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Case Study: Risk Management Case Study: Risk Management In his article, the Response to Hurricane Katrina, Donald Moynihan critically examines how the involved parties acted in response to the Hurricane Katrina (Moynihan, 2009). Moynihan cites that the overall response to the catastrophic event was unsuccessful, owing to a number of key factors. He explains that the involved parties had not prepared sufficiently, though the calamity did not occur exclusively as a surprise. Moynihan explains that these parties received prior warning signs and could have reduced it devastating effects had the involved teams responded quickly.
Experts cite Hurricane Katrina as being among the worst disasters that ever occurred in the history of the US, leading to the loss of over 1800 individuals (Moynihan, 2009). The disaster caused continued flooding, owing to the collapse of the artificial levees. This resulted in a series of industrial damages, pervasive pollution and a cut of critical facilities such as water, energy and communication networks. Moynihan argue that though the response was marred by several failures, it had it positive side.
The 9-11 attack prompted the government to form bodies that would prevent and reduce the impacts of such calamities, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). FEMA was also in place and its response was significant in handling the calamity (Moynihan, 2009). FEMA had warned of the catastrophe earlier, and the evacuation process was underway. President Bush had affirmed a state of emergency and FEMA initiated its response operation. The evacuation significantly reduced the number of victims of the catastrophe.
The magnitude of the catastrophe prompted the intervention of other stakeholders, in a bid to rescue victims and reduce their suffering (Levitt & Whitaker, 2009). As such, various organizations intervened and coordinated in the rescue, evacuation process and the delivering of essential products and services. Private charity organizations also played a significant role in the various forms of the response process. The military response was also critical in assuaging the sufferings of the victims.
The large number of the deployed military officials aided the rescue operations, thereby lessening the hard task of the rescue team (FEMA, 2006). This served significantly in improving the relief efforts, hence reducing the number of affected victims. However, though various parties played significant roles in responding to the catastrophe, there several setbacks were evident. For instance, the slow response of the involved parties contributed significantly in heightening death and property loss (Levitt & Whitaker, 2009).
Moynihan asserts that though the warning signals came earlier, the parties underrated the calamity. The coordination of the involved parties was also questionable. Moynihan also cites that the calamity occurred at a time where FEMA was experiencing management challenges, owing to its lack of sufficient personnel. As such, its response was undoubtedly not at its best. Additionally, the coordination of other involved parties was also questionable. Another predicament to the rescue operations was resources (FEMA, 2006).
In his article, Moynihan claims that FEMA received little funds and its staff did not receive apt prior preparedness, and hence the sluggish response. The State emergency body, LOSHEP, had inadequate personnel and received little training, insufficient to overcome such a calamity. References FEMA, DHS. (2006). Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast building performance observations, recommendations, and technical guidance : Mitigation Assessment Team report.. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA.Levitt, J., & Whitaker, M. (2009). Hurricane Katrina Americas unnatural disaster.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.Moyniham, D. (2009). The Response to Hurricane Katrina. International Risk Governance Council, 1(1), 1-11.
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