Evolution of Seaport Shipping Container Security Since 9/11 - Research Paper Example

Introduction: More than 80% of the world trade depends heavily on maritime trade. On this basis, any disruption of the maritime network will have a great disruption of the world economy. In the 2006 congressional budget office report, the report denoted that closing the port of Los Angeles, would lead to a massive loss of 150 million US dollars per day1. For example, a labor dispute that occurred in 2002, between the representative body of dock workers, and port terminal operators at the port of West Coast led to the closure of the port for 10 days, leading to a massive loss of 15 billion dollars2. Because of this great economic importance of ports, worldwide ports, maritime operations and their associated infrastructure and facilities represents one of the greatest challenges to security of nations, as well as to the growth of the global economy. Despite the economic importance of the ports, before the terrorist’s attack of the US in September 2001, the American ports were very vulnerable to terrorism attacks. In a bid to protect the ports and the containers shipped in it, the department of homeland security has developed a number of policies aimed at bolstering security in the ports. Examples of such security measures include container security initiative, as well as C-TPAT. In as much as the government aims to strengthen the security of the ports; and that of the shipping containers, there are a number of challenges that the government3. One such challenge is that ports of entry are unique, and their environment is a difficult place to secure. On this basis, initiating adequate security measures and procedures to the volumes of activities occurring in the port, without affecting the operations of the port is almost impossible. Another issue that plays a great role in frustrating the efforts of the government to secure the ports is the large size of the ports. Ports normally occupy hundreds of acres of water and land, so that they can have the capability of accommodating ships, rail and truck traffic, as well as enough space for the storage of containers4. On this basis, securing such a large perimeter that is surrounded by land, as well as water is a very complex situation. Based on these facts, most countries in the world are unable to secure their ports. Before the September 11 attacks, the United States was very vulnerable to biological or chemical attacks. This is because proprietors of shipped containers were not allowed to declare the contents of their containers, until they reached their port of entry. This made the country very vulnerable to attacks, and hence after the Sept 11 attacks, these loopholes and others started receiving attention5. This paper examines the evolution of the seaport shipping container security, after the September 11th attacks. Evolution: In the year 2002, the United States customs service was able to launch a container security initiative, and this was in response to the vulnerable position that the American seaport was facing. The main purpose of this program was to prevent an entry of containers that could contain harmful weapons in the United States. This container security initiative consisted of four major components, namely identification of high risk containers, pre-screening of such containers before their entry into the United States, use of technology for purposes of pre-screening containers that are high risk, and development and usage of smart technology for purposes of securing such containers6. The container security initiative policy aimed at focusing on the ports referred to as the mega ports. These are ports responsible for dominating the global sea trade, and each of these ports have the capability of handling thousands of containers in a year. It is important to denote that the top 20 ports in the world have the capability of handling more than 70% of containers that are destined to enter into the United States7. For purposes of carrying out a pre-screening, the personnel of the US Customs service were to be deployed in a foreign port. Their tasks were only to concentrate on screening products that are destined to the US market. When this container initiative program was introduced in 2002, a number of ports in the world, responsible for handling high volume containers were able to join this program. The first ports where US Customs inspectors were deployed, were in Canada, and are the ports of Montreal, Halifax, as well as the port of Vancouver8. This was in March, 2002. These ports normally handle more than half a million containers that are to be transported to the United States. In response to this program, the Canadian customs agency also sent its inspectors to the ports of Newark, and that of Seattle, which normally handle more than 65,000 sea port containers that are always destined for Canada, in each and every year. In June the same year, Singapore joined the container initiative program, and it was followed by other European seaports of Le Havre, Antwerp, Rotterdam, as well as the ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven located in Germany. Other countries that joined the program are Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, etc.9. In November of the year 2002, when the customs agency of the United States denoted that the electronic details of the consignment data will have to be posted 24 hours before the loading of a cargo on a vessel that has docked at a foreign port. Implementing this requirement was of great challenge to the various ports in Asia, and Europe. This is because these ports handled large volumes of shipping containers, and the time frame of 24 hours before the loading of the containers was very small. Furthermore, this initiative faced another legal challenge, one year after its inception10. The legal challenge emanated from the European Union, which brought a case against its member states, who were able to join the container security initiative. The European Union argued that the US should have negotiated with the European Union, as an entire body, as opposed to negotiating with individual countries. On this basis, the European Union argued that signatory ports will have a higher advantage, over non-signatory ports. This would therefore undermine the principles of fair competition. While the implementation of the container security initiative was going on, the United States congress was creating maritime security legislation11. The Maritime security transportation act of 2002 was therefore developed from this legislation, and this was a comprehensive legislation that touched on the security of the port. However, congress was unable to identify the methods of funding this act, and this was a major limiting factor, despite its approval. This piece of legislation had the following requirements12, The secretary in charge of transportation had the duty of conducting a risk assessment, of all shipping containers near or on water for purposes of identifying high risk containers that are vulnerable to an attack. There was a need of developing a maritime as well as a national security plan. All facilities, vessels and ports trading in the US had the responsibility of developing a comprehensive security plan, and the United States coast guard should have the responsibility of approving these security plans. Setting up of local port Security Council’s for purposes of coordinating the efforts of local, state, federal, as well as private bodies responsible for enforcing security at the ports. This also includes agencies such as immigration, customs, FBI, intelligence agencies, as well as the US Coast Guards. The department of transportation should be responsible for developing regulations for purposes of securing of the ports, and this includes the development of identification cards of all the workers, working in the ports. In as much as these measures were aimed at improving the security of the port, this bill made it mandatory for the Coast Guards to fund the provisions contained in it. Originally, legislators proposed that the bill was to be funded through imposing fees on all shipping vessels entering the United States. This would have helped the government to raise more than 3.2 billion dollars that could have helped to facilitate the security of the Port13. However, shipping agencies and the stakeholders affected by these fees opposed this program, and argued that the implementation of security arrangements at the port was not a preserve of the shipping companies alone, but of the entire state. On this basis, the security cost of protecting the ports was to be shared and thus equally distributed. The immediate reaction of the US in response to the September 11 attacks was the enactment of C-TPAT14. This is an acronym for Customs, Trading Partnership against the Terrorists. This program began on the year 2001, on the month of November. This program extends the security operations of the US Customs to the port of origin of a particular container. This policy is able to provide its member partners with a clear guideline on how to protect their supply chain. This protective measure are aimed to preventing terrorists from taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of the shipping supply chains, and hence carry out an attack against the containers. The intention of this measure is to involve the international community into engaging in a series of measures aimed at protecting the international community. Members who agree to join this anti-terrorism program, are required to sign an agreement that they are willing to work with the US Customs agency, for purposes of protecting the international supply line, as well as identifying security gaps that can make these supply lines to be vulnerable15. On this basis, these partners will endeavor to implement a variety of security measures aimed at protecting their shipping containers, as well as the supply chain. Furthermore, the partners of the C-TPAT program will have to provide their security profile, which outlines specific security activities that the partners have conducted for purposes of protecting the supply chain. On the other hand, applicants wishing to join this program have to address a wide range of security issues, and thereafter provide a security profile that outlines the action plans responsible for protecting their respective supply chains16. Due to these stringent measures, partners of the C-TPAT are always considered as low risk members, and hence there cargoes will less likely attract examination17. However, this entirely depends on the security profile of the shipping company, the compliance history of the company, etc. The customs border protection of the US has a variety of mutual arrangements with countries in the world, for the main purpose of protecting and facilitating the global cargo trade18. The main intention of creating these partnership programs is to develop a system whereby all the participants in the international trade, gain an approval by a customs unit put in place to ensure that a specific standard is developed for purposes of securing the handling of cargo. For instance, in the year 2007, C-TPAT was able to sign its first Mutual Recognition Arrangement. This was with countries such as Japan, New Zealand, Canada, Jordan, Korea, etc. In June 2005, C-TPAT got some breakthroughs, with the adoption of the international framework for facilitating and securing global trade19. These frameworks were developed by the World Customs Organization, and most of its provisions came from the principles contained in C-TPAT. This framework was supported by more than 52 countries that were members of the World Customs Organization. On this basis, these frameworks led to the development of an international trusted shipper system, whereby ships that complied with the frameworks, were trusted, and on most occasions, they were not vigorously inspected. Furthermore, after the September 11th attacks, the US government, through the 2002 technologies security act introduced the use of technology in screening the various containers entering the US ports. Based on the provisions of this act, the government was able to develop the radiation technology, as well as the X-Ray technology for purposes of checking illicit containers. For instance, the radiation technology was developed by the ministry of energy, and it helped to detect illicit nuclear shipments, as well as radio-active materials. Up to now, the US Customs department has deployed these radiation technology equipments to more than 38 ports in the entire World. These include various Ports in Americas, Europe, as well as Asia. On the other hand, the X-Ray technology helped to introduce a system whereby port security officials could check a cargo, without physically removing the contents of the cargo. This method is cheaper, as well as effective in examining the contents of a cargo. Furthermore, the use of the GPS, as well as the RFID technology has enhanced the security of the ports worldwide20. The RFIDs are always placed in the port terminal, and they are used for collecting data, as well as tracking the container shipments. Conclusion: In conclusion, the September 11th attacks changed the manner in which security was being handled in various ports of the United States, as well as various ports of the world. The US government through the homeland security act initiated a series of measures aimed at protecting their vulnerable ports from terrorist attacks. Such measures includes the container security initiative, which were measures that were put in place, for purposes of tightening the various security loopholes witnessed in various ports of the United States. Furthermore, the technologies act enabled the US government to introduce the use of technologies for purposes of monitoring and inspecting the various shipments entering the US ports. These initiative developed by the US government were followed by other countries of the world, which were in a bid of securing their ports, by closing all the vulnerable areas of their Port operations. On this note, more than 40 leading ports in the world have managed to partner with the United States in secure their supply chains. Bibliography: Acciaro, Michele. "Risk Management in Port Operations, Logistics and Supply Chain Security." Maritime Economics & Logistics 10, no. 3 (2008): 325-327. Altiok, Tayfur. "Port security/safety, risk analysis, and modeling." Annals of Operations Research 187, no. 1 (2011): 1-3. Bateman, Sam. "Maritime security and port state control in the Indian Ocean Region." Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 8, no. 2 (2012): 188-201. Chang, Myung-Hee, and Da-Yeon Kang. "Factors Affecting the Information Security Awareness and Perceived Information Security Risk of Employees of Port Companies." Journal of Korean navigation and port research 36, no. 3 (2012): 261-271. Eski, Y.. "Port of call: Towards a criminology of port security." Criminology and Criminal Justice 11, no. 5 (2011): 415-431. Greenberg, Michael R.. "Risk analysis and port security: some contextual observations and considerations." Annals of Operations Research 187, no. 1 (2011): 121-136. Helmick, Jon S.. "Port and maritime security: A research perspective." Journal of Transportation Security 1, no. 1 (2008): 15-28. Jeong, Woo-Lee. "A Study on the Development of Analysis Model for Maritime Security Management." Journal of Korean navigation and port research 36, no. 1 (2012): 9-14. Taquechel, Eric. "Options and Challenges of a Resilience-Based, Network-Focused Port Security Grant Program." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 10, no. 2 (2013): 317-339. Tsuneyoshi, Takao, Hiroyuki Matsumoto, and Kenichi Nonaka. "Evaluating International Port Facilities From the Point of View of Port Security." The Journal of Japan Institute of Navigation 128, no. 0 (2013): 65-71. Yeo, Gi-Tae, Ji-Yeong Pak, and Zaili Yang. "Analysis of dynamic effects on seaports adopting port security policy." Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 49 (2013): 285-301. Yoon, Daeg-Wun, and Cheol-Seung Kim. "A Study on System Development for Ships Integrated Safety and Security." Journal of Korean navigation and port research 35, no. 2 (2011): 131-136. Read More