Lying v. Misleading - Essay Example

Lying v. Misleading There is a difference between lying and misleading. Lying is saying something that is untruthful. Misleading issaying something that is technically true, but is designed to create deception. According to Stokke (1), the moral differences between lying and misleading have been a topic of debate for philosophers in general. Philosophers have not only tried to characterize the difference between lies and misleading statements, but also have debated over the moral significance of each kind of utterance. Therefore, the two main question s are what speech act is required for lying, as opposed to being misleading; and what is the moral difference between the two acts of speech. One theory, from a linguistic point of view, according to Stokke (2), is that there are different ways of conveying information, which means, in turn, that there is a difference in the speech acts involved in both misleading and lying. When one is lying, the mode of communication is saying. This means that lying requires saying something, and being misleading is conveying information without coming right out and saying it. The example that Stokke (1) gave was a person who is looking forward to going to a party that evening after work. Another person, a co-worker, comes up and says that she doesn't want to go to the party unless person A is going. To which, person A simply says “I have to work.” But person A is actually going to be going to the party. This is misleading, because A implies that she wouldn't be going to the party by her statement. But she wasn't lying – she did have to work that day. Lying would mean that person A would come right out and say “no, I am not going to go the party tonight,” when she really is. As it was, the scenario was an example of merely misleading person B. Green (160) makes the distinction between lying and misleading by stating that lying is telling a false statement, while misleading involves stating something that is true, but is calculated to draw the inference of a lie. Stokke (348) further makes distinctions between lying and misleading, and the ethical implications of each. Someone might lie without the intent to deceive. This is because there are reasons for lying that do not have to do with deception. For instance, a person can lie on the witness stand because he fears reprisals, not that he wants to deceive everybody. This is especially true when it is clear that he did see the murder, or whatever it is that he is lying about on the witness stand. He knows that he isn't deceiving anybody, and that was never his intent. Rather, his intent was to simply secure his own safety or the safety of others who he might be protecting as well. Therefore, some philosophers have attempted to craft categories of lying where there is not an intent to deceive, such as the case above. In this definition, a lie is a lie even if there is not an attempt to deceive, as long as there is a warrant for the truth (Stokke, 349). Since one can warrant for the truth, while knowing that the statement is false, even if that person did not intend to deceive, then this would still be considered to be a lie. Therefore, there does not necessarily have to be an intent to deceive for the statement to be considered to be a lie (Stokke, 349). This would contradict the basic formula which is put in place by Stokke (348), which is that a person lies a person A makes a knowing false statement to person B, and there is also an intention to deceive person B. This somewhat complicates the ethical consequences of a lie, according to Stokke (350). this is because there is one traditional school of thought that lying is morally wrong when one intends to deceive. But, if there is not an attempt at deception, is this lie morally wrong? Stokke (350) states that it still is morally wrong, even if the person does not intend to deceive, and, in fact, deceives nobody (such as the witness to the murder, when that witness was caught on tape actually witnessing the murder. He doesn't intend to deceive when he states that he didn't see the murder, and, in fact, he does not deceive). This is because there still might be some kind of negative repercussions for telling this kind of lie. For instance, even in the case of the murder witness who lies on the stand, despite there being clear evidence, in the form of a videotape, that he did witness the murder, there can be negative effects for this bald-faced lie. One such effect might be that the murderer is not convicted, because the videotape was ruled somehow inadmissible, therefore cannot be used in jury deliberation. Therefore, the witnesses' testimony is all that the jury has to convict, and, if there is a lie, even if there is not deception, it could have negative consequences (Stokke, 350). This is what makes even bald-faced lies, which are lies that do not intend to deceive, morally wrong (Stokke, 350). In other words, a lie is morally wrong, even if there is not an intent to deceive, because it blocks options that might have existed if the person did not tell the lie – such as the jury being able to convict the murderer if the witness didn't lie about not seeing it (Stokke, 350). Nevertheless, even though it is possibly less morally wrong to lie without the intent to deceive, than it is to lie with the intent to deceive, it is even less morally wrong to mislead than it is to lie without intent to deceive. Therefore, on the moral scale, lying with intent to deceive is at the top; followed by lying without an intent to deceive; followed by misleading. This is seen in a variety of contexts, according to Stokke (351). For instance, legally, one can get into trouble with lying on the stand, as this carries with it a charge of perjury. However, making misleading statements on the stand are not punishable if they are not also lies. Religion is another context where the morality of misleading is less than that of lies, as religions forbid lying but do not always forbid other kinds of deception, such as misleading (Stokke, 351). Yet, Stokke (351) states that there are other cases where lying and misleading are equally bad. One is where the speaker's responsibility is not confined by what he or she just said. This would generally mean that there are the same negative consequences for both the lying and the misleading, therefore the speaker's responsibility goes further than what he or she actually said. As an example of this, Stokke (351) states that if there is a case where person A has a peanut allergy, and person B prepares a meal with peanut oil in it, planning to kill person A, person B is misleading when he tells person A that there are no peanuts in the meal. And lying when he tells person A that the meal is safe to eat. Yet, the consequences are the same – the person dies either way. In this case, misleading has the same moral responsibility as lying. However, in a more innocent case, where there are no negative repercussions for the misleading v. lying, the misleading is less morally wrong than the lying. That is because what the speaker's responsibility is confined to what was said. For instance, person A visits Vegas and enjoys herself, but is concerned about how she might look to her sophisticated friends. When asked about the trip, she might lie and say that she hated it or mislead by stating something negative about it, like the fact that there is a copy of the Eiffel tower there (Stokke, 351). In this case, there is not a negative consequence for misleading, so it is not as morally bad as the lie (although one might argue that neither is morally wrong, since nobody got hurt). Moreover, there is another distinction between lying and misleading, and this is the reason why misleading is less morally wrong than lying. And that is that, when one misleads, the listener bears part of the responsibility for the deception, whereas, when one lies, it is only the speaker who bears the responsibility (Stokke, 351). In other words, the person who misleads is simply being unclear and hiding the truth. The listener bears at least a part of the responsibility to try and probe further what the speaker means. For instance, in the case of the person putting peanut oil into the food, the person who is allergic is at least partially responsible for letting the misleading statement stand – that person should probe further, and ask if there are any peanut products in the food. Or the person who states that there is a copy of the Eiffel Tower, which would imply that she didn't like Vegas because of the kitschy nature of the place, her friends probably should have went further and said “so, there's a copy of the Eiffel Tower there. Does that mean that you didn't like your trip?” Green (160) refers to this dynamic as caveat auditor, or “listener beware,” and he states that caveat auditor is the main reason why misleading is less morally wrong than lying. This means that the listener bears the responsibility of assessing a statement as being true before believing it. Caveat auditor is based upon the same principle as caveat emptor, which is buyer beware, and means that a person buying something has the responsibility for determining if the item is quality before buying it. Misleading, according to Green (166) is better than lying, because there is not a warrant for the truth – the statement is literally true, and the conclusions which are drawn from the misleading statement is as much the responsibility of the listener as the speaker. In the case of misleading, it is deception, but not lying, and this means that it is partially the hearer's responsibility (Green, 167). There is another possibility, one that is not necessarily mentioned by the commentators regarding philosophy, and that is that neither a lie nor a misleading statement should be considered to be immoral, at all, if there was no harm done. For instance, take the case of the woman who either lies about hating Vegas or misleads with a statement that is negative, but truthful, yet has no bearing on whether or not she liked the place. The question is why either statement is immoral at all. Where is the harm? Nobody is hurt by her statements, either of them, and the woman is allowed to save face with either comment, so really there is only good that comes out of either of these statements. If the concept of morality necessarily includes that there has to be harm done if something is to be considered to be immoral, than such little “white lies” would not qualify as being immoral at all. Conclusion There is a clear difference between lying and misleading, and, while there are a multitude of things that set the two apart, the fact remains that misleading is less morally culpable than lying. Generally. This is because the listener has the responsibility to probe further when there is a misleading statement – if coworker A responds that she “has to work” which implies that she isn't going to the party that evening, coworker B has the responsibility to ask for clarification by saying “oh, you have to work tonight?” At which point, A either has to lie or own up to her statement, but if B just takes that statement at face value, then this is partially B's fault. Nevertheless, morality has to consider harm done, and, when misleading statements have the same negative consequences as lying, then perhaps both are equally bad. Such as the case as stating that there are no peanuts in a meal, when there is peanut oil, therefore the person eats the meal and dies. This is the same consequence as if there was a lie about the meal, stating definitively that the meal was safe. Either way, the consequences are deadly, so each can be possibly seen as equally bad. And, conversely, if there are no consequences for either the lie or the misleading statement – such as the case of the woman who might either lie or mislead about whether or not she likes Vegas – then perhaps both misleading and lying would not be considered immoral at all. In other words, whether lying or misleading is more moral or immoral than the other is all based upon how one looks at the nature of morality. References Green, Stuart P. "Lying, misleading, and falsely denying: How moral concepts inform the law of perjury, fraud, and false statements." Hastings LJ 53 (2001): 157. Stokke, Andreas. "Saying too Little and Saying too Much Critical notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, by Jennifer Saul." Stokke, Andreas. "Lying, deceiving, and misleading." Philosophy Compass 8.4 (2013): 348-359. Read More