Leuchtenburg and Cushman View on What Case Constituted a Constitutional Revolution - Essay Example

A Comparison of Leuchtenburg and Cushman View on What Case Constituted a Constitutional Revolution After president Roosevelt took power in 1933, he established programs to restore the economy of the United States. This was after the destructive effects of the great depression of United States which began in 1929 (Himmelberg, p14). Just like other countries in the aftermath of the Great Depression, the government embarked on a mission to increase its power and influence by enacting laws to control the economy (Leuchtenburg p213). His programs were collectively called the New Deal. The New Deal projects by President Roosevelt suffered massive drawbacks at the courts. Most of them were frustrated by the supreme courts issuing verdicts that they were unconstitutional (Himmelberg, p19). The statues and provisions in the new deal programs that were struck down by the courts include the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which supported financially staple farmers, the National Industrial Recovery Act, which approved the cartelization of industries, and the Railroad Retirement Act. According to Leuchtenburg, these sudden changes precipitated a constitutional crisis. They posed a difficult challenge to the conventional dogma of the Supreme Court leading to a constitutional revolution (Leuchtenburg p213). Frustrated by the courts actions, President Roosevelt reacted by announcing his reorganization of the judiciary. This was infamously known as the “court packing” plan (Mannino, p293). Several writers argue that the courts struck down numerous important laws in the twentieth century. The two pertinent reasons fronted for this precedence were; the laws were hastily and poorly drafted during the emotional hundred days of Roosevelt in office and that they were badly defended in the courts. It must be noted that these two arguments were found with flaws. One law in New York drafted by the best law practitioners in United States was a casualty in this period. This reason amongst others weakened the reasoning held at that time (Leuchtenburg p234). The court packing plan, for instance, according to Leuchtenburg had frightened the courts and posed a danger to them. This to him might have had some effect relative to jurisprudence. However, the interpretation of the constitutional revolution in the 1930s is diverse. Several law scholars have cited different Court cases of the twentieth century to support their stand on which case actually represented a constitutional revolution. In this term paper, the cases West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish, argued for by Leuchtenburg and Wickard vs. Filburn argued for by Cushman will be analyzed. As a result, determine which authors interpretations of the cases amount to a revolutionary case. In the case West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish (1937), the Supreme Court judgment upheld the constitutionality of legislation on minimum wage passed by Washington State. It overturned the trials court decision that was based on the precedent of Adkins vs. Children’s Hospital (Leuchtenburg, p164). This decision is believed to have ended the era in which the Supreme Court had a penchant for quashing legislation intended at regulating enterprise. Leuchtenburg argues that, this case marked a notable divide in the history of the courts. It also had a significant consequence on the destiny of President Roosevelt Court packing plan. In addition, Elsie Parrish case prompted a constitutional revolution in the United States Supreme Court (Leuchtenburg p163). Her case appeared to be heading for defeat since for a decade; the Supreme Court had ruled that a minimum wage act for women was unlawful since it violated the liberty of contract that the Court assumptions were guaranteed by the Constitution. Against all odds, Elsie Parrish was resolute in her quest for justice. Following the precedent of Adkins, her case was never watertight in the eyes of legal practitioners. Even at the time, the finest law practitioners like Ben Cohen and Felix Frankfurter were very cynical on this case’s conclusion (Leuchtenburg p167). The Tipaldo was another instance that further blurred Elsie Parrish chances. Here the Court had again upheld that the minimum wage laws for women were still unfounded. In an unprecedented twist though, the Tipaldo verdict caused strong criticisms even from some Supreme Court members, notably Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. He reprimanded most of the justices who upheld the decision for not being able to recognize that the New York law can be differentiated from the act of Congress declared unconstitutional in Adkins or rather than the state had the authority to safeguard women from being oppressed by unscrupulous employers. The Tipaldo caused resentment among the general populace since the ruling was viewed as curtailing the government authority to reign on dishonest employers thereby leaving its citizens to the vagaries of the same dishonest employers (Leuchtenburg p169). From its decisions, the Supreme Court clearly showed that it was unsympathetic to social legislation irrespective of whether it originated from a state legislature or Washington. Chief justice Charles Hughes in his written judgment in a 5-4 decision stated that minimum wage law did not infringe the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and that Elsie Parrish was entitled to indemnity. The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment provided that no State “shall deny any person of life, liberty or property without due process of the law”. Parrish took legal action against the hotel for the difference between what she was rewarded and the $14.50 per week of 48 hours set as a minimum wage by Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry, under the Washington State law (Leuchtenburg, p164). To this end, Leuchtenburg believes that “externalist” factors played a major role in constitutional revolution of 1930s. The West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish was a contentious and far-reaching departure to jurisprudence in the 1937. Leuchtenburg henceforth attributed this scenario to political pressure. Though other critique on the case believes that the judgments were passed just before president Roosevelt‘s pronouncement of his plans. Another reason that Leuchtenburg reaffirm his belief that this case constituted a constitutional revolution is the Justice Owen Roberts dramatic switch, to help constitute a majority that upheld the minimum wage legislation. His move was presumed that he changed position because of the court packing threats by the Roosevelt administration. Justice Roberts also sided with the “Four Horsemen”, in all the cases that they were unified, and more so interestingly in the New Deal cases. During this period, Leuchtenburg asserts that the courts performance signified a slow evolution of legal doctrine but rather to a more liberal view of the control of federal government. Wickard vs. Filburn was a 1942 verdict of the Supreme Court that acknowledged the power of the national government to control economic activity. By mid-1930s, the Courts had withdrawn its restraint on national government giving it room to gain power hence save capitalism which was under threat after the Great Depression (Mannino p115). Thus during this period, the government encountered less hurdles on its ability to control the economy. Wickard vs. Filburn is an example of a case that highlighted this scenario (Cushman, p215). Roscoe Filburn was a farmer who grew wheat for personal consumption. The government had established restrictions on wheat production depending on land owned by a farmer, to increase wheat prices during the Great Depression. Filburn though, was growing in excess of the restrictions allowed in the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s regulations. This Act set out the quotas on the quantity of wheat put into interstate trade and established punishments for overproduction. Its overall goal was to stabilize market prices of wheat by averting scarcity or excess production. Before the Courts, Filburn argued that the wheat he grew for personal consumption was beyond the authority of the federal government to control (Mannino, p268). The Federal District court hence ruled in favor of Filburn. On appeal, the Supreme Court’s ruling vindicated the constitutional revolution of the New Deal. Here, the Court prolonged the commerce clause to allow Congress control anything that had a considerable economic outcome on commerce, using the “aggregation” principle. The Supreme Court argued that the possible impact on commerce would not originate from one farmer but also from other farmers in similar circumstances affected commerce (Stephens and Scheb, p155). The Courts henceforth reaffirmed its withdrawal on legal affirmative position by proclaiming the legislature, and not the judiciary, the last authority of whether a regulation or law was logical. Cushman indeed agrees not less to this conclusion that it instigated the crucial revolution of the constitution. Cushman’s argument is that the constitutional revolution did not take place as the conservative perception would want to recognize it. He believes that the political atmosphere at that time of New Deal laws being upheld by the Courts neither had an effect on the revolution. To him, the 1930s court decisions were rational, logical and honest conclusion of previous improvements in legal doctrine. Cushman further argues that the legal doctrine should be comprehended as a culmination of legal considerations and not simply several lines or a line of doctrine. He sees as “externalist” the conservative justification of the New Deal influence on constitutional revolution. From his reasoning on the outcome of the Wickard vs. Filburn case, that the notion that the justices reformed under intimidation of president Roosevelt court packing plan is not reasonable (Stephens and Scheb, p154). Also the 1936 landslide re-election victory by Roosevelt was no effect. In summary, he opines that the manner, in which the laws were written, legal hypothesis and facts deduced in the cases, altogether influenced individual legal perception of justices. This to him was what contributed to the constitutional revolution. In the Wickard decision, Cushman’s investigation of Court papers show how after the 1942 opinion, the justices discussed how additional facts reinforced a finding that the regulation of wheat for home utilization had a considerable effect on interstate commerce (Cushman, p254). It is true that the 1930s herald a constitutional revolution according to cases deduced by Leuchtenburg and Cushman. There is common ground though on both scholars’ arguments. This common ground is that: they acknowledge that the implication of the constitution changes with time; the reality that Supreme Court justices are unaffected to some extent by political influences and enjoy tenure of service; the power of justices to make ultimate interpretations of the spirit and letter of the constitution; and the supremacy status of the constitution in federal government (Stephens and Scheb p318). The issue of constraint while delivering verdicts is easily an identifiable factor of why these two authors have opposing views on which case constitutes a constitutional revolution. Both of them recognize the significance of constraints on justices as legitimate interpreters of the constitution. These constraints have been found to guide against the conduct of justices from acquiring tyrannical tendencies (Mannino, p113). Another major importance of this constraint originates from the point that the constitution is the sole authoritative source of law in America. Hence the Supreme Court justices perform a crucial role in construing the constitution and these justices are immune to direct political machination of the government (Stephens and Scheb, p56). However, their main difference stems from why and how the constitutional revolution took place. In my decision, I find Cushman’s Wickard vs. Filburn case arguments to have convinced me as the best revolutionary case of the 1930s. He tries to detach the actions of the courts to prevailing political situations. Cushman’s detailed jurisprudential investigation of his court case clearly highlights his points. Thereby convincingly lay it bare that the courts own internal factors drove it to make decisions that he billed as meriting constitutional revolution (Himmelberg, p68). To him, constitutional revolutions cannot be merely pegged on political and economic concerns as the principal factors in delivering unprecedented judicial verdicts (Cushman, p279). He reinforces this fact by showing that the justices enjoy tenure of service. Cushman instills confidence that the courts had no reason to fear President Roosevelt court packing plans since the same plans backfired and were defeated by non partisan opposition in Congress. Cushman shows that the Courts deserted the system of laissez fair jurisprudence as the justices became conscious of the social realities of the time. In the Wickard vs. Filburn, the facts associated with the Great Depression carried the day and the laissez faire legal system suffered a big blow (Cushman p 220). Another factor that Cushman highlighted here is the manner in which the Supreme Court justices reached their decision. Here the justices reached a unanimous decision. By emphasizing it’s mutually respectful decision making process, the courts showed that its decision should be viewed as a united institutional product rather than shared judgments of individuals. It achieves this by formulating an opinion of the Courts instead of split opinions. Here, Justice Jackson read a unanimous verdict that reasoned that the authority to control the price at which commerce happens was inherent in the authority to control commerce (Stephens and Scheb p231). Hence they greatly focused on the scrutiny of the legal doctrine as a united team. Their long term aim was to reduce the manifestation of disagreement amidst individuals. Thus dissenting opinions were quashed by this simple logic. By nature of its verdict, Cushman shows that this case relied on the final summative effect of the action instead of its geographical nature. He bases his account on actual case facts, arguments by attorneys and the judge’s opinions. In contrast, Leuchtenburg believes that constitutional revolution happened abruptly in the 1930s. According to him, the courts made significant rulings within a short period of time that overturned earlier precedents. This short duration that Leuchtenburg suggest as leading to constitutional revolution, by drawing attention to factors that are in their own unprecedented leaves a lot to be desired, more so the political pressure from the Roosevelt administration. His inference that the political pressure generated owing to the effects of the great depression towards the courts was only resolved by jurisprudential shift does not inspire confidence in supporting his reference case (Stephens and Scheb, p331). Thus his suggestions do not seem unique to the history of the courts which had faced similar political pressures. In summary, his arguments do not relate well with the fact that the courts were bound to shift their jurisprudential decisions regardless of President Roosevelt court packing plans which Cushman clearly opines (Himmelberg, p72). In his case study, Leuchtenburg analyses the possibility that President Roosevelt court packing plans could have had an influence in the constitutional revolution. His inferences show that the justices could have been intimidated to engineer a revolution consciously. Leuchtenburg account of his court verdict leaves out the significance of legal doctrine. He does not also believe that the statues and provisions could have been incorrectly drafted. In sum, Leuchtenburg inferences from the West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish and other related court judgments of the 1930s could be due to political pressure by the Roosevelt administration. He constructs a notion that the courts yielded to these pressure leading to constitutional revolution. What ails his argument is the time period of these changes. Moreover, he tries to link the political machinations of the day to the unprecedented short period of the constitutional revolution. For instance, he is swayed by the 1936 election period opinion that the public was largely going to vote a new administration with the directive to restrain the Courts. In summary, I hold that Leuchtenburg example of West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish does not have the threshold to constitute a constitutional revolution merely because of “externalist” influences solely based on political pressure. Though the stance taken by Leuchtenburg evokes fundamental questions on how an outwardly independent judicial process could succumb to a political pressure within a short period of time, resulting into constitutional revolution, some important “internalist” debate must be considered. It does not go without notice that some judgments actually borrow from the social and economic factors that the law does not necessarily relate to. Hence Cushman presents his arguments regarding legal doctrine of the law. By a large amount, Cushman tries to challenge the popular notion that the Supreme Court during the New Deal period deserted jurisprudential position it had set forth in areas like commerce clause doctrine and due process. He thus differs sharply with Leuchtenburg views of external pressures causing constitutional revolution. Rather his focal point is the internal diversity of the doctrinal development. Work cited Cushman, Barry. Rethinking the New Deal court: the structure of a constitutional revolution New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 Leuchtenburg, William Edward. The Supreme Court reborn: the constitutional revolution in the age of Roosevelt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995 Mannino, Edward F. Shaping America: the Supreme Court and American society: Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2009. Himmelberg, Robert F.: The Great Depression and the New Deal: Greenwood Press,: 2001 Stephens Otis H., Scheb John M: American Constitutional Law: Sources of Power and Restraint: Cengage Learning, Feb 7, 2011 Read More