacking previous theory prior to revealing his own position sometimes without consistent support for his arguments. Moreover, Ryder highlights that “Zizek occasionally loses his point in his attempt to out radicalise everyone. His constant manoeuvre is essentially to identify common conservative wisdom on a topic; identify its usual leftist correlative; then attack the moorings of both before revealing his own ultra-radical position.” (Ryder at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). However, this trend in Zizek’s narrative can lead into dangerous territory in the consistency of argument, leaving itself open to holes in the argument regarding revolutions. For example, Ryder highlights the point that in the analysis of the world trade center Zizek somewhat contradictorily refers to the causes of terrorism and American foreign policy as somehow devaluing the suffering of the victims of the tragedy, followed by the somewhat paradoxical statement that “the only appropriate stance is solidarity with all victims” (in Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). The problem is that whilst Zizek’s arguments can appear somewhat circular, this appears to be rooted in his need to look for the rationale for the occurrence of events beyond conventional theory. However, whilst using Lenin’s work and the historical backdrop as the central basis for explaining the two revolutions beyond historical reflection, this arguably is the inherent weakness in Zizek’s work in failing to propound an alternative explanation whilst relying heavily on shooting down converse arguments. This is further highlighted if we consider by comparative analogy the extrapolations of Brighenti. Similarly, Brighenti seeks to go beyond conventional historical reflection and focus on a theoretical discussion of the relationship between organisation and revolution. However, Brighenti seeks to support the arguments and consider various theories pertaining to the concept of revolution in an “attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the subjectivist and the structuralist view” (Brighenti, p.1). To this end, Brighenti puts forward the novel concept of “diavolution”. In explaining this neologism, Brighenti argues that diavolution focuses on the desire element consistent in revolution notwithstanding the polarised views on the concept of “revolution”. To this end, the essence of Brighenti’s argument is that “whereas revolution seeks radical resolution of organisational problems and organisational contradictions by overcoming the organisation that has generated those problems and contradictions, diavolution enables people to inhabit those problems and contradictions by transforming…. them. The diavolutionary genre of inhabiting…. Implies the continuous activities of border crossing organisations and their respective revolutions (Brighenti, pp.17-18). On this basis, Brighenti’s argument suggests that the concept of revolution itself inhabits an organisation by preparing for its own occurrence, which in turn facilitates revolution. Alternatively, diavolution “rejects the idea that inhabiting the organisation means belonging to it” and as such, revolution focuses on territory, whereas diavolution focuses on the zone form, which is arguably in line with Zizek’s rationale for the two revolutions. It is submitted that Brighenti’s arguments clearly go further than Zizek’s in terms of attempting to formulate a theoretical basis for the interrelationship between revolution and organisation, which further highlights the inherent weakness of Zizek’s narrative. Ryder further comments that Zizek’s real weak point is “his inability to come to terms with violence and appears to ignore the reality that Lenin did kill people” (Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). Ryder refers specifically to the fact that in the foreword to “Revolution at the Gates” Zizek refers to the fact that Lenin’s alleged ruthlessness has the same status as “his love of cats and little children in the Stalinist hagiography” (in Ryder, at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). As such, the lack of impartiality is arguably a central flaw in Zizek’s arguments, further highlighted by the reality of Lenin’s reliance on violence as a central strategic tactic in his revolution. Accordingly, the central contradiction in Zizek’s work is the inherent contradiction in his central argument. On the one hand, Zizek highlights the point that the first revolution created a theoretical democracy, which could become an autocracy, which in turn necessitated the second revolution. However, Ryder highlights the point that Zizek appears to avoid the reality of violence orchestrated by Lenin. To this end, Zizek’s arguments whilst not without merit, clearly fails to provide an impartial account to support his arguments. This is further evidenced by the moral tone of Zizek’s narrative, which appears to shift according to the line of argument he is adopting. Nevertheless as Ryder highlights, “Zizek is one of the most important theorists on the radical left. This writing’s polemical value, as a call for the Left to abandon its weakness, is particularly timely” (at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009). As such, it is submitted that Zizek’s explanation of the two revolutions is not without merit and is important in looking beyond the historical backdrop and conventional theorem. However, the central weakness of Zizek’s argument is the lack of consistency and impartiality, which clouds the meritorious nature of his argument. This is further highlighted by Brighenti’s “diavolution” concept, which whilst in line with the Zizekian line of thought, goes further in seeking to propose a theoretical explanation for the interrelationship between organisation and revolution, which it is submitted is vital to contemporary socio-political theory going forward. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brighenti, Andrea Mubi: Revolution and Diavolution: What is the Difference? At http/eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00001482/01/CRS_34_6_Andrea_Mubi_Brighenti.pdf Eagleton, Terry (1997). “Enjoy!” London Review of Books 27 November. Lenin, V. I. (2002). Revolution at the Gates, A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917, Edited and with an Introduction and Afterword by Slavoj Zizek, London. Myers, Tony (2003). Slavoj Zizek. Routledge Parker, Ian (2004). Slavoj Zizek: A Critical Introduction. London: Pluto Press. Andy Ryder: “Revolution at the Gates by Slavoj Zizek” Reviewed by Andy Ryder at www.bard.edu/bgia/bardpolitik/vol3/vi-article3.pdf accessed on 28 April 2009. Read More