Creating an Effective Aviation Safety Management System Program - Research Paper Example

Creating an Effective Aviation Safety Management System Program College Creating an Effective Aviation Safety Management System Program Introduction This research paper shall engage an in-depth analysis of the concept of Safety Management System (SMS) especially within the considerations of the aviation industry with a close reference to previous renowned safety analysis case works in an attempt to try and consolidate information on the actual need for and how to create an effective SMS for purposes of safety sensitization and education in the daily operations of most organizations, the airline industry specifically (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). In the same regard, the best approach to take in this case is to first establish the basics of SMS with a close niche of the real life experiences using the numerous information available on this topic and typically, before setting out to elucidate the approach on how to create them, there is need to inform the whole process based on previous evidence and analysis. For a start, a Safety Management Systems (SMS) is a framework, which is principally formal and systematically indicates how to proactively identify risks and hazards before they eventually happen and become a big consideration to an organization (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). With the global business changes and the development of the modern organization, it has kind of become a regulation that before any company or business organization is legally considered safe for operation, there be a stated safety management system as a form of a reassurance that the risks that might be experienced by individuals while working for the organization are well informed to the management and that they are ready to mitigate. There actually are legal provisions and government recommendations and framed mechanisms to guide organizations on how to set their safety goals, plan for them, and measure the performance of the system (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000). Implicatively, an SMS is part and parcel of any given organization and in fact, defines the kind of operation and association the organization has and therefore every employee within the organization holds the responsibility of enforcing the frameworks for the well being of the business operations for the organization (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). In the aviation industry, SMS is a global standard that every industry player has to meet before they are officially licensed to operate and is closely monitored by global authorities. The industry operators therefore have a legal mandate to lay down, clearly, their SMS strategy defining how risk shall proactively be managed within the organization by first identifying the most likely risks within their lines of operation and how they shall be mitigated and controlled (Tracking, 2009). Usually, the formulation and formalization of this system will heavily rely on the communication structures the company puts in place in substantial availing and sustenance of the communication protocols of the potential associated risks and hazards to the employees and the public within the organization and how non-conformities shall be analyzed and determined, for purposes of system improvements (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). Important to note however is the fact that safety management systems are not just put in place for purposes of risk assaessment and prevention of hazards, rather, they are also used as the framework to investigate occurrences of such hazards in cases where they occur (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). In the investigation, the organization seeks to unravel the cause of the hazard and if possible align it to the occurrence for conformity and also determine the factual reason as to why the occurrence (Tracking, 2009). SMS Background According to FAA, the process of SMS is evolutionary in nature and structurally obliges organizations to prioritize and manage safety protocols within their operations as a part of the core business of the organization. The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) are the organizations charged with the responsibilities of recognizing the organizations’ roles in accident prevention by using Safety Management Systems as a framework to provide: A structure for safety, risk management and decision making, A way to demonstrate capability for safety management proactively, Risk control confidence by structuring safety assurance processes, An interface to share knowledge on safety management, and A framework for the promotion of safety and a sound safety culture. Within this same respect, a safety management system is then explained in terms of Risk Analysis, Accident Analysis, and Safety promotion. Risk analysis is done at the pre-occurrence stage, as a proactive measure to preventing occurrences of accidents and hazards while accident analysis is reactive to an occurrence already. Accident analysis is designed to elucidate the reason as to why the accident occurred, the extent of the damage and how to mitigate and control such occurrences. On the other hand, safety promotion is a construct of internal communication on the best practices to ensure the safety of the individuals within the premises of the organization (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). In a nutshell, SMS can be viewed as a threshold framework for an organization designed in such a manner so as to meet its stated legal obligations under occupational health and safety management law. The SMS structure should therefore be vocal to the effect of an organization tool for myriad occupational safety and health aspects and with an existence within the organization that would foresee the meeting of a safety focus beyond the threshold legal requirements labeled on it. But then, the effectiveness of an SMS heavily relies on the implementation of the same. In implementation, effectiveness would then demand that the organization is keenly looking into all possible risks within the organization within a single system to avoid competing systems within the organization and foster competence of the designs and structure of the system. The system has to be systematic, explicit, and comprehensive with an incorporated design to provide for goal setting, planning and performance evaluation. In the adoption process of SMS by organization, there is always the initial need to first understand what safety within the organization imperatively means. Safety definition within the organization is always key in the determination of the approach and efforts put in place to meet it. Safety is generally considered to be the reduction of risks to a level that is low, reasonable and practicable (Salmon Cornelissen & Trotter, 2012). This is done with close considerations from the imperatives of legal, ethical and financial dockets. This then implies that the use of SMS places a moral obligation on the employer to ensure the activities at the place of work sum up to being safe as it is also instrumental in the reduction of the financial risk exposure of the organization. History and Evolution of SMS in the aviation Industry In the early days of the aviation business, there was very little safety assurance as due to the fact that safety regulation by then was not fully developed as they would be in the modern setting. The pioneers often had quite considerably little practical experience and engineering knowledge that would then be important in the guiding the formulation of the same regulations. However, with time, and with improvements in operational experience and technological developments, aviation processes gradually started evolving and became more geared towards the improvement and the considerations of flying safety for all its employees and passengers. This actually saw improvements in the general safety with a centered focus on individualistic human factors so as to reduce accidents. The current standing in aviation safety analysis depicts an advanced regulation on safety standards within the industry however, there still are spaces for improvement and these opportunities are representative of the organizations’ role in the devising accident prevention protocols within their lines of operation and especially with regards to accidents with causal factors directly linked to organizational behaviors and attitudes. Global Aviation Policies, Regulations and Occurrences One of the most common aviation policies used as a global standard is ICAOs Annex 19 that encompasses the International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). This regulation is contained in the nineteen technical annexes of ICAO formulates during the Chicago Convention that is supposed to be universally applied for purposes of technical uniformity for safety. In 1997, ICAO devised GASP, a global aviation safety plan that defined the recommendations given by ANC and which was to serve as a guideline in the prioritization of the technical work programs, which was regularly updated till 2005 when there raised a need to have a broader plan to provide a common reference for all industry stakeholders. The plan was to proactively approach aviation safety policies worldwide to reduce accident rates for commercial aviation. This was later followed by the development of the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap in 2006 after a sitting in Montreal by ICAO and the Directors of Civil Aviation which was to provide a global framework for use in the coordination of safety policies and initiatives. ICAO then embarked on the development of the roadmap and revised its GASP with an objective to reduce the occurrence of accidents as was experienced within that duration worldwide without the consideration of the air traffic volumes. As a requirement of the same, the first Safety Management Manual was developed and published by ICAO to provide guidance to organizations on the designing and development of their individualized safety management systems. With this in place, the initial Chicago convention annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, and 14 had to be revised to give provisions for the frameworks for the implementation and maintenance of a State’s Safety Program (SSP) and another for the implementation of service providers’ Safety Management Systems. The target here was the harmonization of the extended provisions to the safety management for all categories of service providers from aircraft operators, navigation operators, aerodrome operators, maintenance service providers, aircraft design and assembly service providers, and to training organizations. All states were required to create programs that obliged aircraft operators, ATS service providers, and aerodrome operators to have an SMS for purposes of achieving safety standards and the systematic management of safety in their daily operations. In March 2010, the High Level Safety Conference (HLSC) which was attended by more than 600 delegates representing the 150 member countries and industry representatives recommended the development of a new annex with a specific focus on safety management. This annex was to contain frameworks for safety responsibilities under the SSPs and which included the implementation of SMS for aviation service providers. The following year, ANC established the Safety Management Panel (SMP) with regards to the previous year’s recommendations of the HLSC. The SMP was mandated to provide content recommendations and structure Annex 19. In 2011, the development of the annex was set off alongside the revision of the guidelines on the implementation of SSPs and SMS and was to consolidate the safety management responsibilities and processes for emulation by industry players (Salmon Cornelissen & Trotter, 2012). The annex 19 to the Chicago convention was then adopted by ICAO in February 2013 and was purely dedicated to safety management. This annex structurally consolidated the provisions of the SSP and SMS into one annex and was implemented as demonstrated tool to the support of continued safety evaluation for proactive strategies to improve safety. In the annex, the existing SARPs were merged together in one annex to serve as a one stop resource for states and industry players, with a few necessary modifications made for purposes of clarity and harmonization. With thus approach, it is expected that the continuity of the current SSPs and SMS requirements are maintained with a focus for new requirements in the preceding phases. The annex has provisions for safety management functions in direct support and relation to safe aircraft operations and the importance of Safety management across aviation domains. Role of SMS in Organization Safety A typical SMS is instrumental to the decision making around organization operations. As a tool, SMS helps organizations manage and adapt to change and increasing complexities within the consideration of limited resources. Through installed methods to predict hazards within the organization structure, SMS ensures continued safety improvement by use of employee reports and data collection. It hence uses the approach of reaction to previous occurrences and proactively includes them into modern and present considerations so that eventually, it uses the information to predict potential future problems (Salmon Cornelissen & Trotter, 2012). Goals and Aims of Safety Management Systems The main aim of SMS is to foster safety in any given organizational set up through the continuous assessment of the company systems and the improvement in the safety levels of the company/organization. The goals can however be spread over into either for external safety, for emergency preparedness, or as a typical government regulation (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, &Cromie, 2000). With external safety, the practice of SMS is focused on the individuals the company or organization associates with but indirectly. These can be clients to the organization’s services and products, or any other individuals. Such types of industries include industries such as retail, airline, food, and construction industries. Companies within these industries therefore ensure safety standards to avoid occurrence of hazards and for the reputation of the company’s operation. SMS also serve the role of emergency preparedness which cues the company and their employees in case of emergencies. Such a system will have laid out plans and responses for all employees and general public to follow in case of any emergency experienced in the company’s vicinity to as a way to avoid loss of lives. With respect to government regulation, SMS will be representative of a requirement for safety before operation that all stakeholders are obliged to meet before clearance for operation. It therefore becomes a qualification framework assessed by government bodies and international bodies such as the ICAO in the case of the aviation industry, as a global regulation. Creating an Effective Safety Management System: Components of SMS Safety management can be viewed from four perspectives, which ideally comprise the main components and elements of SMS. These are: safety policy; safety risk management; safety assurance, and safety promotion. a. Safety Policy In safety policy, the organization defines the policies put in place, which will imply the safety policies and procedures of the whole safety management system (Tracking, 2009). As a pillar, safety policy is important in determining the level of commitment by the organization in ensuring safety for everyone. It also stipulates the main operations within the system and how they will be conducted for purposes of improving safety. Safety policy therefore ensures that safety objectives are set and that the organization is sufficiently committed to the attainment of those objectives (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). However, these policies should be in compliance with the legal frameworks in direct effect of the organization and a documentation of the same made with a well-defined reporting and resolution mechanism to ensure responsibility and accountability (Tracking, 2009). Within the policies tenet, the organization consolidates new procedures into already existent procedures and determines cooperation through cross-communication within the organization. If anything, the success of any SMS heavily relies on this pillar as it influences the initial stages of the success of the SMS (Tracking, 2009). b. Safety Risk Management As would be expected, risk management is the most vital aspect in any given case of SMS and hence the modeling of the same. This owes to the fact that within the pillar of Safety Risk Management, the practical safety actions are defined. By defining it implies the identification of the risks, mitigation, and probable elimination of the risks before they get to be actual hazards, accidents or incidents. The organization identifies, tracks the risks, assesses them, and essentially controls them to manageable and acceptable levels after which it allocates resources to the specific tasks and if possible monitors the mitigate progress of the risks. Ideally, this approach is proactive to the occurrence of accidents and incidents and important in error prevention as opposed to the reactive approach. However, in the valuation of the risks the assessors need to have an understanding of the qualification criteria a risk so as to avoid misrepresentation of statuses and potential misallocation of resources (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). Usually, a risk is a consequence of a hazard which could accidental or incidental but either way cause a breakage of a chain of service delivery either inform of human loss or loss of any tangible operative instrument. In a nutshell, a risk is the actual loss: they are not tolerated and are measured in terms of occurrence probability and severity of the loss. In most SMS, organizations conduct PHA (Preliminary Hazard Analysis) so as to identify the hazards existent by auditing the organization processes, observations, investigations and probably even research, and many other methods, after which they then determine the kind of controls required, so as to control or better still eliminate the possibilities of the occurrence of the hazards (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000). c. Safety Assurance The safety assurance pillar answers the question of how safe are all the stakeholders or involved parties in an organization’s operation? Implicatively, there will be need for a continuous mechanism that monitors the safety of the organization and implements the relevant improvements to ensure that the safety and quality of goods and services within the organization are improved. Safety assurance obliges organizations to correct errors in their system and constantly conduct performance audits of the safety management system. In safety assurance, the task is for the system to have the ability to continue the implemented risk controls steadily and with consistency even in cases where there are changing environments (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). The actual purpose of this pillar is to bestow confidence in the engaged parties that the organization’s approach to outputting meets or even exceeds the safety requirements. However, key in this approach is building trust upon which a system of error reporting can be developed. It should be known that employees will never want to report an error if they know the implication of any error is punitive (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly & Cromie, 2000). It is therefore upon the management to develop a culture that is just both to the employees and the company operations. That when an error occurs employees are encouraged enough to report the error for rectification yet at the same time an error occurring due to some violations is justly punished (Leveson, 2004). d. Safety Promotion The fourth and last pillar is safety promotion. As the name suggests, this pillar involves doing almost anything and everything to promote safety in the organization. It therefore includes training of staff on safety mechanisms and generally ensuring a continuous and palpable effect of SMS is felt all around (McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000). The organization therefore develops a culture within its employees and production processes that upholsters safety and promotes effective communication within the organization for easier error reporting and correction. The training also aims at aligning the attitudes of employees towards perfecting of the processes of the organization or company; in this case, it is the role of everyone in the organization to promote safety. Implementation of SMS The implementation process of SMS equally takes consideration of the four pillars of a safety management system as explained in previous sections. So now, the obvious first step involves the definition of safety policies that generally takes the recommendations put under the local and global aviation regulatory bodies. The difference in the approaches however is indicative in the explanations on the different segments of this paper as the use of methodological findings and results are incorporated. When it comes to risk management, there are two aspects, the first being the identification of the risk itself and the second being controlling that identified risk, that is what is summed up into risk management. In this case therefore, the organization identifies the risk, risk, analyzes it, and mitigates it to some desirable level or if possible eliminates the risk from the processes totally (Rasmussen, 1997). In most cases, risk identification would involve physically analyzing the possibility of an occurrence of a hazard by assessing the structures and operations of the organization followed by the setting up of mechanisms to control the occurrence of the hazard to prevent unprecedented losses (Leveson, 2004). This risk identification process is then used to set safety policies and model a management system to be used within the organization. Eventually, in the long run, the organization is able to formulate a SMS manual which documents the risk analysis mechanisms which has to be constantly updated to reflect on the most current definitions of risks as the organizational operations and instrumentation changes (Rasmussen, 1997). The implementation of risk management would also involve the allocation of company resources with respect to the defined processes. Resources could be finances to replace damaged instrumentations due to an occurrence of a hazard or even legal fees in cases where the organization is faced with legal charges. Risk Management: Operational issues in Aviation Industry In aviation, one common accidental phenomenon is known as the bird strike. These kinds of accidents usually occur when flocks of birds attack airport runways preventing the aircraft from normal landing (Allan, 2000). Also at times, the aircraft could encounter bird strikes during take offs and at relatively high altitudes which is even more dangerous. The results of this kind of risk is grave as it is known to be the main cause of accidents and the fact that controlling it has proven quite difficult has only complicated issues (Leveson, 2004). The first reported and recorded bird strike aircraft collision, took place in 1992 in the United States (Lewis, 1995) and proceeding this, similar occurrences of such strikes has inflicted a near total of fifty two aircrafts, losing a total of almost 190 lives on a global scale (Allan, 2000). Most of such collisions had resulted to only minor damages on the airplane, however, in 1995, a bird strike led to the loss of twenty four lives upon a US Army Boeing plane (Boeing E-3B) when it collided with the birds as it was taking off from the runway. Investigations indicated that the birds, which were the Canada Geese flew in front of the plane when it was taking off and a number of them were ingested in two of the aircrafts engines that resulted in the blockage of the engines and hence insufficient power production (ICAO, 2001). Approximately 30,000 bird strikes are reported to inflict civilian aircrafts every year, with an average global cost due to the incidents of approximately US $ 3 billion annually. A typical solution to this would be to apply methods in the creation of a safety management plan to mitigate such issues. Risk Management: Methods Using the issue above, the identification processes would identify bird strikes as the primary risk. The definitions of the risk would then encompass the areas of occurrence of the risks that involves the taking off, at high altitudes and during landing. However, with the increase in air transport and equal increase in bird’s population due to wildlife conservation programs, it can only be assumed that such occurrences will be detrimental if not controlled and managed on an early level (Leveson, 2004). In the risk management process, there is need to know the specifics of the accident: the species of birds that are common, there common breeding grounds, the parts of the plane that are usually affected and then devise a counter plan to avoid such occurrences in proceeding days. Interestingly, the management of such a risk is usually left to the airport managements. Indicatively, these birds will always have specific kinds of environments where they will prefer visiting for ecological purposes. All these factors are therefore relevant for consideration before the airport authorities decide on a place to set up airport grounds. Decisions such as ensuring the runaways are free of food substances that can attract the birds can also help to a great extent. Specific approaches could therefore include the clearing of the birds’ nesting areas, reducing amount of stagnant water on the airport grounds and possibly scaring the birds away using laser beams and short guns. As much as the admissibility of the above could be practical, the results from them might not be practically implacable in all bird species. The best approach in management of the bird strike hazard is therefore to study the patterns of the strikes and schedule flights in situations that most definitely will reduce the strikes, the same way flights are scheduled with respect of weather. Safety assurance involves doing everything possible to ensure the delivery of safe products and services to the clients or customers. It is a mechanism through which an organization proves beyond any visible doubt that their services or products are safe for consumption. However, safety assurance does not only imply in the cases of customer satisfaction but also an environment that assures even the employees of their safety. Safety assurance is a principal determinant of success especially in the airline industry. On the other hand, lack of safety assurance will imply high probability of occurrence of accidents. Safety Assurance: Operational Issue Ideally, safety is an implicative of the absence of accidents. With respect to aviation, accident is an occurrence respective to an aircraft operation between the times of an individual boarding the aircraft for purposes of travelling and the person disembarking the aircraft on reaching the destination in which either a person is fatally injured as a result of him/her being in the aircraft, or the aircraft is damaged or structurally fails and does not perform as per its specified strengths (Leveson, 2004). In safety assurance, the approach is usually the analysis of accidents and incidents common to the aviation industry in a bid to ensure the prevention of the occurrence of such accidents again in future. Accident analysis models are mostly used in this case. Such model include the Swiss cheese model, the Shell Model, the hazard scenario model, the 5M model of system engineering, and others such as the sequential model, epidemiological models (analogous to the spread of diseases), and systematic accident models. The Swiss Cheese Model - This model analyses the advancement of hazards through successful layers of defenses till it finally becomes an accident or is deflected into a mitigated and controlled mode. The cheese holes are viewed as active failures in controlling risks that eventually turn into accidents (Leveson, 2004). The underlying reason behind the use of this accident model is to conceptualize the accident and also try to explain how the accident occurred, why it occurred, where, and the possibilities of how it occurred. The SHELL Model – the SHELL model is usually used as design tool to prevent accidents and hence safety assurance. It is a conceptual model of human factors with a scope clarification if such factors and their relationships with aviation systems, resources, and the human sub systems (Hawkins & Orlady, 1993). Initially developed by Edward (1972) and later developed into a structural building block by Hawkins (1984), it is representative of the components: software, hardware, environment, and liveware which now incorporates the human factor, and has a concentrated emphasis on the human interaction with other components of the aviation system (Johnston, McDonald, & Fuller, 2001). The SHELL model’s perception is a narration of the fact that the human factor is rarely the only cause of accident and hence considers the systems perspective that looks into the context and task related factors with which the human factor interacts with in the aviation system. The 5M Model - the 5M model is an approach used to investigate the occurrence of accidents and it literally comprises the 5M that are representative of: Man, Machine, Medium, Mission, and Management which typical of the five main failing factors of modern accidents. It actually is the most commonly used models in the investigation of accidents in the aviation industry. It is systematic and is focused on the main analysis areas within which accidents occur. The first M that represents man as a factor basically involves the human elements i.e the physiology of the human aspect, the psychology and the proficiency of the human operator. The second M represents the medium i.e. the environment within which the task and operations are conducted. It also includes the external environment such as the weather, terrain, obstructions, sun, airfield lightings, and navigation aids. Third, there is the M that represents the machine which is a reference to the design elements and the manufacturing, and maintenance of the aircraft (Leveson, 2004). The management M on the other hand is concerned with the supervisory elements of the operation in terms of regulations, policies and general safety attitudes. Finally, the mission M refers to the type of task that was being implemented. It seeks to establish whether the task was complex or routine. HFACS – as a method, it was developed by Dr. Doug Wiegmann alongside Dr. Scott Shappell and is used a s a framework for human error and their factorial contribution to accidents. In most cases, this model is applied together with the Cheese Model and is designed to investigate training and prevention of accidents (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). It systematically identifies failures, both active and latent that could have caused an accident and is purely uses for analysis and by extension incorporates Heinrichs “Domino Theory” and Edwards “SHELL Model (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). Under HFACS, there are four levels cognizant to failure: unsafe acts especially by operators i.e. skill based errors, decision errors, or perceptual errors, and violations (routine or exceptional) (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000); the preconditions stage i.e. environmental, conditional operators or personnel factors; unsafe supervision; and organizational influences which could imply factors like poor resource management, poor and inappropriate working environment in the organization, and inappropriate operational processes (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000). Safety Promotion: Implementation This in a nutshell would involve anything and everything done so as to ensure the safety of an operation within the aviation industry. This will involve training of personnel for competence, and designing of comprehensive operation procedures to ensure the systems are free of failures. The most important aspect of safety promotion is the communication mechanism put in place (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). Promotion is all about communicating the need, and availing resources to foster safety within and without the organizations. The success of safety promotion therefore heavily relies on the organization attitudes with regards to aviation safety and their facilitation towards the attainment of the same. This then implies the promotional messages should be designed in a way so as to attract the attention of an audience and basically in a layman’s language promote proficiency of safety workplace attitudes. This is done by first ensuring a favoring organizational culture with respect to safety programs, which is key to winning the trust of the employees (Allan, 2000). In this case, safety promotion is therefore a construct of the management and they have to be totally involved in it for it so that the employees are motivated enough to ensure safety in their daily operations (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). But then, to a great extent, safety promotion sets the tone for the organization and foster improved safety performance. It actually supplements safety policies by creating a culture or a certain kind of behavior within the employees that is healthy in the development of a safety healthy value system. It ensures the adherence these polices and establishes competence in the technical processes of the organization including the technical staff. Safety promotion is therefore enhanced through education and training, effective communication and information sharing (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). Ideally, safety promotion campaigns are supposed to involve comprehensive sensitization of the staff and management about safety and an assurance of the same processes (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). The first thing in the safety promotion campaign is usually, to initiate training in safety management systems for both the management and the employees. The training has to specifically be conducted at all levels of management and tackle specific areas of safety promotion i.e. communication, and documentation of safety information. However, much focused should be aligned to the communication processes within the organization as a continuous way of ensuring the employees are sensitive to the need for safety operations within the company (Allan, 2000). Communication can be done by use of aids such as bulletins, notices, newsletters, intranets and periodic briefings on the safety status of operations, periodic seminars and annual safety retraining for new and joining staff and retraining of any other old staff as recommended by the supervisors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). It is then expected that after the training, the management will closely supervise activities of flight operations and if possible come up with an event log for all employees to be recorded and submitted online before they leave the premises for their homes (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). The logs could be for employees to report any unusual activity noticed during their normal working procedures and are filled by every employee regardless of their department. These are then to be used by the analysis team during risk analysis processes to be able to establish any new possible causes of accidents or incidents. The following is an example of a typical training approach that can be used (Allan, 2000). From the design, it is expected to enable the operator manage risks and possibly tackle emergency operations as they arise (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). All employees can be provided with online accounts to internally submit reports of unusual occurrences while they are working which are submitted to an online database that analyses the information for key words and ranks them for severity and linked to an alerting mechanism depending on the logged information. The employee accounts for log event will be in containment of all the details of the employees and their active roles and instance of the noticed event (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). The role of the supervisor would then be to oversee the operation of the employees and foresee the reporting progresses of the employees (Allan, 2000). The training process is however supposed to be continuous to ensure that relevant changes in operations and risk management are captured within the trainings. Each new employee will have to be taken through the training processes before they can be stationed for duty. 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(2003). A human error approach to aviation accident analysis: The human factors analysis and classification system. Aldershot [u.a.: Ashgate. Wiegmann, D. A., &Shappell, S. A. (2012). A human error approach to aviation accident analysis: The human factors analysis and classification system. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Read More