The Effects of Strip Markings on Air Traffic Control - Research Paper Example

The Effects of Strip Markings on Air Traffic Control Introduction The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has largely superseded the requirement for its Air Traffic Controllers to use Strip Markings, what it calls Flight Progress Strips (FPS). However emergencies happen, the power fails, computers crash, and any other catastrophe can occur and the planes in the air and the thousands of people in them have to be landed safely. Several incidents in recent years have shown the confusion that can result when those emergencies do happen. So the FAA has established specific regulations for the implementation of the Flight Progress Strips and the proper markings for them. Plus, records are statutorily required to be kept in the event of a disaster. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is tasked to investigate all civil transportation crashes (in addition to some military ones) and one of their requirements is to have complete Air Traffic Control records. Without flight voice recorders and the transcripts they provide, the investigation could be hindered and stalled. Discussion Prior to World War II, the air traffic control system was confusing at best. Ran by the Civil Aeronotics Agency (CAA), controllers were in place at the airport towers but could not talk to the pilots directly and instead were forced to relay messages through the air companies. For en route traffic, airlines were basically left to their own devices and pilots were more or less allowed to pick and choose their own airspace. All of that was managed by clerks at the airline using Flight Progress Strips, which showed estimated times and altitudes. The US Government took over the operation by 1938 but the system of no communication and free altitude remained in place. The populace was lucky this perplexing and somewhat ridiculous sounding system didn’t result in more crashes. Yet fate and technology were quickly catching up to the ATC system. The country had entered the jet age and the decade after World War II (1945-55) saw five midair collisions over the United States, resulting in the deaths of over one hundred people. Yet planes were getting bigger and faster, as more people began to fly. All of this culminated in the disastrous 1956 midair crash over the Grand Canyon in Arizona. As incredible as it seems, “It was a common practice then for pilots to deviate from their route slightly to offer a great view”. United Air Lines 718 was an almost new DC-7 with 58 people on board and TWA 2 was a Lockheed L-1049 with seventy more. On June 30, the two planes did just that, deviated from their plan so their passengers could see the Painted Desert at the Canyon. At 10:31 AM, the planes collided and crashed deep into the canyon, with all 128 passengers perishing. Interestingly enough, a controller at Salt Lake City knew in advance both planes were at 21,000 feet and would intersect; a fact that he either did not or could not communicate to the doomed crews (Brandt). The crash and the resulting public outcry from the largest US civilian air disaster to date still took another two years of bureaucratic wrangling with the Military still having control of its flights and the CAA controlled civil aviation. Yet in 1958 another disastrous collision between a fighter jet and another United DC-7 caused an additional 49 deaths. This resulted in the Federal Aviation Act from with the FAA was formed, with total operational control over the United States airspace (Military and Civil) and the Agency (at the time) was tasked with modernizing the ATC system. By 1962 the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) building was opened and air traffic control as we know it today was in place. Another innovation that helped revolutionize air travel and reduced the chances of incidents like that in the Grand Canyon was RADAR (RAdio Detection And Ranging). Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) is further aided by RADAR in “Aircraft are afforded 1000 feet vertical separation or five miles radar separation (three miles when close to an airport and under a TRACON's control)”. TRACON stands for Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities. Collisions still occur but are far less frequent in this county than prior to the modernization of the air traffic control system (FAA I). From its inception, the FAA ARTCC’s still utilized the Flight Progress Strip system started by the airlines’ primitive flight controllers. To quote the website referenced above, “the entire IFR system is based on the strip”. The basic strip included at a minimum the flight call sign and information on the aircraft itself, such as type, speed, and what equipment it carries. Other required relevant information was altitude, the designated routes, and times relevant to the flight. All of the Flight Progress Strips continued to be handwritten for over a decade after the FAA’s forming, even though all the while the Agency was trying to modernize and automate all of its systems. Some like Washington ARTCC were experimenting with mechanically processing the strips by the late 1960’s. By 1974 all ARTCC had automated strip processing for en route processing and in effect could “hand off” the strips to the local TRACON responsible for the airport landing the flight. Still the FAA recognized that handling of strips was a time consuming process and that something had to be done and established the goal of executing automation of FPS by the late 1990’s. This was a daunting task in that there are twenty-one ARTCC alone and countless other TRACON. With a survey indicating some controllers felt they could control the in-flight aircraft very safely using RADAR alone, the Agency commissioned a tem from the University of Oklahoma to study the feasibility of doing just that. The research was performed at the FAA’s training facility in Oklahoma City and the ten subjects were experienced instructors who at a minimum had to have served as an active controller at an en route facility within the previous two years. Their goal was to see whether automation was feasible. Some segments used teams of two controllers, R-Side (RADAR) and D-Side (Data Collection). With this in mind, the question was whether FPS were separate from other controller functions. If so, automation was possible and if not, the current strip should be continued. To make the scenarios as realistic as possible the controllers were placed in the areas for as much as an hour and were presented with various departures, arrivals, en route and even emergency procedures. The observers used video cameras, voice recorders, and laptop computers to record the reactions. “Ghost” pilots were even placed to communicate with the controller subjects. In their conclusions, the University researchers stated that although written strips could be manipulated and normally are. Also, the actions of D and R side controllers were not as integrated as one might suspect in the use of the word “team”. Therefore the team concluded not only that strip automation was possible but that it should be implemented to help the “individual controllers control the same amount of aircraft with less effort and therefore be better prepared to manage the increases air traffic expected in the coming decades” (Edwards). Yet it is now the twenty-first century, more than thirty years since that fist automation milestone of 1974 and sixteen years since that study. That same first Chicago ARTCC is awaiting direct computer links to the aircraft but meanwhile still must rely on the trusty strips until such time as they are replaced by automated aircraft lists which display the same basic information sometime in the near future. As a redundant feature, the replacement controller who takes over from someone is charged with reviewing either the strips or aircraft lists, whichever is applicable. Any discrepancies must be reported and confirmed with in-flight pilots to either confirm deny errors. In late 2005 Chicago ARTCC also implemented URET (User Request Evaluation Tool). In effect, this further reduces the number of flight strips printed so that automation can continue unaffected. This is important, for Chicago also serves Milwaukee, which encompasses sixteen approach control facilities (FAA I). So, with the knowledge that Flight Progress Strips are a fact of life in the Air Traffic Controller’s life for quite some time to come, the FAA has continued to issue its policy order JO 7110.65U (Section 3. Flight Progress Strips), with the latest being effective February 9, 2012. One of the first sentences of the order states that “Unless otherwise authorized in a facility directive, use flight progress strips to post current data on air traffic and clearances required for control and other air traffic control services”. The directive goes on to state “En route: Flight progress strips must be posted”. To avoid confusion at a later time, it also gives specific instructions as to what writing instrument must be used (red pencil) on hand printed FPS, and even gives a chart which provides examples of how letters and numerals should be printed, including the fact that the number zero (0) should have a diagonal slash to avoid confusion, especially concerning entries for weather data. As such the Agency is very specific as to how the FPS are filled out. Basically, for an en route FPS, there are seven columns with as much as thirty bits of information. Column One has items 1-10, the Verification symbol (if required), Revision number (DSR-Not used) Aircraft identification (number of aircraft if more than one, heavy aircraft indicator “H/” if appropriate, type of aircraft, and aircraft equipment suffix), Filed true airspeed, Sector number, Computer identification number (if required), Estimated ground speed, Revised ground speed or strip request (SR) originator, Strip number DSR- Strip number/Revision number. DSR is an acronym for Display System Replacement. Column Two contains items 11-14, Previous fix; Estimated time over previous fix; Revised estimated time over previous fix; Actual time over previous fix or actual departure time entered on first fix posting after departure; and Plus time expressed in minutes from the previous fix to the posted fix. Column Three specifies items 15-19, Center-estimated time over fix (in hours and minutes), or clearance information for departing aircraft; Arrows to indicate if aircraft is departing (↑) or arriving (↓); Pilot-estimated time over fix; Actual time over fix, time leaving holding fix, arrival time at non-approach control airport, or symbol indicating cancellation of IFR flight plan for arriving aircraft, or departure time (actual or assumed); Fix. For departing aircraft, add proposed departure time. Column Four only has two entries. First is Altitude information (normally in hundreds of feet) or possibly in thousands of feet as authorized by the manager. Second is optional when voice recorders are operational and required to be used when they are not operating and strips are being used at the facility. The area is used to record reported RA events. The letters RA followed by a climb or descent arrow (if the climb or descent action is reported) and the time (hours and minutes) the event is reported. Column Five will consist of Next posted fix or coordination fix; Pilot's estimated time over next fix; Arrows to indicate north (↑), south (↓), east (→), or west (←) direction of flight if required; and the Requested altitude. Again the altitude should be hundred but can be transcribed in thousands of feet as authorized by the manager Column Six will again only have two entries, Point of origin, route as required for control and data relay, and destination; and Pertinent remarks, minimum fuel, point out/radar vector/speed adjustment information or sector/position number (when applicable), Recording Information), or NRP. High Altitude Redesign (HAR) or Point-to-point (PTP) may be used at facilities actively using these programs. Column Seven Mode 3/A beacon code if applicable; Miscellaneous control data (expected further clearance time, time cleared for approach, etc.); and Transfer of control data and coordination indicators. So the FPS contains quite a bit of information that the controller must update on a continuous space. There is no room for error and one can easily see why the need for automation of the FPS is so great (FAA II). The events of September 11, 2001 proved to be a very confusing time for the air traffic control system. With two planes crashing into the World Trade Center in New York and one more slamming into the Pentagon outside Washington, DC, the controllers were having an especially difficult time doing their job that morning. To top that confusion, United Flight 93 was missing for quite some time and the Control Center in Cleveland was the only one to hear any transmission from the aircraft until reports came in that it had crashed in a Pennsylvania field. Also, Delta Flight 1989 was likewise missing for a certain period of time and was considered hijacked until the plane finally landed safely in Cleveland. Also not long after the attacks, the FAA shut down all US airspace for more than seventy-two hours, stranding hundreds of planes and thousands of passengers, including international inbound people forced to remain in Canada. Nowhere was confusion more evident than in the control facilities serving the nation’s capital. Reagan National Airport, situated within Washington proper and only blocks from the hubs of the US Government, was shut down for three weeks. Still very limited traffic is allowed into the airport and absolutely no general aviation aircraft (private planes). In July 2003 as part of their investigation, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) toured several Washington area control towers and TRACON. The senior control supervisor at National TRACON was notified by Dulles controllers that a “fast mover” was headed for his location. Without any voice communication with the aircraft (later proven to be United 77), the controller asked an Air Force C-130 to keep watch on the aircraft. Also two military aircraft from Dover AFB, Delaware (call sign “Bobcat”) were being monitored. However, all previous hijacking training told the controllers that the hijacked aircraft would eventually land safely, perhaps in another country. Therefore neither the FAA nor the US Military had any experience with possible military intervention and the 9/11 Commission admitted the controllers that morning ”started to take their own action”, including FAA controllers at Andrews AFB in Maryland, the base where the President’s aviation assets are maintained (9/11). On a day rife with lack of radio communication and especially with the two planes that hit the WTC, the absence of flight data recorders (“black boxes”) throughout the Commission report above the Flight Progress Strips are mentioned as an invaluable tool in determining the specifics of what transpired that morning. For example, “flight strips and other information indicate that Bobcat 14 and Bobcat 17 originated out of Dover” and “In looking through the flight strips from that day, Steve Marra found a ticket for a C-130”. Without the FPS, the Commission would have had an especially difficult time of piecing together the disastrous events of that day. Another major problem is one that every business (and individual) can sympathize with. On February 6, 2009, the FAA experienced major computer failures at its Atlanta facilities. Hartsfield is the world’s busiest airport by passenger traffic and the Agency quickly recognized it had a big problem. In accordance with its redundancy procedures, the system was switched to its Salt Lake City, Utah facility. That was no doubt a bad mistake, for Salt Lake was much smaller than Atlanta and not equipped to handle such immense traffic. It too crashed with in a short period of time and because of the airlines’ “hub and spoke” system the ripple effect was felt all up and down the East Coast. With the additional effect of bad weather, American had to cancel “40 or 50” flights and Southwest admitted forty per cent of its air traffic in the East was either cancelled or delayed. A spokesman for the Controllers said “the problem forced controllers to enter flight information manually”. Once again the old style Flight Progress Strips proved to be what saved the day (CBS). CONCLUSION The Federal Aviation Administration has made great strides in automating the Air Traffic Control system and many more people are flying more miles and are safer even as airplanes continue to get larger. The Agency has tried many times over the decades to get rid of the Flight Progress Strips (strip marking) yet natural disasters, machinery failures and now the newer threat of terrorism have shown them that the strips will be around for many years to come and it will be a long time before the new controller is shown a FPS and asks “What’s that?” References Brandt, Trey, “Aircraft Wrecks in Arizona and the Southwest”, December14, 2011, accessed June 8, 2012, http://www.aircraftarchaeology.com/twa_united_airlines_grand_canyon.htm. Federal Aviation Administration (I), “History of the Air Route Traffic Control Center”, Web, accessed June 8, 2012, http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/artcc/chicago/information/media/BriefHistory.pdf. Edwards, Mark B, et al, “The Role of Flight Progress Strips in En Route Air Traffic Control: A Time Series Analysis April 19, 1995, accessed June 8, 2012, http://websites.psychology.uwa.edu.au/labs/cogscience/documents/Vortac%20%281995%29%20-%20Flight%20progress%20strips.pdf. Federal Aviation Administration (II), “Section 3. Flight Progress Strips”, Web, accessed June 8, 2012, http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atc/atc0203.html. 9/11 Commission, “Visit to Reagan National Airport Control Tower in Alexandria, VA and Andrews Air Force Base Control Tower” July 28, 2003, Web, accessed June 10, 2012, http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00245.pdf. CBS News Travel, “FAA Computer Failure Disrupts Travel”, February 11, 2009, Web, accessed June 10, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-501843_162-2905662.html. Read More