The explanatory gap - Essay Example

?The explanatory gap Introduction The explanatory gap is a term used in the modern philosophy by Joseph Levine in his "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap" published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1983.  The main focus of Joseph Levine was “qualia” or consciousness, our subjective sensations of the world.  The explanatory gap in this aspect refers to mental functions such as memory, perception, emotion, and reasoning, as well as to human behavior. John Levine introduced the explanatory gap for the difficulty that the mind theories of physicalists have in explaining the physical properties in giving rise to the way things experienced when they are felt. Levine in his 1983 article used the explanatory gap to point out that even though it might be applicable in a physiological sense, the explanatory gap does not aid our understanding of pain feeling. The explanatory gap has intrigued and vexed a number of researchers and philosophers in a similar way in the past decades and resulted into a considerable debate. Finding a fulfilling and gratifying mechanistic explanation to bridge the gap is a hard problem. This paper seeks to define the explanatory gap, and highlight whether or not the explanatory gap poses an obstacle to materialism with reference to the work of Levine. The explanatory gap infers that there is an existence of a gap of consistent and rational meaningful information that describe and account for characteristics and qualities of consciousness processes, content and states that it is explicable to a rational and logical level of mastery. That is to say, explanatory gap is in the human concept. The term explanatory gap does not illustrate a gap in nature, but rather a gap in our own understanding of nature (Levine 1983). Joseph Levine in his works demonstrates the explanatory gap as an obstacle to materialism. Materialism holds that there exist identities between material kinds and conscious kinds. Joseph Levine illustrates that pain is identical with the C-fibers firing, and also gives an example of viewing something are red which is identical with an activity in the visual V4 area cortex. Joseph Levine also looks at the explanatory gap as an obstacle to materialism in the line with contemporary orthodoxy materialist, and that such kind of identities are posteriori. Levine argues that it is a matter of scientific investigation, to ascertain whether or not pain is the firing C-fibers, rather than conceptual reflection to seeing things as red is an activity in the V4 area in the visual cortex. In this regard, the identities of mind and brain that are discovered will be of the same kind to such exemplary a posteriori identities of science as that of temperature is mean kinetic energy, or that of water is H2O. There is also a good scientific evidence for the presence of such like brain and mind identities. In particular cases, there are direct evidence in the co-occurrence of certain material kinds and conscious kinds. Joseph Levine even asserted that the identities of mind and brain strike quite differently from the apparently corresponding scientific identities (Levine 1983). Levine cites some questions to demonstrate the explanatory gap as an obstacle to materialism: presume that we actually have evidence that pain is the same as firing of C-fiber and is one. Would we not still want to try and find out why firing of C-fiber feels pain instead of something else? And why there is pain in the firing of the C-fiber? There is however no analogous questions that press on us in most of the scientific cases. For example, after finding out that water is H2O, there is no further feeling of the need to know why even when there is H2O, we still have water, or why water is H2O and not anything else. This is the reason Joseph Levine coined the explanatory gap in order to give an impression that something have been left unexplained by mind and brain identities. Many other philosophers besides Joseph Levine have argued that explanatory gap emerges because people cannot draw from the facts that concern state of consciousness a priori from the physical verity, in such a way that people can draw facts concerning temperature and facts concerning water from the physical facts. In addition, it is broadly presumed that the distinction in derivability results because of the contrast means in which people envisage states of consciousness on one hand, and the natural kinds like temperature and water on the other hand. Joseph Levine considers identity of H2O and water which is a posteriori issue. Levine asserts that purely possessing H2O and water concepts may not ensure that people know the identity. The conception in this idea is that the concepts of natural kinds such as water are basically evocative perceptions. Levine in his illustration of the explanatory gap says that people perceive water as liquid that is odorless, tasteless, and colorless, expands on freezing, flows in rivers among others. This according to Joseph Levine allows us to detect where there is water in a whole physical explanation of the world. People only check via the description of water in ascertaining what physical liquid suits the water description constituting the water concept. The explanatory gap poses an obstacle to materialism (Levine 1983). This is ascertained when we consider C-fiber firing and pain identity, or any identity between a material mind and a conscious mind. According to Joseph Levine in his article, it appears that there is no definite amount of physical knowledge that enables people to draw from the facts of pain a priori from the physical facts. The obstacle to materialism posed by the explanatory gap is the primary concept of the conscious kind such as seeing something as red or pain which is not particularly descriptive or expressive concepts. People thinks of such conscious kinds directly in regards to what they are like, instead of as entities playing evocative role. We do not need to know the exact characteristics of pain or the causal role or of viewing something as red so as to think of such experiences. One will be able to think of such experiences directly if they have had them practically. The obstacle posed on materialism is due to the priori route to the pain identification from the physical facts with the firing of C-fiber. Because we do not practically perceive pain as a situation that plays a behavioral role, we will not be able to plead to any sort of a priori knowledge description to determine the physical state that plays the role of pain. This has seen the explanatory gap concept subjected to debate. Some philosophers have thought of the explanatory gap as a mere constraint or limit on our present ability to explain a priori knowledge. Other philosophers have argued that further research and studies by philosophers could possibly close this gap, however, according to Joseph Levine, the explanatory gap is a clear cut limit on human cognitive abilities and that no particular amount of further research, study, or information will enable human beings to close such gap (Levine 1983). There has not been consensus with respect to what the explanatory gap provides in the existence of metaphysical conclusions. Other philosophers who use the existence of the explanatory gap in supporting dualism have always taken the premise that the epistemic gap necessarily involves a metaphysical gap, especially if it is a definite limit on human cognitive ability. Philosophers such as Joseph Levine have wished in his article to remain silent of the epistemic gap and the explanatory gap issue, and argue that there is no such kind of metaphysical conclusion that could be derived. Levine agrees that the conceivability is flawed as a way of developing realities of metaphysics. However, Joseph Levine points out that even though people come to the conclusion of metaphysics that qualia are physical, they present an explanatory gap matter. Although materialist response is obstructed in the end, this does not put the problem of mind and body to rest. While mental properties are metaphysically not reducible to the physical properties, or considerations of conceivability do not institute that the mind is very distinct from the body, they still demonstrate that people lack mental explanation with respect to the physical. Explanatory gap or epistemological gap issue indicate an underlying issue of metaphysics: the qualia non-physicality is far from being ignored even if not supported by the arguments of conceivability. Ultimately, the argument of the explanatory gap does not illustrate the nature of the gap, rather the gap in the mastery of nature. A plausible explanation of the explanatory gap in people’s understanding of nature is that in reality, there is a genuine explanatory gap in nature (Levine 1983). In summary, the explanatory gap refers to mental functions such as memory, perception, emotion, and reasoning, as well as to human behavior. The explanatory gap infers that there is an existence of a gap of consistent and rational meaningful information that describe and account for characteristics and qualities of consciousness processes, content and states that it is explicable to a rational and logical level of mastery. As discussed in the paper, John Levine introduced the explanatory gap for the difficulty that the mind theories of physicalists have in explaining the physical properties in giving rise to the way things experienced when they are felt. Bibliography Levine, J. 1983. "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64 354-61 Read More