How to Resist Physical Attacks - Coursework Example

PHYSICAL SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT PHYSICAL SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT The hardening requirements for BC Place Stadium Hardening in the most basic language is the reinforcing and thickening of building materials to resist physical attacks like breaking in and cutting it. There are two specific types of hardening that act as the final line of resistance against intrusion, these are; antiballistic hardening and forced entry resistance (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). Consequently, hardening also significantly describes the efforts made to make regular entry and access of build structures more channeled and resistant. Hardening is an expensive but worth course, the lives and safety of people is always at stake especially in social and recreational places like in stadiums, shopping malls, and other places associated with big crowds of people. Terrorist threats are real and thus security with regard to the mentioned places should and must be upheld at all costs. In many occasions high resistance materials with capacity to resist bullets and other explosives have been used to firmly safeguard important build structures. Further, roads and streets leading to and from these building are barricaded to ensure channeled and controlled entry (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). This section is dedicated to discussing the hardening requirements for the BC Place Stadium during the Olympic Games. Building a perimeter wall around the BC Place Stadium is the first and foremost physical security measure that stadia physical security management board should put in place. The distance from this perimeter wall to the stadia should at least be 200 meters; this, in its own right is hardening enough to resist a blast. Accordingly, the perimeter wall should be built using high resistance materials and thickened to make it hard if not impossible for intrusion and breaking in. In the same line of argument, building a perimeter wall will ensure that unauthorized and malicious vehicles with ill intention do not have any easy access to the stadium. The wall should also have cement or steel barriers to resist attacks from heavy trucks that might be loaded with explosives. This is also essential for forced entry resistance (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). Putting up barriers particularly at the convergence points is another measure that must be taken into consideration; although it is costly but it is vital for the safety of the masses that would come to the stadium. Setting up a low barrier slightly away from the stadia will provide adequate security while also not intruding on the visitor’s privacy. For instance, movable bollards and concrete planters should be placed at every access point (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). Putting bigger barriers in front of the entrances to the stadium is a major challenge as many people can be scared (Fennelly, 2003). The automobiles accessing the stadia should be restricted to staff, athletes, journalists and games management personnel. The stadium itself should and must be built with very strong and high resistance materials with relatively few entrances. The engineering of the stadia should be aimed at coming up with a building that is a shelter against bombs; a building with thicker walls, with deeper curves, or having a combination of both. Furthermore, the gates and other entrances should be built with heavy steel mounted with analog locks and keys that require numeric codes to be opened. For instance once they are locked no one can easily unlock them. The hinges to the gates and other doors should be installed with precision; they should not be exposed to the outside to eliminate chances of breaking in (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). The stadium should have a 24/7 surveillance during the games; for instance the layers of surveillance should cover the stadia and the distance from it to the four streets that encloses the stadium. The layered defenses will ensure redundancy while increasing safety to the stadia. Additionally, the stadia should have a Special Operation Center (SOC) situated at undisclosed location with a single mandate of ensuring that the structure is fully secured at all times (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). This SOC will increase the safety of the masses in the stadium. Security Measures and Procedures The safety of spectators and the athletes during the Olympics games is paramount, the BC Place Stadium security management team must ensure that the loathed for safety is in abundance. This will vastly be achieved by employing Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) tchnologies. The CPTED concepts are aimed at applying design initiatives and principles to a physical defined area or site to reduce the magnitude of facilitating or anchoring criminal acts. These principles recognize the relationship between the design and management of the physical environment and human behavior (FEMA, 2012). Nonetheless, CPTED principles are aimed at improving safety by designing physical environment that is geared towards influencing human behavior. When constructing big community structures, these concepts should be incorporated in the planning and design stage for them to have greater impact on human behavior (FEMA, 2012). This section is aimed at discussing physical security technologies and identifying security measures and procedures to be put in place during the BC Place Stadium opening ceremonies, during medal presentations and around the stadium. The measures that will be used to ensure human safety and stadium security are as follows: a) Access control This is basically making sure that only legitimate persons are allowed in the stadium; only those with valid games tickets will have access to enter the stadium for Olympic Games opening ceremony, and during medal presentations. The initial and primary objective of access control is to decrease criminal opportunity (FEMA, 2012). Access control will be attained through adequate use of strong doors with hinges and locks that cannot be broken into thus hardening the target. In addition to these, stationing security guards at all entrance to frisk and screen all people entering the stadium will ensure that there are no lapses in security. Streets around the stadia should be restricted to only selected groups like athletes, games management personnel, and journalists. Creation of psychological barriers will also help in deterring criminals. It has been established that criminals display certain environmental preferences and creating psychological barriers is key to upholding security. For instance, the target should be made mysterious and unattractive to potential criminals (FEMA, 2012). b) Natural Surveillance The primary importance of natural surveillance is to keep outsiders under serious scrutiny or observation while they are inside the stadium. It also helps in keeping intruders away; in this regard, surveillance increases risk to offenders and the actual risk particularly when the observers act when a potentially threatening situations arises (FEMA, 2012). This can be achieved when various design techniques are employed for example channeling the flow f activity by putting more observers near potential targets; in this case, during medal presentations to athletes who have won medals. This can also be incorporated with organized surveillance; using uniformed and civilian police surveillance in and around the stadium (FEMA, 2012). The use of CCTV surveillance and alarms will also enhance security in and outside the stadium. c) Motivation Reinforcement As it has been observed by many, motivation reinforcement not only distracts criminal behavior relative to the built environment, but also affects criminal motivation by increasing the risk of apprehension while magnifying the potentiality of criminals’ involvement in and identification with the built environment (FEMA, 2012). The concept insists positive motivation reinforcement of the masses at large by increasing territorial concerns, social cohesion and the general sense of security. With regard to this, criminals will be hindered from attempting any malicious and criminal activities during the Olympic events. d) Territoriality The Olympics games management and the BC Place Stadium security management should help the community around the stadium identify with it. For instance, the community should identify with the stadium, feel proud of it and projecting the same to others (FEMA, 2012). In this regard, the community will take it as an initiative to protect the stadium during and after the games. Possible CBNRE Threats and their Specific Countermeasures Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) threats that are possible in this case scenario are Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive threats. Although the scope of detonating a nuclear bomb integrated with radiological and explosives is minimal, there are still chances. This is because the typical integrated nuclear bomb is big and weighty and can be seen from long distances especially when a plane is used to drop it (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). Consequently, another method can be by loading the bmb on a truck and driving the truck to the target (BC Place Stadium). In this scenario, the perimeter wall and increased layers of surveillance will not allow such a threat to succeed. However, the planners of the Olympic Games need to be aware of the threat and plan in advance for counter measure strategies. There are two main preparedness measures that must be present to safeguard the masses in case such security lapse happens (Fennelly, 2003). Hardening and filtering have been identified to be the most appropriate counter measures. In this regard, the stadium should be hardened with strong thrust resistant materials. Heavy concrete and steel bars should be used in building the stadium walls. Consequently, the walls should be built thick enough to resist high magnitude of any explosion. Filtering, on the other hand, helps in ensuring that radiological materials do not penetrate into the stadium thus avoiding contamination (National Institute of Building Sciences, 2012). In the event of a nuclear and radioactive explosion it is eminent that radiations will get into the HVAC system. Though filtration is expensive but it is a worth venture to avoid massive loss of lives that would be attending the Olympic games at the BC Place Stadium. References Fennelly, L. J., (2003) Effective Physical Security. Burlington; Butterworth-Heinemann National Institute of Building Sciences (2012) Whole building design guide: Unified facility Criteria (UFC) Retrieved on 13/08/2012; From; http:///www.wbdg.org/ccb/browse_cat.php?o=29&c=4 FEMA (2012) National response Framework. Retrieved on 13/08/2012; From; http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/mainindex.htm Read More