Do Universal Moral Principles Exist - Research Paper Example

Do Universal Moral Principles Exist? The debate regarding whether there exist a universal set of moral principles by which we all live has been a burning question for centuries. Countless philosophers, scholars and authors have been unable to avoid becoming involved in the debate in all of its glory, and thus the issue is constantly refuelled. The question is complex; the analysis of whether we as humans live by a set of moral rules involves many elements of everyday life and well as deep philosophical reasoning. The man who contests that we do indeed live by a set of moral rules must then face the task of explaining how they were developed, or from where they were borne, lest his contention be mocked as pitiful. The issue seems endless, the answer unreachable on any proven level, yet is sparks fire in the hearts of even the judges in courtrooms who must apply the law to ‘hard cases’ and stretch its definition whilst keeping in line with written provisions. Indeed, there are strong arguments both for and against the existence of universal moral standards. The issue is not one of proof; it is rather one of providing the most plausible argument. So what is a universal moral principle? It is an objective knowledge of right and wrong; a confidence in the natural goodness of human nature. Our reflective intellect possesses a direct knowledge of the qualities from which conclusions might be drawn about what these moral rules are. The biggest problem faced by this contention is answering the question: where do they come from? Are they inherent within us, or do they come from a higher being? Do we learn them over time as we grow, or were we born with the ability to access these moral principles? Aquinas makes reference to the existence of natural laws created by God, which we access by intellectual reasoning given to us by Him (Aquinas 1920, Q.2-94:2). Hare states that human logic applies to our moral assertions, allowing us to arrive at an objective standard of moral principles. Rousseau argued that we were born with a certain set of natural rights, which are then transpired into the moral respect we give each other Rousseau (1762). If these different contentions are right, they all point to one thing; an existing set of moral principles, followed universally. So, everyone considers murder, or the taking of another’s life to be immoral. This is very plausible if one considers the law and punishment severity in law for murder; we all arguably believe in the preservation of life. However, in some societies this means killing the elderly to save sparse resources for the young, in others this means ensuring the quality of life for the elderly. Indeed, the fundamental moral value; the preservation of life is universal. Yet, the way in which this value is expressed from society to society differs (Finnis 1980, p.34). Let us label the preservation of life principle as the Basic Principle and the ways in which it is expressed the Specific Principle. Let us accept that the Basic Principle never changes. But the Specific principle is a clear expression of differing opinions; where the morals of one society would repel killing the elderly, the moral beliefs of another would cause him to repel the preservation of the elderly. How can we reconcile these two principles? Indeed, is reconciliation at all necessary, if we accept the Basic Principle as a basic moral standard? No matter which Specific Principle is employed by a society, the underlying Basic Principle does appear to give strength to the existence of a universal set of moral principles. If there do not exist moral universal principles, what examples can be shown to formulate this argument? It seems too easy to fall back on the everyday happenings that suggest the futility of the argument that moral principles exist on a moral level. The debate surrounding abortion is rich with conflicting moral arguments – it is wrong to kill any being versus specific circumstances which require an exception to the rule. The argument here thus appears to run on the existence of exceptions to the normal rules; many have been pardoned when killing in self defence for fear of their own life. Thus can moral rules be merely an aspiration that we heed, unless exceptional circumstances allow us to ‘fall from grace’? Perhaps the very existence of these exceptions is in itself a moral rule that The biggest and most weakening crack in the existence of moral rules argument is the evidence that we do not all necessarily know how to access them. Those who steal, those who kill and lie and do wrong to others without reason generally defies that any universal set of moral rules exist. It appears that the contention of such an existence is undermined by the way in which some interpret these moral rules. We thus move into a complex maze of when an individual’s personal interpretation of a moral principle is correct, as well as an analysis of which ways to interpret moral principles exist. But need the situation be so complex? The fact that we interpret these moral principles means that they at least exist; the previous argument that different societies can regard the same moral principle in entirely different ways demonstrates this. But if we are to interpret them, or to manipulate them to fit our needs, or to acknowledge them and disregard them completely, then what is the function or point of these universal rules? If they cannot achieve a universal standard of moral behaviour then perhaps the argument against their existence is much stronger than one would care to believe or indeed admit. There is no question that a world in which we all acknowledge and heed a moral set of rules is an extremely attractive one. But are moral principles merely subjective after all? This is not to question whether moral principles in themselves are subjective, but that the way in which we see them is arguably subjectively so. Raphael argues that objective moral principles cannot exist because values can only be expressed in the form of different attitudes and beliefs towards values (Raphael 1994, ch.2). Such expressions, he says are subjective; the way we react to an act is not the result of the act itself, but the result of our personal perception of the act. The same can be said for moral principles, values and rules. Thus, even if one can contend that moral rules exist, our perception of them is emotional, and if we cannot react to them or view them in the same way, then their very existence is rendered rather useless. As Hume stipulates, the idea that lying is wrong is a fact in the mind and not in the act itself, and because each mind can vary, there can thus be no moral objective opinion (Hume, 1739, III.i.1). Another example is as thus: A pulls a cat’s tail. Let’s suggest that it is a moral principle that pulling a cat’s tail is wrong, as in harming others is morally wrong. Why is it morally wrong? Perhaps it is because most would see it as a disturbing act, they would be negatively affected by viewing such a cruel act. And here is the weakness in the existence of moral principles argument – it is not wrong as an act in itself – it is wrong because certain people see it as wrong. Thus the immorality of such an act is not inherent within the act itself, but immoral according to the onlooker; indeed some would find it amusing, or not be affected by it in any way. The fact that A pulled the cat’s tail does not defy the existence of the possibility of this moral rule; we all at some time or other commit an immoral act knowing that we are doing so. The focus is on the onlooker, for it is the only way in which a moral principle can be enshrined. The only way in which pulling a cat’s tail could be morally wrong on a universal level is if every person seeing it were to be repulsed or morally offended by it in some way. It cannot be said that this is so; subjective values are so different and varied that it leaves morals to the mercy of human perception. But what of the contention that universal moral rules have been created by some form of higher being? Again, this seems to depend on the individual, or on specific groups. To believe in god is to allow one to lean towards the argument for universal moral principles. But this is limited to those who have faith, and even those within the faith group can still interpret morals subjectively – the ten commandments can be, and have been, interpreted and applied in endless ways. This is a topic that is in itself a whole side topic too vast to cover here in any detail, yet it is worth noting. Suffice it to say that for the purpose of this paper, recourse to religion provides little help in gaining any ground on the topic, if purely due to its separation of people into ‘believers’ and ‘non-believers’. The arguments thus stated do not serve to eradicate the argument that universal moral principles exist; they merely serve on to explore the issue on a deeper level. Indeed, there can be no truly right or wrong answer. Perhaps everything can be retracted back to a basic, underlying moral principle, perhaps we are all aware of a certain set of values which we strive to live by. Note that it has been already stated that the fact that we may not always abide by these moral principles does not diminish the fact that we may be aware of them. Suggesting that there is a universal moral code, what might it consist of? What types of moral standards do we abide by on a day to day basis, and in what way do we relate to them or locate them? To state that we abide by written laws is not to state that they are a form of universal moral standard – it needs to go deeper. It could be suggested that the very act of abiding by these laws is a form of moral standard – that we must abide by the laws of the state or face punishment. However, it could be counter-argued that the punishment factor takes away the voluntariness of abiding by these laws. The presence of a universal moral set of principles is intended to go beyond written laws; it is more an ‘unwritten’ form of behaviour which we follow. So, if we move from the concept of written laws, we must find another form. It could be suggested that these moral standards are so primitive in their form that they could not be specifically defined. It could also be suggested that the exceptions that sometimes occur are also a part of the complex web that is the universal moral code. Once we begin to expect less specific elements, the issue becomes arguably more palatable. The fact that a universal moral set of standards may exist does not necessarily mean that it could be written in a specific set of rules, lest it become the written commandments. If moral standards do exist on a universal level, does it necessarily mean that we are all able to access them? Does it require that we should access them? Nietzsche’s view was that morality is more the necessity of those who feel inferior in a master-slave relationship. By turning to morality, a comparison could be made between good and evil, and would allow such people to justify their sense of inferiority in relation to their masters. Nietzsche saw it as a method of making slavery a matter of choice. This does not help us in the quest for a universal set of morals, for the moral standards of Nietzsche’s slaves differed from those of his masters. Essentially, deciding what is good and bad, categorising what is evil and what is saintly is the closest one can come to defining morality as a set of standards. Perhaps it should be seen as a universal practice as to how we decide what is good and what is evil. Speculation could, and indeed has, pondered over this issue endlessly – and it seems that it will continue to do so. However, the arguments put forward both in favour of and against universal moral principles do seem to favour the latter. The fact that conflicts exist, the argument that morals are laid open to subjective personal interpretation paves a bleak path for the stance that moral principles can be present on a universal level. It seems more plausible to look at moral principles as a form of practice of deciding between what is good and bad; what is right and wrong. Indeed, there is a strong argument for the practice of looking beyond the more specific aspirations to arrive at a much more general view of the topic. It is nonetheless clear that a concept of universal moral principles has proven somewhat taxing to establish – perhaps we should accept that universality is a quality best left to science. Bibliography Aquinas, Thomas. 1920. Summa Theologica. in Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. 1997. New York: Bibliobazaar Finnis, John & Hart, HLA. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hume, David. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature. http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705 Morgan, George. 1941. What Nietzsche Means. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2004. The Antichrist. Grand Rapids: Kessinger. Raphael, D.D. 1994. Moral Philosophy. UK: Oxford University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1762. The Social Contract. in Rousseau, Jean-Jacques & Gourevitch, Victor. 1997. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. UK: Cambridge University Press. Read More