Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections - Essay Example

Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections (Abramowitz, Alexander, Gunning) (a) Lack of competition in elections is a national problem. (e) In the 2004 U.S House elections, only five challengers succeeded in defeating an incumbent. (+) Of the 435 seats in the house, only 22 were decided by a margin of less than 10 percentage points. (a) Redistricting has not made these elections less competitive and turning control of redistricting over to nonpartisan commissions would not necessarily increase competition. House districts are classified as safe or competitive based on the majority party vote in the most recent presidential election. (e) Presidential vote closely reflects voters’ party loyalties and is not influenced by whether an incumbent is running in a district or how much money the local candidates spend. (+) Districts that voted at least 10 percentage points more Democratic than the nation were classified as safe Democratic; districts that voted at least 10 percentage points more Republican than the nation were classified as safe Republican; districts that were within 5 percentage points of the nation were classified as competitive. (a) House district have become less competitive, but not because of redistricting. Most of the change has occurred between redistricting cycles. For the same reasons that states and counties have become less competitive- Americans are increasingly voting for candidates who reflect those values. (e) on the county level-number of counties dominated by one party and the proportion of voters living in such counties have increased dramatically over the several past decades. Also, growing ideological polarization at the elite level has made it easier for voters to choose a party identification on the basis of their ideological preferences. (+) Polarization=sorting, as voters bring their policy and partisan preferences into alignment (a)Growing financial advantage enjoyed by incumbents also contributes to the low level of competition in recent congressional elections. (e) It now costs over a million dollars to wage a competitive campaign for a U.S. House seat. (+) Most incumbents can raise that kind of money easily, but very few challengers can (they lack the financial resources needed to wage competitive campaigns). The most vulnerable- those in districts that were more supportive of the opposing party’s presidential candidate than the nation. Drawing the Line on District Competition (McDonald) McDonald finds that redistricting tends to reduce the number of competitive congressional districts. Contrary to Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning who claim that nine non- partisan redistricting institutions existed in 2001, McDonald (2004) identifies only two such institutions, in Arizona and Iowa. Claims that redistricting does have an effect on the number of competitive congressional districts and, as a case study of redistricting institutions in Arizona illustrates, the choice of redistricting institutions and criteria does indeed affect the number of competitive districts. Examining the data uncontaminated by the 1992 election, the author agrees with Abramowitz that a significant change in district partisanship has occurred between redistricting cycles. Both redistricting and underlying changes in the geographic distribution of partisans are contributing to the decline in the number of competitive districts. If the number of competitive districts is maximized, then the resulting plan is based in favor of the minority party. This explains why a Democratic activist was the primary financier of the campaign supporting Proposition 106 (Davenport 1999). 4 important points- (1) rules that govern a commission constrain the number of competitive districts it can draw, (2) in a partisan unbalanced state it is impossible to draw all districts to be competitive (but still, it is possible to draw many competitive districts if there is an imperative to do so). (3) Drawing heavily Democratic majority-minority Voting Rights Act districts in a Republican state reduces the possibility of drawing competitive districts in the remainder. (4) Accommodating communities of interest, being almost by definition a community with a shared political interest, conflicts with the goal of drawing competitive districts. Evidences- “pudding” (McDonald). With so few competitive districts now and few neutral redistricting institutions, it is difficult to measure the contemporary effect of redistricting institutions on competitive districts and of competitive districts on elections. (+) If reform efforts are successful, then political scientists will have a larger number of competitive districts to examine in future studies of redistricting and electoral politics. Drawing the Line on District Competition: A Rejoinder (Abramowitz, Alexander, Gunning) (a) Contrary to the finding of these authors that non- partisan redistricting commissions have failed to produce increased competition in House elections, McDonald claims that nonpartisan redistricting in Arizona provides a positive example of what can be accomplished by nonpartisan redistricting commissions elsewhere. Their conclusions are supported by other studies that have examined the consequences of partisan redistricting for competition. Redistricting often leads to increased competition because partisans drawing district line face a fundamental tension between incumbent protection and maximizing their party’ electoral potential. 1971-1972 redistricting cycle (redistricting produced “minimal change” in competition). Gopoian and West(1984) found evidence of increased competition as a result of the 1981-1982 round of districting because “leaders appeared to trade security for seats in their redistricting decisions” (1080) (e) finding that there was no significant decrease in the competitiveness of House districts between 1990 and 1992 is consistent with findings for the 1981-1982 and 2001-2002 redistricting cycles. Most importantly- McDonald’s own estimates of the number of competitive House districts do not support his conclusion that redistricting accounted for a significant share of the decline in competitive districts between 1990 and 2002. (+) Much of the evidence presented by McDonald concerning the detrimental effects of partisan redistricting reform consists of anecdotes based on his personal experiences as a consultant to various pro-reform groups. Evidence in this study demonstrates that redistricting has had little or no impact on the overall competitiveness of House elections. Re- Drawing the Line on District Competition (McDonald) Continued disagreements with Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning over the effect of redistricting on the number of competitive congressional districts. McDonald is claims that these authors have misinterpreted his work and is offended by their rudeness. Claims that the only change to districts is in distribution of partisans within districts, and thus there cannot be a change in district partisanship associated with anything other that rearranging district boundaries. Attempted to faithfully replicate the authors’ analysis based on personal communication he had with Abramowitz, but the continue to have unresolved discrepancies. Claims that his case study of Arizona demonstrates that nonpartisan commissions are not sufficient to produce competitive districts, as “nonpartisan” commissioners are constrained by context and institutional rules. The method used in this study- essentially map simulations under hypothetical rules( a methodology suited to address this question and has been used in a similar analysis of California’s 2005 redistricting reform initiative) The competitiveness of a district is related to the competitiveness of the election held within it(Jacobson 2001,182) While redistricting is unlikely the only cause of the low levels of electoral competition in 2002, McDonald suspects it is a contributing factor .(e) the number of competitive districts in 2002 is low and district competitiveness declined between 2000 and 2002. District competition is an important factor in its own right on election outcomes and politics more generally. (e) Competitive districts are related to the presence of strong challengers to incumbents (Maisel and Stone 1997) (+) Ansola-behere, Snyder and Stewart find a relationship between district competition and polarization in Congress, as “more competitive districts tend to produce more moderate candidates” Read More