The Relationship between Dreams and Reality in Light of Descartes Views - Essay Example

The Relationship between dreams and reality in light of Descartes’ discussion in the first meditation Dream skepticism is one of the few philosophical lines of inquiry into dreams. It concerns the effectiveness of any self-applied test presupposing that one did not merely dream that it was carried out (Honderich, 1995: 206). The question is whether one knows that one is dreaming or awake even when we consider ourselves to have woken from a dream. The doubt is actually of two kinds: one pertaining to being presently awake, and the other to being ever awake (SEP, 2005). The latter especially raises the issue of delusion and questioning what is reality. The worry that this world might too be a dream was famously expressed by the French philosopher Rene Descartes in the seventeenth century in his Meditations. In fact, he specifically sought to doubt whatever could be doubted in order to lay the foundations for true knowledge through reasoning. After pointing out what happens during sleep, he makes his ‘dreaming argument’ when he writes, “In dwelling carefully on this reflection, I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream” (Descartes, 2009: 12). Put simply, the reasoning of his argument is that perceptions during both states are similar, and given that there are no ways to distinguish between them, therefore this raises the possibility that even during ‘waking’ one may be dreaming such that the perceptions during ‘waking’ may turn out to be ‘false’ as in dreams. An outline of this argument is presented below. Table 1: Outline of Descartes’ dreaming argument I have perceptions now similar to those while dreaming Plus, I cannot distinguish between dream and waking experiences Therefore, it is possible I am dreaming right now and all my perceptions are false Thus, Descartes doubts both; being presently awake and being ever awake. He refers to the particulars (i.e. what we do) during sleep as false delusions, and the things represented to us in dreams, as “painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true …” (ibid). Incidentally, this shows that the non-dream world does have a greater originality than the dream world because what is painted in dreams is not created ex nihilo, but he continues to suggest that all the thoughts he has “are no more true than the phantasies” of his dreams (ibid: 49). Furthermore, Descartes’ obsessively skeptical approach is rather dubious because in places, it does not make sense, and some of his ideas like the demon are hypothetical. Moreover, it is ironic that after much doubting and casting aside the trustworthiness of the senses, he never once doubts his own ability to think! The biggest weakness in the third part of his argument though is that he did not base it on an experience of a greater reality but on assuming dreams are indistinguishable from being awake. Isn’t just the fact that right now we are discussing the states of ‘dreaming’ and wakefulness’ itself evident that the two are different? Likewise, Malcolm (1959) relying on Wittgenstein’s ideas on dreams mentioned that the two are not the same because the very concept of dreaming derives from relating a dream. Regardless, Descartes is successful in making us question the reality of what we normally consider as the real world even if it is not something that becomes an everyday issue of confidence while interacting in this phenomenal world of material forms. The dream-like world can now also be created artificially using computer simulation at least to an extent anyway, and this can offer some insight into the reality of our own world besides our dream worlds. The more realistic virtual reality environments allow immersion, navigation and manipulation (Rheingold, 1992). An illusion of ‘being there’ (telepresence) can also be effected using motion sensors (Encyclopedia Brittanica). A distinction is made between this simulated reality in which there is no awareness of the surroundings being simulated, and virtual reality wherein one is fully aware of the world not being real. Popular recent movies that have centered on the theme of simulated reality are The Matrix and The Thirteenth Floor. In The Matrix, dream skepticism is expressed when Morpheus raises the possibility of being unable to wake from a dream, so the person would be unable to know the difference between the real and dream worlds (The Matrix, 1999). There is a parallel in The Matrix with Descartes’ construct of a malicious thought demon behind the manipulation of this world, and the later ‘brain in a vat’ hypothesis of the philosopher Jonathan Dancy (1985). Complete computer simulated or ‘virtual worlds’ are already functioning on the Internet and private networks. Popular examples are Second Life and Habbo Hotel, and game worlds such as World of Warcraft. They all have the following six features in common: (1) shared space, (2) graphical user interface, (3) immediacy, (4) interactivity, (5) persistence, and (6) socialization or community (Virtual Worlds Review, 2008). The many such worlds that have been created are found to be useful for community building or socialization, and political expression, and have educational benefits. They are also used for flight and military training purposes because they allow training to be conducted within a ‘safe’ environment without physical consequences. Likewise, they are now also beginning to be used in medicine (Gorrindo & Groves, 2009). Presently, hardware and software limitations have not been able to instill consciousness in the characters operating in these virtual worlds. However, with increasing computing power, these virtual worlds will expectedly become more sophisticated and life-like, and consequently, people in the future will be able to run simulations of their forebears also. An Oxford University philosopher, Nick Bostrom, put forward a simulation argument in his article ‘Are You Living In a Computer Simulation’, which appeared in the Philosophical Quarterly in 2003. The basic idea presented is that if we acknowledge that in the future, our descendents will be able to run ancestor simulations, referred to as the post-human stage, then what makes us think that we are not already living in such a simulation? He says, “If we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendents who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears”. Therefore, he argued using logic that at least one of three propositions must be true. The first is that “the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a ‘posthuman’ stage”; the second is that “any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof)”, and the third follows: “We are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation.” He further discusses a number of other consequences of this result as well. However, he suggests that an equal credence be given to all three given our ‘ignorance’. Another problem with Bostrom’s thinking is that he makes what is known as the self-indication assumption. That is, it assumes that if you exist, it should be taken that the majority exist even if only a few exist. The fundamental constraint of artificially created dream-like worlds highlighted above is that of simulating consciousness. Bostrom’s (2003) third scenario is the more likely one in so far that future generations of humanity will be able to create simulations of their ancestors. However, this does not mean that we now are living in a computer simulated world although it is true that we are living in a world of illusion depending on which other world it is compared to. The ancestors living in those virtual worlds would differ significantly from their ‘real’ ancestors and the difference if not in terms of capability is certainly in terms of consciousness. The table below summarises the key differences between the four worlds – two ‘natural’ worlds, one in which the reader is presently interacting with this text, and the other the ‘dream world, which is the main subject of discussion, and two artificial computer created worlds. Table 2: Summary of characteristics of two natural and two artificially created worlds Present world of illusion Dream worlds Simulated worlds Virtual worlds Awareness of perceiver (the individual at the center of perception) Fully aware (though most consider it ‘real’) Usually not aware (unless lucid dreaming) No awareness of surroundings Made to feel some awareness Awareness of perceiver of the perceiver (or the one who creates/controls) Assumed to be fully aware Unaware (unless consciousness has transferred) Fully aware world is not real Fully aware world is not real Composition of world World of concrete reality (physical/tangible) ‘Mind stuff’ (not physical reality) Computer created Computer created The important difference between the first two worlds and the last two man-made artificially created worlds is that the individual perceiver at the center of the perception within the world itself is aware of his or her surroundings in the former (at least to a certain extent) but not in the latter. This is brings us to the concept of degrees of reality, the number and nature of different worlds of reality, and the question of which perceiver the consciousness lies in. No matter how sophisticated the simulation, it remains ‘a world within a world’ and owes its very existence to the first world, which contains it and which therefore has a higher degree of reality. This also brings us back to the point that our present reality is also a world within a world and therefore is an illusion in comparison to it. The idea that our reality is or maybe less than concrete has existed throughout history, and did not originate with computer simulated worlds or popular works of fiction on the subject. This world has been likened to an illusion before. Nor was Descartes the first philosopher to write on dreams. Philo of Alexandria for example wrote on dreams in his De Somniis in which he distinguished types of dreams and like Posidonius before him, delved on the mechanics of dreaming, but also made a useful classification scheme. In ‘Dreams in the History of Philosophy’, Dreisbach (2004) surveyed the past 2,500 years on the interest of dreams in western philosophy and noted a decline of interest in recent decades. However, the idea posed by Descartes concerning the reality of this world, i.e. whether it is also a dream, has immense relevance in this age again where computer simulated and virtual worlds have come into existence as additional realities to be grasped philosophically. The nature and reality of dreams and their degree of reality is not only a subject of interest to philosophers but also mystics and psychologists. It is beyond the scope of this work to delve on this in detail, suffice it to say that in most if not all mystical systems, the illusory nature of this world is something that one needs to become aware of and to then strive towards reaching the worlds of greater and ultimate reality. To assist us in doing this we first need to be able to distinguish between them, and contrary to Descartes regarding us as having weak natures, it is possible to do so. In Sufism for example, descriptions of reality and guidance are far richer; a clear distinction is made between types of perception according to the world or state one is in, and detailed information is available for distinguishing between the states of dreams and wakefulness and other degrees of reality along with practical measures. In Hindu philosophy, this illusory world is called ‘Maya’ and we realize the true nature of reality when we have truly ‘woken up’. Psychologists have also been able to distinguish between the states of dreaming in terms of its observable effects on the physical body. The two sets of experiences are also distinguishable because it is environmental circumstances i.e. experiences during the waking state that influence dream content (Gregory, 1987: 202). This is similar to what was mentioned earlier about dream content not being painted ex nihilo. However, for the purpose of this study, the focus has been on being able to distinguish between dreams and reality as it pertains to this phenomenal world of tangible reality, not why this world is an illusion, and confined to the perspective of philosophy. Although Descartes himself categorically states he could not distinguish between wakefulness and sleep before continuing to doubt even wakefulness, in pointing out that in dreams there are ‘painted representations’, he does inadvertently provide a criterion for distinguishing between the two. This is by virtue of the direction from ‘creating’ to ‘applying’. In this phenomenal world of physical forms, the experiences we go through, or that are ‘created’, shape our experiences in the dream state. Therefore, the dream state is contained within this world and not vice versa, and it follows that the latter has a greater degree of reality than dreams. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that dreams tend to be fragmentary whereas life in this world is continuous. The solidity of experience in dreams is also variable because usually for most people, only some dreams feel life-like but not all. In addition, navigation and the ability to manipulate objects in dream worlds are much greater because they are dictated by the power of the mind whereas in this world we are constrained by the limitations of the physical body. For example, we can fly in dreams but not during wakefulness. Another difference is that this world is governed by laws and we are responsible for our actions and certain actions are punishable, but there are no legal frameworks in the dream worlds. These points of contrast are summarized in the table below. Several more such contrasts can also be made. Table 3: Summary of key differences between the states of wakefulness and dreams Wakefulness Dreams Direction of experience Source of experience Application of experience Representations Paintable representations Painted representations Continuity of experience Continuous Tends to be fragmentary Solidity of experience Same Variable Flexibility of actions Constrained Great Responsibility of actions High None Another interesting point Descartes makes in his Meditations is that as dreams have a foundation in reality (despite not admitting he could exist independently), likewise there are elements that have simpler fundamental forms (which reminds us of Plato’s ideas on absolute forms). This has significance for determining what is reality, or rather what is comparatively more real. As for knowing that we are dreaming while we are actually dreaming, and under what circumstances dreams can have an even greater reality than this world, that would require another essay to delve on. We have shown that at least in comparison to this world, the world of dreams is (normally) an illusion and can be distinguished. Similarly, if we were to compare this world to the world that contains it, then this world too is an illusion but not in comparison to any simulated, virtual or dream worlds contained within this world. Bibliography Bostrom, Nick. Are You Living In a Computer Simulation? Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255. 2003. Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell. 1985. Descartes, Rene. Meditations of First Philosophy. CreateSpace. 2009. Dreisbach, Christopher. Dreams in the History of Philosophy. Dreaming. Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 31-41. Springer. 2004. Encyclopædia Britannica. Virtual Reality (VR). Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 2009. Dec. 14, 2009. Gorrindo, Tristan and Groves, James. Computer Simulation and Virtual Reality in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders. Academic Psychiatry. Vol. 33, pp. 413-417. 2009. Gregory, Richard L. The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. 1987. Honderich, Ted. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 1995. Malcolm, Norman. Dreaming. Humanities Press. 1959. Matrix, The. (Movie directed by Wachowski & Wachowski). 1999. Rheingold, Howard. Virtual Reality: The revolutionary technology of computer-generated artificial worlds – and how it promises to transform society. Simon & Schuster. 1992. SEP. Descartes’ Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005. < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#3.1> December 14, 2009. Virtual Worlds Review. What is a Virtual World? 2008. 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