The Missing Link in Conflict Resolution - Essay Example

The Missing Link in Conflict Resolution I. Introduction Nagda and Durins (2007) argue that the three most important elementsfor a successful conflict resolution process is effective communication among groups; working within the actual social constructs and effective leadership. In this regard, intergroup dialogue (IGD) as an educational tool is perceived as a method for incorporating these elements by bringing students from diverse social mores together for the purpose of building relations “across cultural and power differences” as a means of heightening awareness of inequities (Nagada and Durin 2007, 35). IGD also aims to identify differences across the groups brought together and to improve the capabilities of both individuals and groups to achieve social justice (Nagada and Gurin 2007, 35). This paper compares and contrast the conflict processes operative for Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Israeli/Palestinian conflicts. The object is to identify what if any of the IGD theories are reflecting in these three conflict resolution process. II. Overview The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is characterized as among the country’s “most effective” conflict resolution processes to date (Gibson 2006, 409). The TRC has contributed significantly to South Africa’s democratic reforms by influencing a “more reconciled society” (Gibson 2006, 409). The conflict resolution process in Northern Ireland takes a similar holistic approach in that the conflict resolution process is centered around policies and initiatives designed to foster equality and to “improve community relations” (Cairsn and Darby 1998, 754). The School of Peace approach to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict resolution is slightly different in that the process aims to heighten individual awareness of the conflict, their part in it and the facilitation of identities via intergroup interactions (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004, 49). III. The IGD Conflict Resolution Process IGDs are built around bringing together between 12 and 16 students once a week for between ten and fourteen weeks. These students convene under the leadership of a “trained peer” who instructs from a plan that merges several learning initiatives which include “intellectual and effective engagement”; “individual reflection and group dialogue”; “individual intergroup and institutional analyses”; “affinity-based and heterogeneous groupings;” and “individual and collective action” (Nagada and Durin 2007, 35). IGD takes the position that the social justice education typically fails to implement tools of intergroup interactions and seeks to incorporate this missing link by emphasizing three factors that are crucial to dialogue. They are: Critically analyzing and appreciating diversities and “dominance” (Nagada and Durin 2007, 36). Reasoned involvement with respect to diversities. Commitment and cooperation in building communities and “conflict engagement” (Nagada and Durin 2007, 36). Critically analyzing and understanding diversities and dominance is characterized as gaining insight into inequities as symptomatic of system constructs and not merely confined to individuality. In other words, IGD places group diversities in the context of social and power constructs. Reasoned involvement refers to debating, discussing and engaging in dialogue. Debating focuses on thinking, oral representation skills and the capacity to influence through defense of one’s own perspective. Discussion involved reasoned decisiveness in terms of conversation as a means of cultivating “self-awareness and self-critique” (Nagada and Durin 2007, 37). Dialogue is designed to cultivate meaningful connections and insight via “inquiry and mutual respect” (Nagada and Durin 2007, 37). Effective dialogue means being able to listen without judging, realizing presumptions and reflecting as well as the ability to inquire (Nagada and Durin 2007, 37). Ultimately IGD aims to use the power of communication to gain insight into bridges in society, inequities and awareness that we do not have to accept those malfeasances. IV. Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland One of the major by-products of the Cold-War era was and to a certain extent continues to be conflicts along the lines of nationalism and ethnicity. These conflicts are partly facilitated by perceptions of threat, security fears along ethnic lines and little or no confidence in opposing ethnic or nationalist entities. Obviously the key to resolving these conflicts is in building trust between opposing entities and the reduction of: Ethnic security dilemma by providing multiple forums of representation, promoting overlapping identities, and pooling sovereignty (Williams and Jesse 2001, 571). Tensions arise from self-perceptions of group classifications along nationalist or ethnic lines. For example, the Catholics of Northern Ireland look upon themselves as Irish while the Protestants perceive that they are British (Williams and Jesse 2001). The security dilemma arises when one group perceives that the other group is more dominant. In Northern Ireland, the police force is primarily made up of Protestants. Moreover, Protestants dominate the professional fields, government offices, non-clerical labor and employment generally. The result is not only Protestant domination but also inequities between Protestants and Catholics. The out-group (Irish Catholics) may be left to feel as though they do not have a viable course of redress thereby facilitating greater conflict with the Protestants (Williams and Jesse 2001). The 1998 Northern Peace Agreement, also known as the Good Friday Agreement seeks to address the security dilemma in a variety of ways. During the negotiation stage, political and national identities were maintained as leaders of the various political parties and identification as Northern Irish were able to get to know the dominant group and vice versa. This was facilitated by intergroup relations which were personalized. The groups were committed to continued dialogue even when they could not reach a consensus (Williams and Jesse 2001). Dialogue, as proffered by Nagada and Durin (2007) is among the crucial factors for conflict resolution plans. The success of this approach was evinced during the negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement as both sides were committed to arriving at an agreement satisfactory for both sides. Through dialogue and personalization of the negotiations, both sides came to an understanding that should they not agree on a satisfactory resolution the conflict would likely resume with greater intensity (Williams and Jesse 2001). Ultimately, providing a voice for the less dominant group in the Good Friday Agreement facilitated a more positive image of the other group and immediately addressed the security dilemma. It also addressed the inequities that spurred conflict by giving the less dominant group a voice and permitted equal engagement (Williams and Jesse 2001). In many ways this approach is also quite similar to Lederach’s (2005) mediative capacity building which focuses on “transforming intergroup relations” (95). Certainly, permitting representatives from the Catholic Irish to engage in dialogue with the dominant group on an equal footing changed intergroup relations and by doing so created more positive images of the opposing group for both sides. V. Conflict Resolution in South Africa South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in the 1990s is often referred to as a “negotiated revolution” (Hamber 1998). The negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African government, the National Party (NC) was spear-headed by the ANC following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ANC began by becoming more averse to the NP’s centralist policies. These changes corresponded with increasing pressure from the West for market reform in former communist states. Simultaneously, the ANC began to sense that the NP was weakening (Hamber 1998). Although there was no actual dialogue at this stage, a definite reduction of the security dilemma was taking place and as such corresponds with William and Jesse’s (2001) discussion of the success of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. At this stage in South Africa, the less dominant party began to see an opportunity for engagement with the dominant party once perceptions of threat were declining. Perceptions of threat were certainly curtailed by the wear and tear of international economic sanctions on South Africa. Moreover, in 1990 the ANC lifted its ban on liberal parties, with the result that inequities between the less dominant party and the dominant party were reduced somewhat (Hamber 1998). Although negotiations would take place they would be dominated by the dominant party. It therefore comes as no surprise that the previous peace negotiations between the dominant and less dominant parties had stalled and were restarted in 1992 under the auspices of the Record of Understanding in which both sided pledged to put an end to the ongoing violence. Unlike previous negotiations, the ANC held the power. Shifting dynamics meant that dialogue could be productive since the NP’s legitimacy had become contentious. Moreover, the ANC had the momentum was with the ANC since it had the majority of South Africa’s citizenry behind it (Hamber 1998). Shifting power dynamics facilitated the negotiation process as both sides realized that they needed to compromise in order to achieve their respective gains. The ANC wanted to avoid further violence and the NP wanted “to secure the minority and economic rights” (Hamber 1998). The threat of violence only fortified both sides’ commitment to negotiating a peace settlement. Conflict resolution required a complex amalgamation of agencies and bodies as the political bodies were not entirely representative of the citizenry. For this reason other bodies would provide for a more holistic approach to conflict resolution. These bodies included the TRC who would grant amnesty and would play a “quasi-judicial role” by providing “survivors with space to recount their past traumas” (Hamber 1998). The TRC would also orgaqnize compensation in respect of the new government (Hamber 1998). Other groups included the Human Rights Commission for establishing and protecting equal rights and fundamental human rights. Perhaps the greatest success of the South African conflict resolution followed from the role that the TRC played in the process. It provided a forum for reconciliation and dialogue where survivors and disenfranchised South Africans could be heard in line with the IGD’s strategies for listening and mutual respect. More importantly the TRC opened up opportunities for commitment and cooperation for constructing the new South Africa as well as conflict engagement. Conflict engagement came by way of compensation and permitting survivors to recount their experiences. VI. Conflict Resolution in Palestine/Israel Conflict resolution in the Palestinian/Israeli tensions as espoused by the School for Peace Approach is focused on individual and intragroup dynamics. In this regard, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict resolution processes are distinguished from the South African and Northern Ireland conflict resolution processes. The latter two conflict resolution processes involve intragroup interaction but at what appears to be a political level. Even so, the approaches taken by Northern Ireland and South Africa through political leaders do incorporate the good leadership quality for successful conflict resolution as espoused by Nagda and Durin (2007). The School for Peace Approach however is more closely aligned to the IGD’s theory of conflict resolution. Essentially the School for Peace Approach focuses on “individual orientation” and “group orientation” (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004, 47). Halabi and Sonnenschein (2004) explain that the approach used by the School for Peace emphasizes “the encounter between Jews and Arabs, on the conflict” and on relating “to the participants as representatives of their groups” (48). This approach is entirely consistent with the IGD’s approach which is to heighten awareness of the conflict and facing and understanding differences and similarities between the groups (Nagda and Durin, 2007). Sharper similarities are observed in the encounters organized by School for Peace, something that was missing in the South African and Northern Irish conflict resolution processes. The School for Peace approached the encounters as a means to cultivate a equal, just and humane society. The encounters, in line with the IGD programs are calculated to heighten awareness of the conflict and the parties’ role in the conflict and to explore and transform identities by virtue of interaction with the opposing faction (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004, 49). As noted previously, the IGD program is predicated on working with the individual to gain insights not only into the individual’s own awareness of the conflict but to form empathy with the opposing group. As Halabi and Sonnenschein (2004) explain: Awareness gives people the option to choose their path according to their understanding and consciousness; having a clear and mature identity equips a person to build reciprocal and egalitarian relationships (49). In working with the groups, the School for Peace treats each group differently and realistically. This is because Arabs have to confront the fact that they are the less dominant group in the conflict and as such are a minority entity. The Jews are required to cope with the fact that they form the dominant group. In the meantime, both parties are required to inquire into the “oppressive patterns in which they are caught” and take the next step forward, away from these trends by forming a greater bound with the concept of humanity (Halabi and Sonnenschein 2004, 50). This too incorporates the IGD’s theory that intragroup interactions must have an inquiring aspect to it. The utility of inquiry is instructive. Essentially inquiry permits open dialogue and promotes the sharing of feelings and thoughts, a key component of good communications. VII. Conclusion Nagda and Durins (2007) three elements for a successful conflict resolution process: effective communication among groups; working within the actual social constructs and effective leadership is most evident in the School for Peace approach to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The major differences in the approaches taken by the three groups is in the leadership proviso. While Northern Ireland and South Africa focused on leadership effectiveness in negotiating the conflict resolution, the School for Peace Approach does not and focuses instead on individuality and group dynamics. It would therefore appear that the approaches taken by Northern Ireland and South Africa for putting an end to the violence and carnage as quickly as possible, the focus in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is to look ahead by transforming social spaces for the long term. Works Cited Cairns, E. and Darby, J. (July 1998) “The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, Consequences, and Controls”. American Psychologist, Vol. 53(7): 754-760. Gibson, J. (June 2006) “The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons From South Africa”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50(3): 409-432. Halabi, R. and Sonnenschein, N. (2004) “Awareness, Identity, and Reality: The School for Peace Approach”. Cited in Halabi, R. and Reich, D. (Eds) Israeli and Palestinian Identities in Dialogue: The School of Peace Approach. Rutgers University Press. Hamber, B. (30 October 1998) “Who Pays for Peace? Implications of the Negotiated Settlement for Reconciliation, Transformation and Violence in a Post-Apartheid South Africa”. Public Lecture at the Annual General Meeting of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London Voluntary Sector Resource Centre, London. http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papwhop.htm (Retrieved December 11, 2010). Lederach, J. (2005) The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford University Press. Nagada, B. Gurin, P. (2007) “Intergroup Dialogue: A Critical-Dialogue Approach to Learning About Difference, Inequality, and Social Justice”. New Directions for Teaching and Learning. No. 111: 35-45. Williams, K. and Jesse, N. (Sept. 2001) “Resolving Nationalist Conflicts: Promoting Overlapping Identities and Pooling Sovereignty: The 1998 Northern Peace Agreement.” Political Psychology, Vol. 22(3): 571-599. Read More