Death in Morbid Fascination: Can There Ever Be a Right to Die - Essay Example

?Death and Morbid Fascination: Can there ever be a Right to Die? Introduction Despite the universal inevitability of death, the issue of dying will constantly exist as a fearsome yet darkly interesting issue. The media is fascinated with death; movies and books keep watchers and readers glued to the process of death as it is played out on screen or within pages (Blakey and Murray 941, McKenzie). It is the terrible car accident we drive past on the motorway yet cannot help but peek at for a glimpse of the macabre scene; the dead bird in the garden we stare at just a few seconds too long before throwing it in the rubbish. Societal fascination with death is simply everywhere, yet its embodiment in reality is often met with great discomfort. The demise of legal attempts to regulate anything other than the prohibition of acts which cause death has caused heated debate. This is particularly the case for abortion and assisted suicide. This paper will explore the issue of death as embodied in the law, and societal responses to attempts to provide some form of ‘right to die’. Abortion and Death What is primarily a relevant topic for debate is the way in which the law treats euthanasia and abortion differently. While the law essentially allows the killing of another (the foetus), it openly prohibits granting others the right to help another who expressly wishes to die (Klasing). The approach of the law to these two issues brings a great deal of principles into play: is killing the unborn human more palatable than killing the already born human? Why is a life of pain and suffering not to able to succumb to the right to die? Can there ever exist a right to die? Before such underlying principles are assessed, it is primarily necessary to provide a brief overview of the stance of the law (and underlying public policy principles) relating to euthanasia and abortion. Abortion law in the UK initially emerged as early as the 13th century through common law decisions. Since then, abortion has traipsed a rocky path. In accordance with the approach of religion, abortion was accepted and permitted until ‘quickening’ caused the spirit to enter the foetus, until it was prohibited under Lord Ellenborough’s Act of 1803. Abortion became subject to dangers posed to the woman’s life as a result of the foetus, in which cases it was allowed under the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929. Arguably as a response to the deaths of women who resorted to illegal methods of abortion, it was finally made legal in the Abortion Act 1967. Currently, the most acceptable reason for permitting abortion is due to foetal disability, though only 1% of abortions carried out are under this justification (Department of Health 1). Importantly, abortions undertaken by reason of foetal disability are permitted up until birth. The law of abortion, however, is the subject of much debate: the criminal law’s fundamental aim to preserve the sanctity of life (Devlin 2) is at complete odds with its law on abortion. While some argue that abortion laws are merely a response to public attitudes (hence its legalisation in some countries and prohibition in others), it has been responded that “no claims can be made on that basis about which interests requiring legal protection the regulation is (ultimately) intended to benefit” (Esser et al 30). The most central problem experienced by laws which permit abortion is the cut-off period, beyond which abortion is not permitted. It is clear that the law considers such a point to be indicative of actual ‘life’ within the foetus on a scientific level. But what of the philosophical aspects of this cut-off point? Why does foetal disability make death more warranted (or acceptable) than a normal foetus (Keown 125)? Why does active causing of death need a justificatory reason based on threats to another’s life? The differences in approaches across the globe to abortion highlights that social attitudes towards death is an inherently subjective moral concept. As a result the regulation of abortion in different countries varies (Cline). For example, Ireland’s prohibition of abortion is evidently due to its religious bearings and the response of the Church to the permitting of death. Despite such global disparity, reasons adopted to permit abortion in certain cases can be located, suggesting that some degree of global consensus towards death is existent. For example, it seems to be the case that abortion is generally permitted when foetal disability is evident, and where the pregnancy poses a threat to the health or life of the female. Further consensus can be found in the restriction of the time limit within which abortion is permitted in the countries that permit it (Centre for Reproductive Rights 2). The general delicate yet controversial topic of abortion can be located in legal and societal responses to death in relation to two main circumstances (Moller): natural death and positive actions causing premature death. While this will be fully explored below, it is currently relevant to state that societal concepts of death appear to rotate around these two central differences; this is evident in the almost universal prohibition of and reaction to murder. It is evident that this is why abortion laws have caused such varied responses; any provision which permits premature death will inevitably be labelled as permitting murder. Why the concept of death is perceived differently under the two headings will be further explored when a comparison will be made between abortion, euthanasia and death. This will bring into play assessments of quality of life, the prospect of life for the foetus, the taboo surrounding the control of death and the difficulties surrounding a right to die (Walter). Euthanasia and Death Euthanasia has been the recipient of a much harsher response, and as a result, UK law has declined to legalise it. The Suicide Act 1961 decriminalised suicide, though it maintains that it is a criminal offence to aid, abet or counsel another in committing suicide (section 2(1)). This particular content of the Act has caused some to criticise the evident conflict between allowing one to take one’s own life and preventing others from helping another who expresses a clear wish to take their life but are unable to alone (Bennion 519). Interestingly, little literature exists on the underlying considerations which led to such a distinction at law (Seneviratne), though it is clear to see how legislation which condones helping others to commit suicide would be barricaded with an onslaught of problems. Indeed, the stance of the law is not entirely reflected in the way it has been enforced in the past. The Director of Public Prosecutions has historically not convicted individuals who have admitted to helping another commit suicide, yet when convictions have been enforced, the reasoning behind such actions have not been clearly explained (R(Purdy) v DPP [2009]). The law has declared some decisions to be based on public policy, whilst others have interpreted such policy as mere compassion (Epstein and Foster 7). It is argued that the stance of the law reflects the intense discomfort felt towards active causation of premature death in living individuals. The approaches of the law thus far appear to be inconsistent. Why does the active killing of a foetus enjoy legalisation (albeit controversially), while the killing of a terminally ill person who wishes to die suffer prohibition? What are the different embodiments of death in the two circumstances, and how do societal and jurisprudential elements react to these two different situations? Why is killing a foetus more acceptable than killing a person, and why is natural death easier to stomach than prematurely caused death? Why is it so unacceptable to express a desire to die? Euthanasia, Abortion and Perceptions of Death Death is certainly more than scientific: “much of the ritual response to death is a creative declaration that death is more than biological cessation for it has social, symbolic, temporal and spiritual significance” (Earle at al 37). We seek to understand it, yet will never be able to fully experience the ability to consciously analyse it through direct experience. Some claim that reasoning about death “is ineffectual, because it denies the existence of any evil that does not fit the immutable laws of a logical and orderly universe” (Dillard 40). Death fascinates us, terrifies us, beckons us, and threatens us. Some of us turn to religion in order to assign death an expectation that we await when our body ceases to function, others watch their loved ones slip away and wonder what happens with terrified awe (Kubler-Ross). Even those of us who question whether death can ever be a better alternative to life explore such questions with ignorance and innocence. Perhaps this is why the regulation of death through law has suffered such difficulty. How can the law regulate something that is so elusive, yet so deeply a part of everyone’s life at any moment? Legal regulation of death is thus nothing more than an attempt to form and embody opinions as to how and when premature death should be permitted. Death in law is primarily associated with the living, and it is thus defined by the effects it has on those who live. It is primarily evident that societal responses to death differ greatly when death is natural and when death is prematurely caused; while the former causes grief and pain, the latter causes anger, disbelief and trauma (Maciejewski et al). Death is the ultimate harm that can be caused to another, yet such a simplistic approach to the concept of death lacks its application to specific circumstances which may not render the same conclusion. Essentially, our fear, fascination, and cultural tendency to abhor death causes us to stand blinkered among a field of alternative arguments which can, in some cases, permit premature death. The fact that the law permits abortion is blinding evidence for this argument. Why it has of yet failed to permit assisted suicide is somewhat perplexing. How is death embodied differently in abortion and assisted suicide? Surprisingly, theorists Freeman and Mensch have been criticised for calling abortion ‘death’ (Lacey 11). This criticism goes a long way to convey how many perceive abortion to have a looser connection to death than assisted suicide. And so the societal approaches to death come to form a stereotype which functions to form such differential approaches to abortion and euthanasia. First and foremost, abortion does not solely concern the death of the foetus; it involves the ‘life’ of another. ‘Life’ in this context is intended to mean ‘enjoyment’ of continued life which is threatened by an unplanned pregnancy, and ‘existence’ of life which is threatened medically by the pregnancy. Death in this sense is thus not simply the taking of a person’s life; it is wrapped in a complex approach to the right to life of the mother, the right to enjoyment and fulfilment of life of the disabled foetus, and so on. This approach, combined with the lack of personality imbued to the foetus causes societal views of abortion to be greatly different to views of assisted suicide. Essentially, the issue of abortion rotates around the debate concerning whether the foetus is a human being. Responses to this question are varied, and depend on the extent to which the foetus depends on the mother, the lack of ability to survive alone, extending to arguments of experience and capacity to reason (Noonan). The mere uncertainty surrounding whether a foetus is a human being serves to greatly ease the connotations of murder connected to abortion. Death cannot occur if life has not begun. While the majority of consensus claims that a foetus is indeed a human being, the same majority also claims that “a woman is under no moral obligation to complete an unwanted pregnancy” (Warren 6). Death under this approach thus becomes subject to other rights; the rights of the women who has ‘more’ life than the foetus. This concept of ‘more’ life also applies to explain why the law does not permit assisted suicide in the UK. While the life of the foetus remains faceless and subjected to the conflicting rights of the mother, the life of the person who wishes to die is clear. It is not however in conflict with any other person’s right to life. This is a major problem in opinions of death in relation to assisted suicide and presumably embodies the argument put forth by Li that death can cause harm to the person because being alive “is generally good” (3), despite early philosophical arguments of Epicurus (30-31). Essentially, then, the future of the foetus is not as relevant as it is in the grown person, because “the fetus will never develop those interests” (Luper 212). The fundamental flaw in such an argument of course fails to recognise that the life of a terminally ill patient in extreme and constant pain may not be a life at all. Yet we dare not sign our names under the claim that death may sometimes be a better alternative. Why? Perhaps the majority of us view death just as that: the end of our existence. Thus, how can the end of existence possibly be better than any form of existence, no matter how dreadful? Those of us who are somewhat more enlightened may be able to view death not simply as “death itself, but rather the relation between the fact of death and the possibilities for vital and fulfilled human life” (Malpas and Solomon 3). The previous difficulties in reconciling abortion in cases of foetal disability up to birth and allowing assisted suicide become clarified. A disabled child is aborted because its quality of life would be seriously impaired (Sheldon and Wilkinson): this essentially claims that death is better than life. Why can the same not be said for the severely disabled person who actually wishes to die? The core element of this discussion centralises around whether there can ever exist a right to die. Dare we answer this in the affirmative? Dare our fear of death fade so that we may one day have the option to take our own life? Should society defend the possession of the individual’s right to die (Mill 142)? Alternatively, should our duty to preserve life extend to every case, regardless of its content or merit (Walsh)? It seems that the elusive notion of death and our ‘morbid’ fascination with death has been the result of our general reluctance to claim that a right to death can exist, despite the fact that many have expressed the desire to possess such a right if they were terminally ill. How our perceptions of death allow us to stomach more easily the long, drawn-out, yet natural death of an individual than the abrupt, actively caused (yet freeing) death of an individual is perplexing. 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