The US Foreign Policy and Nuclear Proliferation - Research Paper Example

US Foreign Policy and Nuclear Proliferation Since the beginning of the nuclear age, nuclear proliferation has become a problem for the United s.The superpower arms race between the US and the Soviet Union increased the possibility of nuclear war. By the early 1960s, the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought technological advances in nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power and had also increased the possibility of using such technologies for the development of nuclear weapons. The fear that came out of the possibility of a nuclear war or the use of nuclear power in modern conflicts made nuclear proliferation a high level issue for American foreign policy. American Interest An examination of the US foreign policy in modern times highlights the significant role of nuclear weapons. The reason is that nuclear weapons constitute an important part in the achievement of the United States foreign policy and defense policy goals. There are two arguments that rationalize this. First, is that nuclear weapons are seen as valuable instruments of statecraft and the foundation of global stability by serving as a deterrent to a wide range of threats. Secondly, the American Cold War policy still has its imprint on modern foreign policy particularly in regard to the emphasis on the importance of being ready to deliver a quick and massive attack against opposing nuclear forces. According to a Harvard Nuclear Study Group: [The United States] wants from them many of the same things it wants from its conventional military forces. The basic goal is to protect the security of the United States and its allies from attack or coercion by a hostile power. Nuclear weapons should serve that primary purpose. (Carnesale & the Harvard Nuclear Security Group 134) During the Cold War nuclear weapons is at the center of the American security strategies. The US, as part of this strategy, developed large, diverse and dispersed nuclear forces that were maintained at high alert levels. The officially stated rationales for these forces were to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and its allies with either conventional or nuclear weapons. The disintegration of the Soviet Union after the Cold War changed the nuclear policy due to three fundamental factors: 1) the likelihood of all-out war between the United States and Russia has drastically diminished; 2) the increase in regional conflicts no longer calls for nuclear deterrence; and, 3) the conventional forces are sufficient to deal with potential adversaries. (National Academy of Sciences 16-18) And so several post-Cold War policy studies have concluded that the security of the United States could be considerably enhanced by undertaking reductions to nuclear proliferations globally. In line with this, the US foreign policy focused on the nuclear weapons reduction and the curtailment of nuclear proliferation. The present American nuclear nonproliferation policy, according to the National Academy of Science has three challenges in its achievement: 1) maintaining and strengthening the formal nonproliferation regime, 2) reassuring nations that foregoing nuclear weapons will not jeopardize their security, and, 3) preparing to respond if additional proliferation occurred in the face of changing landscape of conflict. (47) Nonproliferation Regime The Treaty on the nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of which the US is a signatory, recognized the five countries that by that time had tested nuclear weapons. These are the US, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. These five were considered as nuclear weapons states and that all other countries that signed the treaty would do so as nonnuclear weapons states and would agree not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. The essence of the treaty was contained in Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. (Blacker and Duffy 156) The success of NPT is rooted in the treaty’s core bargain, which is in exchange for a commitment from nonnuclear weapon states never to develop or otherwise to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards intended to verify compliance with this commitment, the nuclear states agrees to provide unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was setup to provide grants to countries wanting to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The IAEA’s safeguard system relies on periodic inspections to detect the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes. NPT and US Foreign Policy In March 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the NPT as “the most important multilateral arms control agreement in history.” (Patrick and Forman 227) This underscored its success in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons globally today as well as the US commitment to the pact. A second vital multilateral component to the American foreign policy in regard to nuclear proliferation was its membership to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. In addition to NPT and CTBT, the US is also involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states designed to prevent the proliferation of dual-use technologies, which include, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Another policy option for the US foreign policy in regard to nuclear nonproliferation is the unilateral approach. For instance, the United States has legislated several laws against proliferation and the spread of nuclear weapons. Particularly, one sees this in the US reserved option to unilaterally use force to prevent countries other than China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Then there are some Americans who mistrust the effectiveness and the politics of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and advocate a reliance to the US unilateral capabilities particularly in terms of intelligence assessments as the driver of the American policy. This is also seen in 2001 when an ambitious posture review (official US nuclear weapons policies are regularly enunciated by the American government in the form of posture reviews) was released. Unlike past posture reviews, which named no specific adversaries that might be targeted with nuclear weapons besides Russia and China, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review listed five other states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria. (Diehl and Moltz 81) Iran At present, the case of Iran demonstrates the direction of the US foreign policy on nuclear proliferation, including the challenges it faces. Iran’s nuclear ambitions started in mid-70s when the government attempted to construct nuclear reactors. Crucial development happened in 1995 when the country clinched an $800 million deal with Russia to complete the nuclear reactors in Bushehr. (Feldman 48) The contributions of this reactor to the Iranian military nuclear capability are believed to be indirect. However, large-scale nuclear purchases for the reactors completion would, in effect, make it more difficult for NPT or the Western intelligence agencies to ascertain whether Iran is enriching its nuclear capability for military purposes. In 2004, the controversy over the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program intensified when the country affirmed its plans to develop a uranium enrichment facility. This gave rise to the concern from Europe and the US that Iran had started to engage in sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. (Stockholm International Peace Institute 555) Presently, the US is engaged in a flurry of diplomatic efforts in order to pressure Iran to halt its nuclear enriching capabilities. But pressure alone is unlikely to work as the country has already made a major, long-term commitment to acquire nuclear weapons. Getting the country to abandon its attempt requires not just the threat of harmful consequences. It is widely believed that the zero enrichment goal is already improbable in the case of Iran. (International Crisis Group) As diplomatic solution is still considered the best option to end the Iranian nuclear ambition, the United States have to be involved in a combination of international pressures and inducement. It had to engage its allies in Europe for more collective pressure in the form of economic sanctions, for instance in order to stop Iran from finally developing nuclear weapon. Then it had to persuade, pressure and negotiate with Russia and China, because these countries are Iran’s major nuclear materials suppliers. Until recently, the US has refused to directly negotiate with Iran until it stops its uranium enriching activities. (Isaacson) The change in the American administration in 2008, however, has shown an openness to dialogue. The United States has been since engaged in multilateral talks that aim to develop a framework that would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while allowing it access to nuclear materials for peaceful purposes as a bargain. Conclusion In regard to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, the American policy takes the most important role. This is not to say that other states are unimportant. Rather, the US is in the best place to take the lead in drafting and presenting a concrete strategy or vision for the role of nuclear weapons in the modern world. Being the first country to have developed nuclear technology and the only country to have used it as a weapon, the country had the most number and the most secure and sophisticated nuclear arsenal and hence, it has not only the power but also the unique responsibility to lead the world towards nonproliferation. Finally, this strategy is parallel with its defense and security objectives as well. As stated by this paper, the US has two options in regard to advancing the nonproliferation agenda – the unilateral and multilateral strategies. The case of Iran demonstrate for the United States the downside of the unilateral approach - of acting alone, without support from partners and using threats and unwillingness to engage in negotiations that progress is being hindered. It is certain that a foreign policy anchored on multilateral engagement is the best option to achieve nuclear nonproliferation objectives for the US. Works Cited Blacker, Coit and Duffy, Gloria. International arms control: issues and agreements. Stanford University Press, 1984. Carnesale, Albert, Harvard Nuclear Security Group. Living with nuclear weapons. Harvard University Press, 1983. Diehl, Sarah and Moltz, James. Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation: a reference handbook. ABC-CLIO, 2007. Feldman, Shai. Nuclear weapons and arms control in the Middle East. MIT Press, 1997. International Crisis Group. Iran’s Nuclear Impasse. International Crisis Group online. Retrieved 6 Nov. 2009 < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4984> Isaacson, Walter. A Way Out of Iran’s Nuclear Impasse? TIME online. Retrieved 6 Nov. 2009 < http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1599063,00.html> National Academy of Sciences. The Future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. National Academies Press, 1997. Patrick, Stewart and Forman, Shepard. Multilateralism and US foreign policy. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Stockholm International Peace Institute. Armaments, disarmament and international security. Oxford University Press, 2005. Read More