Philosophy: Platos Meno - Term Paper Example

Geometry and Meno's Paradox: A Comment In this essay, I will a sketch a summary of the arguments in the dialogues between Socrates, Meno and the boy in Socrates’ Meno then focus on the section on geometry where Socrates employs Meno’s attendant to demonstrate his thesis regarding “recollection”. I will look at: the validity of Socrates’ thesis as it pertains to the example of geometry he employs; the extent to which Socrates is able to refute Meno’s paradox; as well as the relevance of the “recollection theory” in general. I will then explain Socrates’ view on the question of “virtue”, thus situating the example of geometry in perspective with regard to the arguments on virtue that preoccupy Meno. Plato's Meno begins by Meno's inquiry on "virtue" made to Socrates. Meno asks "whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?” Socrates replies that he is unaware of what virtue itself is. Thus it is impossible for him to understand the nature of its acquisition and further remarks that he knows none who know what virtue is and asks Meno to explain what constitutes virtue. Meno replies by saying that virtue is "relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do". Using examples of bees, health, size and strength and then equating them to the case of virtue, Socrates persuades Meno to concede that there should necessarily be a common quality to that which can be defined as virtue. Meno replies there could be a common denominator for all these. Virtue is then further interrogated by Socrates. Quoting "temperance" and "justice" as qualities important to being virtuous, Socrates makes a point that by participating in similar virtues of "temperance" and "justice", all those who do so must be equally good. Responding to Socrates' desire that one definition of virtue be provided, Meno suggests that "virtue is the power of governing mankind" to which Socrates successfully adds the rejoinder, "justly and not unjustly". Thus a thesis is reached upon by Meno that "justice is virtue". Socrates examines this thesis by suggesting that just like 'round' is a figure as much as 'square', is not justice a virtue just like there might be several other virtues? When Meno mentions "courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity" as rightly being other virtues, Socrates goes back to his insistence that a common quality or virtue be provided that can declare all these qualities as virtues, or rather, that a common denominator, the "common virtue that runs through them all" be produced. I believe Socrates makes an assumption that Meno falls prey to, namely, that “all things have a common notion". Socrates substantiates this notion by using the example of "roundness" being a figure which means that there is a quality in "roundness" that allows it to be included as a figure. This quality or virtue will then be the common standard for anything to qualify as a figure. Meno challenges that he will produce a common quality that describes virtue if Socrates does the same with regard to 'figure'. The latter replies that "Figure is the only thing which always follows color" and further having elicited an unchallenged agreement on the premise that there is always an "end" or "termination", that figure is "that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid". On further demand from Meno that Socrates describe color as well, he gives the definition that "color is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense". Having satisfied Meno, Socrates comes back to his query that a universal definition be produced for virtue. Meno replies, "Virtue is the desire of things honorable and the power of attaining them." Socrates, equating the desire of things honorable to the desire for good, argues with Meno on this point to establish that all men desire good, thus modifying Meno's definition of virtue to "the desire and power of attaining good". Since it has been established that all men desire good, virtue becomes the power to attain good. The desire for attaining good is then extended to the desire for attaining goods as well and this is established by Socrates to be virtuous only when accompanied by the virtues of honesty, justice etc. The multiplicity of qualities that are now deemed virtuous is rejected by Socrates when he points out that Meno has still not been able to provide him with a "whole" definition of virtue. By asking whether anyone who does not know virtue will be able to recognize a part of virtue, Socrates rejects the possibility of providing an answer in terms that are previously unexplained. Thus since virtue cannot be explained through a part of it which itself is unexplained, the question comes back to defining virtue. To Meno's comment that Socrates has left him utterly perplexed, Socrates proposed a joined inquiry into what virtue is. On being queried as to how can one venture to inquire about an object that one does not know anything about, Socrates replies using the 'recollection theory'. In Socrates' words, "The soul, (then), as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is but recollection". This is the central argument that Socrates wishes to establish, and if we may anticipate, the key to Socrates' own view about the indeterminacy of the ability to impart virtue by teaching, practice or nature. To demonstrate his recollection theory, Socrates requests the presence of any of Meno's attendants (referred to as boy). Having provided a summary of the arguments that precede the geometry section of the text, I will now like to look at how Socrates uses the boy to illustrate his point. After interrogating the boy regarding the calculations pertaining to the square, Socrates, believing that he has amply demonstrated his thesis of 'recollection', remarks to Meno: “Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.” I would like to take issue with such a conclusion of Socrates'. Socrates show that although the boy answers correctly initially it is because he has come to the correct answer but with flawed logic. Following from Socrates' understanding that the soul is the repository of all knowledge existing through time and space, and hence that all learning is nothing but mere recollection, all that the boy needed to do to arrive at the correct answers was to be able to recollect correctly. Socrates' intervention was to facilitate the process of recollection and not to teach anything new, since imparting new knowledge, according to Socrates is impossible. Thus by extension, the answers given by the boy at the end of the final interrogation are "answers given out of his own head", which is interpreted by Socrates as the boy having had the notions in him all the while. I would like to contest the notion of the 'recollection theory' as enabling the boy to give the correct answers, in favor of an explanation of 'reason' as being instrumental in the change in the boy's answers. My contention is that the recollection theory fundamentally stands on the premise of the transcendental, owing to its derivation from "priests, priestesses and poets" and evolving from a quest to explain "inspiration", an inspiration that does not seem to have any worldly source. Socrates also deems his explanation of the regeneration of the soul as evident due to the authority that it derives from spiritual leaders. Such a non-questioning of the source of the recollection theory which in turn is the theory regarding soul regeneration is fundamentally problematic. It is problematic because, the location of virtue is attributed to a realm that is not within human manipulation or interference. While dependence on muthos can well be a philosophical method of argumentation, its lack of verifiability other than its self-evident nature restricts further analysis and probing. Thus, though being a muthos does not entirely rule out the possibility of its effectiveness, as is evident when we find Meno agreeing with Socrates, it is not satisfactory when one wants to critically engage with the realm of the muthos itself. I would rather see the boy's ability to arrive at the correct answer as a use of 'reason'. Thus, the boy formerly gave the wrong answers because he was not logically thorough in the mental processes he employed to arrive at the answers, which I will also attribute to Socrates' own intention of misleading the boy to produce wrong answers which later own corrected, or correctly elicited from the boy can prove Socrates' theory. But let us leave aside Socrates' intentions to look at how 'reason' might have been instrumental in helping the boy to arrive at the correct answers. For this we first need to look at an example from the dialogue between Socrates and the boy. Let us consider the following extract after Socrates first arrives at the definition of a square and the boy agrees with it: Soc. And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? Boy. Yes. Soc. But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet? Boy. There are. Soc. Then the square is of twice two feet? Soc. And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. Boy. Four, Socrates. Thus, a square is defined further defined. Socrates here is reiterating an illogical conclusion made by the boy. The conclusion is illogical because if one side is 2 and the other is 1 then the figure cannot be a square. But Socrates is showing the boy that since the figure in question ‘is’ a square, one side being 2, the other side must be equal. The fallacy here is that the boy is comparing the area of a square with the length of a line. In the earlier questioning he reached the correct answer, but with incorrect reasoning. The boy had made an assumption based on what he “knew” – Socrates’ “theory of recollection” He had drawn the conclusion that doubling the size of the square also meant the squaring one line of the square. When Socrates continued requiring the boy to use this recollection in determining the boy’s notion of doubling of the square had a direct correlation to doubling of a line, the boy became confused as his assumption had been based on an incorrect theory. The boy’s own knowledge or rather his perceived knowledge negated his recollection ability. Thus, the boy's inability to answer correctly can be understood as his failure to logically and rationally process both the content and intention of Socrates' questions rather than his failure to recollect some information that was already there. But Meno agrees with Socrates that the boy's example truly demonstrates the fact that all correct answers or information in general are present a priori in the soul and that probing is only a means through which that knowledge be discovered. Thus the boy's lack of education in geometry rules out the fact that he could have been in any way capable of answering Socrates' questions but for the fact that the answers were already present in him. I am suggesting that the recollection theory need not explain the ability of the boy to answer the questions correctly; that "logic" or "reason" can be an effective substitute for the recollection theory in explaining this ability/inability dilemma. Socrates’ point about the geometry discussion with the boy can be satisfactorily explained without relying on the recollection theory. Socrates succeeds in using the geometry question in defeating Meno’s paradox in so far as he attributes virtue to the transcendental realm by means of the recollection theory and later on disproves the possibility of acquiring virtue from the real world. In conclusion, let us now look at the second inference that Socrates derives from the boy's responses. By evaluating the boy's formerly confident answers, Socrates is pointing towards the fact that it is much better to be perplexed by something than to be ignorant about it and give up inquiry. This is in fact Socrates' reply to Meno's comment that Socrates is known to be always doubting himself and making others doubt and Meno's comparison that Socrates is like the flat torpedo fish, always torpifying others, bewildering and confusing them. Proceeding from this premise, Socrates employs the device of hypothesis to then investigate “what is virtue”. Beginning from the hypothesis that knowledge be considered a virtue, he establishes that things accomplished under the guidance of wisdom or prudence as virtuous since anything done by the guidance of learnedness can be useful or hurtful. Socrates then moves on to disprove the hypothesis that good men can impart their virtue by means of instruction, by using examples of famous men. Men who are good, he argues, have right opinions, an opinion that cannot result from mere possession of knowledge and one that cannot be imparted through teaching since it is not a possession acquired through learning. Thus says Socrates, “the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God”. Read More