The European Union Political Institutions - Essay Example

The birth of the Treaty of Lisbon is based on the aspirations of Declaration 23 of the Treaty of Nice. While stating that completion of the Nice Treaty gave the European Union the necessary requirements for allowing the accession of member states, it also called for a more profound debate about the future of the EU. Thus so was borne the need for an extension of the Nice Treaty. The proposed Constitution was greeted with suspicion and doubt, arguably due to its implications of sovereignty. The new revised edition of the Constitution arrived in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, the plan for future enlargement of the EU has created concern surrounding the efficacy of the Union as more and more states become members. Recent reforms are trying to prevent the EU from “becoming paralysed by a brutal expansion of its membership”.1 This concerns many aspects of the EU, though focus within this paper will be on the institutional changes proposed. As the number of member states increases, so does the need to maintain effective decision making. As the number of members within the institutions increases, the effectiveness of decision making and overall functioning of the institutional bodies is potentially compromised. More members considering a decision slows the process and potentially prevents measures from being passed; there is increasing possibility for dissent and disagreement. Yet there is a need to allow for accurate representation of each member state within the Union. This concerns the main institutions of the Union, and the extent to which they strike a balance between fair representation and the need to limit the number of deliberators to ensure effective and developmental decision making. It also concerns the role of national Parliaments and the extent to which they may participate. So how does the Treaty of Lisbon propose to alter the functioning of the institutions, if at all? What effect will this have on the future functioning of the European Union? The reform of the EU institutions in response to enlargement was inevitable; the original framework was built around just 6 member states. As more states join, the need to alter the framework is essential, especially in light of the need to achieve the values stated in articles 1a and 8a of the Lisbon Treaty. If the ability to deliberate is affected in a negative way – as is an inevitable effect of enlargement – then the democratic functioning of the Union itself is diminished. The Nice Treaty had pledged to deal with decision making efficiency and structural characteristics of the institutions; it is highly questionable as to whether it managed to do so. Indeed, the two are inherently connected, for the correct functioning of institutions is dependent on the ability to make efficient, representative decisions and vice versa. The Treaty of Lisbon does acknowledge that the institutions still need to be changed in respect of the growing numbers of members within the Council, Commission and Parliament. The increased participation of the European Parliament was recognised in the Treaty of Nice which made some minor alterations to the composition of the Parliament to make it more representative of member states.2 These were only minor changes, which the Lisbon Treaty elaborated upon to give the Parliament more powers; article 9a of Lisbon increased the maximum number of Members to 750 from the previous 732.3 A maximum and minimum number of Members per member state is also specified (6-96) to ensure that exceptionally large or small member states joining maintain fair yet representative numbers of Members. The European Parliament is also given more power in the form of electing the President of the Commission.4 This is a clear response to criticisms of democratic deficit, in that the Parliament is the only elected body of the Union. Assigning it increasing powers ensures that decisions are more likely to be democratic and responsive to universal suffrage elections. This is a rather substantial increase in the Parliament’s power, where before it could only approve the President, who was appointed by the Commission itself.5 The potential problem of keeping checks on the increasing size of institutions and areas of the Union is likely to be reduced by assigning the Parliament more power. The European Parliament will be given more power and participation in the creation of laws, which will bring it equal to the Council in terms of the scope of its powers. The Council, consisting of the heads of Member States has as its primary function the driving of the creation of EU policies, and shares lawmaking powers with the European Parliament.6 It is the window through which heads of Member States can directly participate in the legislation of the European Union.7 The role of the Council will experience few changes under the Treaty of Lisbon, although it will become a full and formal EU institution under article 13(1) TEU and thus fall under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.8 It will not be given any new powers, but will be governed by the new position of President, whose task it is to prepare the work of the Council and ensure consensus among member states, in conjunction with the High Representative. How the President is to fulfil this task is not entirely clear; rather the position appears to answer the evident weaknesses of the rotation system for the position of Council Presidency and its short term. Fundamentally, the Council represents the EU Member State governments, and ensures that participation and representation within the EU is paramount under this institution.9 The need for greater transparency on a more public level has however been introduced, and in 2014, the possibility of the Double Majority Vote will be assessed. This moves participation even deeper to the citizens of Member States, and will require that not only will a qualified majority vote of EU Member States, but also the population of the Member States in connection to the passing of new EU laws.10 Additionally, the new requirement that the Council meet in public when deliberating and voting on draft legislation11 expresses the importance of democracy on a vertical level. It can be seen here that the increasing importance of public participation is evident; one can see the shift towards more democratic forms of deliberation. The Commission primarily has the task of promoting the interests of the public within the EU and to promote and act in the interests of the Community.12 It is made up of Commissioners from each Member State, and acts to implement and aid EU integration, through legislative initiative. The Lisbon Treaty in relation to the Commission proposes a major change in that it creates a direct link between European election results and the choice of the President for the Commission; without a qualified majority vote within the Parliament, a proposed President will not progress to the vacancy.13 What effect will this proposed change have? Namely, it seems to aim to increase the participation of the Member States in selecting and voting on such positions that are vitally important to the functioning of the individual institutions. Indeed, the responsibilities of the President of the Commission are important and ensure the proper functioning of the Commission. It has thus been recognised that the position requires the approval and note of at least a majority of the heads of Member States if friction within the EU is to be minimal. The President will also have the authority to dismiss other Commissioners, and this is a proposal which assigns great power to the President of the Commission. It appears that the importance of this body as a distinct institution has been recognised and thus been given the proposed higher level of autonomy, yet it also appears to have lost some degree of power. Some changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty appear to address the importance of the co-existence between institutions, addressing that the success of EU integration cannot depend solely on one institution. It thus has moved some legislative power to the other institutions, and even Member States. A quarter of Member States can now initiate legislation in the area of criminal and police matters,14 and the Council can also act on the proposal of a Member State, albeit unanimously so.15 The creation of the post of High Representative also seems to have reduced the powers of the Commission in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy, as under article 30 TEU, only referrals from the High Representative to the Council can be taken by the Commission. This appears to represent a desire to recognise the inter-dependence of the institutions, and the strong implication that the Commission alone cannot fully achieve EU integration. This is illustrated by the introduction of by the Lisbon Treaty of the requirement that the Commission President must be proposed by the Council and then elected by the European Parliament.16 This ensures the need for the Commission and the European parliament to co-operate, as well as increases the power and role of the European Parliament, whilst cementing the legitimacy of the Commission President to act under the assumed support of the European Parliament. Another change brought about by the Lisbon Treaty potentially decreases the strength of the Commission further. The Treaty reduces the previous stance of one Commissioner per Member State and in 2014, when Commission members will consist of just two thirds of Member States.17 This could potentially reduce the strength and influence of the Commission, and cause problems for Member States that do not have a Commissioner in rotation. On the other hand, it aims to strengthen the flow of the decision making process and recognises that the recent increase in Member States’ accession to the EU could prove decision making to be cumbersome and time-costly. The issue represents a balance that the EU has tried to maintain between the efficacy of the Commission and the importance of the decision making process, which would be negatively affected if the Commission consists of too many members. The Treaty also creates the position of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, whose task it is to ensure that the EU’s dealings with foreign countries are consistent. The High Representative will represent the Council on issues relating to Common Foreign and Security Policy and will deal with all external relations. Effectively, the High Representative will overlook the Foreign Affairs Council, whilst also being the Commission Vice-President.18 This is a clear attempt to extricate the field of external relations from the Commission and the Council and place it into one person, which could increase the efficacy of the relationship between the two institutions or cause friction between the High Representative and the President of the Commission. Additionally, it seems a little odd to combine two tasks from two different institutions into one person; such a role (and its success or failure) is difficult to predict, and as such its ‘practical definition……can only be left to development in practice’.19 At an overall glance, the Lisbon Treaty does not appear to have made any dramatic changes, at least to the pre-existing institutions. In respect of the newly created positions of High Representative and President of the European Council, tasks seem to have been delegated and responsibilities within the Council and the Commission will inevitably be shifted in terms of their central concentration of powers and tasks. Procedural elements have seen slight alterations and the main focus of most of the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon is the need for greater transparency and increased participation on the level of the citizens of Member States and national Parliaments, as well as a higher degree of inter-dependence and co-operation between institutions. What will these seemingly subtle changes produce over time? Are the changes as subtle as they appear on the surface, and how can one assess such an issue? Indeed, it is plausible to predict the possible advantages and disadvantages of the new system or procedures and altered elements. It is also possible to compare the new changes to the previous situations and assess how the previous required changes, if any at all. So, what effect are these proposed changes likely to have on the European Union? Has the Lisbon treaty recognised the new requirements of the now larger EU or established the areas which appear to require improvements if the EU is to move forward into a new era? Some proposed changes suggest that the Lisbon Treaty was rather optimistic in its expectations of all institutions concerned. The new position for the President of the European Council illustrates this concern – is it really possible that whoever takes this position can deal with the ever-existing conflicts between EU Member States? It also appears to conflict with the desired rotation of the chair of presidency of the Council – perhaps one could argue that a short period in this position is not enough to enable the functioning and understanding of the Presidential tasks assigned him. The role of the President also appears to be at risk of overlapping with that of the High Representative, especially in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy tasks. Is it desirable that such overlaps exist, or could it create deep conflicts between the said positions involved? In any case, it does not seem to be presumptuous to suggest that the role of the Council will be significantly strengthened by the introduction of the High Representative and the President. Furthermore, the Treaty specifically provides for the separate tasks and capacities of the two seats, at least in the area of CFSP.20 But how does this compare to the possibly weakened stance of the Commission, brought about by its size reduction? In any case, it is clear that the Treaty has put as a paramount focus on, or at least recognition of, the vital element of the successful functioning of the European Union resting mainly on the functioning of its institutions. Furthermore, it seems that the Lisbon Treaty will provide some short-term positive effects, especially in the area of the expansion of the EU and faster accession. As more countries join the EU, it has been recognised that the difficulties surrounding such enlargement will increase. Just exactly what these difficulties will be cannot be predicted with any high degree of certainty, and the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty recognise this. Thus, a concentration on the working of the institutions on an external and internal level appear to have been one of the main focus pints of the Treaty, along with increased transparency and a higher degree of democracy. All of these elements combine to promote and increase the overall legitimacy of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty could be described as being realistic in its approach, in that it did not propose any major overhauls or optimistic aspirations. Thus, the tentative steps taken are more realistic and reflect that one cannot predict what will be necessary in the future, and this is arguably the most appealing manner in which to develop the EU and its future. The Treaty has allowed the EU to develop over time and thus attempt to alter issues and problems as they arise; all changes made to institutions have the clear aim of increasing the democracy and decision-making processes involved. Whether this will be the outcome is difficult to predict, yet the seeds have been planted. Whether the growth of these seeds will need further nurturing or whether they will fall into place will only be seen over time. Bibliography The Treaty of Nice The Treaty of Lisbon (Draft version December 2007) Joint Study CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations (November 2007) Charlemagne – The Parable of the Presidents from The Economist dated 15 March 2008 Breuss, Fritz Benefits and Dangers of EU Enlargement (2002) Empirica 29: 245–274, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Netherlands. Craig, P. Institutional Structure: A Delicate Balance, European Consitutional Law Review 1 (2005) Dashwood, A and Johnston, A The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional Treaty 41 CMLRev (2004) Devuyst, Y The European Union’s Institutional Balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: “Community Method” and “Democratic Deficit” Reassessed Georgetown Journal of International Law, Volume 39, Number 2 (2008) Heichlinger, Alexander; Määttä, Seppo and Unfried, Martin Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy and Process: The Need for Regional and Local Players to Step up Their Involvement (reference unavailable) House of Lords, European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, Volume I: Report (10th Report of Session 2007-08) Kochenov, Dimitry EU Enlargement Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty – Custom Concubinage? (2005) European Integration Online Papers, Vol.9, No.6 Kurpas, S and Micossi, S. 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