Ex-Yugoslavia Conflicts during the 1990s - Essay Example

Ex-Yugoslavia conflicts during the 1990s [Writer’s Name] [Institution’s Name] Ex-Yugoslavia conflicts during the 1990s Introduction Bosnia-Herzegovina, which used to be Yugoslavia, went through a huge genocide in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At this time the President of Yugoslavia was Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic was not only the President of former Yugoslavia, but also the President of Serbia. He became one of the big figures in the Yugoslav wars during the 90s. In May 1999, Milosevic was accused but the U.N.’s International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Several charges were brought to him for crimes against humanity. The war in Slovenia lasted just 10 days. The EC (without any participation from Moscow) brokered a cease-fire at Brioni on 7 July 1991. As a result, Milosevic lost an important base of external support, but the defeat of his allies in Moscow seemed to have little immediate effect on the Serb war effort. (Rosalyn, p. 468, 1993) About a year and a half later, there were violations of customs and laws of war in what is now Bosnia. Milosevic was eventually forced to resign from his office position due to a very popular uprising from citizens that were against his rule. After he resigned from office he was to stand trial. The main criticism of Moscow's Yugoslav policy related to its opposition to the use of external military force in the region. Without Belgrade's willingness to make concessions at Dayton, no peace settlement in Bosnia would have been possible. Discussion Ground realities changed drastically after the cold war. Moscow soon discovered that it had lost the influence and power of the Cold War days. As the war in Croatia escalated, the issue of recognition became a source of tension within the international community. It also upset the Western powers. Boris El'tsin, the new Russian leader, declared his support for the concept of national self-determination and saw no reason to back the Serbs since Milosevic had backed his opponents at the time of the Moscow coup in August 1991. Thus, one of El'tsin's first foreign policy decisions was to follow the EC's lead and recognise both Slovenia and Croatia in February 1992--some two months before Washington. (Andrei, p. 31. 1996) No US or German ground troops were deployed, but Moscow, for the first time in its history, accepted a UN peacekeeping role and deployed 1000 soldiers in the Serb-occupied Krajina region of Croatia. This decision represented the high point of Moscow's pro-Western foreign policy. The cease-fire in Croatia left the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina in a difficult position. From the spring of 1992 the Serbs launched their war against the non-Serb Bosnian population. It appeared that Bosnia could only survive as an independent sovereign state with external military support. In the first phase of the war (up to Christmas 1992) Moscow fully supported Western initiatives. The USA argued for this shift in policy on two grounds. First, the UN arms embargo did not apply to Bosnia since it had been imposed in September 1991, before Bosnia had been internationally recognised as an independent sovereign state. Second, Bosnia, like every sovereign state, had the absolute right in international law to self-defence. It was also a difficult year in Moscow. (Javier, p. 5, 1996) Parliament was critical of El'tsin's perceived servility towards the West at the expense of Serbia--Moscow's traditional ally. Both states were supporting their compatriots in the war effort across the border in Bosnia. Although El'tsin ignored such demands and refused to act unilaterally outside the international consensus, the growing divisions in the West, as well as the failure of Western policy to end the war, encouraged and legitimised Moscow's more independent role in the Yugoslav crisis. Russia began to tilt towards Belgrade. Clinton argued again for decisive action against the Serbs, who were suspected of firing the bomb, and threatened air strikes to remove the heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. When Russia rejected the US proposal for air strikes at the UN Security Council, only China supported Moscow. How could the UN claim neutrality for its troops on the ground whilst bombing Serb positions from the sky? NATO air strikes would clearly endanger the lives of the lightly-armed UN peacekeepers, whilst offering little hope of materially changing the balance of power on the battlefield. Churkin got the Serbs to agree to NATO's demands in return for the deployment of 400 Russian troops to prevent the Muslims from moving into the positions vacated by the Serbs. The deal was greeted in the Russian media as a triumph for Moscow. The Russian army newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, said the settlement showed that Russia was still a great power. Only Russia, it announced, was trusted by the Bosnian Serbs and able to do a deal. Whilst most Western governments were relieved that the risks of NATO air strikes had been averted, many commentators, especially in the USA, viewed the Russian initiative with alarm. Western critics argued that the Russian troops were providing protection for the Serbs around Sarajevo and encouraging further atrocities against the Muslims in other areas. (Atkinson, P.15-25, 1995) NATO justified the air strike under UN resolution 824, which authorised close air support for UN troops under siege, but Moscow was not alone in believing NATO action had broader implications. As a result, Moscow's objections to a second round of air strikes against Serb positions around Gorazde were lifted. The following month, the Contact Group put forward a new peace proposal, which gave 51% of Bosnia to the new Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. Moscow used the Milosevic-Karadzic split to freeze relations with the Bosnian Serbs. (Izvestiya, p. 217, 1997) The Russian government condemned the air strikes, which, it was said, '... calls into question the survival of the current generation of Bosnian Serbs, who are in effect threatened with genocide'. Moscow called for an immediate end to the NATO air strikes, but the Russian demand was ignored until 14 September when the Serbs withdrew their heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo and finally lifted the siege of the Bosnian capital. Milosevic was delegated, on US insistence, to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, and a settlement soon followed. Second, Bosnia would contain two mini-states, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srspka) with both of these mini-states having their own presidents, parliaments and military. Third, Sarajevo would be the indivisible capital of the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation. Fourth, war criminals would be excluded from public office in Bosnia. Despite differences over policy during the war, Moscow was eager to participate in implementing the peace. Many Serb nationalists were dismayed by the loss of Krajina to the Croats and Sarajevo to the Muslim-Croat Federation. Serbia was linked to the Bosnian Serb Republic, but this seemed well short of Belgrade's war aims when the conflict started all those years ago. The future of Bosnia as a sovereign state remains in doubt. The return of war to Bosnia looks a possibility with Muslims still fearing the effective partition of the country along the lines discussed by Tudjman and Milosevic before the war. (Neville-Jones,p. 270, 1996-97) The first argues that the Serbs had little choice but to sue for peace. For Milosevic's campaign for peace began at the time of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993--long before the Serb setbacks on the battlefield. Milosevic appeared to acknowledge that the massive Serb war gains in Bosnia and Croatia were unsustainable in the long term and he was no longer willing to pay the military and political costs of maintaining them. Did the NATO air strikes influence policy in Belgrade? For while the NATO air strikes in the summer of 1995 were far more intense than anything previously witnessed in Bosnia, the actual number of sorties by NATO bombers was roughly equivalent to only one day in the Gulf War. (NATO, p.3, 1997) Furthermore, the air strikes were never intended to force the Serbs to agree to a cease-fire, never mind an overall peace settlement. First, the international community had to be sure that Belgrade would not escalate the war by intervening militarily on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. This was only the case after Milosevic abandoned Karadzic in August 1994. Moscow's role Conclusion Moscow was criticised for its pro-Serb stance for much of the Bosnian war. For the Serbs made their biggest advances in Croatia and Bosnia at a time when Moscow's policy was most closely allied to that of the west. Although Moscow shifted to a more pro-Serb position later, El'tsin continued to support the various international plans put forward to end the conflict--including the VOPP and the Contact Group plan. Although the Russian parliament articulated a more pro-Serb stance than the El'tsin government, it lacked the power, particularly after the constitutional changes of December 1993, to materially affect policy. For Moscow's continued links with Belgrade served a useful purpose. No negotiated settlement was possible without Serb compliance. Moscow's efforts were acknowledged in many European capitals, but it is undeniable that Russia's image suffered because of its conduct during the war in Bosnia. It also created fears that Moscow's more cooperative policy towards the West would not last. Once Russia regained its military prowess, it was argued, Moscow would soon be tempted to return to its Cold War ways. However, based on Russian policy towards Yugoslavia, such an interpretation seems too pessimistic. References Atkinson, Rick 'The Anatomy of NATO's Decision to Bomb Bosnia', International Herald Tribune, 17 November 1995. P.15-25 Edemskii, Andrei, 'Russian Perspectives', in Alex Danchev & Thomas Halverson (eds), International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996), p. 31. Glitman, Maynard 'US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach', Survival, 38, 4, Winter 1996-97, p. 75. Izvestiya, 5 February 1994; and Alex Pravda, 'The Politics of Foreign Policy', Developments in Russian Politics (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997), p. 217. NATO Office of Information and Press, 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia', NATO Basic Fact Sheet, No. 4, March 1997, p. 3. Neville-Jones, Pauline 'Dayton,(1996-97) IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia', Survival, 38, 4, Winter, p. 46. Silber, Laura 'The Hero of Dayton: Slobodan Milosevic and the Politics of War and Peace', World Policy Journal, XIII, 1, Spring 1996, p. 69. Solana, Javier Secretary General of NATO, 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance', NATO Review, 44, March 1996, p. 5. Read More