Ethics Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Jean Jean-Paulre and Nietzsch - Essay Example

1. In his discussions on the of happiness, John Stuart Mill proposes that it is better to be an unhappy human than a happy animal (or happy inferior human). Mill, answering the question of summum bonum-the higher good-which he says is central to concerns of the foundations of morality, (Solomon, 318) uses the human versus pig/fool analogy to support utilitarian philosophy. Mill maintains that this, "the other party," knows better than to want to and choose to exchange places with a lower being, pig or fool, basing his assertions a number of reasons. First, he says, the party that has a range of higher faculties at their disposal would not trade places with an inferior being, even given that being's range of faculties, it's "fullest allowance of pleasures." (326) Nor would the intelligent, superior party be convinced that the inferior party is better off overall, no matter how happy or how much happier-except, maybe, Mill notes, in the case of a truly miserable human who would do anything to escape his/her sufferingeven if this means lowering him/herself. Second, Mill considers the possible grounds of justification for this mindset: the higher party's position, he says, could be attributed to pride, love of freedom, love of autonomy, or to the love of power or excitement. But, he returns, justification of holding onto one's position, refusing to trade places regardless of the degree of happiness of the pig/fool that surpasses his/hers, rests in human dignity. This, Mill reasons, is so imperative to intelligent, superior beings, that they would for no reason outside it compromise it. Further, Mills admonishes anyone contesting his approach as one who is confusing the definitions/conditions of happiness and contentment. He concedes that 1) a higher being has higher (and/or greater) needs-he/she needs more to make him/her happy; and 2) a lower being with a lesser range of (and thereby need for) the capacity for happiness will have a better chance of complete happiness, whereas one with greater needs is at risk for having a smaller percentage of his/her needs fulfilled. If a person has only one bucket to fill as opposed to twenty, for example, the person with only one bucket will have a better likelihood of walking away from the fountain of happiness and saying, "I have successfully filled all of my buckets." But after conceding, Mill returns to the higher party's ability to tolerate more, and therefore to bear greater burdens. Such is the opinion of the higher, intelligent being-with the capacity to tolerate, appreciate, and understand that to be a superior being who is momentarily unhappy is far better than to be an inferior being with constant happiness. And, he claims, if the other party does not agree, it is only because he/she is incapable of understanding Mill's position and is therefore basing his/her [inferior] contention on a lack of information. That is, the lower being cannot fully comprehend the options of both sides, does not have the capacity or range to choose, even, and does not, therefore, understand what it is to have the dilemma of choosing in the first place: if you are not smart enough to understand the difference in stations (the higher and the lower's stations in life), then you have not the ability to choose between the two-and do have, as Mills does, the grounds upon which to base your opinion. 2. For Nietzsche, anything which intrudes upon or impedes one's will to power is suspect. In this case, two select characteristics threaten this will to power-weakness and humility. Nietzsche grants the possibility that within a collective, it might be good and possible to not hurt others and protect oneself from being hurt, if everyone in the group "mutually" "refrains from injury, from violence, from exploitation." (Solomon, 392) But, Nietzsche notes, the moment the practice is made a principle, a law, the effort becomes one of a kind of anarchy, of "dissolution and decay"-what he calls a "Will to Denial." (392) This is for him in direct opposition to the Will to Power. For, maintains Nietzsche, the essence of life is the Will to Power, is composed of spending and getting, of overtaking, harming, of necessarily suppressing, oppressing, of exploiting. To deny such a reality, he implies, is to indulge in "sentimental weakness" (392), which is fatal to the Will to Power phenomenon. To work together, cooperate, help each other, care for each other's needs and successes is ideally lovely. But it is an ideal, not real. What is real is the contingency of growth: to grow, to evolve, to flourish, to "gain ground," the organization inevitably must concede to the imperatives of growth (being more fit, overpowering, acquiring [more than]); and to submit to the former attitude, to weakness, is to deny the inevitable Will to Powerand, in so many words, die. Similarly, the attitude of humility is problematic for Nietzsche, though he acknowledges the value, in a sense, of humility as a relative stance-one equally relative to denial. Humility for Nietzsche is a false pride, a vanity that self-imposes value and demands on others to, in a sense, agree to the lowly value that the humble one has assigned to him/herself. Again, while this is ideal, it is not real. That is, Nietzsche notes how the common man has always been "only that which he passed for." (393) The ordinary man is not, therefore, humble by his own "choosing" but by a predetermined (by the higher man) assignation. Both weakness and humility, then, function-for Nietzsche-as nonfunctional in any organization or collective but as natural elements of the master/slave morality (of a "science of morals" as opposed to a morality, per se, of moral values, which are lacking, he says) which he defines as follows: The master/slave dynamic of which Nietzsche speaks is one he maintains concerns the "human herds" (390) who obey as of the slave morality versus the "very small number of those who command" as of the master morality. (390) As a formal conscience, (390) he says, the slave [perspective] needs to be commanded, or given commands, and the master [perspective] needs to deliver the commands. Each instinct, compelled as a part of an interdependent dynamic, though, is in conflict with the other. The master morality, justifying the instinct toward superiority as its obeying a higher command, as part of its "nobility." It exists to impose value; it is value creating. And while it needs the essence of its nobility, it does not need acknowledgement or approval to be what it is-a morality that acts in accordance to its naturewhich is to subscribe to a will to power. The slave morality, justifying the instinct towards inferiority as its being "the only permissible kind of man" (391) who is of utility to the collective, is useful in its "public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, pity" (391) -that is, in its weakness and humility. This latter morality, then is what Nietzsche saw as an inversion of values, esteeming itself (as necessary and right) in spite of its inferior position. 3. First, if my spouse and I were miserable enough to consider divorce, it might be that we believe in many of Jean Paul Sartre's expressions-one of us might nod in agreement that "the other is the drain hole of my existence," for example, and the other might mutter that "hell is other people!" This is not to minimize Sartre's existentialism, reducing it to "my husband bugs me" or "my wife's a drag." Rather, it is to subscribe to the philosophy and practice it as we struggle to consider both pros and cons of divorcing or staying together. In doing so, we would inevitably also struggle within the context of certain existential phenomena: CHOICE and the RESPONSIBILITY of CHOOSING What is just as painful as the possibility of the relationship dissolving (or of staying together in misery) is the understanding that we are, as Sartre says, "confronted with the possibility of choice." (Solomon 415) In our case, both options present good and bad results, but the very act of choosing can be anguishing. At the same time, however, as Sartre points out, we are committed to choosing regardless of what alternative we go with and regardless of whether we give up and not choose either. That is, we are confined by the very nature of choice, for to not choose is to actually choose, make a choice (we choose to not choose). (421) Just as importantly, and again, each of us chooses, and each us must "bear the responsibility of the choice(s)." (421) AVOIDING BAD FAITH If Sartre were to advice us, he would, therefore, remind us that to not choose (responsibility) is to be in bad faith. However long it takes, and whether we decide now, in a week, or in a month, we must decide. (419) It is a kind of existential sin to avoid choosing. To be in bad faith is to form and accept the contradictions of a circumstance, and then fail to act (choose) based on determinations that hold that both alternatives are of equal merit. That is, to divorce would be to honor the self as individual and the freedom of the individual; and to stay together would be to honor the sake of the children; so to pass the days, weeks, months never talking as spouses, never making a definitive stay or go decision, is to be in bad faith. DEALING with ANGUISH Understanding the nature of bad faith is being in anguish. Committing to anything is anguish. (418) Realizing the commitment and the inevitable responsibility of self is being in anguish. Moreover, another kind of anguish comes when we (spouses) contemplate what right we have to impose upon our children that it is best for them to be in a home with both parents, regardless of the levels of pain and misery that will ensue and/or what moral right we have to impose upon our children the pain of losing one parent in the process of divorce The anguish comes when we doubt we know what is best for our children and again when we question our holier-than-thou egos. And, finally, the anguish comes with having to choose and with having more than one choice (both of equal worth, apparently). CONFRONTING [the POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY of] FREEDOM While my spouse is my drain hole, changing the freedom that I am, he/she is also an imposition on my freedom if he/she and I separate. That is, I need the other to exist-and if the other leaves, I will no longer be me but a me-without-the-other; I also need to be free of the contingency of the other whom I need: I need to not need the other. In addition, if my existence depends upon that of the other, so does my freedom depend upon the freedom of the other. Freedom, then, exists only in us as a couple. TAKING ACTION So, to live in or be in good faith is will the conditions of good faith, to be in action. We are, therefore given the following variables: 1) wo/man only attains existence when s/he is what s/he purposes to benot what s/he wishes to be [my italics];" (417) our freedom/need for freedom is sacrificed to the responsibility of living with choice(s), starting with the responsibility of acknowledging and meeting the imperatives of the original choice-to get married (especially in a state that insists on a "till death do us part" vow)-and on the subsequent choice-to have children (who are at the center of the concern); and 3) our freedom, our very existence, depends upon the freedom of and existence of the other. So, inevitably, we must choose-and we must choose to stay togetherat least until the children have grown. 4. Bertrand Russell would deny the veracity of Jiminy Cricket's platitude, to always let conscience be your guide"-conscious being understood as the knowing what is right and what is wrong. Russell maintains there are two problems with this belief: 1) different people have different consciences; and 2) different causes are found to fuel different consciences. (Solomon 433) An appropriate analogy today would start with a consideration of involvement in the Iraqi war (or in any war for that matter). For example, conscience A is told (taught, expressed) that if you are a true patriot, you will, without hesitation, fight to defend your country (or fight when the Chief deems it necessary). The motivation behind this conscience is to do "good" by fighting in battle. Conversely, for conscience B, to fight in any war is to do "bad", hence this person (the conscientious objector, in fact) follows what Jiminy Cricket advises, yet is in direct opposition to the conscience that does the sameyet with quite different approach and result. Likewise-and using a similar example-Russell maintains that because the origins of such diversity of conscience are also diverse, Jiminy Cricket's approach is fallible. For instance, in one culture, children are raised with a punishment and reward system that ensures their conscience will develop accordingly: each is rewarded for favorable action, punished for truancy. But there the discrepancy lies-in what is determined favorable. In the U.S., abiding by God and the federal laws, a child is taught that murder is sinful (wrong). 3,000 plus miles away, children of the Taliban are taught (indirectly or directly, in early training) that to murder (destroy) certain humans will guarantee a seat next to Allah for eternity, thereby making the same act for one an act in bad conscience but for another an imperative of good conscience. And since we have no way to measure or decide the difference in such values, we have no way, says Russell, to reach any conclusion other than this: that the difference in such values (of conscience) is left to a difference in tastesnot in objective truths. The utilitarian view, however, contends that there is such a concept as that which is objectively right, and implies that Russell's view is then somehow blasphemous or immoral in its consequences. But Russell denies such a position as one based on faulty reasoning. While there exist consequences of the doctrine of subjective values (of, to follow the above example, imprisonment, solitary confinement, and even execution), and anything not earmarked as incurring the consequences for going against that subjective right[-ness] is, says Russell automatically accepted/implied as right. But, to add to the first two problems of ethical, subjective and objective right-ness, the human who is acting against subjective rightness may in fact be acting out of objective rightness: he may, contends Russell, be going against moral law but not his own law, not against his own conscience. 5. In his writings, John Rawls establishes the original possibility of equality as an imperative, as a social contract. Given these fundamentals-of freedom of thought; liberty of conscience; political liberties; freedom of association; liberty and integrity of self; and rights and liberties covered by law-the equal distribution of education is covered, or protectedor should be. First, the securing of what Rawls calls "the veil of ignorance" is in order-that equality is ensured for all concerned in education: the powers that be, by marked intention, are kept ignorant (not knowing) about characteristics of the applicants to education. So, for example, the applicants to a major university would not be judged by that which is not disclosed to the admissions board or committee members beforehand (if ever). These who hold the power to admit or deny would not know what ethnicity, gender, religion, abilities and disabilities (mental, physical, or emotional), or social status (how much money Mommy or Daddy would invest in a new wing for the school, for example, is not known and is not a contingency for admission). Next, given Rawls' notion of "justice as fairness", each student would have the same rights. He and she would be together in an automotive class. Asians would be mainstreamed in English classes by their own choosing, not sequestered on a parallel track of English for Speakers of Other Languages-unless they wanted to. Grades would be earned on criteria of merit, not on "handicaps" (such as those found in golf, that is) or on special social interaction between any said students and any said faculty. And special offerings and opportunities-work study, financial aid, educational development support-would be open to all, regardless of social, economic, or other conditions. (Possibly with the only exclusion of high-income students from receiving much sought after and rarer funding source but this is against Rawls theory, so it may be discarded). In essence, to ensure equal distribution of education is to abide by the first and second principles of justice-the equal liberty principle and the difference principle (the former holding the truths to be those ensuring the liberties listed above and the latter as connected, subsequently to the former)-by the understanding of all of justice as it is defined, as fairness; and by the adoption of the notion of justice as goodness and subsequently, then, as rational in nature. "Foreign" students would study abroad and be charged the same fees as students who are "residents"; international students would be allowed to work/participate in work study. Alternative groups could form clubs, those which as the Muslim club or the Pilipino club would "rank" as of the same value, in fairness, as the chess club, the honor society chapter, or the GBLT (Gay, Bi-, Lesbian, and Transsexual) alliance. Colors would represent, solidarity would be honored, individuality would be respected. And in fairness (theoretically, according to Rawls), no measures against conduct without sufficient reason would be imposed, no political tendencies would be assigned lesser or greater status, and no social group of any shape, form, color, or mindset would be denied access to full amenities and offerings of that which higher education is capable. Works Cited Solomon, Robert C., and Clancy W. Martin. eds. Morality and the Good Life: An Introduction to Ethics through Classical Sources. Ohio: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2003. Read More