Plato's Meno - Research Paper Example

? (Teacher) Plato’s Meno As one of Plato’s earliest Dialogues, the Meno is known as one of the ancient Greek ics that revealed Plato’s Theory of Forms and beliefs in a world which is separate from the material world that one can perceive at a physical level. One of the ideas presented in the Meno is the Theory of Recollection, which Socrates demonstrates to Meno by getting a slave boy to solve a basic geometry problem. Despite the criticisms of the validity of the Theory of Recollection and Socrates’ method of elenchus, the theory remains valid. One very significant part of the Meno is that which demonstrates the Theory of Recollection, or the idea that “what appears to be learning something new is really recollecting something already known” (Cohen, University of Washington), or what is known as the doctrine of anamnesis, which means that “all learning is [merely] recollection” (Samet, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). This theory is what Socrates exactly proves to Meno when the latter asks, “…on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all?” (Plato, Meno, 80d2). The “thing” that Meno is referring to in his question is actually virtue, for this is the concept upon which the dialogue is particularly focused. Virtue, in fact, is the whole point of the discourse. However, the discussion has temporarily shifted to the Theory of Recollection in the middle part of the dialogue. This begins when Socrates has concluded that “[no one] can know a part of virtue when he does not know virtue itself” (79c1), which means that neither Meno nor anyone else knows virtue. Upon hearing this, Meno then begins to ask Socrates a rather common sense question: How can the latter know that this is not virtue the former has been talking about early on in the dialogue when the latter himself does not know what virtue is? Socrates’ reply to this rather sarcastic accusation is the Theory of Recollection. In demonstrating the theory, Socrates first attempts to explain to Meno the roots of the theory by stating that it came from priests and priestesses (81a8) and poets “of heavenly gifts” (81b1), and that these people all say that “the soul of man is immortal” (81b1). Socrates then concludes from this premise that the soul “has been born many times, and has [therefore] beheld all things both in this world and in the nether realms [and therefore] has acquired knowledge of all and everything” (81b1). Socrates then adds that since the soul has already learned everything, then “there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing – an act which men call learning – discover everything else” (81d1). Now, if one goes back to Meno’s accusing question - How can you look for something whose nature you do not know? – Socrates’ answer is that one actually already knows everything but simply cannot remember anything. In short, everyone knows what virtue is, only that not everyone can remember. According to Socrates, aside from courage and determination in searching, “research and learning” are needed in order to remember. Moreover, Socrates even equates “research and learning” with “recollection” (81d1), which means that, for the philosopher, the learning and the remembering are the same, and that everything is simply all remembering. After Socrates calls on the boy, what follows is an elenchus, whose literal meaning is “refutation” but may actually mean a type of “cross examination” (Ionescu 10). One purpose of the elenchus is for Socrates “to help his listeners discover for themselves the inadequacy of what they hold as true” (Johnston). A second purpose, however, is, according to Socrates himself, is for an individual to “[find] out the truth of the matter [and to] push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge” (Plato, Meno, 84b7). In short, the first purpose of this elenctic discourse is for someone to discover his ignorance and for him to search for the truth. Still, however, a third purpose of the elenchus, which Socrates somehow fails to especially delineate, is to prove to Meno that the Theory of Recollection is in fact true – that it is true that one only recollects and not remembers. This particular purpose is the one that serves the greatest bearing to our discussion. The elenchus then transpires between Socrates and the slave boy. The philosopher first draws a square two feet long on all sides and four feet wide in area. He then asks the boy a series of questions that eventually leads to the ultimate question of the day: “And might there not be another figure twice the size of this, but of the same sort, with all its sides equal like this one?” (82d7). He further asks the boy, “Come now, try and tell me how long will each side [be]?” (82d11). In short, Socrates is looking for the length of the side of a square whose area is eight feet wide, which is double that of the originally drawn square. The boy then makes a few mistakes as he gives Socrates wrong answers to the question. Obviously, the boy does not know how to proceed and so Socrates resumes asking a series of questions again while drawing a diagonal through the original square and draws three other sides to it until he forms another square, which is bigger than the first one. The series of questions eventually leads to the idea that “the double space is the square of the diagonal,” which Socrates somehow generously attributes to the slave boy by preceding the statement with “according to you, Meno’s boy” (85b7). The ultimate conclusion now is that “without anyone having taught [the slave boy], and only through questions put to him, he will understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself” (85d3). This means that, for Socrates, he has finally proven to Meno that the Theory of Recollection is indeed true. However, there are a number of alleged flaws associated with the way Socrates has proven the truth of the theory. One of the problems of the elenchus between Socrates and the slave boy is that Socrates asks leading questions (Cohen). This means that throughout the whole question-and-answer part of the discourse, Socrates is simply “feeding the boy the right answers” (Samet, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Therefore, the boy has not learned nor remembered anything (Bastos 4). This elenchus is therefore “not…a compelling defense for the doctrine of recollection” (Samet). Somehow, this is obviously true since if one reads the conversation between Socrates and the boy, the latter would normally only give short answers such as “Yes” (Plato, Meno, 83a6), “That is true” (83c2), or “I think so” (83d4) to questions that somehow express the ideas fully. Moreover, certain questions of Socrates are obviously leading the boy to say yes, such as, “Or let me put it thus: if one way it were two feet, and only one foot the other, of course the space would be two feet taken once?” (82c7). Such questions do not even just seem to teach the boy but also somehow confuse his mind so much that he would just be compelled to say yes to it. Moreover, the boy might have known something about Socrates’ reputation in Athens and he might simply be compelled to answer his questions with a yes, or that Socrates might have asked the questions in a manner and voice that would naturally compel the boy to answer the questions affirmatively. Although these may only be speculations, they could be true. Another flaw is found in Socrates’ contention that the slave boy is capable of learning almost anything: “Or has someone taught him geometry? You see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge” (85e1). Geometry is a branch of mathematics that deals mostly with logical principles and usually addition would somehow simply come naturally even with very young children. Nevertheless, if what Socrates refers by “every branch of knowledge” includes biology, chemistry, astronomy, anthropology, and other non-mathematical subjects, then the boy must certainly be at a total loss with the questions. An exception would, however, occur if someone asked exactly in the same way Socrates did, like “If only the nucleus controls the whole cell, then the mitochondrion doesn’t do it, right?” – to which a student who has not studied biology at all would naturally answer “That’s right!” The two aforementioned weaknesses somehow translate as accusations against the validity of the Theory of Recollection, upon which knowledge and education, according to Socrates, are based. Nevertheless, if one looks more closely into each of the weaknesses, one discovers that somehow they are not justified. Now, on the allegation that Socrates is actually feeding answers to the slave boy and on his contention that the slave boy can actually learn anything only through recollection, Socrates might not exactly be talking about geometry per se or the technicalities of any other branch of knowledge. He might be talking about one’s capacity to reason, to understand a concept, and to make deductions. If this is what he means by what the boy recollects, then he is simply somehow equating geometrical principles with deductive reasoning when he speaks to Meno, as he equates learning and recollection. Thus, the boy’s newly recollected ability to reason out in turn helps in the learning of the technical aspect. Perhaps the only problem that remains to be seen is the idea of the boy having to answer yes out of reverence for Socrates, or perhaps out of fear. The Theory of Recollection, as presented in Plato’s Meno, is indeed valid. The theory states that one has already learned everything there is to learn before this life and that all learning is simply only a form of remembering what the soul has already previously learned. The Theory of Recollection is criticized by those who that Socrates has fed the slave boy with answers during the elenchus that transpires in the Meno. Nevertheless, if what Socrates means by boy’s recollections during the elenchus is the latter’s powers of deductive reasoning, then it simply means that Socrates has actually not taught these powers but has somehow only drawn them out. These powers in turn help the boy learn the technicalities of the subject. Works Cited Cohen, S. Mark. “Meno’s Paradox.” 2 Nov 2006. University of Washington. 15 Jul 2011. Ionescu, Cristina. Plato’s Meno: An Interpretation. Lanham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2007. Print. Johnston, Ian. “Lecture on Plato’s Meno.” Nov 2000. Vancouver Island University. 15 Jul 2011. Plato. Meno. 1969. The Tufts University Website Perseus Digital Library. 14 Jul 2011. Samet, Jerry. “The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness.” 2008. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 15 Jul 2011. Read More