Regulations Influence on Agencys Productivity and Efficiency - Coursework Example

Table of Contents Introduction 2 of Official and Unofficial Regulations 3 Literature Review 4 Data and Methods 9 Research Question 9 Data and Methods 9 Empirical Findings 12 Productivity 12 Efficiency 16 References 26 Introduction Each law enforcement agency has a set of internal policy and regulations to achieve their goals in a productive and efficient manner. The overall goal of an office of investigations is to solve and conclude a case in a timely manner. If such case involves criminal violations under the state and/ or federal penal codes, the goal is to get the case accepted for prosecution by an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). The Inspector General Act of 1978 was amended after the creation of The Homeland Security Act of 2002, establishing an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Homeland Security, (oig-dhs.gov). Within the Office of Inspector General, an Office of Investigations was created, whose mission statement is to “investigate allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions. Additionally, the Office of Investigations provides oversight and monitors the investigative activity of DHS’ various internal affairs offices,” (oig-dhs.gov). With such mission, some principals were set as part of the mission statement referring to the accepting of allegations which is as follows: “When we refer to the Nation from dangerous people and dangerous things the mode is to open 100 percent of referrals on border corruption or compromise of employees or programs, integrity of transportation, and immigration process,” (DHS-OIG-INV Investigative strategy). This basically entitles that the agency is suppose to accept all allegations received. Even though, the Mission Statement of INV states that the OIG will investigate 100 percent of referrals regarding border corruption or compromise (employees or programs); 100 percent of referrals regarding the corruption or compromise of transportation security and 100 percent of referrals regarding the corruption or compromise of the immigration process, there are a set of standards set internally for the selection of complaints accepted, (DHS-OIG Special Agent Handbook). Internal regulations are a set of official/ unofficial set of rules that an agency should follow in order to be in compliance that is suppose to help the agency achieve its goal in an efficient and productive manner. Description of Official and Unofficial Regulations The Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations has a set of official and unofficial regulations when accepting allegations for investigation. The official set of regulations, stated in the DHS-OIG Special Agent Handbook, to consider in deciding whether to open cases are as follows: Specificity of the allegation. Seriousness of the allegation. Primary and/or shared jurisdiction. Credibility of the complainant and suspect. Whether the suspect is an active DHS employee. Availability of evidence and witnesses. Whether administrative action or some other disposition was previously taken in the case. Prosecutorial guidelines. The age of the allegation and the effect, if any, of the statute of limitations. Or allegations involving the following are generally deemed to be inappropriate for OIG investigations: Off duty misconduct. Prohibited personnel practices. Non-criminal misconduct of employees below the GS 15 or equivalent. Misuse of a Government Owned Vehicle. Misuse of government resources less than $1000. Misuse of government credit card less than $1000. Time and attendance issues. On the other hand, the unofficial regulation is the percentage rate that each office is allowed to get a case declined for prosecution by the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA). At the beginning of fiscal year 2007, the Office of Inspector General instructed the Offices of Investigations that they could only get 25 percent of the cases presented to the AUSA declined. This resulted in the addition of a statement in the DHS-OIG Special Agent Handbook: “A federal prosecutor must be consulted to ensure that the allegations, if proven, would be prosecuted. Such consultation will ensure coordination of investigative methods,” (DHS-OIG Special Agent Handbook). Literature Review Internal regulations are a set of official/ unofficial set of rules that an agency should follow in order to be in compliance that is suppose to help the agency achieve its goal in an efficient and productive manner. There is no previous literature review performed on the productivity and efficiency of the Office of Inspector General-Office of Investigations, therefore, for the purpose of this study, similar studies on different agencies within the field of law enforcement and studies whose method of the study was the pooled cross-sectional time series regression will be used for guidance. The Office of Investigations within the Office of Inspector General are divided by Field Offices whose are divided by region and are entitled to a certain regional jurisdiction, then followed by a set of Sub-Offices who have to report to the Field Offices. A conjunction of Sanhog Moon, Alex Sekwat, Rodney Stanley and Richard Bennett studies, it will serve as a foundation for the methodology of this research. “The goal of this research design is to test for a shift or change in the trend of the dependent variable at the point of the policy intervention. The premise for the design is that the post-intervention values of the dependent variables are different from the pre-intervention series,” (Moon, Sekwat & Standley, 2004). Richard Bennett “explores the macrostructure tenet of the approach upon a sample of 52 nations spanning a 25-year period (1960-1984). The findings offered qualified support for the approach and uncover interesting anomalies. First, the model appears to be crime specific, applying more to property crime than personal crime. Second, the best fitting is nonlinear and specifies threshold effects” (Bennett, 1991). Like suggested in Richards Bennett research, the method used to select their suitable sample will serve as the basis for the selection of the Field Offices that I will be studying. In this research, Bennett developed a set of concept to select the sample from the pooled of available targets, which “specifies the model by crime type,” only certain crimes would fit the ideal sample. For this study, the same technique will be used for both the selection of the participating offices and the participating complaints. First, only the Field Offices will be studied. The Field Office data that involves FEMA complaints will not be included to prevent false results, due to the increase of such during hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, and Rita around year 2005; no major disaster has hit since then causing another increase on the number of complaints received. Therefore, Sub-Offices will not be taken into consideration, since some are exclusively assigned to investigate disaster related complaints. Once they are divided into these categories, additional clusters would be divided the same way Bennett did in his research, which would be to divide the complaints by year from the beginning of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2009, followed by dividing the outcome of the complaint, whether the complaint was accepted for investigation by the Field Office or declined and the number of cases that have close to test for productivity. Once that data are presented, another set of outcomes will be presented for the complaints that resulted in the opening of an investigation to check for efficiency. Such an outcome will be divided by the number arrests, indictments, convictions, personal actions, investigative recoveries (fines, restitution, recoveries), and cases refer, accepted and declined for criminal prosecution by AUSAs will be compared to the before and after the implementation of the regulations. I cannot compare the outcome that Bennett had in his research because it was only used for the purpose of adequately selecting the right sample. The following study was used as information of how the employees feel and react to whenever stress is present, in this case, stress that lower management in the Field Offices deal with when deciding which complaints are going to be open as an investigation while following the mission statement and the unofficial and official internal regulations. Fernando Jaramillo, Robert Nixon, and Dorren Sams study “takes an interdisciplinary research orientation in an attempt to investigate the effects of police stress internal to the organization, (i.e. Role ambiguity, role conflict, supervisor support, group cohesiveness, and promotion opportunities) on organizational commitment, after controlling for the effects of job satisfaction. Existing empirical models have mainly been limited to analyses of the effects of role conflict and role ambiguity on job strain and depend on samples of salespeople, customer satisfaction employees, and retail managers working at private organizations to the neglect of not-for-profit organizations” (Jaramillo, Nixon & Sams, 2004). Organizations are constantly going through reorganization and regulations and policies are always implemented internally and externally within the organization. Management in the Field Office is responsible for selecting the outcome of the complaint, whether it is going to be declined, meaning the complaint will be filed and referred to the agency’s internal affairs for whatever action they deem appropriate, or whether an investigation is going to be initiated from the received complaint. Management has to make sure they meet the official and unofficial regulations, which are stipulated in the DHS-OIG Special Agent Handbook at the beginning of fiscal year 2007and the 25 percent rule, no more than 25 percent of the caseload per agency, can be declined by an Assistant United States Attorney when presented for prosecution. The research will be analyzing whether there was an effect in productivity and efficiency in the Field Office due to the regulation. This study can serve as a basis for a continuation of this research to have a perspective of the management level when it comes to productivity and efficiency in their office when they are under the stress of meeting the mission statement expectations and the unofficial and official internal regulations. Jaramillo, et al. study shows that the, “underlying research hypotheses were tested using responses to 150 surveys from police officers of six law enforcement agencies” and the “results indicate that, in addition to job satisfaction, supervisor’s support, group cohesiveness, and promotion opportunities are the best predictors of organizational commitment of law enforcement officers. The results also indicate a significant relationship between organizational and intention to leave.” Stephanos Bibas study served as a basis of information in understanding the concept and power that prosecutors have over the cases that investigators present. It gives a basis for the procedure that the court follows on the decision making of cases presented for prosecution by law enforcement agencies. “No government official in America has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor,” (Bibas, 2008). In this study, the researcher analyzed the role of prosecutors and the power that they hold in the court system. Such power can influence in productivity and effectiveness of an agency such as the Office of Inspector General, which the prosecutorial decisions influence the agency and regulations were created to assure the acceptance of cases. “In theory, prosecutors are beholden to the public interest or justice. These concepts, however, are so diffuse and elastic that they do not constrain prosecutors much, certainly not in the way that an identifiable client would act. As I have argued elsewhere, prosecution is a low-visibility process about which the public has poor information and little right to participate,” (Bibas, 2008). The study showed that prosecutors do hold a tremendous power on the decision of cases, and concluded with three suggestions to limit their power and ensure justice. First, he suggested a set of external rules, “many commentators have argued that legislatures, judges, or bar authorities can regulate prosecutors more vigorously.” Second, suggested external control by stakeholders, which “holds out moderately more hope for giving voters, victims, and defendants for better information and greater rights to participate.” Finally, the consideration of internal structures, cultures, and incentives that prosecutors’ offices could use to regulate themselves and finds them most promising, is essential. “Leadership by head prosecutors could do more to create and shape office culture, values, norms, and ideals. Hierarchical office structure can promote internal consistency and make possible more procedural and substantive oversight. Prosecutors’ offices should promulgate and publish more procedural guidelines to structure their internal review of cases. Internal substantive guidelines could harmonize prosecutors’ substantive results,” (Bibas, 2008). Due to the lack of previous research on the subject of study, information related to the subject has served as basis for the creation of such. Starting with the selecting of sample and organizing the data, with a foundation from Sanhog Moon, Alex Sekwat, Rodney Stanley and Richard Bennett studies. Following by the information gathered from the Fernando Jaramillo, Robert Nixon, and Dorren Sams’s study to understand the pressure in which management in have to go through when it comes to decision making while keeping in mind the agencies regulations, policies, and law. In this case, the lower management within the Office of Inspector General, Offices of Investigations, each Field Office is responsible for their decision making in the caseload but yet they have to keep in mind the unofficial and official regulations on complaints. Finalizing with an analysis of Stephanos Bibas study, which concentrates in the power that prosecutors have over law enforcement agencies’ case load. The agent is responsible for conducting the investigation and gathering all the evidence necessary for the prosecution. The case is then presented to the prosecutor, who decides whether or not the case will be accepted or denied for prosecution. The previous studies serve as a foundation for the study that will concentrate whether or not the Office of Inspector General-Office of Investigations unofficial and official regulation implemented in 2007 had an effect on productivity and efficiency. Data and Methods Research Question The mention above regulations does not represent the mission statement to its totality; therefore a review of productivity and efficiency before and after the official and unofficial regulation of the Office of Inspector General- Office of Investigation will be conducted. My research question is; does the implementation of official and unofficial internal regulations created a negative effect in productivity and efficiency of the DHS-OIG Offices of Investigations? My hypothesis is that such regulation implementation has decrease the productivity and increase efficiency in criminal cases but decrease efficiency in non-criminal cases within the DHS-OIG-Offices of Investigations. Data and Methods 14 Field Offices of Investigations within the Inspector General will be studied, and the data will be collected from an internal data base called Enforcement Data System (EDS) and from Semiannual Reports submitted to Congress, for the purpose of this research. Enforcement Data System is an electronic version of the case load for each office within DHS-OIG-Investigations. The database shows the number of complaints received and the number of open and closed cases for each office. The system also has a statistical report that is updated each month for arrests, indictments, convictions, administrative and personal actions, acceptance and declinations by AUSAs for each office. If a complaint is declined by the office, there is a six month time period for the complaint to finally appeared in the system, not to mention that the allowed percentage rate for prosecutorial declinations by AUSAs has been set to 15 percent, instead of 25 percent, in fiscal year 2012, therefore, the data utilize for this research will be from the beginning of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2009. The Semiannual Reports will be utilized to compare the information gather in EDS for accuracy, since the report should reflect the same information that the database presents. Productivity will be measured by comparing the number of complaints received to the number of the cases opened, to show how many of those complaints were actually accepted for investigation, before and after the implementation of the regulations. To measure efficiency, the number arrest, indictments, convictions, personal actions, investigative recoveries (fines, restitution, recoveries), and cases refer, accepted and declined for criminal prosecution by AUSAs will be compared to the before and after the implementation of the regulations. The unit of analysis is, every Field Office identifies whether their productivity and efficiency was affected by the regulations, a pooled cross-sectional time-series regression analysis model will be used. “The goal of this research design is to test for a shift or change in the trend of the dependent variable at the point of the policy intervention. The premise for the design is that the post-intervention values of the dependent variables are different from the pre-intervention series,” (Moon, Sekwat & Stanley, 2004). First, a set of proportions reflecting several variables of the complaint received to the number of open cases by year, starting with FY 2003 all the way to FY 2009 will be collected. The data will be divided among each Field Office, no sub-offices data will be included for the purpose of this study, due to the fact that many are just assigned exclusively to disaster related cases (FEMA cases). When analyzing the data, complaints received that affect FEMA will not be counted, due to the fact that there was an increase in complaints and workload during the Katrina, Rita, and Gustav Hurricanes, and since no other major disasters have hit, there has been a decrease in these types of complaints; including these data can result in a false conclusion. Then, the data will be presented through a set of linear functions that will lead itself to statistical analysis through a general linear regression model. Such will reflect the impact, if any, resulted in the Office of Inspector General- Field Office of Investigations productivity and efficiency after the official regulations. Empirical Findings Productivity DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2003 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2004 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2005 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2006 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2007 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2008 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity for Fiscal Year 2009 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA         Chicago, IL         Dallas, TX         Detroit, TX         El Paso, TX         Houston, TX         McAllen, TX         Miami, FL         Philadelphia, PA         San Diego, CA         San Francisco, CA         Seattle, WA         Tucson, AZ         Washington, DC         DHS - Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Productivity Before Internal Regulations FY 03-06 Field Office Complaints Received Investigations Initiated Currently Open Investigations Closed Atlanta, GA 6,195 380 81 145 Chicago, IL 2,179 119 125 64 Dallas, TX 8,679 540 51 454 Detroit, TX 325 39 90 8 El Paso, TX 1,166 180 161 91 Houston, TX 3,249 204 78 92 McAllen, TX 894 137 110 60 Miami, FL 6,194 471 111 277 Philadelphia, PA 2,789 185 57 159 San Diego, CA 1,635 127 153 72 San Francisco, CA 1,953 312 39 219 Seattle, WA 453 41 27 18 Tucson, AZ 1,631 203 100 83 Washington, DC 1,888 51 132 15 Efficiency DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2003 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 35 82     5 2 1 0   Chicago, IL 27 125     4 4 2 1   Dallas, TX 323 51     21 22 5 9   Detroit, TX 0 90     0 0 0 0   El Paso, TX 10 161     0 0 0 0   Houston, TX 49 78     4 2 2 0   McAllen, TX 29 110     1 1 4 0   Miami, FL 43 111     2 2 0 5   Philadelphia, PA 82 57     48 39 34 1   San Diego, CA 38 153     0 1 0 3   San Francisco, CA 76 39     20 20 19 0   Seattle, WA 0 27     0 0 0 0   Tucson, AZ 20 100     1 1 0 1   Washington, DC 0 131     0 0 0 0   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2004 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 46 82     11 15 6 10   Chicago, IL 54 125     5 2 0 10   Dallas, TX 46 51     81 23 15 12   Detroit, TX 6 90     0 0 0 0   El Paso, TX 57 161     7 4 1 3   Houston, TX 41 78     31 30 6 10   McAllen, TX 48 110     0 0 0 0   Miami, FL 91 111     9 8 8 6   Philadelphia, PA 44 57     19 21 29 1   San Diego, CA 42 153     10 11 1 15   San Francisco, CA 67 39     15 14 11 0   Seattle, WA 12 27     1 1 0 2   Tucson, AZ 63 100     2 3 1 2   Washington, DC 13 131     0 0 0 0   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2005 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 57 82     6 5 6 3   Chicago, IL 18 125     10 11 9 4   Dallas, TX 39 51     6 15 18 4   Detroit, TX 18 90     2 1 1 1   El Paso, TX 71 161     4 8 5 12   Houston, TX 33 78     4 8 18 5   McAllen, TX 33 110     2 2 0 2   Miami, FL 252 111     17 14 14 1   Philadelphia, PA 33 57     14 11 7 0   San Diego, CA 30 153     3 0 8 31   San Francisco, CA 70 39     9 10 11 0   Seattle, WA 18 27     7 3 3 13   Tucson, AZ 85 100     7 8 3 1   Washington, DC 21 131     1 1 1 0   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2006 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 242 82     86 105 71 4   Chicago, IL 20 125     13 10 7 2   Dallas, TX 132 51     104 111 85 14   Detroit, TX 15 90     5 5 4 2   El Paso, TX 42 161     8 10 6 6   Houston, TX 81 78     35 38 34 7   McAllen, TX 27 110     1 1 2 1   Miami, FL 85 111     19 21 12 3   Philadelphia, PA 26 57     14 17 17 0   San Diego, CA 17 153     11 14 14 23   San Francisco, CA 99 39     29 31 26 0   Seattle, WA 11 27     2 5 3 2   Tucson, AZ 35 100     4 6 6 3   Washington, DC 17 131     4 3 3 1   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2007 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 101 82     119 111 84 2   Chicago, IL 17 125     20 22 9 2   Dallas, TX 57 51     37 44 43 14   Detroit, TX 18 90     3 1 1 1   El Paso, TX 76 161     4 11 5 4   Houston, TX 37 78     33 36 29 2   McAllen, TX 36 110     0 0 0 0   Miami, FL 40 110     117 16 15 2   Philadelphia, PA 19 57     15 20 19 1   San Diego, CA 25 157     1 0 0 13   San Francisco, CA 58 39     55 55 45 0   Seattle, WA 22 27     17 16 16 0   Tucson, AZ 36 100     7 4 6 6   Washington, DC 26 131     14 22 12 0   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2008 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 56 82     37 45 61 6   Chicago, IL 39 125     7 23 8 1   Dallas, TX 37 51     46 41 29 8   Detroit, TX 9 90     1 0 0 0   El Paso, TX 45 161     5 6 3 3   Houston, TX 27 78     22 20 18 1   McAllen, TX 46 110     2 2 2 0   Miami, FL 61 111     10 6 12 6   Philadelphia, PA 40 57     6 5 8 4   San Diego, CA 48 153     5 6 3 11   San Francisco, CA 29 39     22 28 26 0   Seattle, WA 23 27     6 9 8 1   Tucson, AZ 45 100     31 34 21 8   Washington, DC 24 131     4 7 9 3   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Fiscal Year 2009 Efficiency Report             Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 53 82     30 27 29 6   Chicago, IL 35 125     6 9 6 3   Dallas, TX 69 51     59 35 30 4   Detroit, TX 50 90     16 18 4 4   El Paso, TX 68 161     6 3 9 4   Houston, TX 62 78     23 22 15 3   McAllen, TX 94 110     10 10 3 9   Miami, FL 58 111     12 11 10 5   Philadelphia, PA 50 57     4 5 5 13   San Diego, CA 65 153     6 2 4 4   San Francisco, CA 16 39     12 9 18 0   Seattle, WA 15 27     1 3 4 2   Tucson, AZ 64 100     4 8 17 10   Washington, DC 24 131     7 7 4 4   ** Inv.- stands for Investigations** DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Efficiency Report Before Regulation FY 03-06               Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA 380 81 15 161 128 145 117 18 $7,363,077.56 Chicago, IL 119 125 0 71 32 28 19 17 $486,689 Dallas, TX 540 51 27 295 231 191 133 35 $5,819,344.20 Detroit, TX 39 90 2 7 7 6 5 3 $3,845 El Paso, TX 180 161 3 26 22 25 13 24 $8,138.70 Houston, TX 204 78 40 97 74 78 60 22 $137,013.35 McAllen, TX 137 110 3 6 5 4 6 1 $27,800 Miami, FL 471 111 11 69 47 45 34 11 $678,846.65 Philadelphia, PA 185 57 32 110 100 93 92 2 $7,574,677.55 San Diego, CA 127 153 55 32 24 26 23 6 $13,800 San Francisco, CA 312 39 17 88 74 76 68 33 $1,591,462.36 Seattle, WA 41 27 2 12 10 9 6 16 $71,200 Tucson, AZ 203 100 78 28 14 18 10 7 $28,630 Washington, DC 51 132 4 12 5 4 4 1 $1,163,720 DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations   Efficiency Report After Regulation FY 07 - 09               Field Office Inv. Initiated Inv. Currently Open Inv. Declined for Prosecution Inv. Accepted for Prosecution Arrest Indictments Convictions Personnel Actions Inv. Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Atlanta, GA Chicago, IL Dallas, TX Detroit, TX El Paso, TX Houston, TX McAllen, TX Miami, FL Philadelphia, PA San Diego, CA San Francisco, CA Seattle, WA Tucson, AZ Washington, DC DHS-Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations Annually Presidential Report Fiscal Year Indictents Successful Criminal Prosecutions Successful Civil Actions Suspencions/Disbarnments Investigative Recoveries (fines, recoveries & restitutions) Personnel Actions 2003 114 78 2 1 87 15 2004 114 99 4 5 72 77 2005 116 124 3 14 97 86 2006 543 382 10 3 447 65 2007 591 478 28 8 706 ($35,252,422.42) 49 2008 451 405 37 13 801($56,262,163.16) 64 2009 References Edwards, Charles . Office Of Inspector General: Semiannual Reports to the Congress. Homeland Security. Retrieve from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=83 Edwards, Charles . Office Of Inspector General- Program Office: Office of Investigations. Homeland Security. Retrieve from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=14 Edwards, Charles . Office Of Inspector General: Annual Performance Plan. Homeland Security. Retrieve from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119&Itemid=81 Edwards, Charles . Office Of Inspector General: What We Do. Homeland Security. Retrieve from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=63 Edwards, Charles . Office Of Inspector General: Special Agent Handbook. Department of Homeland Security. Moon, Sangho; Sekwat, Alex & Stanley, Rodney. 2004. Testing the Assumptions of Pooled Time Series Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis Through ARIMA and Interrupted Time Series Modeling: Beck and Katz Revisited. Institution of Government, Tennessee State University. Bennett, Richard. (1991). Routine Activities: A Cross-National Assessment of a Criminological Perspective. Social Forces, 70:1 (1991:Sept.) p.147 Bibas, Stephanos. (2008). Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability. NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository. Moon, Sanhog; Sekwat, Alex & Stanley, Rodney. (2004). Testing the Assumptions of Pooled Time Series Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis Through ARIMA and Interrupted Time Series Modeling: Beck and Katz Revisited. Institution of Government, Tennessee State University. Jaramillo, Fernando; Nixon, Robert & Samns, Doreen. (2004). The effect of law enforcement stress on organizational commitment. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 28 No. 2 pp. 321-336. Read More