The Causes of the Crimean War: the Allies Goals - Essay Example

and Number of the Teacher’s THE CAUSES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE ALLIES’ GOALS INTRODUCTION The Crimean War (1853-1856) was the outcome of the rivalry between Britain, France and Russia. The war was fought between Russia on the one side, and Turkey’s Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, and Sardinia on the other. The causes of the Crimean War, and the allies’ goals of waging war were multidimensional. The background of the dispute was the unresolved Eastern Question. Russia coveted Turkey’s Constantinople which it hoped to gain by the partition of Turkey, since it lacked a warm water outlet to the sea. As a result of Russia’s plans, Great Britain felt threatened of its dominance in the Mediterranean, and also of the strategic importance of the Suez Canal. Further, “the more immediate occasion was a dispute between Russia and France over the Palestinian Holy Places” (Encyclopedia 12428). Thesis Statement: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the causes of the Crimean War, and the Allies’ goals in participating in the war against Russia. DISCUSSION The British opposed the aggressive policies of Emperor Napoleon III; moreover, the British and the French were old enemies of each other. However, in the Crimean war, due to unexpected circumstances they became allies, combining forces against the Russians to protect the Turks. The Crimean War (1853-1856) resulted from the decline of the Turkish Ottoman Empire which “encouraged Russian imperialism and stoked the British nightmare of Russian interference in India” (Cavendish 55). Additionally, the continued dispute between Greek Orthodox and Latin (Catholic) Christians over the Holy Places in Palestine proved as a catalyst to a series of events that led to the war. THE ALLIES’ GOALS IN THE CRIMEAN WAR During the war, the newspapers particularly The Times played a predominant role in irresponsibly attempting to shape the course taken by the British nation, thereby fueling modern, middle-class misjudgments (Arnold 153). With the war getting prolonged, dissatisfaction with the war effort increased. Further, treatment of the sick and wounded reported as very deficient, the news of the unfortunate end faced by the Light Brigade at Balaclava due to the issuing of wrong orders, and the costly victory at Inkerman caused grave misgivings about the continuation of the war. The allies suffered on account of “mismanagement, bad weather, cholera, and bad luck” (Neff 171), which prolonged the war to several months of torment, instead of the quick, easy campaign it was initially expected to be. DISPUTE OVER THE PALESTINIAN HOLY PLACES Jerusalem is a Holy City for Christians, who belong to a variety of persuasions. The French emperor had obtained the right of representation and protection of Christians, as against the Ottoman power. The Eastern, Greek Christians correspondingly expected the Russian Tsar to provide them with a similar aid. Russian rights were registered through the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, and Russian power grew and began to assert itself successfully against the Ottoman (Albrecht-Carrie 85). In Jerusalem, the situation had developed where “the monks of two Christian branches: Catholic and Greek shared the care of the Holy Places” (Albrecht-Carrie 85). The rival churches quarrelled for exclusive privileges at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, where the baby Jesus was born and cradled in the manger. The dispute worsened and dignity declined with monks coming to blows with crosses and candlesticks in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. For this reason the Crimean War which involved three major European powers was to be termed as the “quarrel of the monks”, and the war itself came to be known as the most unnecessary war. The dispute could not have increased the regard that the peace-oriented Turks had towards Christianity. The situation was taken advantage of by outside interest, particularly that of the Russians in Ottoman affairs. Besides the narrow religious aspect of the matter, other more concrete reasons for Russian initiative were that the Straits were becoming increasingly more important for trade between Russia and Britain. According to Albrecht-Carrie (p.86), Russian intervention led to adverse reactions from other countries. Emperor Napoleon of France with an intention of gaining Roman Catholic support for himself at home, demanded in 1852 that the Sublime Porte in Constantinople recognise France as the protector of Christian monks and pilgrims in the Holy Places. Napoleon’s move of sending a French warship up the Dardanelles resulted in the Porte complying to his wishes, giving the Latins a key to the Church of the Nativity’s main door. This action ignited the Tsar Nicholas I’s ire, since he was the traditional champion of the Greek orthodox, and sought for Russia’s confirmation by the Porte “as the protector of the Holy Places and of all Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire” (Cavendish 55). When the Porte did not obey, a Russian army in July 1853 invaded Turkey’s Ottoman provinces of Moldaia and Wallachia which is modern Romania. With the Turks declaring war and the conflict continuing, by November the Russians succeeded in destroying a Turkish fleet at Sinope in the Black Sea. THE EASTERN QUESTION “The status of the whole Near East had been regulated in 1840” states Albrecht-Carrie (p.85), but the efforts of the Ottoman empire to revive itself had not been successful. Hence, it continued to be the Sick Man of Europe, and the uncertainty about its fate was a great concern of the major powers. Through the 1840s it was peaceful and even the Russian invasion in 1848 on the Principalities like that in Hungary was a temporary disturbance. Moreover, since the intention was to counter revolutionary activity, it might even be considered as intervention to preserve Ottoman stability and integrity. With the start of the 1850s, changes occurred, beginning with the quarrel of the monks. While the Crimean War was in progress, diplomatic efforts continued at the same time. The Russian Tsar had no time to talk to Napoleon III, but he believed that a gentleman’s agreement with the British would resolve the question on what should be done about the Ottoman Empire. In the event of matters not being settled, the Tsar conveyed that Russia may occupy Constantinople temporarily. The British and French were afraid that the Tsar would completely destroy the Sultan’s unsteady empire and occupy a predominant position in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. As a result, igniting fury in the Russians, in January 1854, the British and French sent warships into the Black Sea. Figure 1. The Crimean War: Black Sea (Black Sea 2009) In the centre of Fig.1. is seen the Black Sea, flanked by Russia to the north and the Ottoman Empire of Turkey to the south. Crimea, the only autonomic republic of Ukraine, is the peninsula jutting below Russia. According to Sweetman (p.8), Sevastopol on the Black Sea coast of Crimea was a major target of war operations by the Allies. On February 27th 1854 the British and French demanded Russian withdrawal from the two Balkan provinces, by means of an ultimatum sent to St. Petersburg. Any refusal on the part of the Russians whether to obey or to answer, was to be considered as declaration of war. Since the Russians gave no answer, the British and French declared war on successive days in March. Cavendish (p.55) states that “the Allies sent troops into the Black Sea and invaded the Crimea”. The heavy costs of the war were in terms of thousands of lives and a great amount of money. The philosopher and war analyst Engel noted that the military superiority of the Allied forces, especially their artillery and cavalry, was greater than that of Russia. Because of Russia’s primitive methods of production, they were at a disadvantage against modern military techniques and the tactics of small detachments (Paret et al, p.271). UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE CRIMEAN WAR The fundamental causes of the Crimean war are attributed to “a series of irresolute, wrongheaded, and duplicitous maneuvers by Britain, France, Russia, and Austria” (Neff 169). These great powers attempted to employ balance-of-power diplomacy to cope with the breakdown of the Ottoman empire. According to Arnold (p.86), the causes of the Crimean war could be traced back to the informal talks on the ultimate fate of Turkey, held between Tsar Nicholas I and British Ambassador Sir Hamilton Seymour in January, 1853. Sir Hamilton Seymour with his concerns about the Philistines and the press, successfully misled Nicholas I who had no intention of settling disputes by going to war. The Tsar who respected England, was amenable to comply with the views of a capable British minister (Neff 170). On the other hand, British Ambassador Stratford de Redcliffe’s gave Turkey irresponsible assurances of European support. Consequently, Turkey declared war on Russia on 23rd October, 1853 (Neff 170). This is reiterated by Albrecht-Carrie (p.85), who states that the Turkish reply to the Tsar under de Redcliffe’s suggestion was a skilful rewording of the message that reversed the purpose of the note. This version was unacceptable to the Russians and in spite of negotiations in progress, there was increasing tension in Constantinople. Convinced of being provided with support from the Western Powers, the Turks declared war on Russia on October 4th. Figure 2. The Crimean War (1853-1856) (Battery B 2008) Figure 2. depicts the Crimean War (1853-1856) fought between Russia on one side, and Turkey, Great Britain, France and Sardinia on the other. The map of Crimea which is the peninsula emerging below the Russian Empire depicts the location of the surrounding seas, besides Sevastopol, Balaklava, Inkerman and other crucial Crimean territories involved in the war. Within ten days of the start of war, the Russian fleet from Sebastopol destroyed a Turkish naval squadron near Sinope in the southern shore of the Black Sea in Asia Minor, before bombarding Sinope itself. The British government was compelled by public opinion in Britain, and by the pressure exerted by the French and Austrians to punish Russian adventurism. Finally the British agreed to issue an ultimatum to Russia to withdraw the Tsar’s forces from the Danubian Principalities, which was of great concern to Austria. The Tsar, however, refused to abide by the ultimatum on 19th March, 1854. Napoleon was keen to establish himself as a major power, hence, about a week later, France declared war on Russia and England, 27th-28th March, 1854 (Neff 170). Thus, reluctantly, the three major western powers had allowed themselves to come to the point of hostilities. The fundamental issue at stake was that Britain did not wish to permit certain Russian encroachments into the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, and France joined in half-heartedly only to support Britain against Russia. According to Albrecht-Carrie (p.90), Austria formed an alliance with Prussia both giving each other mutual guarantees of their territories, and jointly opposed Russian intervention in the Balkans. Austrian forces exerted pressure on Russia and succeeded in evacuating her Principalities; and consequently the Austrians occupied them. The re-arrangement contributed to separating the belligerents, while Vienna in Australia continued to be the centre of negotiations. The Agreement known as the Four Points of Vienna proposed a collective, and not a Russian protectorate of the principalities, and free navigation of the mouths of the Danube; a revision of the Convention of the Straits of 1841 towards reducing Russian preponderance in the Black Sea; Russia’s withdrawal of exclusive claim to protection of the Christian subjects of the Sultan of Turkey, instead of which organization of collective rights should be made. However, these proposals were not of interest to Russia who had not so far suffered any military setbacks. The Allies decided to take the war to Crimea where their forces landed in September. There was heroic fighting on both sides, immense suffering and hardship from the adverse forces of nature and from the ravages of disease, a well as mismanagement and incompetence at the higher levels in the command structures of the forces. The Russians strengthened their defenses at Sevastopol, and the subsequent battles included the well-known Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava and the “Thin Red Line” that restricted a heavy attack by Russian cavalry. Although the Allies were functioning “under the handicap of extended overseas lines of communication” (Albrecht-Carrie 90) they were victorious against the Russians on their home ground. The conducting of diplomacy was increased, especially the attempt of the Allies to include Austria, which was matched by the Russian attempts to maintain Austrian neutrality. In this competition, Russia was successful, but Austria took advantage of the uncertainty by all in her regard.The directors of Austrian policy were divided regarding intervention or direct arrangement with Russia. Despite the Prussian alliance, Austria feared that “Prussia might take advantage of the situation in her rear if she allowed herself to become involved in the war” (Albrecht-Carrie 91). These circumstances were favourable for the entry of a new participant: Sardinia, which had no dispute with Russia, and it was difficult for the small country to convince the great powers of its requirement in the conflict. The British did not like the idea of the larger French contingent in the Crimea, hence a Sardinian force would help to equalize the balance. More important, Sardinia could be used as a pawn to exert pressure on Austria whose enlistment was considered to be more vital. This situation resulted in two outcomes: In December 1854, Austria committed herself to entering an offensive and defensive alliance with Britain and France. She obtained the condition of guarantee of her Italian possessions. The news was not appealing to Cavour of Sardinia since there was pressure being put on him by the western powers. In January 1855, Sardinia entered the war. Austria would not do more than mobilization of its forces (Albrecht-Carrie 92). With continuation of hostilities in the Crimea the desire was growing stronger among the Russians and the French to withdraw from the conflict. In January, the Tsar accepted the Four Points of Vienna as the basis of negotiations. Shortly after that, the Tsar passed away. The limitation of western forces in the Black Sea was not acceptable, and the greater effectiveness of the western power had to be faced by the Russians. “The final capture of Sebastopol in September” (Albrecht-Carrie 92) was not compensated “by later Russian success in Kars in November”. Further, the possibility of Swedish intervention was again taken into consideration, while Napoleon hinted at pursuing the cause of nationality toward Russia in Poland, toward Austria in Italy. At the end of the year 1855, Austria issued an ultimatum to Russia; and this last pressure was sufficient to result in Russian acceptance of the Four Points of Vienna. The Congress of Paris Treaty brought an end to the Crimean War (Encyclopedia 15059). It prevented Russia’s now ruled by Tsar Alexander II from using its naval power in the Black Sea, and attempted to place the Turkish empire under international protection. However, by the end of the Crimean War, Turkey had become the “Sick Man of Europe” and its decline could not be arrested. LACK OF UNITY AMONG THE ALLIES The circumstances under which the Crimean war was brought to an end has revealed new evidence from recent research. James (p.24) states that there is “apparent political and military absurdity that within two weeks of settling on plans for a Royal Navy strike” which would certainly have brought the Allies swift victory in the war, Britain agreed for an armistice in February 1856, which did not help her achieve any of her declared war goals. In this connection, it was found that Britain and France who had united in the war to stop the southward expansion of a militaristic Russia, had opposing views on the strategies to adopt. Since France was satisfied with the performance of her troops at Sevastopol, saw nothing more worth fighting for, while Britain continued to be determined to use the Royal Navy to gain the victory within her grasp. With deepening distrust between the two European great powers, the British government became distrustful of its ally France, more than its enemy Russia. Britain planned to continue the conflict against Russia alone, with attacks both in Crimea and in the Baltic. It slowly became clear that France under Napoleon III had already started approaching Russia secretly towards a post-war alliance, while excluding Britain, with the purpose of achieving domination of Europe. Britain abandoned its planned naval campaign to destroy the fortress at Kronstadt which protected Russia’s capital St.Petersburg from attack from the sea. This was because such an attack would “invite an opportunistic cross-Channel invasion by France to avenge Trafalgar and Waterloo” (James 31). Moreover, Britain’s Lord Palmerston was told of France’s immense strength and capabilities; and this combined with his belief regarding French motives resulted in Britain’s acceptance of a poor peace in 1856 when on the verge of a famous victory. Thus, according to James (p.24), the poorly defined ending of the Crimean War between Autumn 1855 and Spring 1856 was because Britain’s war leaders being doubtful about the commitment of the French and the intentions of French policy CONCLUSION This paper has highlighted the causes of the Crimean War, and investigated the Allies’ goals in engaging in conflict against Russia. The Allies constituted Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia. Dispute over the Palestinian Holy Places, the continuation of the Eastern Question, and other underlying causes of the Crimean War have been discussed. Research evidence has attributed a lack of unity among the allies to the poorly executed ending to the war. The movement of Russian troops into the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia caused Turkey to declare war on Russia in October 1853. Soon after, the Russian navy massacred and demolished the Turkish fleet at Sinope. This compelled the British to send their fleet into the Black Sea. Russia did not succeed in getting Austrian support, since the latter remained neutral, unwilling to lose the Italian provinces under its dominance to France, and occupied the Principalities from which Russia withdrew. With a shift in the war to Crimea, and the Allies’ victory on Russian soil the war was culminated with the peace conference Congress of Paris Treaty. One of the outcomes of the Crimean war was that the need for Russian infrastructural, technological, military and economic reform became evident. Further, Russia took increasing interest in the Balkans, in conflict with Austrian intentions in that region. The Allies including Britain also realized the need for army refom. Prussia’s Bismarck planned the expansion of the country with new diplomatic alliances. Sweetman (p.92) supports the view that outdated factors were eliminated and improvements brought in, and adds that a new European balance of power developed to replace old ties. WORKS CITED Arnold, Matthew. Friendship’s garland: Being the conversations, letters and opinion of the late Arminius, Baron Von. The United States of America: BiblioBazaar, LLC. (2009). Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. A dipolmatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. The United States of America: Taylor & Francis. (1965). Battery B. The Crimean War (1853-1856). 2008. Retrieved on 23rd February, 2010 from: http://www.batteryb.com/Crimean_War/index2.html Black Sea. The Crimean War. 2009. Retrieved on 23rd February, 2010 from: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ward_1912/black_sea_crimean_war.jpg Cavendish, Richard. The Crimean war begins: March 27th/ 28th, 1854. History Today, 54.3 (March 2004): pp.55 to 59. Encyclopedia. Crimean War. The Columbia Encyclopedia. Sixth Edition. New York: Columbia University Press. (2009). James, Brian. Allies in disarray: The messy end of the Crimean War. History Today, 58.3 (March 2008): pp.24-31. Neff, D.S. The Times, the Crimean War, and “Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse”. Papers on Language & Literature, 33.2 (1997): pp.169-176. Paret, Peter, Craig, Gordon A. & Gilbert, Felix. Makers of modern strategy: From Machiavelli to the nuclear age. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. (1986). Sweetman, John. The Crimean War. Great Britain: Osprey Publishing. (2001). Read More