Concept of Justice in Plato's Republic - Essay Example

Concept of Justice in Plato’s Republic Introduction The concept of justice is morally inclined by modern standards, butThrasymachus’ Socrates and the rest of the best of men seem to suggest that this inclination does not suffice. In Book I of Plato’s Republic, the discussion between Thrasymachus’ and Socrates along with the ancillary audience seems to portray a different viewpoint of how justice encapsulates the wishes of the ruling class. Thrasymachus’, in his seemingly well-informed rage, presents his arguments to Socrates in describing what he thinks is just; “just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (338c). This argument is presented to Socrates in an accusatory fashion, and with Thrasymachus’ replies to what Socrates seeks in clarification in support of his argument, it seems evident that Thrasymachus’ himself did not completely understand the depth of the position he just took. This becomes apparent when Socrates designs his retorts to explore the argument further, dedicating the rest of the Book I to seeking clarification of the argument Thrasymachus’ had just presented. Socrates aims to make it apparent that a concept of justice such as this must develop in a coherent fashion towards one final definition of justice presented by Thrasymachus’, but as the argument continues, it is seen that Thrasymachus’ himself is slightly skewed in his approach and ends up presenting more than one definition of justice, with both consistencies and inconsistencies between the two. Discussion between Thrasymachus, Socrates and Cleitophon Thrasymachus, who originally seemed like an avid listener, enters into the discussion of justice by interrupting Socrates in a seemingly demeaning manner at 336b, positioning himself first as an aggressive philosopher who was staunch in his understanding of the dialogue at hand, ready to move forward and express his displeasure with the same, “But when we paused … he could no longer keep quiet; hunched up like a wild beast, he flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces.” (336b). Moreover, he exclaims to the recipient, “What if I could show you another answer about justice besides all these and better than they are? What punishment do you think you would deserve to suffer?” (337d). Clearly, Thrasymachus is about to make a sweeping statement regarding the concept of justice. When Thrasymachus delivers his version of what he believes justice encompasses, “nothing other than the advantage of the stronger party” (338c), Socrates approaches the man with a determined outlook to seek clarification. In response to his appeal, Thrasymachus presents clarifying examples, describing at first instance the various systems of governance that permeate societies of modern age, specifically, tyranny, democracy, and aristocracy. In all three of these variants, governments seek to design laws that not only uplift their own desires but also make it unlawful to act against them, passing laws with a view to their own advantage (338e). Justice is then designed to be the responsibility of the government, who would pertinently seek to protect their own wishes before they protect anyone else’s, making it clear that in “every city, the same thing is just, the advantage of the established ruling body” (339a). Thus, Thrasymachus applies that a reasonable man would necessarily conclude that the advantage of the ruling elite becomes justice in the land that he governs. In doing so, he supplies us with the first interpretation of his sweeping ideology of justice, that it is what is to the advantage of the stronger party; the strongest of the land take charge, make their own laws, and in doing so, define what is just and what is not. It follows that a person who acts in compliance with the wishes of his government is definitely just. To the above utterance, Plato, speaking via his teacher Socrates, begins to identify possible loopholes. According to him, there is a distinct lack of adherence in Thrasymachus’ policy to man’s natural inclination to make errors in judgment. The ruling class, or the strongest, may fail to decide effectively what is and what is not in their favor, therefore rendering the notion that a person acting in concordance with the law that they set may not be acting just. After all, if a mistake of decision is made, in so much as the ruling class deems something advantageous to them which is actually not, then, it would be just to go against their laws rather than agreeing to comply with them, and according to Socrates; “…in this case, most wise Thrasymachus, doesn’t it necessarily follow that it is just for the others to do the opposite of what you say? For the weaker are commanded to do what is doubtless disadvantageous for the stronger” (339e). Socrates objection is straightforward. He points out that man, who makes mistakes without realizing he’s made them, could make similar mistakes in drafting rules in the position of the stronger party for those he commands. However, since Thrasymachus believes that those who are ruled MUST work to the advantage of the stronger party, having them obey these fallible rules could be disadvantageous to the ruler. In order to offset this disadvantage, the commanded would have to disobey the rulers, which according to Thrasymachus’ original concept of justice as an act working to the advantage of the stronger party, would render them unjust. Therefore, in Socrates’ view, there is no difference between acting in compliance or in non-compliance of the rules set by the stronger party. In the discussion that follows, Thrasymachus presents retorts that display both consistency and elements of doubt, channeling both either through his own person or through his audience. The argument that the just is the advantage of the stronger is all but defeated by Plato in the above passage at 339e when Cleitophon presents Thrasymachus with a possible defense: “He said that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage. This is what must be done by the weaker, and this is what he set down as the just” (340b). This introduces an element of subjectivity in the concept of justice and allows Thrasymachus to recoup. It points out at the justice concept in so much as not to be viewed objectively in the larger interests of mankind or the inhabitants of the land but in the more subjective context of the rulers, who may even mistakenly suggest a disadvantageous thing as just but because the weak have to obey, it is what they believe to be good for them that becomes just on its own, regardless of whether it successfully protects their interests or not. This notion is in line with what Thrasymachus originally suggested, that is, justice is the advantage of the stronger. Cleitephon has presented support for Thrasymachus’s argument. However, Thrasymachus rejects this assistant definition of justice and responds differently. Rather than modifying the argument in his favor this way, he suggests to follow a different line of reasoning: “The ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself, and this must be done by the man who is ruled” (341a). Thrasymachus in the above statement seeks to define what he means when he refers to the ruling party. Not only does he consider a ruler a craftsman or a tradesman skilled in his trade, he also considers them incapable of committing a mistake, since the commission of a mistake would mean the craftsman lacks skill. Thus, as a ruler, he cannot make a mistake, and in his quest to preserve his self-interest, he lays down rules which define the ambits of what is just and unjust. When those who are ruled oblige, they work to the advantage of the stronger party. Socrates does not seem to agree, and argues that a ruler in Thrasymachus’ definition would not act in the way he perceives them to act, that is, in his best interests, but rather, would act in the best interests of those subject to that ruler (342c). Socrates uses the example of doctors, who are rulers of bodily functions but still only work in the interests of their patients; pilots, who are masters of the sails yet work to the advantage of their subjects the same way. As it follows, the narration by Socrates presents a winning formula, at 342d, where it appears that Thrasymachus has given in after putting up a fight, and thus cannot find any particular defense to fall back on in support of his original claim. The definition of justice “had been turned around in the opposite direction” (343a). This is where Thrasymachus seems to present a slight waywardness in his argument which brings about an element of inconsistency to his concept of justice as an advantage of the stronger party. Thrasymachus spends the first few sentences in the same aggressive stance he overtook the discussion with, determining that Socrates and his theories about justice are misinformed. He reiterates that justice works to the advantage of other people and not for the one who acts just, benefitting the stronger party, the ruler where as being worse off for the underling at the receiving end (343c). Thrasymachus is of the view that the individual who is just is worse off than an unjust one, who other people tend to take advantage of since he purports to act through moral conscience to their benefit. In explaining so, Thrasymachus circumvents Socrates’ argument and ends up buttressing his own, signifying justice as the advantage of the stronger party. That is, justice is a motion which either directly goes to the advantage of the strong party or can be tailored in a way where the strong party can take advantage of it. This characteristic definition seems to provide a definition of injustice more so than justice, causing confusion in the more formal concept of justice. Conclusion The word play between Socrates, Cleitophon and Thrasymachus attributes, in a seemingly confusing way, to Thrasymachus’s orienting notion, justice is to the advantage of the stronger party. His rejection to Cleitophon’s display of support solidifies his own position to a certain degree, and his speech in 343c in reply to Socrates introduces injustice as a deliberate consequence of the actions of the stronger party rather than the absence of morals. What Thrasymachus suggests in his word play is that a just person would only provide aid to the ruling party either directly or would be taken advantage of to the same, fulfilling the same purpose. In this way, his argument represents consistency. However, the different character that the interpretation of Thrasymachus’ account of justice at 343c gives to the concept is evident, as it no longer is as simple as a rule to follow, or a positive notion. Instead, justice has become anything that derives through an action an advantage to the stronger party. This seems more an element of injustice than justice, however, Thrasymachus seems to be adamant that there is a link between the two, and that link is verifiable by his original orienting phrase: presenting an advantage to the stronger party. Works Cited Bloom, Alan. The Republic of Plato. 2nd ed. 3 October 1991. Print. Read More