Ethics of Assistance - Research Paper Example

Ethics of Assistance Introduction In response to the East Bengal famine in the 1970s Peter Singer constructed a now seminal argument for the moral necessity of citizens of industrialized Western nations to sacrifice their excess wealth to ensure that impoverished regions are able to prevent the deleterious effects of widespread feminine. While on a visceral level Singer’s moral imperative rings true, when one considers the argument’s literal proscriptive nature its rests of weak logical assumptions; this is exactly what theorist Martin Peterson did in his essay ‘Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom’ (2004). Even as Peterson agreed with Singer’s moral imperative for citizens of affluent nations to monetarily contribute to famine relief, he argued that the utilitarian and economic principles that influenced Singer, as evidenced in Singer’s arguments that utilized a ‘weak’ version of the Pareto Principle, needed to be revised to express the more complex reality of the situation. This essay examines the nature of Singer’s argument and moral imperative through its evolution since the early 1970s, and considers Martin Peterson’s criticism and amendments to Singer’s initial claim and argument. Finally, a personal perspective is advanced that follows Peterson (2004) in amending Singer’s moral imperative to include a more philosophically rigorous and logically stable foundation. Section 1: Singer’s Moral Claim and Argument Peter Singer argues that it is the moral responsibility of Western nations to aid non-affluent nations in regard to famine relief, as long as the contribution doesn’t encounter new moral complications. Singer’s argument arose in response to the famine affecting East Bengal in the 1970s and was articulated in his essay ‘Famine, Affluence, Morality’ (1972). For Singer, famine aid is a monetary issue and his understanding is that, for westerners, parting with extra wealth is such a minimal sacrifice compared with the moral imperative of feminine relief that it is essential it be undertaken. There is also a ‘weak’ version of Peter Singer’s moral argument that argues one should seek to prevent something bad to occur from happening, as long as it doesn’t result in something ‘morally significant’ occur in response to the actions one takes to prevent this from occurring. When considering Singer’s argument in regards to this weak version, what he considers to be morally significant is open for interpretation and functions not as a direct literal version of this moral statement. In regards to the weak version of Singer’s moral argument, Martin Peterson (2004) notes that it follows the Pareto principle which states resources should be allocated if nobody would lose anything by it. A number of years later Singer further articulates his moral argument. In One World. The Ethics of Globalization, he adds an amendment to his earlier argument. He (as cited in Peterson, pg. 3) states, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we out, morally, to do so.” One notes that Singer has further elaborated on the nature and extent that which is sacrificed should be when determining to enact the sacrifice to prevent the bad thing – in Singer’s case famine – from occurring. Furthermore, it’s Peter Singer’s argument that the donations for famine relief should come from individuals rather than federal governments. Although he wouldn’t necessarily oppose government donations for famine relief, he argues that it is the moral responsibility of the individual citizen to donate excess wealth in reallocating resources to impoverished regions. This is because individuals are capable of developing a causal link between their monetary donation and the lifestyle improvement its makes in an impoverished country. Singer also argues that geographic distance should make no difference in determining one’s moral obligation to aiding countries in famine relief. Section 2: Martin Peterson’s Claim In an effort to expand to make Singer’s use of the Pareto Principle more argumentatively sound through his incorporation of Sen’s concept of final value as substantive freedom. In developing his claim Peterson considers the nature of final value. While traditional utilitarianism seeks methods of linking the abstract concept of increased happiness to objective entities such as primary goods, including things like health care, education, etc., this causes the same logical inconsistency as Singer’s weak implementation of the Pareto Principle. As a result, Peterson turns to Sen’s concept of substantive freedom, rather than the traditional utilitarian understanding of final value. Sen’s concept of substantive freedom considers the nature of final value in terms of capabilities and functionalities. Functionalities represent the ability of someone to partake in a particular action; where capabilities represent the potential ability of someone to partake in a particular action if they choose to do so: while affluent individuals are capable of living without food, individuals’ situations in impoverished nations function to ensure that they go hungry. It follows that for Sen, and for Peterson, that the final value is determined through the hybrid interaction of capabilities and functions. For Peterson, Singer’s logical premise that individuals should aid countries in famine relief if it doesn’t require loss of anything morally significant, it’s the ‘moral significance’ that represents his final value. As described above, Peterson indicates that instead of the understanding Singer’s concept of final value in the traditional utilitarian way one should understand it through Sen’s concept of substantive freedom as a combination of functionalities and capabilities. In this regard, Singer’s ‘moral significance’ is best understood as substantive freedoms; Peterson believes that through this understanding of substantive freedoms “we have access to an argument for foreign aid not available to adherents of competing theories about final value. The point is that no substantive freedoms have to be given up in order to support foreign aid” (Peterson, pg. 7) Peterson goes on to elucidate this argument be noting that when an individual in an affluent country donates a small sum of money, this won’t result in a loss of their substantive freedoms, but it will open up substantive freedoms for the individual in the impoverished country. For Peterson then, the line that is drawn between what is morally significant and that which isn’t is made at the level when one understands that their substantive freedoms will be compromised by donating further monetary funds. It’s important to note that Peterson’s arguments set the level of moral obligation at a lower level than traditional utilitarianism might. In classic utilitarianism affluent Westerners would be responsible to aid impoverished nations to the extent that what they sacrificed wasn’t more significant than the pain suffered by the individuals in the impoverished regions. Instead, Peterson argues that it is only for substantial freedoms. In this regard, his definition of substantial freedoms is difficult to ascertain. While one could sacrifice going to a movie weekly and instead donate the money to an impoverished region, and likewise one could donate a dollar a day, at what time does one make a division between substantial and insubstantial freedoms. In response to this, Peterson (2004, pg. 9) states, “I am not allowed to go to the cinema every night, but perhaps one visit per month is needed for preserving my substantial (cultural) freedom.” Peterson also notes that the reverse formulation doesn’t hold. That is, if the wealth of the affluent westerners could be increased without affecting the individuals living in impoverished countries; in these instances Peterson indicates that his moral argument is such that it functions in terms of only the better off aiding the worse off. The freedom of elite individuals in these developed nations is also considered. In affluent western countries donating to impoverished nations there will surely be a shift in the power structure between poor individuals and the elite members of society; in this regard, Peterson’s argument is that if their individual substantial freedoms are threatened in terms of a shift in the social power of society then that would be reason enough to prevent one from donating monetarily to impoverished regions. Peterson also considers the idea that the accumulation of funds, even one dollar at a time, could result in the eventual loss of a substantial freedom. In this regard, Peterson argues that if someone saving an extra dollar a day were a regular practice, then that might constitute a substantive freedom; but if this isn’t a regular occurrence and is only a hypothetical example then it discredits it as an example. However, if this constitutes a regular occurrence then it represents a possible loss of a substantive freedom and would mean that money shouldn’t be donated. Peter Singer argues that since there is a direct link between an individual donation and the person it helps individuals rather than collective entities such as governments should be morally responsible to donate. Peterson notes that in some cases this is true, such as sponsorship programs, but in most instances this is inaccurate. In this regard, Peterson suggests that it might be more beneficial for famine relief if individuals were to donate to a collective entity such as the government that is capable of collecting a series of small donations – possibly in the form of a small tax – that could be then implemented in famine relief. Utilizing this method would surely require the smallest loss of substantive freedoms for the general population and aid more effectively than individual donations. While Peter Singer doesn’t respond to criticisms leveled at his theory that it doesn’t address the long term concerns of infrastructure and economic development in these developing nations, Martin Peterson develops his own response to these issues. Peterson notes that there are instances in which foreign aid has been mismanaged but he also indicates specific instances where it has functioned in progressive ways to ensure that the impoverished nations are not merely given funding, but that it is implemented to improve infrastructure that allows for increased access to food. The example he gives is off the National Railway in Zimbabwe where increased funds were implemented to develop better railway communication patters that enabled more efficient transportation of food and supplies to greatly impoverished regions of the country. Another claim Peterson addresses is that the impoverished nations are the way they are because they are not democracies; proponents of this theory argue that no democratic nation has ever experienced a famine. One of the claims associated with this line of reasoning as noted by Sen, however, is that while democratic nations experience minimal famine shortages, “Democracy might well be taken as an indicator of improved living conditions, rather than a cause of it.” (Peterson, pg. 12) Similarly, China is an example of a well-developed nation that does not have a democratic government. Section 3: Implausibility of Singer’s Claim In ‘Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom’ (2004) Martin Peterson suggests a number of objections to Peter Singer’s moral argument. While Peterson agrees with the underlining assumption that individuals in affluent Western countries should donate their excess wealth to aid famine relief he disagrees with the logical structure of Singer’s argument. Peterson states that the Pareto Principle implemented in Singer’s moral argument is important for its simplicity, but ineffective as it is not comprehensive enough to consider the extent of logical arguments that could be raised against it. One of the initial critiques Peterson levels against Singer’s argument is grounded in the nature of the Pareto Principle that informs the foundation of the moral argument. Singer states that monetary donations should be undertaken if they can be undertaken “without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant.” (as cited in Peterson, pg. 3) Peterson takes issue with the extent that something is considered ‘morally significant,’ as in some regard nearly anything could be considered morally significant. Singer goes on to amend his initial statement to include a weak version, incorporating the Pareto Principle, which states one should seek to prevent bad things from occurring as long as one loses nothing in the process. Taken literally, it’s clear that this statement could mean that even if the most insignificant things are lost then it would make the act implausible. For instance, consider if one witnesses a crime; while it would surely cost one’s time for them to phone the police and function as a witness in the investigation, few people would argue that one isn’t morally obligated to aid in the investigation. Peter Singer also argues in terms of the nature of individual versus collective donations. He states that individuals should be responsible rather than collective entities because one can make a direct connection between their donation and the people it is aiding. Peterson argues that this claim is implausible since it naively assumes that the monetary donation will aid directly aid another individual; in truth it often takes fairly extensive non-profit entities such as FIMA, Oxfam, or the Red Cross to pool the funds and ensure that they are distributed to the correct entities. Martin Peterson (2004) notes that while Peter Singer responds in ‘Famine, Affluence, Morality’ (1972), and One World to arguments that proximity should be a determining factor when considering the nature and extent of donations, there are still a number of claims that remain implausible. Peterson (pg. 11) notes these as, “(i) foreign aid does not work in practice, (ii) democracy is the key to development, not traditional foreign aid programs, and (iii) western aid programmes ruin the traditional cultures of developing countries.” Indeed, as one considers Singer’s claim in great part it seems to focus on the singularity of expression of his moral argument in donation, rather than considering the macro-concerns that must be considered. For instance, while direct monetary aid is immediately beneficial to impoverished countries one must question the extent to which it functions to solve the long term problems. In some instances consistent aid could enable a country to become too dependent on the affluent region’s donations; in these instances it’s possible that the country would fail to progress socially and economically to the point that their element of infrastructure could function to ensure that all the individuals in their society are supplied with adequate amounts of food. Instead these countries would settle into a perpetual state of oppression through their reliance on these foreign nations. Rather than developing industries that function strategically in the world marketplace they become stuck in a perpetual state of cyclical poverty, where donations function like drugs to merely stave off the addiction rather than treat its root causes. In these instances, one can see how it’s possible that Singer’s claim that donating should only be undertaken if it doesn’t engender or cost anything of moral significance or similarity could negate the moral value in donating money to these foreign regions. Indeed, in these instances it’s clear that donating monetary sums for famine relief can actually be seen as something that is morally wrong and should be avoided if one truly considers the long term well being of the impoverished countries and individuals suffering from hunger. Section 4: Personal Claim In formulating a personal response to Peter Singer’s argument for moral responsibility in response to famines in impoverished nations, my personal response is much in line with Martin Patterson’s. When considering the nature of Singer’s formulation of the Pareto Principle through arguing that individuals should be morally obligated to donate to famine relief in impoverished nations as long as it doesn’t create or cost anything of moral significance, one can see where individuals can take issue with the logical and literal formulation of the argument. However, when one considers the full extent of Singer’s argument since the early 1970s one understands that it is more multi-faceted than merely one moral principle. For instance, in Singer’s The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (2004) he considers the extent to which aid can be implemented in complicated ways in aiding infrastructure. Similarly, in One World: the Ethics of Globalization (2004) he addresses a number of complaints raised against his arguments. However, it’s the fundamental question of whether it’s the individuals moral duty to donate that underlines all discussions. While Martin Peterson argues along lines of substantive freedoms and notes that there are varying degrees of substantive freedoms within Western society, it seems his ultimate concern is not a moral one, but rather with the singularity of the structure of Peter Singer’s argument in terms of its implementation of the Pareto Principle. While he indicates this is done purposely for the effectiveness of expression it allows, it seems more likely that it was done to willfully disregard the broader arguments that can be levied against any formulation of the Pareto Principle, even one involving Sen’s concept of substantive freedoms. While Peterson expounds on a lengthy discussion of why Singer’s application of the Pareto Principle is of limited value, his replacement as evidenced in Sen’s concept of final value and substantive freedoms to some extent seems to be merely replacing one way of articulating substantive freedoms for another. Martin Peterson is successful in addressing a number of broader concerns levied against Singer’s claims; specifically that Singer doesn’t consider the long-term concerns of the impoverished nations. Peterson also moves beyond Singer’s basic logic as evidenced in the Pareto Principle by attempting to link substantive freedoms to more tangible and objective elements, however in both instances it seems that Peterson doesn’t go far enough in articulating a clear moral sentiment or plan of action. While morality is an important belief, there needs to be develop a hybrid model that combines elements which consider infrastructure in productive ways, with an equilibrium economic model. While speaking of moral assumptions and intentions is theoretically viable, when it comes to barebones donations individuals will surely determine substantive freedoms on a rational level and determine their willingness to donate accordingly. In this sense, Sen’s concept of substantive freedoms is not so much a moral concern that needs to be argued through an ethical system, but an economic question that will be determined through supply and demand economics. Conclusion In conclusion, Peter Singer argues that it is the moral responsibility of individuals to donate to famine relief. Although few would disagree with his underlining claim, Martin Peterson notes that there is a number of logical fallibility in his argument and outlines an ethical argument that strengthens Singers argument based on the concept of substantive freedom and final value. While Peterson’s amendments greatly enhance Singer’s moral argument, they ultimately don’t’ go far enough in developing an economic model that considers the nature of what ultimately constitutes ‘substantive freedoms’. References Peterson, Martin. (2004). ‘Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom’ Singer, Peter. (2004) The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty. Random House. Singer, Peter. (2004) One World: the Ethics of Globalization. Random House. Read More