Describing Functionalism and Psycho-Functionalism - Term Paper Example

? FUNCTIONALISM Describing Functionalism and Psychofunctionalism According to NedBlock, Functionalism is concerned with finding then answer to the question (what the mental states are). One of the features of the functionalism is that it sees each form of mental state as being a state which includes the tendency to behave in particular ways in addition to possessing particular mental states. Functionalists are usually preoccupied with the individuation of mental states, partly on the basis of causal relations to other mental states. As Shoemaker explains, in the 1975 work, functionalism, from the philosophy of mind view is the conviction that psychological or mental terms can be done away to a certain extent. Functionalists have been known to treat terms related to mental states as a mental state functional characterization which differs from input and output terms. Therefore in a (simplified Turing –machine assumption of the theory,) mental states are associated with the states of the Turing-machine, which own on their own are clearly defined by a machine table which mentions outputs and outputs that are explored nonmentalistically. Additionally functionalism empathizes that characterization of mental states ought to include descriptions of outputs and inputs in both its non-machine and machine versions. The variation between Psychofunctionalism and Functionalism brings forth a difference in specifying outputs and inputs. Functionalists are restricted to specification of outputs and inputs that constitutes common-sense knowledge; Psychofunctionalists are not bound by such restrictions. Whereas both sides lay emphasis on physical specification outputs and inputs, Functionalists are keen on classifications that are externally observable. Psychofunctionalists, have the alternative to specify outputs and inputs in terms of internal parameters. Problem of the inputs and the outputs The difference between Psychofunctionalism and Functionalism generates a distinction in the manner of specifying the inputs as well as outputs. Functionalists tend to be restricted to inputs’ specification, as well as the outputs which are plausibly an integral of common-sense capacity; Psychofunctionalists, however, are not under such restriction. Even if both the Functionalists and Psychofunctionalism emphasize on physical, or nonmental-specification over inputs and outputs, the requirement by Functionalists remains the externally observable classifications, for example, inputs whose characteristics assume the terms of the present objects within the organisms vicinity, expressed in body parts’ movements. On the other hand, Psychofunctionalists are at liberty to present a specification between inputs and outputs, assuming the internal parameters’ terms; for example, signals in input, as well as output neurons. One problem of the input and output is that it is depended on the premise that outputs and inputs can be distinguished by neural impulse descriptions. The fallacy with such approach is that it is chauvinistic because organisms that do not posses neurons are precluded from having functional descriptions. One way to avoid chauvinism associated with inputs and outputs is by characterizing outputs and inputs simply as just outputs and inputs. Other functionalists insist that descriptions of output and input be non-mental. The very version of functionalism, however, fails to tack down functional descriptions at the most important point with descriptions of outputs and inputs that are relatively specific. Instead this form of functionalism merely specifies inputs, states and outputs only by insisting that they be outputs, inputs and states. The problem with this form of functionalism is that it is exceedingly liberal. There is therefore the need of specifying, when one describes outputs and inputs so as to avoid liberalism, but general enough to steer clear from chauvinism. Block however has preservations concerning the existence of such a description. It has often been pointed out by functionalists that physicalism is false for the reason that one mental state is realizable by an enormous variety of physical states with insufficient physical characterizations. Yet if this functionalist criticism of physicalism is correct, and then the same applies to outputs and inputs because realizing mental states physically can be an important part of the output and input devices. Therefore as long as functionalists’ argument against physicalism is correct, there can never be physical characterization that refers to only mental systems outputs and inputs. Thus any efforts to create a functional description that have physical characterizations of outputs and inputs will invariably either leave out certain systems with mentality or include certain systems that have no mentality. For this reason, it is impossible for functionalists to avoid liberalism and chauvinism. Therefore, the problem of chauvinism and liberalism cannot be solved by making physical specifications. Neither can mental terminology be used in such a case because using such specifications of outputs and inputs would amount to sacrificing the functionalist system of characterizing mentality in non-mental terms. On the other hand, characterizing outputs and inputs as just that, amounts to liberalism. Standard Psychofunctionalism describes inputs and outputs as species-specific, for example, in neural activity’s terms and thus chauvinist as well. (Standard input-output’s chauvinism by Psychofunctionalism is easy to explain). There is an enormous variety of the presence of intelligent life. Response to Block, on behalf of the Psychofunctionalist (Counterarguments) Ned Block pledges a case against functionalism, basing the argument on the principle, if a theory has a flawed conclusion which is hardly believable, and if in addition there is no means of explaining the absurdity or making it clear that it is irrelevant, and if there is no plausible reason to believe the theory that is marred by absurdity to begin with, then you don’t have to believe in the theory. The question therefore arises as to whether a good reason exists for believing in Functionalism. One argument raised in support of Functionalism is that it is the best theory on the body-mind problem. This line of argument is flawed. One of the problems with functionalism has been termed as the problem of differentiation: certain mental states are different yet they do not differ on the basis of platitudes. A case in point are variations in smells and tastes that have familiar causes and effects, yet whose ordinary causes and effects are unclear to most people. Another problem with functionalism is often known as the problem of truth which is associated with platitudes often being wrong. One way of dealing with this problem as suggested by Lewis is to specify causal relations between mental states, outputs and inputs, not through conjunction of platitudes but by a group of them. The problem with this approach is that it may amplify the problem of differentiation because there will be pairs of varying mental states that are similar in relation to most platitudes. According to Functionalism paralysis that affects the nervous system affects the neural impulses as well therefore the problem that may be exhibited in Functionalism may also arises in Psychofunctionalism. In truth however, diseases of the nervous system can change the mentality, for example, they can make victims unable of experiencing pain. In this case it may be that a chronic disease of the nervous system that leads to paralysis makes people unable of certain mental capabilities. Psychofunctionalism posses a resource that Functionalism lacks , because Psychofunctionalism enables people to alter the line drawn between the outside and the inside of the organism in order to evade problems associated with such a situation. It is evident that all versions of Functionalism fails when they try to draw this line on the based on common-sense knowledge alone. There is a lack of a plausible argument for functionalism which is based on platitudes. In addition, the idea of functionalism as based on platitudes results in trouble issues that platitudes can hardly say anything about. A case in point is the example of brains being taken out to be cleaned and rejuvenated while (individual links between the brain and the body) are maintained through radio as one carries out their chores. The cleaning would take several days to complete after which the brain would be put back in place. In certain instances, one’s body may be destroyed by an accident as the brain undergoes cleaning. If the brain is connected to input sense organs instead of output sense organs, the brain may manifest platitudinous linkages between behavior and input clusters and mental states which are not part of those usually exhibited. If such a brain were to have nearly all the narrow mental states as we have, then functionalism would be flawed. Shoemaker has suggested that problems related to brains can be dealt with using what he terms as (paradigmatically embodied person). Paradigmatic embodiment entails having considerable control of bodily movements and sensory apparatus. Further, Shoemaker suggests that we begin by functionally characterizing a paradigmatically enabled person, stating inter alia if there is any need for a physical state to have a particular mental state in a paradigmatically enabled person. By following this trend, functional characterization would be extended to persons who are nonparadigmatically embodied by arguing that a physical structure which does not constitute a paradigmatically embodied person will be considered as realizing mental states. It is shoemaker’s suggestion that a brain in a vat can be seen in this light, as a case of amputee-amputation of all faculties except the brain. This is because the brain may be included into a system, in order to form a paradigmatically embodied person, but by not altering the brain’s state relations and internal structure. Shoemaker’s view may appear as a step in the right direction, yet it saves functionalism by shifting from it to Psychofunctionalism. Clearly, prescientific common sense wisdom does not say what should or should not be paradigmatically embodied without altering its inner structure and state relations. As a matter of fact, drawing the Psychofunctionalist boundary the outside and the inside of an organism may be similar to Shoemaker’s attempts at drawing the demarcation between what should and what should not be paradigmatically embodied while not altering its state relations and internal structure. Psychofunctionalism presents an instructive comparison regarding the concept of handling brains in bottles. Referring to Psychofunctionalism, the only element that counts as inputs and outputs of the system assumes an (empirical question.) The process of counting impulses of neurons to give the entries of inputs and outputs helps avoid the dilemma just sketched, because the brains contained in bottle, and paralytics would bear the right impulses of neurons, though without bodily movements. The objection, however, would be, there is a possible paralysis which affects the body’s nervous system, and this can therefore affect the neural impulses. Psychofunctionalism therefore presents the same problem that is presented by Functionalism. A sound reply would be, diseases of the nervous system have the potential of changing one’s mentality, for example, they cause the victim never suffer the feeling of pain. Therefore, there is a probability of reliability in finding, that a widespread disease of the nervous system which brought about intermittent paralysis caused people to be incapable of various mental slates. Work Cited: Block, Ned. “FUNCTIONALISM”. Accessed 29 Nov. 2011. from http://w3.uniroma1.it/cordeschi/Articoli/block.htm Read More