Human Factors in Aviation - Assignment Example

 Human Factors Report Justifying Operations in Australia There has been much heated debate over whether Pavlovian Airlines should be allowed to establish aviation operations in Australia, with opponents indicating that the firm’s lack of a Human Factors program could potentially jeopardize consumer and employee safety. Based on our current financial position, introducing such a program is not feasible and would entail significant labour and capital expenditure to initiate a firm-wide program. Even without the implementation of such a program, Pavlovian Airlines is well-equipped to ensure appropriate safety protocols as a viable airline servicing the Australian consumer and commercial customers. In a study conducted by Inglis, Sutton and McRandle (2007), a total of 2,025 different aviation accidents were studied to determine what factors served as the contributors to these mishaps and disasters which occurred between 1993 and 2003. In only eight cases, supervisory errors were deemed to be primary conditions causing these accidents (Inglis, et al.). Furthermore, in only one incident, managerial failure to take corrective action to fix a known problem was cited as a contributing safety factor (Inglis, et al.). Hence, organisational factors and supervisory factors represent only a marginal catalyst for aviation accidents and safety incidents. Pavlovian Airlines maintains a well-developed and highly in-depth training program for all supervisors responsible for overseeing aviation operations which has had proven results in improving employee competency for safe flight operations. We call this training Crew Resource Management which focuses on improving communication and collaboration between pilots, operations employees, air traffic control, service station operation crew, maintenance, flight attendants and other supervisory staff involved in the business. This training facilitates greater competency in problem-solving, team methodology, knowledge transfer, situational awareness and the use of automated technologies throughout the entire business model. CRM training emphasizes best practice strategies to ensure safe airline operations and raise management awareness of employee psychology that might exacerbate the problem of maintaining a quality safety record (Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm 1999). In the same study by Inglis, et al. (2007), skill-based errors were attributed to a significant 1,333 accidents in the aviation sector in Australia. Our well-developed CRM program emphasizes skill development for all employees throughout the entire model, improving their skills competencies, a program with quantifiable results in improving human skills proficiency and expertise. We rigorously test all employees to gauge their comprehension of skills training concepts and we do not certify these employees until they have scored at least 90 percent on this in-depth skills testing model. Hence, our CRM program justifies our ability to operate safely in Australia, as it is unparalleled in the international aviation industry. Furthermore, Pavlovian Airlines routinely collects safety incident data and utilizes logistic regression methodology to determine an odds ratio that will predict which areas of operations and decision-making requires training-based adjustment. This methodology is modelled against a model for predicting the potential risk of aviation incidents related to human skills and decision-making provided by Walker and Bills (2008) designed to quantify where safety-related issues require addressing through appropriate training programs. Combined with an intensive psychometric testing procedure which measures the socio-psychological capabilities and deficiencies of all employees throughout the entire organizational model, we have the capability to virtually eliminate all risk factors associated with human capacity that could potentially contribute to safety incidents and accidents. While other airlines conduct qualitative analyses which is based on subjective interpretation, Pavlovian Airlines quantifies its best practice approaches based on hard data and statistical analyses to identify our existing weaknesses and predict future safety capacity. Hence, while Pavlovian Airlines is currently ill-equipped to launch a Human Factors program modelled against Australian standards for safety practice and prevention, our CRM program is unequalled in the aviation sector in Australia and throughout the world. We have established a model that is capable of providing valuable metrics that effectively and competently measure human behaviour which is examined by executive leadership, human resource management and line management throughout the business model to construct more effective and evolved training concepts. This methodology, combined with psychometric evaluation and Crew Resource Management ideology, provides for irrefutable statistics about our capacity to maintain safe and incident-free aviation operations in Australia. Arguing Blockage of Pavlovian Airlines in Australia The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has rigorously reviewed Pavlovian Airlines’ bid to establish operations in Australia and has determined that the firm’s lack of appropriate Human Factors program provides excessive liability to human safety and this bid should be effectively blocked until such development is implemented. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) states that human error is the most primary threat to ensuring aviation safety for airlines (CASA 2015). With this recognition, Pavlovian Airlines’ lack of emphasis on preventative strategies for human error poses substantial danger to ensuring appropriate safety measures. Maintenance is a fundamental aspect of ensuring aviation safety and evidence suggests that maintenance errors contribute to more safety incidents and accidents than any other factor (Reason and Hobbs 2003). In fact, it is estimated that 60 percent of all aviation accidents are directly attributed to human error in the maintenance operations of an airline model (Learmount 2004). Pavlovian Airlines has not implemented a human factors program to ensure maintenance safety, a job role environment in which maintenance employees face psychological stress where work is highly strenuous, and requires significant attention to detail. Maintenance workers are often forced to comply with substantial time pressures, exacerbating opportunities to make fatal errors in aircraft maintenance processes. In many instances, maintenance teams are forced to perform mundane and repetitive work obligations, creating opportunities for employees to make absent-minded errors such as failing to install basic, required components (Hobbs and Williamson 2002). Regulation 42ZV of The Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (1998) mandates that all airlines in Australia establish a system of surveillance that ensures maintenance operators are performing their maintenance tasks in a satisfactory manner. While Pavlovian Airlines does comply with this oversight, the airline has not established a relevant framework for supervisory oversight that recognizes environmental factors and socio-psychological factors that are just as relevant in ensuring safe and competent maintenance operations. Maintenance workers are subject to experiencing adverse mental conditions which has been recognized as being positively correlated with inadequate supervisory oversight (ATSB 2008). Pavlovian Airlines’ safety protocols recognise the tangible factors of maintenance oversight, such as having independent evaluators examine the quality of maintenance activity, but has not established a system which identifies an inspection process addressing environmental, social and psychological states of maintenance workers necessary to ensure appropriate safety measures. Australian best practice in human factors governance (at the supervisory level) understands that these aforementioned, less-tangible assessments are critical for ensuring top level safety performance by maintenance workers. In fact, in one study, adverse mental states maintained the highest probability for instances of unsafe acts which was supported by logistic regression methodology of available safety instance data (ATSB). With no relevant model addressing psychological realities in the maintenance division under a human factors program, Pavlovian Airlines is leaving potential adverse mental conditions to chance rather than building an oversight system necessary to identify these conditions and rectify their recurrences. The ATSB (2009) reports that because maintenance workers perform constant routine behaviours, they are more prone to slips. The ATSB reports an instance of a maintenance worker performing this routine maintenance on a helicopter in which the worker automatically reached for a rag to wipe up an oil spot on the aircraft. However, this lack of conscious awareness as a result of redundant activities caused the rag to be swallowed by the aircraft’s engine intake which led to costly foreign object damage to the helicopter (ATSB). Pavlovian Airlines is compliant to maintenance regulations at the technical level, but has failed to properly address psychosomatic aspects of human behaviour which are strong predictors of predicted, future safety incidents and accidents as was reported by the ATSB (2008). It is not just the mental state of maintenance workers, but also of pilots, flight crew and ground support that must be considered to ensure a quality safety record for airlines. Maladaptive psychological behaviours are recognized in human factors programs with most airlines, adding a psychotherapeutic methodology to the process of safety management (Martinussen and Hunter 2010). Probability theory, as a type of mathematical expression of human psychology, serves as a relevant model for contemporary Australian airlines to incorporate psychological evaluation and recognition into their human factors programs. This ideology has improved safety records attributed to human error for international airlines (Martinussen and Hunter), justifying that Pavlovian Airlines is significantly increasing safety-related liabilities to Australia by not incorporating psychological assessment and evaluation throughout the firm’s organisational model. Pavlovian Airlines, therefore, in its current state, is not a viable aviation model with the legitimate capacity to service the Australian environment. If Pavlovian Airlines can be coerced to establish a human factors ideology in its current operational model, CASA will endorse its entry into the Australian aviation industry. However, the firm is adamant that such an endeavour is not feasible due to its capital position and labour capabilities, thus serving as an endangerment to the Australian airline traveller. While other airlines recognize the human factor element and its congruence to positive safety, this non-conformist airline simply does not acknowledge its deficiencies associated with human factor recognition and resolution ideology. A High Court Determination on Pavlovian Airlines in Australia Human factors are rarely admissible in High Court cases in the judicial context, as they are subject to a judge’s knowledge and expertise of a situation and qualitative values of the presiding authority (Enright 2010). Judicial interpretation of an incident relies on judges’ idiosyncrasies, hunches and even intuition in the event that provided evidence cannot be quantified (Enright). This is, in the High Court, established to prevent irrational judgments based on individual judge predispositions. Hence, without a valid set of evidence showing a poor safety record by Pavlovian Airlines in which human error can be reasonably established as the culprit for safety incidents and accidents, it is unlikely that the High Court will hear speculative assertions about the potential liability associated with not having a well-constructed human factors program at the airline. Furthermore, the High Court established in the 1970s that safety could not be ensured in aviation simply by addressing human performance deficiencies; rather that addressing systemic defects was necessary as a primary objective of airlines (Weigner and Nagel 1988). Efforts have been imposed on legislative bodies to assert this notion that human deficiency can explain safety issues, guised under the notion of recurring quality improvement, but such efforts have failed to saturate legal jurisprudence and establish precedents which support this ideology (Weigner and Nagel). While CASA sustains very quality arguments that a human factors program at Pavlovian Airlines would be beneficial for addressing human behavioural factors which could potentially lead to safety incidents or accidents, Pavlovian Airlines is not in a state of non-compliance with established Australian aviation regulations by not implementing such a program. While it is suggested as a best practice methodology, without a legal framework coercing an airline to abide to a human factors methodology, it is unlikely that CASA can convince the court to block the airlines’ entry into the Australian aviation market. In 1975, the High Court in the case, Australian National Airlines Commission v. Commonwealth and Canadian Pacific Airways Ltd, found that the Canadian Pacific Airways pilot was negligent in a runway collision after misinterpreting the instructions of air traffic control. The Court found that this pilot should have relied on his own eyes and ears to provide appropriate action cues for the aircraft and was negligent in sustaining situational awareness (Bartsch 1996). In this situation, human factors were admitted as potential cause for the serious collision, however there was sufficient, quantifiable evidence of human negligence underpinned by substantial expert testimony in the aviation industry and the presence of a shattered aircraft. CASA’s arguments are only inductive, founded on generalizations about the potential liabilities that could be imposed on Australia by not sustaining a human factors ideology in the airline’s operational model. The results of an empirical study of over 2,000 different aviation incidents and accidents found that over 1,300 of them were attributed to skills-based errors (Inglis, et al. 2007). This is an organizational problem at airlines and suggests a need for better training systems to ensure that all employees are competent and proficient in their job role responsibilities. This places liability on the airline itself and not inherent human error. As Pavlovian Airlines identified, it has established a rigorous and in-depth CRM training system which it refers to as unprecedented in order to ensure that its employees are adept and capable of performing high quality work outcomes. In the event that Pavlovian Airlines did not have such a CRM system in place, this would represent a blatant violation of legislative mandates imposed by The Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (1998) regarding establishment of appropriate employee certification and training. The speculative nature of CASA’s arguments, while founded on some dimension of evidence that human error and behaviour can impact safety records, it is unlikely that the High Court maintains the ability to block Pavlovian Airlines from entering the Australian aviation industry. CASA’s arguments are founded on hypothetical scenarios (a what-if scenario) that cannot be backed by a poor safety record by the airline or quantified by sufficient metrics supporting that the airline will definitely impose safety liabilities on Australia. If CASA was capable of conducting an independent audit of Pavlovian Airlines, a competent investigation that could provide proof of deficiency caused by human factors, the High Court would consider blocking market entry. Through the use of a mixed auditing methodology consisting of employee interviews, examination of safety records and incidents, determining the viability of the firm’s training program, and assessing all aspects of operational strategy, this would be substantial proof that Pavlovian Airlines poses a danger to consumer safety. However, the Australian government supports a more free market ideology with limited regulation and opportunities for businesses to establish models they deem relevant in benefit to the business. Imposing such an audit on Pavlovian Airlines, a longitudinal study, would represent non-compliance to free market ideology and likely give the airline just cause for a retaliatory lawsuit against such an auditing authority for coercing compliance with no appropriate legal framework to justify such an in-depth and invasive audit. CASA’s arguments are theoretical in nature and serve as a supposition as a means of coercing the High Court to consider blockage of the firm’s entry into Australia. A premise or theory is insufficient for gaining support by the High Court to seek legal technique to obstruct this entry. CASA could not provide substantial facts and hard data which demonstrate Pavlovian Airlines is deficient in ensuring its employees are competent, proficient and understand how to maintain situational awareness. Therefore, the High Court will not serve as a presiding agent seeking market entry blockage for Pavlovian Airlines until CASA approaches the court with evidence substantiated liability claims and corroborating this evidence with quantifiable metrics of safety negligence or similar reckless abandon along its business model. References ATSB. (2009). An overview of human factors in aviation maintenance, Australian Transport Safety Bureau. [online] Available at: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/27818/hf_ar-2008-055.pdf (accessed 30 March 2015). ATSB. (2008). Evaluation of the human factors analysis and classification system as a predictive model, Australian Transport Safety Bureau. [online] Available at: http://www.dviaviation.com/files/45147192.pdf (accessed 1 June 2015). Bartsch, R. (1996). Aviation law in Australia. Sydney: LBC Information Services. CASA. (2015). Human Factors Activities: Human Factors in CASA, Civil Aviation Safety Authority. [online] Available at: http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_100997 (accessed 1 June 2015). Enright, C. (2010). Legal technique. Sydney: The Federation Press. Helmreich, R.L., Merritt, A.C. and Wilhelm, J.A. (1999). The evolution of crew resource management in commercial aviation, International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9, pp.19-32. Hobbs, A. and Williamson, A. (2002). Skills, rules and knowledge in aircraft maintenance: errors in context, Ergonomics, 45, pp.290-308. Inglis, M., Sutton, J., & McRandle, B. (2007). Human factors analysis of Australian aviation accidents and comparison with the United States. Canberra: Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Learmount, D. (2004). Annual accident survey, Flight International, January, pp.34-36. Martinussen, M. and Hunter, D.R. (2010). Aviation psychology and human factors. New York: Taylor & Francis. Nagel, D.C. (1988). Human factors in aviation. San Diego: Academic Press. Reason, J. and Hobbs, A. (2003). Managing maintenance error: a practical guide. Ashgate: Aldershot. Walker, M.B. and Bills, K.M. (2008). Analysis, causality and proof in safety investigations. Canberra: Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Read More