Culture and Ethical Values - Mills Harm Principle - Essay Example

Mill’s Harm Principle: An Analytical Discussion In his seminal work, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill introduces the idea of the ‘harm principle’, whichhas since become one of the cornerstones of liberal political philosophy and theory. The principle posits that any form of social intervention in the actions of an individual could only be warranted if that action were to cause demonstrable harm to other individuals; coercion is only justified if it is used to thwart ‘harm’. In essence, “Mill advances a radical liberal theory of political right” (Gaus 2004: 109), and it is the purpose of this essay to explore and analyze this advancement. For Mill, the defense of individuality was paramount, for that alone would guarantee the fullest development of one’s person, promoting the happiness and well being of both individuals and society at large (Fiss 2003: 179). To clinch this pursuit of individualism, Mill devised the classical liberal maxim of “non-interference” premised on the harm principle. He says: “…that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” (Mill 2003: 80) An essential provision of the harm principle remains that the freedom of an agent is not abridged every time such an action can prevent harm to others, but that it is only under such a condition or circumstance or prevention that interference may be considered (Bird 2006: 197-198). To reiterate, the harm principle is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the justification of interference. Therefore, the harm principle “expresses a necessary condition on the legitimacy of proposed interference” (Knowles 2001: 109, italic in original). The burden of proof is placed squarely on the source that endeavors to curtail one’s liberty, commensurate with the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition where one is innocent unless proven guilty. Mill vehemently holds on to this justificatory scheme, for a contrary system that requires an agent to validate the goodness of his actions necessitates a hierarchical conception of good, leading to despotism. Indeed, “[w]hat Mill’s harm principle enables us to do is to identify the realm of autonomy and then to focus on the interests that are alleged means to that autonomy” (Capaldi 2004: 279). In fact, Mill argues that there can be many situations in which one’s actions may be harmful to others, but interference could still be imprudent. For example, competitive business policies employed by one firm put others out of business, but the same remain concomitant to the entrepreneurial spirit and free market distributive system of a free and autonomous society. As Shapiro argues, Mill’s “commitment to individual rights, manifestly embodied in the harm principle, rests partly on the idea that individual freedom is an intrinsically valuable feature of human existence” (2003: 57). However, this should not cloud the underlying philosophy of the harm principle, for it was designed “not to maximize good but to prevent evil” (Capaldi 2004: 278). So, the clarification that Mill provides is not to rule out coercion or external control. Instead, he advances a principled basis for exercising intervention: each time an individual action results an adverse reaction on others, the enterprise of the harm principle is to identify if and how coercion should be exercised. Even though Mill referred to the harm principle as a “simple” standard (Mill 2003: 80), in reality, it is anything but. Behind the veneer of its straightforwardness, a number of difficulties complicate the principle. Firstly, there is no objectively consistent definition of ‘harm’: while some argue that its definition extend to only bodily and psychological damage, others contend that it should encompass all things that impede or set back individual interests. Secondly, the harm principle’s operation becomes problematic when deciphering which of the actions and omissions of an individual are “morally significant contributors to the bringing about of harm” (Beitz 2007: 634). Due to the unintended consequences of certain actions of an agent, another individual may be harmed; we find here an incidence of harm without intent, which confuses the punitive measures that can be taken in response. The seminal dispute in the interpretation of the harm principle hinges on whether Mill tried to identify a set of acts that are immune from intervention or a set of reasons that justify coercion (Gaus 2004: 109). In either case, the operation of the principle carries with it a presumption of liberty. Therefore, if one consents to being harmed by the actions of one or more agents, the consent amounts to an autonomous decision outside the domain of coercion or intervention through the harm principle. Again, if an individual voluntarily chooses to harm herself, Mill would contend that she is free to do so. It would appear, thus, that Mill does not believe in any justification for paternalism and is a champion of free choice. However, self-harm is only free upon serving the requisites of ‘informed consent’ and ‘voluntary action’, paving the way for “paternalistic interventions”; the harm principle is not free standing, but attached to a more complex set of substantive categories, which make it a contingent (and not independent) standard of judgment (Gaus 2004: 110). It is impossible to locate a singularly accurate interpretation of the harm principle. Even with such a pluralist view, Mill offers no clarifications on which harms correspond to which kinds of state action, how disagreements on the understanding of harm can be adjudicated, and what governmental intervention should constitute (Shapiro 2003: 67-68). In the end, despite Mill’s best intentions, the harm principle throws up more questions than answers. At its core, the principle is undoubtedly a model built to safeguard individual liberty. However, this abstract construction does not always lend itself to unambiguous policies, given that we inhabit a world where individual choice and voluntary action invariably connote externalities and unintended consequences. It is little wonder, thus, that a large volume of contemporary liberal theory has concentrated on discussing the implications of the harm principle. References Beitz, C. R. (2007) ‘Human Rights.’ In A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Volume II [2nd Edition]. Ed. by R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit, & T. Pogge. Malden, MA: Blackwell: 628-637. Bird, C. (2006) An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Capaldi, N. (2004) John Stuart Mill: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fiss, O. (2003) ‘A Freedom Both Personal and Political.’ In Rethinking the Western Tradition: On Liberty / John Stuart Mill. Ed. by D. Bromwich & G. Kateb. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 179-196. Gaus, G. F. (2004) ‘The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.’ In Handbook of Political Theory. Ed. by G. F. Gaus & C. Kukathas. London: Routledge: 100-114. Knowles, D. (2001) Political Philosophy. London: Routledge. Mill, J. S. (2003) ‘On Liberty.’ In Rethinking the Western Tradition: On Liberty / John Stuart Mill. Ed. by D. Bromwich & G. Kateb. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: 73-175. Shapiro, I. (2003) The Moral Foundations of Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Read More