Is Rodney Guilty of Negligence - Case Study Example

Loss to Jeff The first thing that needs to determined is whether or not Rodney is guilty of negligence, as well as whether the business, Trotter Independent Traders Ltd., also has liability for the negligence. Then, it must be determined if Jeffs losses are compensable. The elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation, damages. First of all, was there a duty from Rodney to Jeff? Donoghue v. Stevenson established that a duty is owed to anybody who could reasonably foreseeably be harmed by the defendants actions (Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 532, 580). Caparo Industries Place v. Dickman, however, stated that there is a requirement of proximity between the claimant and the defendant (Caparo Industries Place v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605). Foreseeability alone is not enough to create a duty of care (Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, 60). Thus, under the Donaghue test, a duty of care would be established. Donoghue concerned a decomposed snail in the claimants ginger beer. Initially, there was held to not be a duty of care, as there was not a proximity between the claimant and the shopkeeper, as the claimant did not purchase the ginger beer. However, the Donoghue court decided that the shopkeeper did owe a duty of care to the woman, as it was reasonably foreseeable that she would be harmed by having snail in her drink, and she would have been considered to be a “neighbor” (Donoghue v. Stevenson, p. 580). Thus, under Donoghue, there would be sufficient proximity between the claimant, Jeff, and Rodney to establish a duty of care. Just as in the Donoghue case, there was not a special relationship between the parties, yet the harm was reasonably foreseeable – it was reasonably foreseeable that, if one drinks and drives, an accident may occur. Jeff would be considered to be a “neighbor” in the loose sense of the term, in that the loose sense of the term would describe a “neighbor” as anybody who would be reasonably foreseeably harmed by the defendants actions. Therefore, under Donoghue, the first element, duty, is established. Next, did Rodney breach that duty? In other words, did he act as a reasonable man would act? (Blyth v. Company Proprietors of the Birmingham Water Works (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781). This is the objective test for whether or not a breach occurred. At first glance, it would seem that Rodney did not act reasonably – he drank and drove. And, there was some indication that the vehicle might have been unsafe, as it was described as “rather old.” Therefore, there must be two questions asked and answered – number one, was Rodney over the limit with his blood alcohol content to sufficiently impair his faculties? And, number two, if the van did have mechanical problems, did Rodney know about them? While the second question cannot be answered on the facts, in that the van was described as “old,” yet the facts do not establish whether Rodney knew of any mechanical problems, the second question is more answerable on the facts. Rodney was said to have drank “a couple of beers” before driving. Assuming that the limit for drunk driving is .08, then it must be established whether Rodney was at that limit would he drove. A couple of beers would most likely put him at that limit. Therefore, that would establish a breach of the duty of care, as a reasonable man would not drive intoxicated. Therefore, a breach of duty of care is also established. Next, causation. This one is fairly straightforward – one only has to look at the “but for” test (Barnett v. Kensington & Chelsea NHS Trust [1968] 1 All ER 1068) – in other words, would the damages have been suffered “but for” the defendants negligence? The answer is a definitive yes, as far as the damage to the shop window – the shop window would not have been damaged if not for the Rodneys actions. Damages is next. First of all, the extent of compensable damages must be ascertained. There is the damage to the structure of the building, and there are damages related to the loss of business. The damage to the structure of the building is most likely compensable; the loss of business is most likely not. The reason why the loss of business is not compensable is because it would be considered to be a purely economic loss; the damage to the building is compensable because it is damaged as a direct result of the negligence, and is not a purely economic loss, but structural damage. The case that is illustrative of this fact scenario is Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. [1973] 1 QB 27. In Spartan, the defendant caused damage to a factorys furnace and metal, and also caused the factory to be deprived of electricity for 15 hours, which caused a lost profit on metal that was not melted because the electricity was turned off. The court held that the damage to the furnace, and the damage to metal that was directly caused by the negligence was compensable. However, the purely economic loss was not compensable, as it was considered to be “independent of the physical damage” (Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. [1973] 1 QB 27, 29). Therefore, under the Spartan principle, the shop damage is compensable and the lost profits were not. Alan Alan will have a difficult time recovering anything from Rodney. First of all, it does not seem that Rodney had a duty to Alan. While it was reasonably foreseeable that Rodneys actions would cause the kind of damage sustained by Jeff, it was not foreseeable that his actions would cause the kind of damage sustained by Alan. It is unclear why Alans shop was even closed. Therefore, it is unclear whether Alans damages were reasonably foreseeable, or if they are too remote, a test put forth by Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388. Therefore, it must be asked – would a reasonable man foresee that a shop next to a shop that is damaged by defendants negligence would be closed? Of course, this would depend upon facts that are not presented in the case – the extent of the damage, how close the shops are to one another, how close the damage was to Alans shop, etc. Also, was it a well-known policy to cordone off any property that is within a certain area from the damage? These are all questions that need to be answered before it can be ascertained if a reasonable man would see that Alans shop would be closed because of the damage done to Jeffs shop. At any rate, there does not seem to be any damage to Alan except economic damage. Therefore, his claim would probably fail under the Spartan principle. There is also some question as to whether the business, Trotters Independent Traders Ltd. would also be liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability. Under this doctrine, employers are liable for negligent acts of their employees while the employee is performing his or her duty for the employer. Although the traditional test excluded intentional acts, recent cases have established that an employer may even be liable for an intentional act committed by the employee (Lister v. Hensley Hall Ltd. [2002] 1 AC 215). Therefore, even though the drunk driving might be considered to be an intentional tort, this does not get the employer off the hook. Here, Rodney was performing an act for the company when the accident occurred, therefore there might be vicarious liability. He did take a detour to the bar, and this might take him out of the course of his employment (Joel v. Morison [1834] EWHC KB J39). Also, it is not clear if there was not a typical master-servant relationship, which is usually necessary to establish vicarious liability (Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530). Rodney was a part owner of the company, not an employee, which might defeat a vicarious liability claim on the company. Cassandra This one is fairly straightforward – Rodney owed a duty to her, as she was his wife and a passenger in the car, therefore there is proximity. Rodney breached the duty to her by driving recklessly and/or intoxicated, his negligence caused her damages and she had actual physical damages. The only question is whether she can recover from the company, in the event that there is vicarious liability, despite the fact that there is not a master-servant relationship. The question is whether her being in the car takes Rodney out of the course of his employment. There is some indication that this would be the case, as with Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. [1951] 2KB 266. In that case, the employer was not liable to an employee of another firm when an employee of the defendant employer picked up the second employee without the employers knowledge or consent. This is analogous to this case – there was not knowledge or consent on the part of the Derek, who would be considered to be the employer in this case, that Rodney would do this, so the company probably would not be liable to Cassandra for her injuries. Dismissal First of all, it must be determined what kind of employment Cassandra had with her employer – was she an “employee” for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The facts state that she had an employment contract, therefore she would be considered to be an employee (Employment Rights Act 1996 (230)). The next question is whether or not she was fairly dismissed. Fair reasons for dismissal, according to the Employment Rights Act 1996 are dismissals that “a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do; b) relates to the conduct of the employee; ba) is retirement of the employee; c) is that the employee was redundant, or d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or made under an enactment” (Employment Rights Act 1996 (98)(2)). In this case, the relevant provisions are a and b above. There is no indication that Cassandra had become redundant, which would mean that her job had become obsolete and there was no indication that d would apply either. Cassandra was an accountant whose job it was to maintain the companys ledger. Her injuries were to her face and shoulder. There is no indication that Cassandra would no longer be able to perform her work as an accountant as a result of her injuries, therefore section A would not apply. Not only that, her injuries were so minor that she was treated and released within a couple of hours after going to the hospital, so her injuries would not be enough that she was incapacitated to the point that she could not do her job. The other relevant provision is that Cassandras conduct possibly caused her to lose her job. In this case, it is unclear what the conduct was, but the employer indicated that part of the reason why she was terminated is because her injuries were from her own neglect. However, there is no indication that her on the job conduct was poor. Moreover, there is no indication that her injuries resulted from her own neglect, despite what the letter stated. She was simply a passenger in a car that was in an accident. Possibly her neglect was not making sure that her husband drove after drinking or insisting upon driving herself rather than let him drive. At any rate, even if she was responsible for her own injuries, this fact would be irrelevant, as it has no bearing on her conduct on the job. Cassandra was also entitled to notice before being terminated. The amount of notice is contingent upon how long the employee had worked for the employer. Under the Employment Rights Act 1996, if an employee had worked for an employer between one month and one year, she is entitled to one week notice; two years, two weeks notice; and so on, up to a maximum of 12 weeks notice (Employment Rights Act 1996 (86)). In this case, Cassandra had worked for her employer just under one year when she was informed that she was to be terminated, therefore she was entitled to one week notice. Since the facts indicated that she was “thereby terminated,” it would seem that she was not given notice, therefore this is a breach of the statute as well. Sources Used Barnett v. Kensington & Chelsea NHS Trust [1968] 1 All ER 1068. Blyth v. Company Proprietors of the Birmingham Water Works (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781. Caparo Industries Place v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. [1951] 2KB 266. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 532. Employment Rights Act 1996. Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. Joel v. Morison [1834] EWHC KB J39. Lister v. Hensley Hall Ltd. [2002] 1 AC 215. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. [1973] 1 QB 27. Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] AC 388. Yewens v. Noakes (1880) 6 QBD 530. Read More