Is This Thing We Call The Mind Nothing but Our Brain - Essay Example

? Is This Thing We Call “The Mind” Nothing But Our Brain? of Is This Thing We Call “The Mind” Nothing But Our Brain? Introduction The fact that the activities that we normally categorize as mental, such as thinking, making decisions, wishing, imagining, and experiencing pains and pleasures, are activities that we directly engage in as we go about our everyday lives should make the nature of the mind obvious to us. Yet, when asked about what we know about the mind, either we do not have the slightest idea or our idea of it is too general to mean anything. Perhaps, the most practical thing to say about the mind and its states is they are “in the head,” but the moment we try to be more specific about what we mean by it we find ourselves in a muddle. By being “in the head”, do we mean, for instance, that what we call the “mind” is actually just the brain and consequently that what we call “mental states” are nothing but the physical states of the brain? If this is the case, we should then in principle be able to tell a person’s thoughts simply by examining the physical states of his or her brain, but this is, if not utterly improbable, a possibility that in the immediate future is least likely to materialize. Or perhaps we mean that the mind is something other than the brain but in some special way is related to the brain, like that it is through the brain that the mind affects our behaviors. But what kind of entity is the mind, if at all it is an entity, if it is not the brain? There are two general kinds of existence under which any conception of how the mind exists can be classified; namely, physical existence and metaphysical existence. By “physical existence” we mean the kind of existence that lends itself to empirical observation and quantitative measurements while by “metaphysical existence,” we mean the kind of existence that does not. Furthermore, as physical existence is existence in time and space while metaphysical existence is not, an entity that exists physically is subject to change while an entity that exists metaphysically is not. Views that claim that the existence of the mind is physical are classified as materialist views, while those that claim that it is not as metaphysical views. For my purpose, I shall focus on the materialist views of the mind, for it is here where we can differentiate the mind from the brain. As we shall see later, there are variations of this view, for there are different ways in which the mind can be said to exist physically. Thus, I shall examine the basic claims and arguments under the materialist view of the mind upon addressing the main issue of this paper, i.e. is the mind nothing but the brain? The Materialist View The materialist views are divided into non-realist physicalism and realist physicalism. The issue between these two types of materialism concerns the reality of mental states in relation to the reality of the physical states of the brain or of the body: whether there really are no mental states and hence there are only these physical states or there really are mental states in addition to these physical states. Accordingly, non-realist physicalism rejects the existence of mental states and claims that there exist only the physical states of the brain or of the body; while realist physicalism affirms the reality of mental states in addition to the reality of the physical states of the brain. For non-realist physicalism, I shall examine the views of behaviorism and identity theory. And for realist physicalism, I shall examine the views of functionalism and computationalism. Afterwards, I shall present my own argument as to which among the said arguments best prove the nature of the mind’s existence. Behaviorism Behaviorism is generally regarded as the view that reduces mental states to the physical states of the body or, more precisely, to the body’s behaviors (Kim 1998, p. 24-46). This view is also often expressed as the view that claims that mental states are nothing but behaviors. Behaviors are here understood as external physical movements of the body, and thus include verbal behaviors and but not brain activities. Accordingly, all mental states are believed to be behavioral dispositions which may be actualized or not (Greetham, 2006, p. 207-209). For instance, to be in pain is to exhibit behaviors such as crying, wincing, saying “ouch,” etc., or to be disposed to behave in such ways. Thus, behaviorism defines mental terms in behavioral terms, and this is often expressed as the view that mental states are just behaviors. This view, however, can be interpreted in two ways: (Jackson & Rey, 1998) 1. There really are no mental states to which mental terms are normally understood to refer to. Mental terms only refer to what behavioral terms refer to, that is, behaviors. 2. There are mental states to which mental terms are normally understood to refer to. However, mental terms actually do not refer to mental states but to what behavioral terms refer to, that is, behaviors. One of those who straightforwardly subscribe to behaviorism is Ludwig Wittgenstein through his famous private language argument (Wittgenstein, 1953). Wittgenstein does not deny that there are mental states; what he denies is that the meaning of mental terms has something to do with such states. The basic argument is that since the meaning of mental terms is inter-subjective or public, then such meaning has nothing to do with mental states that are by nature private. If they do, then mental terms would constitute a private language, a language understandable only to its user. A private language is internally inconsistent and hence is not possible because it lacks an objective criterion of correctness in the usage of its words. What accounts then for the intersubjective meanings of mental terms is their reference to observable behaviors which vary according to the rules of the language-game in which such terms are used. Identity Theory The identity theory contends that the mind is nothing but the brain, or that mental states are nothing but the neural states of the brain (Smart, 2012). This theory was advanced by J. J. C. Smart and Herbert Feigl. On this view, to be in pain, for instance, is for the C-fibers in the brain to be stimulated. The terms “pain” and “C-fiber stimulation” are here regarded as identical in the sense that both terms refer to one and the same thing: the C-fiber stimulation (Smart, 1959). As such, pain is not something that is over and above the C-fiber stimulation; it is itself the C-fiber stimulation. As Smart writes: “When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge. I am using “is” in the sense of strict identity.” (1959, p. 141-156) Identity theorists are confident that in the near future, the discoveries of science will be able to reduce the existence of mental states to that of brain states in the same way that it had established that lightning is an electrical discharge or that water is H2O. As the terms “lightning” and “water” are merely the unscientific equivalents of the scientific terms “electrical discharge” and “H20” respectively, and so is the term “mind” to the term “brain”—the term “mind” is merely the unscientific equivalent of the scientific term “brain” (Smart, 1959). The primary motivation behind this theory is the scientific principle called “Occam’s Razor” according to which one should not multiply entities beyond what is necessary (Baker, 2011). Accordingly, Smart (1959) argues that the belief in the existence of mental states as something beyond brain states is an unnecessary multiplication of entities and is therefore a dispensable anomaly toward a completely scientific explanation of the workings of the human mind. Functionalism Functionalism regards mental states as functional states or higher-level physical states that are definable in terms of their functions or causal roles in systems of inputs and outputs. For instance, pain is defined in terms of its function in a system where the input is tissue damage and the output includes the usual pain behaviors (wincing, saying “ouch,” etc.). This view was advanced by Hilary Putnam (1975) as an alternative to behaviorism and identity theory. In a way, it can be said that functionalism builds on the failures of these theories. Putnam originally uses the model of the Turing machine to explain the basic features of functionalism. The mathematician Alan Turing (1950) comes up with the concept of the Turing machine to explain the basic processes involved when a computing machine does its computation. Accordingly, the machine contains (1) a device that scans and prints symbols of a finite number of types, say “1’s” and “0’s”, (2) a tape of an infinite length that is divided into segments or squares and on which the scanning and printing device reads and writes symbols by moving either to the right or to the left of a certain segment, and (3) a machine table or ‘program’ that contains instructions for the scanning and printing device, an example of an instruction is: if it reads “0” on one segment of the tape it should move to the next segment right to it and write “1”. A critical consideration here is that as the machine performs its operations it goes into certain internal states. There is nothing metaphysical about these states; they simply refer to the physical states of the machine as it receives an input (the data it reads on the tape) and produces an output (the data that in writes on the tape) according to the instructions in the machine table (Crane, 1995). Putnam claims that our mental states are explicable in terms of the internal states of the Turing machine, for like the internal states of a Turing machine, our mental states are functionally defined—from receiving inputs they proceed to exhibiting outputs. Computationalism The computational theory of mind, claims that the mind is a computer program or a complex of such programs and mental states are the computational states of a running computer program. Here, the main claim is that human minds are themselves computer programs. John Searle (1980) calls this as the claim of Strong Artificial Intelligence. Consequently, it is Strong AI that subscribes to computationalism. A popular formulation of the thesis of Computationalism is as follows: the mind is to the brain as software is to hardware. The main theses of computationalism have been articulated by Fodor’s so-called mentalese hypothesis, the hypothesis that our mind or brain uses an internal system of representation, called the “language of thought”, as it carries out its computational processes (Fodor, 1975). This representational system is believed to be what makes some features of the mind or the brain possible, like its capacity to produce new thoughts by combining previous thoughts and the generality of certain structures in its processes. The language of thought may be compared to the “internal language” of computers, or better yet, of our cell phones. Notice that we can easily change the natural language of our cell phones, say from English to Filipino or German, for these languages are just programmed into the “internal language” or the language of the main program of our cell phones. As such, the rules governing the computational states of our cell phones are not the grammatical rules of the natural languages, but the rules of their “internal language.” In the same way, our mental states do not follow the rules of our natural languages—which, in a way, are just programmed into our minds, but the rules of the language of thought. Conclusion Based on the theories presented, I believe that functionalism and computationalism offers the strongest argument in its theory of the nature and existence of the mind, as well as its distinction with the brain. Here, we are given a basis from which we could work out the differences between what we call the “mind” and what we call the “brain.” This theory has its main sources in two disciplines: philosophy and artificial intelligence, i.e. a branch of computer science whose main interest is the construction of intelligent machines. As mentioned earlier, the main claim here is that human minds are themselves computer programs. This claim has become the foundation of modern cognitive science—the projected ultimate science of the mind that draws from the findings of philosophy, artificial intelligence, psychology, anthropology, biology, neuroscience, and linguistics. For, just as we ascribe intelligence to the human mind, it paves the way to ascribing intelligence to that of machines. We already saw how Putnam uses the Turing machine to explain the nature of mental states. With regard to the claim concerning machine intelligence, “Turing’s imitation game” (Turing 1950), better known as the “Turing test,” is used as a justification. Here is one simplified version. Imagine a human interrogator communicating with two respondents, one of which is a human being while the other is a machine. A wall physically separates the interrogator and the two respondents; and the interrogator communicates with the respondents only through text messages using computers. Let us say that there are two computer terminals, one for each respondent; and the interrogator, though he knows that he is communicating with a human being and a machine, does not know in which terminal he is communicating with the human respondent or with the machine. Now, if after a series of questions and answers, the human interrogator could not tell, on the basis of the respondents’ answers, which is the human and which is the machine, then the machine is said to have passed the Turing test. Thus, we can now say that the machine is “intelligent” (Turing, 1950). It is in this regard that the nature of the mind’s existence to that of the brain is best depicted. For, it through functionalism and computationalism, we can best understand the workings of the human mind, as well as gain a well-grounded understanding of the nature of our mental states, of which I believe, behaviorism and identity theory fails to address. References Baker, A. (2011). Simplicity. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/simplicity/ Crane, T. (1995). The mental causation debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69, 211–236. Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. New York, NY: Crowell. Jackson, F. & Rey, G. (1998) Philosophy of mind. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V038 Kim, J. (1998). Philosophy of mind. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language, and reality. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–457. Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, 68, 141-156. Smart, J. J. C. (2012). The mind/brain identity theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/mind-identity/ Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59 (236), 433–60. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. New York, NY: Macmillan. Read More