Lying and Deception in Professions - Essay Example

Lying and Deception in Professions Lying and deception is commonly practiced in varied professions specially in lawyering, health care, law enforcement, research, management, and others, such that the act has been accepted as part and parcel of the profession. Yet going over the ethical codes of different professions, for example in universities and professional associations, not one has negated the immorality of lying and deception in the professions; telling the truth has been always the maxim (Gert 1988, cited in Berreman 2003, p. 98) making the profession and the practitioners more reputable. Ironically though, Nyberg (1993, p. 7) observes that despite all these public condemnations against lying and deception, everyone is actually privately culpable of it. Why so – he furthers that perhaps it is necessary to maintain equilibrium in people’s social relations, or possibly, it gives credence to moral decency. Meaning, although lying and deception is publicly acknowledged to be an immoral professional act, certain circumstances may compel or warrant professionals to resort to lying and deception. As Englehardt & Evans (1994) suggests, there are some instances when outright lying may be morally right and there may also be some instances when the simple act of not divulging information is morally wrong. Such is the heart of the matter – Is lying and deception justified in the conduct of one’s profession? Are professionals ever justified in, or even compelled to lie to or deceive their clients? If so, in what context would this be morally permissible? If not, why? Is outright lying worse than deception in the professions? Why would it be or would it not be? Is a professional ever entitled to lie to his/her client, or to other people to protect the client? Such are seemingly easy questions? There may not be correct or wrong answers to them. Nevertheless, the issue of lying and deception in profession is one of the gray areas in professional ethics that warrant further inquiry and discussion.   Lying and Deception Defined Since there is no single definition for lying (Kagan 1998, p. 113) and deception, both terms under contention are defined purposely for this paper, to look at the issue on a similar context. From the following definitions of lying – ‘No liar preserves faith in that about which he lies… wishes that he to whom he lies have faith in him, but… does not preserve faith by lying to him’ (Chisholm & Feehan 1977, p. 152); ‘A person lies when he asserts something to another which he believes to be false with the intention of getting the other to believe it to be true’ (Kupfer 1982, p. 104); ‘A person lies when he asserts a proposition he believes to be false’ (Fried 1978, p. 55); Lying is ‘making a statement believed to be false, with the intention of getting another to accept it as true’ (Primoratz 1984, p. 54); Lying is ‘an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content (Williams 2002, p. 96) – three common elements can be noted: (1) the speaker knows the lie, (2) the speaker intends to deceive another person (ONeill 2003, p. 8), and (3) the speaker betrays the trust of the other (Carlson 2001, p. 24). As such lying could be defined as an act wherein an individual deliberately, by choice, deceives another unknowing individual by giving outright false information or withholding vital information (Ekman cited in Parsons 2002, p. 265). Deception, on the other hand, is defined by Buller & Burgoon (1996) ‘as knowingly transmitting messages to a receiver with the intent to foster a false belief or conclusion’ (cited in Caspi & Gorsky 2006, p. 1). To which Englehardt & Evans (1994) further that ‘[d]eception is a more passive form of creating a false impression; disingenuously a misimpression is permitted’. As such, both lying and deception are morally wrong. Does it mean then that Kant’s absolutism: Lying in whatever condition is always wrong, even it could mean saving a life (Pruss 2001), should judge professional ethics? Are professionals ever justified in, or even required to, deceive their clients? To judge whether lying and deception is justified in people’s everyday lives may be simpler than when it is judged in its practice in any profession. What makes this so is the nature of the professional-client relationship, which is basically based on an acknowledged trust. Meaning, the client seeks the professional’s expertise believing on what the professional says can be provided. For example, a sick person seeks the service of a medical doctor because the doctor claims he could do so. And based on this relationship comes the lucrative danger of lie and deception. As Carson (2010, p. 201) observes: Professions are commonly practiced to gain economic benefits that professionals may conveniently deceive their clients to foster their financial interests. Let it also be added that not only financial interest tempts professionals to deceive their clients but also prestige and power. Here is the classical problem of ‘conflict of interest’, which occurs ‘when, in the presence of some duty to pursue the interest of another, [one] is motivated by self-interest to do something inconsistent with that duty’ (Latham 2001, p. 283). For example, rather than giving patients cheaper medicines equally effective for the disease but least profit for the doctor, patients are instead given more expensive branded-medicine by which bigger profit for the doctor is assured. Or as what is commonly illustrated in movie films, lawyers or accountants deceive their clients to amass their clients’ wealth. In such cases, lying and deception could easily be determined to be morally wrong, since the means and the end are both wrong. What if the lie and deception is done not to foster one’s vested interest but rather to promote the greater good? Would not the end justify the means, especially so if the means is the last resort? Here is the classical problem of a dilemma. Would Fried (1978, p. 69) be correct to say that although the promotion of truth is basically good, its value must in all honesty ‘be balanced against all other goods and bads with which it competes’? As Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics (Ross & Brown 2009, p. 85) asserts: ‘the just is – the proportional; the unjust is what violates the proportion’. Or is Kafka’s more correct to say that necessity matters more than the allegiance to truth (cited in Smyth 2002, p. 1). As, Plato’s Socrates argues: Lying when done for good intention is justified (Kesk 2000, p. 2). For example, would it be more morally right to tell a cancer patient with a suicidal tendency that he/she is actually dying than giving him/her a hope that he/she could live longer once he/she undergoes medication? Or would it be permissible to tell a lie to diffuse a life-threatening situation? In the first place, for who would honesty in the professional-client relationship more beneficial – to the client, to the professional and the profession, or to the society? Honesty in this relationship benefits more the client on two grounds: (1) it guarantees the clients safety from possible manipulation and abuse of power by the professional, and (2) it respects the client’s ‘right to self-determination and self-knowledge’ (Bakhurst 1992, p. 65). It also benefits the professional and the profession as it would confirm their reputation that would result to greater public trust. In effect this results to a more peaceful and orderly society. In this context, lying and deception cannot be justified, since lying would not only undermine the client’s right but would also disturb the professional’s self-respect and confidence and the society’s order. This also contradicts the paternalistic point of view that telling a lie may at times be more of a call for the professional as it would bring about better consequence. For example, based on the doctor’s expert evaluation, lying may be more helpful for the speedy treatment of a patient. In this case, the doctor’s expertise supersedes the patient’s autonomy. Thus, lying becomes justified. But, who are we to say that our judgment is what is best for the client, when our decisions are based only on the available information? What if the client withhold information from the professional? It could also be argued that telling the truth is the ideal but reality says otherwise. As Machiavelli essentially asserts, being truthful works well in a perfect society but not in an imperfect society such ours, where wretched men practically abuse and manipulate others’ truthfulness (cited in Pasquerella & Killilea 2007, p. 108). In other words, telling the truth is not always wise, but may even be more destructive. But does morality rest on wisdom? Are all wise decisions morally right? With lying and deception in the profession viewed from different perspectives, the truth remains that lying and deception in profession is morally wrong. Not only because the professional-client relationship requires equal respect but also because such relationship creates the moral fiber of the society. To say that the society is imperfect anyway and that its imperfection warrants lying and deception is baloney. On the contrary, it is because the world is so imperfect that professionals should work harder to always tell the truth, because it is in doing so that the world’s imperfection may be healed. As we always say, a wrong cannot be corrected by another wrong. And if everything is wrong, there would be disequilibrium. Kesk (2000, p. 1) may be right to say that the greater injustice anyone can do to a man is to tell him lies, in the sense that lie blinds a person’s judgment. Consequently, a blinded judgment results to disastrous decisions. Furthermore, for expertise to supplant client autonomy and to guarantee correct judgment is arrogance, because we do not know everything. Let us stop playing gods. As we have said, life on earth is uncertain and so are the circumstances of our actions and decisions. Meaning to say there is no guarantee that lying to or deceiving clients would result to greater good. However, in every rule there is an exception. As Bok (1978) strongly argues, lying and deception may be permitted in extreme cases where there is no moral choice (cited in Burke 1995, p. 55). The complexities of and the intricacies in social relations most often make lying and deception expedient. However, expediency does not make an action morally right. I believe; placing lying and deception as the last resort only supports the view that lying and deception in profession is morally wrong and that honesty is still the best policy. Is outright lying worse than deception in the professions?  Is there any difference between lying and deception as to the degree of their wrongness? Pruss (2001) differentiates the two terms on the bases of evidence, such that the evidence of the wrongness of deception rests solely on its intention to make another person believe a false information; while the evidence of the wrongness of lying rests not only on the intention to make a false information be believed by another person, but worse in gaining the trust of the other person with the premeditated intent to betray such trust. Given this differentiation, what is clear is the fact that both lying and deception are morally wrong. So, to determine which of the two acts is worse is immaterial since both are morally wrong, and as what has been stated above, both acts should not be practiced in the profession. In fact, even in a crisis negotiation situation Burke (1995) strongly discourages the use of lie or deception, because trust is what holds society together. Although he may have supported Bok’s assertion for consideration in extreme cases, Burke does not allow such practice lightly. Furthermore, to define that the other one is worse than the other may imply that doing the other is easier to justify than the other. Yet for the sake of argument and in the context of extreme case, as Bok (1980) and Burke (1995) asserts, following Pruss differentiation of lying and deception, clearly shows that outright lying is worse than deception simply because it does two immoral acts: First, making one to believe true that is false; and second, gaining one’s trust by the first act only to intentionally betray that trust. These immoral acts actually motivate evil; promote evil; and do evil. By these, outright lying is positively worse than deception. However, others may argue that deception is worse than outright lying because compared with outright lying, deception can easily make others believe of the false as true. But this does not add evilness to the act. Is a professional ever entitled to lie to his/her client, or to other people to protect the client? Based on the above discussion, I don’t think professionals are entitled to lie to their clients, because that would basically be a breach of trust. And once trust is breached, the professional-client relationship is essentially terminated. This holds true especially in professions that the client seeks for the service of the professional, because the mere act of the client is already a statement of the client’s trust on the professional, regardless of the basis for that trust. On the other hand, the professional’s acceptance of the client confirms that the client’s trust for the professional is appropriate and thereby accepted. Moreover, the professional’s acceptance of the client’s trust in him/her is also an implied recognition of the professional on the client’s right and capacity to judge and decide. Thus the right of the client to autonomy is also recognized. Nobody says that telling the truth to client is easy. But this hard reality does not allow the professional to resort to lying and deception. Instead, this calls on the professional to be more creative, be more patient, and be level-headed with the client. However, in matters of discussing information about a client to other people is a different matter. In the first place, the professional, not unless the client permits him/her so, has no right to discuss matters regarding the client with other people. But, this also does not warrant the professional to tell a lie or to deceive other people just to protect the client. In fact, in this instances, the professional, may resort to two things: Either the client is informed that someone is asking information about him/her and ask for his/her permission; or out rightly tell the third party that the professional is in no position to give information on the client. What if the court compels the professional to do so? I think in this case, the professional should inform the client and ask for his/her permission. Conclusion Telling the truth is universally accepted to be morally right, at least rhetorically, because practice shows otherwise. Although it is true that there are extreme cases where there is no moral choice except for lying or deception, this does not make lying and deception morally right; it is simply the only choice – a lesser evil for that matter, because one thing remains honesty is still the best policy. 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