The Problem of Induction by David Hume - Essay Example

?3/23 The Humean Problem of Induction The problem of induction as presented by David Hume is strong, and is a huge obstacle to positive scientific and philosophical enquiries. When understood fully, the argument seems to undermine any attempt at gaining knowledge, or avoiding radical skepticism, which would level any justification for belief. However Hume does not wish to level all knowledge and inquiry; he simply wishes to understand the faculties used to gain knowledge at the most fundamental level, which actually contributes toward the quest for knowledge. Peter Strawson seems to offer a solution to the problem of induction, by pointing out that Hume applies rules of deductive reasoning to inductive reasoning, to make it seem they are not rational. I however, do not believe this response is an argument, and the problem of Induction maintains it’s force as a theoretically worry to serious philosophers. Furthermore Hume offers a solution to theoretical skepticism by distinguishing between the type of skepticism inquired about by philosophers, and the skepticism you should engage in in everyday life. In other words, Hume admits this problem is theoretically unanswerable, but practically speaking, is unlivable. By making this distinction, I believe that Hume makes the skeptical problem of induction less worrisome, while preserving its theoretical significance. Before going into any solutions Hume provides, we should first explain the basics of Hume’s argument from induction. The conclusion of Hume’s argument about the limitations of inductive reasoning, is that we have no basis to conclude that the future will resemble the past. The idea of cause and effect is not grounded in experience, because we cannot see cause and effect. For example, Hume points out that we cannot conclude that fire causes burns simply from putting our hand in the fire and noticing that it burns. We only are brought to believe this through repeated attempts, and a hypothesis that we should not try it in the future. Nor are our conclusions from experience based upon human understanding or reason, because that would rely on the false implicit assumption that nature always continues uniformly. That is, we cannot legitimately conclude that things in the past will continue to follow that path out of necessity. Hume comes to these conclusions through a complex explanation about how humans come to understand things through experience. A beginning point in Hume’s skepticism about empirical and inductive reasoning, is that forming any argument about experience relies on the assumption that the future will resemble the past. He states, “In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects (Hume, 27). In other words, arguments from experience require that we assume what we have seen in the past will happen similarly in the future. However, this premise could never be proved deductively, because that would require believing any event is absolutely necessary, but it is always possible for things to happen otherwise. It also cannot be proved causally, because that would beg the question. In other words, such an argument would assume the existence of causality, which cannot be proved, because it is the very thing in question. Hume further points out that what we immediately learn from the senses does not always lead us to discover the true underlying properties of nature. For example, simply by observing and tasting bread, we do not arrive at the conclusion that bread nourishes. The only way we know bread nourishes, is by consuming it, and realizing that effect: Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret pow- ers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this infer- ence is founded?...It is confessed that the colour,consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without the aid of experience...[experience] only shows us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces (Hume 27). However, we still can never truly know that bread nourishes, because the cause and effect here is only assumed. We don’t know that bread is causing nourishment here, or that it will in the future, but only that it has tended to in experience. In the bread example, Hume points out that despite our lack of empirical grounds for doing so, we will always continue to believe that nature will act as it has in the past, because we project our own limited intellectual capacities onto nature, thinking that nature corresponds to our own conception of it. In other words, we believe things will happen the same out of habit. Not only do we project our own conceptions onto nature, but nature also unavoidably influences our conceptions, because when we observe an event happen several times, our expectations become habitual, and ever more firmly established over time with each further observation of the event. Hume believes these inveterate expectations cannot simply be willed away, for we are a part of nature. As soon as we begin to observe nature certain beliefs are forced on us. When observing fire, although we can conceive that in the future it may not burn our hand, it is impossible to will away the belief that it will not, because this belief has become so firmly established over time. Thus Hume believes we must be modest when we come to conclusions about nature, and aware that our inductive conclusions are simply a matter of habit. Hume believes we should take this modesty to a high level. He says that it is always a possibility that we only know “a few superficial qualities of objects”, while nature “conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends (Hume, 24). We may be able to discover through observation certain qualities of bread, but we will never be able to discover for instance, why bread nourishes the human body. Hume, though, does not wish to undermine our positive philosophical inquiries completely. He only wishes to point out that if we ignore these skeptical challenges, our positive science and philosophy would be vapid. He points out insightfully that our philosophical decisions “will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations” (Hume, 30). Through inquiry, we can come up with a more refined view of nature, but that view is not helpful, unless we at first admit to its limitations. Here, is where Hume does justice to the quest toward knowledge. His skepticism about the ways in which we come to understand things, is a strategy in gaining more knowledge of this understanding. Thus, Hume’s view seems to me to be perfectly compatible with the idea of scientific progress, because he does not wish to completely undermine our positive knowledge inquiries, but rather point out their limits. While we have made several advances in Biology that give an account of the molecular nature of bread and of how the Human body works, what we are left with is simply a more close up and rigorous view of the qualities of bread and the human body, but we still do not know why bread causes the body to be nourished. We also still are left with the question of if bread will nourish the body in the future, and while by habit we have come to believe it will continue to nourish, it may cease to do so in the future. I do not think Hume would be surprised that we have gained a more detailed view of bread and its properties, and if alive today I think he would still hold that his original insights were correct. For some though, contributing toward knowledge by practicing a healthy skepticism toward knowledge is not enough. Many philosophers and scientists consider any type of skepticism as an obstacle to be overcome, and will not consider their pursuits valid unless they know they are gaining knowledge. For these people, there may never be a satisfying answer to the problem of induction and other skeptical problems. Some Philosophers have tried to come up with their own responses to the problem of induction posed by Hume. Some of these responses provide reasonable answers to the problem. One of such responses is one formulated by a philosopher named Peter Strawson. Strawson’s argument is that the problem of induction as formulated by Hume is not worrisome, because it is not a problem at all. He claims that the problem of induction arises in Hume’s thought, because Hume mistakenly applies deductive principles to inductive reasoning. Strawson says that it follows that the “principle of the uniformity of nature” is not needed to show that inductive reasoning is rational. Inductive arguments are by nature arguments search for and discover regularities in nature, and thus assume there must be some regularity that exists. Not to assume this would be irrational in this context. This response is still not satisfying to me though. This argument essentially seems to be the same thing as assuming the uniformity of nature. Hume’s argument does not require that principles of deductive reasoning be applied to the problem of induction. Even if you look at inductive reasoning as Strawson does—as if it is obvious that you should assume patterns in nature, because the very purpose of induction to observe certain regularities in nature—it still holds true that you cannot assume things will hold few in the future as they had in the past. This holds true regardless of whether you look at inductive arguments under deductive standards. I believe this philosophical problem is insoluble and will always remain that way. Thus I agree with Hume, that this problem is theoretically unanswerable. However, for the non-philosopher, I think this problem still should not be a worry. Hume believes that there is distinctions to be made between the skepticism philosophers engage in, and how skeptical you should be as a normal person engaging in everyday life activities. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature (Hume 64). In other words, the average human being does not worry about whether putting her hand in the fire will result in a burn. They assume that for the sake of living an ordinary life. Worry about the problem of induction is only important for the high scrutiny the epistemologist must endeavor to understand how we come to gain knowledge. Thus, there are a couple of things both the ordinary person and the philosopher can learn from Hume. First, it is important for those serious in the pursuit of knowledge to truly understand the shortcomings of human understanding. We are, after all, limited intellects. Those philosophers and scientists who think they can discover every necessary truth to the universe can be humbled by Humean skepticism, which shows that, theoretically it is impossible to arrive at absolute and unchanging knowledge. Hume’s analysis also provides further insight into what we are engaging in when we attempt at gaining empirical knowledge. The inductive reasoning we use in creating and recreating scientific knowledge is based on certain assumptions, which Hume reveals. Most importantly, Hume demonstrates that operating at an extremely high level of scrutiny generates skeptical problems. The problem of induction should never make its way into ordinary life, and is only a theoretical concern, which should bother those, wishing to arrive at unquestionable knowledge. To the ordinary person, skeptical concerns should remain in the background, only to be summoned during intellectual inquiry. You should not wonder on a daily basis whether putting your hand in the fire will burn you, or whether the world will continue to exist in the following moment. Overall, Hume provides deep and unanswerable questions in the pursuit of knowledge. But he also provides a modest solution to these problems. Anyone interested in science or philosophy, or living a modest reflective life should consider Hume’s position and what it entails. Human knowledge is limited, but we still have possibilities in between its limits for gaining reasonably firm knowledge in the sciences, and living worry free ordinary lives. Hume shows this by pointing out the theoretical worries of skepticism, and giving modest solutions to any serious consequences that arise from these worries. Works Cited AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING." Hume: Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Web. 23 Mar. 2012. . Read More