Film and Reality: Kissing Cousins - Essay Example

? Film and Reality: Kissing Cousins? Introduction Daniel Frampton’s philosophy regarding film is, in essence, that films should not be reduced to itsparts. This is because all of the elements of the film make the whole, and the whole of the film is what is important. It is the belief behind the film. The audience doesn’t really care much about the elements of the film – they just want to be swept away. The film is what makes the audience feel – joy, laughter, heartbreak, fear, etc. We feel the film on an intuitive level, and this is what a film really is (Frampton, 2006). Because of this, according to Frampton, a film theorist shouldn’t break a film into pieces – the director was good or bad, or the acting was good or bad, the cinematography was good or bad, etc. If a film theorist breaks the film into its parts, then the film theorist is missing the point – the essence of the film is the thinking of the film. A good film connects with the audience on a primal level, not an aesthetic one. As such, films which provide a new form of reality that substantially different from our own – like a cartoon or other type of animated film, or even a digital film – takes the audience out of the realm of examining the film intuitively, and makes the audience examine the movie more rationally and aesthetically. The exception to this is the digital film that does not recreate reality, but, rather, provides a fresh perspective on the current reality. These films still succeed in getting the audience to engage on a subliminal level, argues Frampton, because these films provide elements which are familiar, yet providing a new twist on reality (Frampton, 2006). Therefore, cinema, to Frampton, is a cousin to reality. This is because it is not far removed from reality. The audience sees the film and is transported into the world of that movie, with all the attendant dreams, nightmares, thoughts and beliefs of the characters. Dicing a film into its parts takes the film out of this reality, and reminds the audience that they are, in fact, watching a movie. If one takes the movie and talks about the great acting and directing, then it is a reminder that the movie isn’t real. At the same time, according to Frampton, movies that have no elements of being real are not successful in engaging the audience on this level. The films that do have elements of reality, however, but provide a twist on reality, are successful, because they seem familiar to the audience. Star Wars provided a twist on reality, in that, even though it is set a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far, away, it still featured human characters. These humans are familiar to us, and they have the same hopes, dreams and ambitions as we do. Arguably, if Luke Skywalker were not played by a human actor, but, rather, he was portrayed as somebody who looks like an alien, and the other principle parts were the same, the movie wouldn’t be as successful – the audience would not be able to engage, because the movie would not be a cousin to reality, but would be something that would be completely unrealistic. The Twilight movies, which provide a world that is not like our own, in that vampires are roaming the earth, nonetheless works to bring the audience in because the setting is familiar, and the vampires look human, for the most part. Avatar, which featured blue-skinned aliens, worked because of the human element as well. Criticism Yacavone (2008) expands upon the Frampton notion of cinema being a cousin to reality. He agrees that the films are affective, which is what Frampton argues that the films are. But he also states that the films have elements which are symbolic/cognitive elements. Yacavone (2008) states that, unlike Frampton, who believes that films should only be examined on the level of the subjective experience of the audience, Yacavone (2008) states that the creation and objective existence of a film must be addressed as well. Yacavone (2008) acknowledges that the critics who break the film into the diegetic elements are conceiving the world of the film as fiction, as opposed to a cousin to reality. Therefore, breaking the film into elements does not really do justice to the movie, yet is still an essential part of critiquing the movie. In this regard, Yacavone (2008) states that Frampton is short-sighted – that the filmmaker has an intention for the film, yet this is deemed irrelevant to Frampton, as Frampton is only concerned with the subjective experience of the audience. Moreover, the perception of the characters is paramount in Frampton’s analysis, in that the perception of the characters is what determines how the film is received in Frampton’s mind. Again, how the character is perceived by the audience might not be what the filmmaker intended, therefore, the filmmaker is, in a sense, cut out of the analysis of the picture, which does the filmmaker a great injustice. Winters (2010) puzzles over the diegetic elements of film, which is what Frampton eschews. Winters (2010) notes that, for instance, the theme for Indiana Jones in his various movies, informs the character of Indiana Jones, to the point where one cannot exist without the other. Indiana Jones cannot exist without the music, and the music could not exist without Indiana Jones. In that sense, the music becomes non-diegetic – it becomes essential to the audience’s understanding of the film and the characters within the film. Winters (2010) argues that this does the music an injustice, because it would fail to shape the onscreen events, and restricts the reading of the film, if one makes the music non-diegetic. Winters (2010) states that Frampton’s theory regarding the filmind, in which the film creates a world of its own, is a way to make the music seem a part of the diegeis. This is because the music, which would be an film object, exists within the filmind, which would be the film itself. Winters (2010) states that Frampton allows that films may alter time and space of objects, which makes for fluid film-thinking. Therefore, Frampton states that there are three kinds of film-thinking – basic, formal and fluid. The basic film-making is the attitude that the film has about the characters and the world. The formal film-making is what surrounds recognizable people, but the recognizable people are beneath what might be unrealistic scenarios. Fluid film-making alters the filmworld, and re-creates film-thinking – the recognizable world is re-created, and the film may imagine anything. Winters (2010) sees music as being an integral part of Frampton’s theory – music is a part of the world that is created by the film, and, if the film sees reality as fluid, then the music may be a part of that fluidity as well. However, the music is still a part of the film-think, in that how the music comes out is dependent upon how the film conceives the music – just like the rest of the movie itself, one cannot see or hear the music without hearing it the way that the film conceives it. Moore (2010) states that if an audience gets subsumed into a film, to where they escape into the reality of the movie, exchanging one’s present reality for the reality of the film, then the audience is “stupid.” This is true, also, if the audience makes the distinction between the fictive reality of the movie and the encompassing reality of the real world. But Moore (2010) does not mean stupidity in the commonly known derogatory way. Stupidity is comprised of three components – one is that there is a narrowing down, which means that extraneous details fall away, so that something specific emerges. Two, stupidity is the “undifferentiated mass of the unknowable – not in the sense of a finite darkness painstakingly rolled back by enlightened progress, but in the infinite lack of distinction that would make something an object of perception of thought: It is the overload of what is, where nothing is discernible” (p. 1197). These are two polar opposites, and the third component of stupidity is that there is an in-between where knowledge must confront its own limit, and go beyond. This is what Moore (2010) refers to as “forcing thought,” and states that this comports with Frampton’s ideas about films – that the films force thought, not because they are a representation of reality, but because they are reality. The film is not separate from what it shows, and the film is dependent upon the examination of the audience. Schmerheim (2006) feels that Frampton fails in what he set out to do, which is, in essence, to reform the writing and critiquing of films away from analyzing the elements of the film and towards how the film makes one feel. This way of thinking, according to Schmerheim (2006) sets out to put the filmgoer into the right frame of mind for viewing films –that the film can philosophize through expression, and that the typical film review distorts the understanding of the film and the filmind. Schmerheim’s (2006) criticism of this is that Frampton’s theory conflates the view experience with the post-viewing film analyses. He also makes the point that the audience’s enjoyment of a film is due, in part, to the fact that the audience is trained to recognize the elements of cinema. Moreover, Schmerheim (2006) states that film criticism must include the elements, not just the experience. This is because, for instance, if a remake is made, such as King Kong, which was remade by Peter Jackson in 2005, then a film critic would be remiss in not comparing the film to the original, while extolling on how the filmmaker of the earlier film was limited by the fact that technology was not nearly as advanced in the 1930s as it is today. Discussion Frampton’s theory is intriguing, but it doesn’t seem necessarily accurate. It is true that a film is good for how it makes one feel, and it also seems true that a film seems to have a mind of its own – an essence, if you will. Also true is that a film is subjective – obviously, different people will see different things in the exact same film. There will always be different interpretations. All of this is true. However, what is not true is that the audience will always be able to divorce themselves from the elements of the film. It would be nice if that would be so – but audiences, even if they don’t exactly notice the cinematography or directing or the sound features – will notice the performances given in a movie. That an audience probably will notice this would mean that the audience is not necessarily absorbed in the filmthink. Take, for instance, the movie Monster’s Ball. This movie is about a Southern racist prison guard who, after his son shoots himself in front of him, changes his ways. He takes up with the wife of a man who was executed under the man’s watch. In Frampton’s view, the audience is not supposed to notice the elements, but, rather, only judge the film by how it makes them feel. And, to be fair, the movie did evoke emotions – the major emotion that is evoked is pity for these two broken people who suffered so much loss. Then a sense of joy that they were able to find one another, and apparently find love. That said, it is also impossible to not notice the spectacular performances in the film – Billy Bob Thornton, Halle Berry, Heath Ledger and even Sean Combs all give masterful performances. They inhabit their characters. Yet, at the back of the movie goers mind is the image of these people, and who they are outside of the film – Halle’s issues with domestic violence, Billy Bob’s crazy marriage to Angelina Jolie, Sean Combs alter ego as famous rapper P. Diddy, and, viewing the film now, the knowledge that Heath Ledger passed way before his time. These are all well-known actors, and, for this reason alone, it would be difficult just to be subsumed by the film and not notice the excellent performances that each of these individuals gave. As much as each of these individuals “became” their characters, there is still the reality that, because so much is known about them in life, that they are, after all, actors giving a performance. Then, because the actors gave such amazing performances, the audience might also think about the director. The director is usually invisible to the audience, in that what a director does for a film is so esoteric, although there are directors which put cinematic touches that denote that the film was made by them - David Fincher comes to mind for this – but, when well-known actors give masterful performances, the thought is that the director must also be masterful, as the director is the one who is able to coax these performances from the actors. Halle Berry, in the same year that she won the Academy Award for Monster’s Ball – and rightly so – also won a “Raspberry” award for the worst actress for her role in Catwoman. If one has knowledge of this fact, then the inescapable conclusion is not that Ms. Berry is always a great actress, but, rather, she must have had an amazing director who was able to make her shine. Therefore, the audience’s attention is drawn to the director of the film. Therefore, the audience might be unable to just lose themselves in the film, and not parse the film down to the actor and director’s performance, and to imagine that this would be possible is naive at best. Conclusion Frampton (2005) sees film as being a whole, not just a sum of parts. This the essence of his criticism and theory for film. However, while this seems to be a theory that sounds good, it is not entirely realistic. Modern-day audiences are unable to really lose themselves in a film, because our actors are also celebrities. Therefore, these celebrities are just playing a part, and, often, playing it well. But the performances do not go unnoticed, which means that the audience is looking at the films’ parts, not just critics. Besides, as Schmerheim (2006) notes, there is not a way to critique a remake of a film without comparing it to the original, and stating how the original was limited by the lack of technology. Therefore, the elements of that film must be discussed. While Frampton’s theory sounds good, in practice, it falls short, because it does not, ironically, comport with reality. Bibliography Framptom, D. (2006) Filmosophy. London: Wallflower. Moore, N. (2010) Get stupid: Film and law via Wim Wenders and others. Cardozo Law Review, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 1195-1216. Schmerheim, P. (2006) Film not sliced up into pieces, or: How film made me feel thinking. Film-Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 109-136. Smuts, A. (2009) Film as philosophy: In defense of a bold thesis. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 409-417. Winters, B. (2010) The non-diegetic fallacy: Film, music, and narrative space. Music & Letters, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 224-244. Yacavone,D.(2008)Towards a theory of film worlds. Film-Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 83-101. Read More