Industrial Espionage and Strategic Installations - Essay Example

Industrial Espionage and Strategic Installations 1. Introduction “Spying and eavesdropping are as old as humankind“(Fennelly 2004, p.462). Many consider ‘intelligence’ as the parents of espionage and counterintelligence or counterespionage is its enemy. Intelligence is a means of providing the most realistic facts accessible to decision makers. It involves gathering vital information for later analysis. Since overtly accessible information is often an assortment of lies, alteration, misinformation, and sporadic facts, such information is seen as worthless and immaterial for crucial decisions. Espionage activity seeks to uncover facts crucial to the success of an organization, corporation, or nation-state. It also seeks to infiltrate the corporate protective shell and they may even try to blackmail employees or may use competitive intelligence extracting skills or buy required information. Our research focus is about industrial espionage scenarios and countermeasures particularly in businesses and strategic installations. It include discussions on the nature of industrial espionage, its methods and techniques, and analysis of the problem and countermeasures. 2. Industrial Espionage and Strategic Installations 2.1 Industrial Espionage Spies may secretly infiltrate a facility to steal information or mount electronic bugging devices. External espionage may include surveillance, lip reading, use of long-range microphones, and other electronic devices. Hackers, cracker, wackers, freaks, terrorist, competitive intelligence agents, spies, users of illegal bugs and taps, and organized crime families represent espionage threat to a nation. Political terrorists are not interested in purely gathering and accumulating data. “”They want the blood and money of governments and commercial enterprises” (Fennelly 2004, p.463; Walker 1998, p.87). Industrial espionage has its stake of illegitimate activities such as theft, monitoring communications, and denying use of servers to conduct electronic commerce (Jones et. al. 2002, p.22). Industrial espionage is intelligence collection funded normally by a private company with an intense desire to improve its competitive advantage by gathering competitor’s proprietary information. It is an act of furtively retrieving or gathering illicit manufacturing business or trade information from a company (Rohlehr 2005, p. 16). Normally, firms engaging in industrial espionage work with their country’s intelligence service or carrying out the process in support of their government. Espionage and other forms of illegal information gathering is often directed against businesses manufacturing high technology products and the goal is to get hold of the information without spending large amounts of money needed to realize similar technological innovation. The company that can get hold of such information can benefit from momentous competitive advantage (NSEP 1998, p.15). Advancements in information provide fresh opportunities for electronic interceptions for the purpose of industrial espionage according to Williams and Vlassis (2001, p. 200) may also be accompanied by theft of intellectual property. There are numerous groups, organizations, and associations around the world employing high technology and even information warfare strategies to succeed in their objectives. They are any person and everyone who has the knowledge to exploit high technology and who has cause. These groups range from the world organization that some nation-states classify as terrorist to animal rights group. 2.2 Methods and Techniques of Espionage The techniques of industrial espionage are supported by an assortment of technological devices such as tiny cameras and microphones that can listen to conversation from great distance. These devices can be installed inside telephones, furnishings, walls, ceiling, and floors. There are also wireless equipments that can be use to exploit telephone lines and equipments that can record and decipher the spontaneously occurring electronic emissions of computers and communication devices into valuable information. Finally, there are photographic devices mounted on aircraft and satellites that can be use to get images of the target area from a long distance. In most circumstances, it is more convenient to acquire priceless information from innocent employees. Buying information is trouble-free and there is much less likelihood of being caught. The maintenance or cleaning force, which generally works after hours, usually has right of entry to all zones within a facility, including copy machines that can be operated to make duplicates of information left to curious eyes. On average, the cleaning staffs are getting low salaries and they do not have sufficient loyalty to the client or employer thus they can be tempted by a several hundred dollars to collect information for a rival. Previously, many think that the most significant threats to proprietary information were from external sources. However, in the 75% of the reported incidents according to June (2000, p.103), the person identified or alleged of having caused the information losses were those with a confidential relationship with the company or an ‘insider’. These are employees, retirees, contractors, temporary hires, vendors, suppliers, consultants, and business partners. Rationally, the best source of information is a trusted person inside a company or organization whom the collector can ask to provide proprietary or classified information. On the other hand, the rest of information losses were from an array of sources, including local competitors, overseas competitors, foreign regimes, computer hackers, information brokers, and the media. In a study conducted between 1975 and 1991 according to June (2000), 56 of those arrested for espionage were volunteers for the transgressing side and 10 were enlisted. All 66 were insiders with access to confidential and proprietary information. The top five foreign nationalities of those persons known to have cause information losses were Chinese, Canadian, French, Indian, and Japanese. “The use of electronic devices to gain information is not new” (Rustmann 2002, p.76). For as long as radio and tape recorders have been around, individuals have discovered ways to utilize them to acquire information. Bugs can be fixed in almost everything. The only restraining factor is dimension. The host must be big enough to hold a microphone at the least, and unless there is a power source to plug into, it must be big enough to hold an adequate supply of batteries too. For instance, if someone gave you a desktop pen set, be cautious, as it may be sending out all of your most confidential office discussions to a recorder in a nearby eavesdropping area (Rustmann 2002, p.76). Wiretapping involves tying into a telephone line or other wire conductor that is used for communications such as PBX cable, video, or alarm system, and so forth, and listening in from some far-off location. In the case of telephones, physical access is acquired to the target line at some place between the main telephone company switching station and the target building or office, and a second set of wires is connected to the target pair to link the signal back to an eavesdropping post. Frequently a transmitter is installed at the point of the tap to broadcast data to a nearby listening post. The transmitter adds to the security of the operation by allowing the spy to monitor the conversations from a remote location, but the RF signal it generates also increases the probability that it will be detected by a competent TSCM technician. The substitute is live monitoring or mounting a tape recorder at the point of the tap typically within a junction box. It is easy for someone to access an organizations phone lines, all that is required for the eavesdropper to walk up to one of the many often unlocked distribution boxes linked to the target, discover the correct phone pair, and twist on a couple of wires connected to a tape recorder or transmitter. A skilled spy can carry out the actual installation in a matter of seconds (Rustmann 2002, p77). 3. Analysis and Conclusion There are a variety of countermeasures and can range from very cheap yet efficient to educational, physical and electronic or a combination. Once there is a clear image of the actual susceptibilities, suitable countermeasures are developed and presented with proposals for execution. In addition, outside the apparent reasonable, economic, and technical situations, other issues such as the culture of the organization are taken into consideration when deciding on suitable measures (Fay 2007, p.102). It is essential to develop performance metrics in employing countermeasures because it can help determine the efficiency of such standards in security. Since like electrical energy that always finds its way to areas with low resistance, spies are expected to seek another route when obstructions are positioned in their path. Therefore, analysis of threat will vary in line with the countermeasures placed against them. Regular testing and measurement through the metrics guarantees the right expectations of effectiveness. Technical Security Countermeasures or TSCM is an inspection and monitoring technique that utilized complex electronic devices to sense the existence of secretly placed eavesdropping equipment that differ extensively in form and complexity. The conventional devices are the telephone bug, line tap, hidden microphone, and parabolic microphone. Companies that utilize this kind of countermeasures value their proprietary information as strategic assets if not the lifeblood of their business (Fay 2005, p.315). Preferably, when you have an area ‘swept’ for ‘bugs’, there are precautions that should be in place that will keep it ‘clean’. Alarms and access controls are indispensable for keeping an area secure from an intruder inserting an eavesdropping device in specific office or area. Monitored closed-circuit television (CCTV) and a guard force can assist appreciably in overall security. Avert unofficial entry of people as well as cleaning staff and workers. They should not go into the area alone and left to their own devices. Safety measures should be taken when permitting these individuals into sections where you want to preserve a protected environment. In many circumstances according to June (2000, p.103), foreign government and competitors are not above recruiting individuals to acquire information or perhaps plant a device to monitor audio and video activity. A ‘black bag job’ he added, is an act of breaking into an office or residence to install a bug or listening device. Alarms, guard or attack dogs may help in the prevention of this kind of activity. However, in cases like the desktop pen we mentioned in the preceding section, the TSCM technician should examine all such gifts, as well as other possible hosts in the site’s most vulnerable locations. He should examine anything that he suspects could be a host or concealment for an audio device. He should look for pinholes in the walls particularly near electrical outlet to check for hidden bugs. He should check the lamps, clocks, and other electrical devices that could serve as convenient hosts with their own supply of AC current. He should look for RF transmissions that might come from a hidden audio device with IPM or In-Place Monitoring radio equipment. These sophisticated receivers are able to identify RF emanations from bugs even if they are hidden or masked behind normal frequencies. Wiretappings are commonly done in phone lines, which is the preferred method of even the police organization. The reason is simple; it is easy and as we mentioned earlier does not usually required direct access to the room or phone instrument being bugged. A telephone is the most vulnerable instrument thus; do not discuss confidential and sensitive official matters over the telephone including faxes and e-mail. This is because nothing that passes over a phone line is secure unless it is encrypted. Since a phone system is the most vulnerable, a TSCM technician can advise us whether someone has planted something in our phone. Normally, a TSCM technician conducts thorough inspection of every vulnerable telephone instrument with the aid of sophisticated electronic test equipment that will determine whether the existing electronic characteristics of the telephone instrument and the associated wiring have been modified in any way. One simple and effective precaution against any form of phone tapping is to unplug the phone when it is not in use. CIA officers stationed abroad who are highly vulnerable to this type of bugging operation do this routinely (Rustmann 2002, p.79). In strategic installations, physical security planning is essential since espionage, sabotage, theft and assault are very likely to occur. Physical security planning should include identifying the assets such as personnel, property, information, and image. As part of physical security, minimize the threats posed by humans by incorporating locks, barriers, access control systems, lighting, intruder alarms, and security officers. Screening of objectionable employees is essential to protect both the officers and employees. The screening or vetting of employees to thwart probes by foreign intelligence agents is also an indispensable to avert workplace violence, internal theft, and terrorism. More importantly, asset protection strategies should include those threats posed by espionage, and sabotage (IFPO 2003, p.28). Thus, countermeasures should include screening of personnel employed in critical system operations and the implementation of guard and security measures (Constant 1981, p.252). More importantly, in case of catastrophic sabotage, countermeasures should include effective filtration systems, effective gas mask and protective clothing for individuals, inoculations, and availability of medical supplies. 4. Reference List Constant James. 1981. Fundamentals of Strategic Weapons: Offense and Defense Systems. Netherlands: Published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Fay John. 2005. Contemporary Security Management. United Kingdom: Published by Butterworth-Heinemann Fay John. 2007. Encyclopedia of Security Management. United States: Published by Butterworth-Heinemann Fennelly Lawrence. 2004. Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention. United Kingdom: Published by Butterworth-Heinemann IFPO .2003. The Protection Officer Training Manual. International Foundation for Protection Officers. United States: Published by Butterworth-Heinemann Jones Andy, Kovacich Gerald L, and Luzwick Perry. 2002. Global Information Warfare: How Businesses, Governments, and Others Achieve Objectives and Attain Competitive Advantages. United States: Published by CRC Press June Dale. 2000. Protection, Security, and Safeguards: Practical Approaches and Perspectives. United States: Published by CRC Press NSEP. 1998. The Electronic Intrusion Threat to National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications. National Security and Emergency Preparedness. United States: Published by DIANE Publishing Rohlehr Mark Anthony. 2005. Fundamentals of Law and Security Administration. Canada: Published by Emond Montgomery Publication Rustmann F.W. 2002. CIA, Inc.: Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence. United States: Published by Brassey Walker Philip.1998. Electronic Security Systems: Reducing False Alarms. United Kingdom: Published by Newnes Williams Phil and Vlassis Dimitri. 2001. Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses. 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