Substance Dualism - Essay Example

Substance Dualism is Necessary for Beings to Have Free Will Substance dualism, Descartes most famous philosophical thought, is necessary for beings to have free will because it allows for the separation of minds from bodies (Calef); according to substance dualism, our minds and bodies are separate entities that can exist apart as two distinct entities. The duality argument rests solidly on the premises that the essence of the mind is thought while the essence of the body is extension; in this respect, the duality of essences implies the corresponding substances can exist separately and independently from each other. Since the mind is not physical, it cannot be bound by physical laws that govern the body, thus, beings are free not only to do as they please, but also to do otherwise than they usually do. In this respect, responsible human actions are not related to mechanical causation as presupposed by materialism, the philosophical belief that humans are physical beings whose motions are bound by laws of physics (Wartick). A strong sense of free will is supported by dualism, unlike other philosophical thoughts such as materialism because, according to Descartes, humans have an infinite will to act involuntarily and to be held accountable for their actions, and an understanding capable of showing those clear and distinct perceptions. This paper proposes that substance duality is necessary for individuals to have a free will, not only to do as they please, but also to do contrary to their conventional ways by building a strong case for duality and disqualifying contrary opinion. Intentionality, often referred to as the ‘of-ness’ or ‘about-ness’ of mental states is undoubtedly the strongest argument in favor of dualism (“Case for dualism”); physical objects are spatial and have specific shapes unlike mental states such as thoughts and senses that are non-spatial. However, physical objects cannot be about or of each other because ‘about-ness’ or ‘of-ness’ is exclusively a mental phenomenon that is not within the physical realms, therefore, the lack of an equivalent of the intentionality phenomenon in the physical reality is a strong case for duality. On the contrary, mental states have ‘about-ness’ and ‘of-ness’; for instance, if one thinks that a certain painting is beautiful, then it means that the individual’s thought that the painting is beautiful is about the painting and cannot be reduced to any conceivable physical fact about the individual’s mind. Additionally, the fact that the individual’s thought that a painting is beautiful is about the painting cannot be identified with their disposition to react in certain ways like exclaiming and marveling verbally after viewing the painting. In this respect, an individual’s thinking is beyond the mere predisposition or tendency to act in certain ways because if that was not the case then it would automatically imply that individuals would never be aware of what they were thinking about until and after a corresponding behavior has been manifested physically. The implication for this intentionality argument, therefore, is that intentional mental states are purely holistic in nature and are not dependent on any physical manifestation, and because of its intentionality, the mind is very distinct from material non-mental things that are purely physical and mechanical in nature. In this respect, since no physical phenomenon has that aspect, intentionality is not a construct of the physical world, but a mental phenomenon; the absence of a counterpart feature in physical materialism proves that it is possible for the mental to exist separately, unaffected by the physical. Following this intentionality argument, dualism provides strong case for free will because then it implies that individuals have a limitless capacity to think on their own accord and to act on their own accord as well, voluntarily. The intentionality feature makes a great case for the argument that the mind and the body are purely separate and distinct entities, though they exist in relation to each other, thus, implying that one can exist without the other though they interact with each other. In that regard, it would only imply that substance duality is a fundamental prerequisite for beings to have free will, because in the absence of duality, it would only mean that beings are purely physical things whose actions are subject to physical forces and laws that act upon bodies in the universe. Indeed, human beings are capable of free will and are solely responsible for their own actions as proposed by duality because their minds are separate and distinct entities that exist voluntarily on their own. In this regard, it cannot be supposed that the physical body is purely influenced by the physical laws of nature in the universe, a thesis proposed by proponents of materialism, because the mind, which is not affected by those natural laws of physics, interacts with the body to bring about free will in beings. Regardless of the massive support for the existence of substance dualism and free will based on the intentionality phenomenon, strong criticism against this school of thought comes from causal interaction, which contends that if the mind can exist independently from physical reality, duality should be able to explain the relationship between the mind and the physical body. Anti-duality critics have always based their objections against substance duality on causal interaction by claiming that since the mind lacks all physical dimensions, there is no way it could ever possibly affect and be affected by the physical, extended body. Currently it also appears that there is no reasonable way to account for how each of the separate entities, the mind and the body, could ever possibly interact with each other yet one is considered to be purely material while the other is immaterial. According to interactionism, mental states such as beliefs and desires exist in a causal relationship with physical states, a position that seems very plausible, particularly because it appeals to common sense, even though it is difficult to prove through logical argumentation. For instance, it is common sense that when you touch a flame, the physical event causes you to feel pain, which is a mental event, and you are likely to yell, a physical event; this chain of physical-mental events illustrates clearly that the mental states interact causally with physical states. However, interactionism faults dualism on the premises that it does not account for the mind-body interaction, thus, given that the mind is immaterial unlike the body which is material, it is impossible for duality of the two separate entities to ever possibly result to free will. According to the substance dualists, the fact that the mind is immaterial and therefore free from the influence of physical laws, unlike the body, which is material and therefore subject to influence by natural laws implies that the mind has a free will to act as it pleases. However, interactionism is unsettled that a purely immaterial entity like the mind should influence a material entity as the body, and unfortunately, the substance dualists do not provide any logical explanation that can satiate interactionism. In this regard, it has been hotly contended that substance duality could ever possibly result to free will because in the first place, it fails to account for the interaction of the body and the mind; if the mind is capable of free will, it then would mean that it can influence physical states natural laws notwithstanding. However, given that the mind is a purely immaterial entity, it cannot influence the body, which is a material entity, and therefore, suggesting that duality of the two entities can result to free will is to suggest that an imaginary horse, for instance, can drag a real chariot. In this regard, duality of the mind and body does not exist because the two entities are inseparable and dependent on each other; nonetheless, it is quite unlikely that even if indeed duality of mind and body did exist it would lead to free will. The interactionism counter argument, however, does not gain sufficient ground to disqualify the duality of the mind and the body, and the interaction between the two entities simply because their argument is an appeal to common sense. The argument of interactionism is basically that since the dualists cannot account for the interaction between the mind, an immaterial entity, and the body, a material entity, then it means that the two cannot interact. Clearly, both in part and in whole, such an argument appeals to ignorance because it assumes that since the relationship between the mind and the body cannot be accounted for particularly when they are of different properties then it means that the two cannot interact. In reference to the relationship between magnetic fields and gravitational forces, which are very distinct from the solid and spatially located entities that they affect, it is obvious that even though we may not be able to account for how the two immaterial entities are able to interact with the material entities they influence, the interaction indeed occurs. In the same sense, the mind may be an immaterial entity just like the magnetic field or the gravitational force, but it can still interact with the body a material entity, whether the interaction can be explained or not. Similarly, the fact that dualism has not yet been able to explain that interaction between the mind, a purely immaterial entity, and the body a material entity does not in any way mean that the interaction does not exist or does not take place. Ultimately, it is indeed true that duality of substances, in this case, the mind, an immaterial entity, and the body, a material entity, is necessary for individuals to have a free will because then it would be possible for the two entities to exist separately. Duality of substances implies that the mind is not affected by natural laws of the universe and can act on its own volition, unlike the body, which is spatially located and, therefore, subject to natural forces of the universe. In this respect, individuals are solely responsible for their actions and cannot blame them on natural forces because the mind does not suffer interference from natural laws and forces in the physical environment that surrounds the body. As long as the mind and the body are separate entities that have the capacity to exist on their own, it is impossible that individual actions can be subject to natural forces and laws of physics since the mind, which interacts with the body in a causal relationship (though it cannot be explained logically), can regulate them. In this respect, it is indeed true to say that duality of substances (the mind and the body) is necessary for individuals to have free will because it is possible for the mind, which is an immaterial entity, to overrule laws of nature or physics, which act on the body. Works Cited Wartick, J.W. “Quantum Indeterminacy, Materialism, and Free Will: Do our minds shape reality?” Jwwartick.com. 2011. Web. 21st Nov, 2013. Calef, Scott. “Dualism and Mind” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005. Web. 22 Nov. 2013 “Case for dualism.” Brisbane.id.au. n.d. Web. 21st Nov, 2013. Read More