A Metaphysical Analysis of The Paradox of Forgiveness - Essay Example

of A Metaphysical Analysis of The Paradox of Forgiveness In his article, The Paradox of Forgiveness, Leo Zaibert addresses the problem regarding the paradoxical nature of forgiveness. In doing so, he presents two competing views, both which attempt to provide a solution to the aforementioned paradox.1 These are Aurel Kolnai’s idea of repentance and Jacques Derrida’s linkage between forgiveness and the unforgivable. The former argues that “what renders forgiveness is that the wrongdoer has repented” (Zaibert 367). The latter argues that “the phenomenon of forgiveness is independent of whether the wrongdoer repents or apologizes” (Zaibert 368). Zaibert argues against Kolnai’s explanation.2 Although the author does not argue against Derrida’s explanation, Zaibert does agree with what Derrida supposedly had in mind. Thus, he goes beyond and argues that “to forgive is to deliberately refuse to punish” (Zaibert 368). We merely choose or decide whether or nor to forgive on the basis of deliberating on a guilty person’s punishment. If we choose to forgive the person, we thus avoid punishment. It is in this regard that Zaibert contends that forgiveness is a purely mental phenomenon.3 Given this mode of analysis, he contends that the paradox of forgiveness is not so much of a paradox after all. Or is it? In this essay, I shall provide a critique of Zaibert’s solution to the paradox in the light of the philosophy of action. In doing so, I shall focus on his definition of forgiveness as a pure mental act, in relation to his defense that to forgive a person is to intentionally refuse to punish that person. I will argue that his solution to the paradox begs the question and thus, fails to provide a sufficient analysis of the nature of forgiveness from a metaphysical point of view. In what follows, I will provide a summary of Zaibert’s views as discussed in his article. Summary Zaibert presents two competing views that attempt to solve the paradoxical nature of forgiveness, i.e. Kolnai and Derrida’s solution. His motivation for contrasting these two views is to emphasize that “the opposition between these two views of forgiveness shall prove important for my purposes” (Zaibert 367). Indeed, his purpose was to develop his own position, which he thought was what Derrida had in mind when he associated forgiveness to the unforgivable. What was Zaibert’s position then? Zaibert’s position defends the view that to forgive a person is to intentionally refuse to punish that person. “There is, then, a purely analytic connection between punishment and forgiveness worth our attention: only what is punishable is forgivable, and only what is forgivable is punishable” (Zaibert 369). Moreover, the author claims through his analysis of forgiveness, that it allows the guilty to be treated as guilty (Zaibert 369). Yet what does this statement entail? This entails that “our understanding of punishment, qua phenomenon, has not been advanced by the recalcitrant tendency to confuse the problem of its definition with the problem of its justification” (Zaibert 370). Here, the author agrees with Jeffrie Murphy in his suggestion that forgiveness “is something we do for a moral reason” (Murphy 24). Thus, it seems that the act of forgiving necessarily calls for justification and is independent from the reasons and motives that manifest the nature of the phenomenon, i.e. the act of forgiving. We simply decide as to whether or not we ought to punish a guilty person’s wrongdoing. If we choose to forgive the person, we thus avoid punishment. It is in this regard that Zaibert contends that forgiveness is a purely mental phenomenon. I quote: “By focusing on forgiveness as a mental phenomenon, I seek to analyze the root of the talk of paradoxes which surrounds the discussion of forgiveness… this analysis is the most important step in understanding forgiveness” (Zaibert 365). For, it is in this regard that Zaibert solves the paradox of forgiveness. In the final section of his article, Zaibert uses extensions of his account of blame to show the distinctions between pure mental phenomenon and communicative phenomenon, as well as to justify the act of forgiveness. Herein, the author argues that the purer form of forgiveness is mental forgiveness (Zaibert 388). He ascribes several peculiarities of forgiveness as a mental phenomenon, which includes that it is unconditioned by the wrongdoer’s repentance, apologies, or by any behavior in the wrongdoer’s part (Zaibert 388). Moreover, the author emphasizes that a person can only forgive or punish whom he finds blameworthy. According to Zaibert, a person blames (punishes) another person’s wrongdoing when: (1) A believes that X is wrong. (2) A believes that X is an action of B. (3) A believes that B is a moral agent. (4) A believes that there are no excuses, justifications or other circumstances which would preclude blame. (5) A believes that the world would have been a better place had B not done X. (6) A believes that the world would be a better place if something would happen to B, something which would somehow offset B’s Xing. (7) B’s having Xed tends to make A feel something negative, i.e., a reactive emotion, like outrage, indignation or resentment. A forgives B (as a pure mental phenomenon) when (8’) A does something to B, which A believes it is painful for B to endure, as a response to B’s having Xed. A forgives B (in the communicative sense) when, (9) A communicates to B, or to someone else, that she has forgiven (in the sense of a pure mental phenomenon) B (387). The aforementioned account shows Zaibert’s analysis of why person-A blames or punishes person-B. He also shows that while the two kinds of forgiveness may compliment each other, mental forgiveness is the purer form of forgiveness. Thus, from this point onwards, Zaibert concentrates only on mental forgiveness, i.e. “what goes on in someone’s head when he forgives” (388), for much of his discussion on mental forgiveness can be applied to communicative phenomena. At this point, I shall turn to my critique of Zaibert’s analysis and solution to the said paradox. Critique Like Zaibert, my concern here is not moral or ethical, nor is it linguistic but rather, metaphysical.4 Thus, regardless of whether forgiveness and punishment is bad or good, it does not make any difference in my critique. My concern is the nature and ontology of the very act of forgiving, which the author of the article makes as his main task as well: “By focusing on forgiveness as a mental phenomenon I seek to analyze the root of the talk of paradoxes which surrounds the discussion of forgiveness” (Zaibert 365). Here I shall show that Zaibert fails to provide a solution to the said paradox. As mentioned in the summary, Zaibert argues that “to forgive is to deliberately refuse to punish” (368). But if forgiveness is a mental act, how does it cause the physical human act of deliberately refusing to punish? This is where his entire argument breaks down. Zaibert does not discuss the ontology of his "pure mental phenomena" which is where the philosophy of action comes into light. What is the philosophy of action anyway? The philosophy of action primarily asks: what composes an action? What is the nature of action? What is the difference between an action and a mere occurrence? Are our actions voluntary? Are we free in performing an action? Herein, it is important to distinguish between human actions and acts of man. Human actions are deliberate and intentional actions. Voluntariness is necessary in all human actions. On the other hand, acts of man are involuntary actions such as breathing, blinking, etc. So forgiveness is a human act, which is characterized by its deliberate, intentional and voluntary nature. However, Zaibert claims that forgiveness, in its purest essence is a mental phenomenon. The problem is that if forgiveness is a pure mental act, then it has no mode of verification. If it has no mode of verification, then there is no way for me to find out what causes my act of forgiveness. What causes me to forgive the guilty of his wrongdoing? If forgiveness is a human act, then I should have voluntarily intended to forgive him. Indeed, Zaibert would agree, for “Forgiveness, like punishment, is the sort of phenomenon that stands in need of justification” (371). And for Zaibert, forgiveness is justified when the forgiver deliberately refuses to punish or blame the blameworthy, which does not require any form of communication such as repentance or an apology. But is it really justified in this sense? I disagree for the primary reason that Zaibert has overlooked one important aspect of human action, i.e. the cause of action. Consider for instance his account of blame:5 Herein, A forgives (as a pure mental phenomenon) B when A intentionally refuses to punish B’s wrongdoing. So A’s act of forgiveness is an intentional action. But what caused A’s act of forgiveness? For Zaibert, (1) – (7) causes A to forgive B, which amounts to saying that the cause of A’s act of forgiving B is B’s wrongdoing.6 What is wrong with this picture? Zaibert presupposes or assumes that mental acts necessarily cause physical acts. Thus, his discussion of forgiveness as a mental phenomenon is merely based on an assumption. Indeed, “There has been a notorious debate about whether the agents reasons in acting are causes of the action — a longstanding debate about the character of our common sense explanations of actions” (Wilson, “Action”). Herein, Zaibert’s analysis of reasons (1) to (7) as causes of A’s act of punishing B subscribes to a unifier view of action, wherein my mental act of forgiving X can cause my physical act of forgiving X because there is only one act involved, that is, my act of forgiving X. Others argue that there are many acts involved, that is, that my act of forgiving X involves my act of riding a car, going over to X’s place, ringing the doorbell, offering a gift, etc.7 So it seems that we cannot subscribe to the latter for it leads to an infinite regress. So perhaps my act of forgiving a person, which is mental, is the same as my physical act of doing so. However, if that is the case, then the relationship involved in forgiveness and the act of forgiving is asymmetrical (a = b = c) for they are one and the same act. But this model of action will not suffice, for it has no explanatory value. If Zaibert’s concern was to provide a solution to the paradox so as to unveil the true nature of forgiveness, then his solution begs the very question at hand. For example, A forgives B. According to the above analysis, this amounts to A = B, which in turn amounts to mental act of forgiveness = actual act of forgiving. What is missing here? The cause of A’s forgiving B is what is missing. This cause cannot be A’s mental act, for A’s mental act is the same as A’s actual act of forgiving. Claiming such would be tantamount to saying that the cause of A’s act of forgiving B is A’s act of forgiving B, which is a tautology – no explanatory value. Conclusion Therefore, if Zaibert’s discussion of forgiveness hinges upon forgiveness as a pure mental phenomenon, then his reasoning is fallacious - circular and tautological. If so then there would be no explanatory value in his analysis of forgiveness as a pure mental phenomenon, for the cause of such mental phenomenon is left undefined. If the cause is undefined then forgiveness is not a human act but rather, an act of man. But if forgiveness is not a human act, that is, if it is not an intentional or deliberate act, then it begs Zaibert’s very definition of forgiveness as deliberately refusing to punish, which is what Zaibert defends and argues for in the first place. It is in this regard that given an analysis of forgiveness as a mental act in the light of the metaphysics and philosophy of action, Zaibert does not only fail to provide a solution to the paradox but unfoundedly commits a fallacy in his analysis of forgiveness. Therefore, Zaibert’s reasoning and analysis is invalid, for he failed to consider the ontology of action, which undermines and nullifies his conclusion. Notes Read More