Absolute vs Relative Truth - Essay Example

Absolute Truth vs. Relative Truth The claim that ‘there are no absolute distinctions between what is true and what is false’ is a reflection of epistemological relativism, which is defined as the assumption that truth, falsity, and knowledge are relative— to space, time, historical period, culture, perspective, or to individual belief, education, or training— in that what is true or false depends on the importance of these factors (Siegel 1998). As argued by the relativist, knowledge is relative because time, space, cultures, etc. embraces distinct sets of underlying criteria, values, and norms of assessment for knowledge assertions. In other words, the relativist argues that there is no objective or unbiased way of distinguishing between these different sets of norms. Therefore, the relativist’s central argument is that an assertion’s position as true or false is relative to the criteria applied in assessing this assertion. The principle of relativism is often attributed to Protagoras, who argues that “any given thing is to me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you” (Siegel 1998, 35). Protagorean relativism is described by Plato’s Socrates as basing on the assumption that “what seems true to anyone is true for him to whom it seems so” (Siegel 1998, 35). This assumption is a kind of relativism because for the Protagorean there is no norm greater than the person, with his/her own particular position in place, time, culture, context, and so on—with mention of which assertions of truth, and thus knowledge, can be evaluated. Critics of relativism have presented numerous arguments against the principle; without a doubt the most essential is the argument that relativism is self-contradictory or self-referentially incoherent, which is a logical fallacy where in “some claims is made which, upon being applied to itself, refutes itself” (Dancy, Sosa, & Steup 2010, 677). There are different accounts of the incoherence argument. The strongest is that relativism disqualifies the chance of establishing the truth, or, the epistemic value of questionable assumptions and arguments, including itself, because as stated by relativism no assumption or argument can fail any evaluation of epistemic sufficiency or be deemed false or unfounded (Eaton 1925). For instance, Protagorean relativism: the argument “what seems true [or justified] to anyone is true [or justified] for him to whom it seems so” (Siegel 1998, 35) implies that no genuine assertion can fail to be true or be reasonably evaluated to be false. However, if it is impossible for a genuine assertion to be false, the basic difference between truth and falsity is surrendered; a ‘false’ idea is downgraded to something which is not accepted as true. Although Protagorean relativism is on the surface a principle about the absence of absolute distinction between truth and falsity, or the relativity of truth, it is eagerly related to issues of epistemic evaluation in general, and viewed as arguing the relativity of norms of justification, correctness, and truth. If understood along this line, it implies from this type of relativism that it is impossible for an argument genuinely evaluated by an individual as justified or correct to be unjustified or incorrect. The outcome is that the central concepts of justifiedness, correctness, and truth are weakened. However, if this is the case, relativism itself is not justified, correct, or true. Hence, relativism is incoherent in the sense that, if it is justified, correct, or true, the central concept of truth is weakened (Eaton 1925). This weakening takes place because the relativism of norms argued by the relativist makes it impossible to differentiate truth from falsity. The argument and claim of relativism obliges one to take for granted absolute norms in reference to which debatable principles and assertions can be evaluated; yet relativism rejects the possibility of adjudication in line with these absolute norms (Eaton 1925). Hence the relativism principle cannot be logically justified; it can be justified only by being renounced. Therefore, relativism is powerless, unable to justify itself. To explain this primary dilemma confronting relativism in a fairly different manner (Dancy et al. 2010): to the extent that relativism is facing the dilemma with its absolutist philosophical adversary, relativism aims to provide a wide-ranging, non-relative perception of truth, and claim that that broad perception, such as that truth is relative, is epistemologically speaking, more acceptable and better than its opponents; and also to refute that a broad, non-relative perception is justifiable or possible. However, the relativist cannot justify the perception of truth presented in a, in line with which relativism is better epistemologically than absolutism, in a manner compatible with his/her own devotion to relativism. In contrast, justifying relativism in a manner that does not emphasize its epistemic dominance is not to justify it in any way; neither is it to bring into play the set of subject matters that separates relativism from its absolutist adversary. Refuting that a broad, absolute perception of truth is justifiable or possible likewise prohibits the relativist from critically raising the subject matters to which relativist’s relativism is a reply. Even if a workable idea of relative truth could be constructed, interpretations of relativism anchored in it would in fact remain incoherent. Particularly, a justification of relativism that is based on the concept of relative truth seems destined to fail to the extent that it aims either to justify the concept of relative truth as greater than its ‘absolutist’ rival, or to justify any specific relative truth. According to Eaton (1925), because any such justification would take as fact objective, absolute norms by reference to which epistemic dominance could be ascertained, and these norms are exactly those to which relativism, on account of its dedication to that philosophy, cannot demand. Therefore, depending on the concept of relative truth appears not to defend relativism at this point; certainly, the traditional fascination with the possibility of that concept appears to be chiefly unrelated to the issue of the possibility of relativism when the principle is viewed as a broad epistemological creed. Regardless if relativism’s idea of truth is absolute or relative, the claim and justification of relativism seems to fall into incoherence and self-contradiction. References Dancy, J., E. Sosa, & M. Steup. A Companion to Epistemology. UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Eaton, R.M. Symbolism and Truth: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925. Siegel, H. “Why Everything Is Not Relative and Why Non-Relative, Absolute Judgment Is Possible” Free Inquiry 18.4 (1998): 35+ Read More