Conflict, violence and humanitarianism - Case Study Example

Colombian conflict Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) It was formed in 1964 It was the largest and oldestleft-wing group in ColombiaIt had approximately 8000 fighters (Muggah 2009).Its mission was to overthrow the government and install a Marxist regime. This is through the use of armed struggle.After attack by the paramilitary forces, the group turned to drug trade in order to raise money to sustain itself (Rabasa & Chalk 2001).Although it has weakened, it remains in the top list of US terrorist groupsNational Liberation Army (ELN)It was formed in 1965The group was mainly inspired by Cuban revolution and Marxist ideologies (Isser 2011) It has approximately 1500 fighters (Sandole 2009)It generated funds through ransom and extortionsIt recently turned to drug traffickingThis group has an attribute of being cruel, compulsive and inconsistent in the way they conduct their attacksThey have a behavior of murdering people, kidnapping, and arsonTheir actions have context of body harm United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)It was formed in 1997It is led by Carlos CastañoThe group has more than ten thousands combatantsIt was mainly formed by landowners and drug traffickers (Millett & Army War College (U.S.) 2002)It was formed to respond to frequent kidnappings and extortionsThe group entered into a peace agreement with the government in 2002 (Loveman 2006)This group has an attribute of being cruel, behavior of murdering people, and a context of poverty which makes them form the group.

BACRIMIt emerged after demobilization of paramilitariesIt has approximately 3400 membersIt is involved in drug traffickingIt combines paramilitary’s facets with mafia like criminal strictures and operationsThey engage in extortions and illegal miningIt has an attribute of lack of empathy, behavior of coercion, and a context of poverty Colombia governmentThe government has been trying to combat the various groups that have arisen due to poor leadership (Hintjens & Žarkov 2015). In several cases, it has been accused of failing to offer the people with the security.

It controls the military although it was accused of being ill-trained and equipped (In Sacipa-Rodriguez & In Montero 2014). On the other hand, the government failed to bring the groups together in order to sign the peace deal. In addition, some of the officials have been accused of supporting the rebels. In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe refused to enter into a negotiating table with FARC and instead launched maximal military (Leech & Information Network of the Americas 2002). Nevertheless, the government has been trying to implement new laws on victims through compensationMilitaryIt has been in the forefront in fighting the rebel groups.

It has been helping in settling the indigenous people who have been replaced by the war (Drake & Hershberg 2006). It has been asking for external help in order to overwhelm the group of rebels. Poor financing from the government has been making it very hard for it to face the guerilla groups.International Organization for Migration (IOM)It has been compensating victims of violence in order to overcome extreme poverty. In addition, it has been in the forefront in pushing the government to sign the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ballentine & Sherman 2003).

The initiative aims at compensating four million people. Furthermore, it provides support to the affected people through building heath centers and schools (Fouskas 2007). The body has also been liaising with the private sector in order to encourage the organizations to participate in corporate social responsibility with the aim of improving the lives of the local population which has been mainly affected by the war (Öberg & Strøm 2008).United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesIt entered Colombia in 1997.

It has been supporting the victims of war through providing basic necessities (Bouvier 2009). In addition, it has been pressuring the government to sign peace deals and compensate the victims. Many of the people have been displaced, an aspect that has increased the demand for aid (Flämig & Leiner 2012).ReferencesBallentine, K., & Sherman, J. (2003). The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Bouvier, V. M. (2009). Colombia: Building peace in a time of war.

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Drake, P. W., & Hershberg, E. (2006). State and society in conflict: Comparative perspectives on Andean crises. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Flämig, S., & Leiner, M. (2012). Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Fouskas, V. (2007). The politics of conflict: A survey. London: Routledge. Hintjens, H. M., & Žarkov, D. (2015). Conflict, Peace, Security and Development: Theories and Methodologies.

New York: Routledge. In Sacipa-Rodriguez, S., & In Montero, M. (2014). Psychosocial approaches to peace-building in Colombia. Isser, D. (2011). Customary justice and the rule of law in war-torn societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Leech, G. M., & Information Network of the Americas. (2002). Killing peace: Colombias conflict and the failure of U.S. intervention. New York: Information Network of the Americas (INOTA. Loveman, B. (2006). Addicted to failure: U.S. security policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Millett, R., & Army War College (U.S.). (2002). Colombias conflicts: The spillover effects of a wider war. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Muggah, R. (2009). Security and post-conflict reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war. London: Routledge. Öberg, M., & Strøm, K. (2008). Resources, governance and civil conflict. London: Routledge/ECPR. Rabasa, A., & Chalk, P. (2001). Colombian labyrinth: The synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Sandole, D. J. (2009). Handbook of conflict analysis and resolution. London: Routledge.