The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights - Essay Example

Order: 306426 Human Rights “With the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Convention on Human Rights has become law in the United Kingdom. Since November 2000, all courts must take into consideration the judgments, decisions, declarations or advisory opinions of the European Court of Human Rights when arriving at a decision.” (www.accessmylibrary.com). If that is a fiat accompli, how could anyone say that “it is clear from Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that the European Convention on Human Rights has, in one sense, a lower status than ordinary statutes, in that it cannot automatically override pre-existing law”? (Fenwick, H.; “Civil Liberties and Human Rights”; 2007). The answer lies in the fact that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, as also many other sections, hedges its bets by saying that, “so far as it is possible to do so”, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention’s rights. For instance, Section 12 of the Human Rights Act emphasises the role of courts in defending the right to freedom of expression, and states that this Section applies if a court is considering “whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression”. (Coppel, J; “Human Rights Act 1998: Enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Courts”; 1999) Moreover, it is considered unlawful for a court to act in a manner contrary to a Convention right “unless obliged to act in such a way by a provision of primary legislation”. (www.highbeam.com/doc/IP3-77629772.html). (www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts 1998/ukpga/19980042_en_1) Incidentally, discretionary increase in police powers has landed the UK Government at least once in the soup. Article 15 of the Convention states in Para 1 that “in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, any contracting party may take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. However, in the case of Brogan and others v United Kingdom (1988; II EHRR 117) four persons were arrested on the suspicion that they were provisional members of the IRA, and detained under Section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984.They were released after four-to-six days. They claimed that Britain had violated several parts of the Article 5 of the Convention; for instance, Article 5, Para 1 (C) on the ground that they were not arrested on suspicion of an “offence”. Furthermore, after being arrested they were not promptly either taken before a judge or released, as the provision states they should have been in Para 3 of Article 5. The court held that on all four counts there had been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. (“Issue of Terrorism and Its Impact on Human Rights”’ www.Mindrelief.net; 2007) Additionally, there has been no consistency in the interpretation of the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights by English courts. “Diane Pretty’s attempt to challenge the Director of Public Prosecution’s refusal to provide an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her to commit suicide failed because the European Convention on Human Rights did not contain an implied right to euthanasia (R (Pretty) v DPP (2002) 1AC 800). Similarly, Human Rights Act challenge to the Hunting Act 2004 (R (Countryside Alliance v Attorney-General (2006) EWCA Civ 817) failed in part because Article 8 was not engaged. (http://webarchive.national archives.gov.uk). It has also been held that the statutory regimes relating to matters as disparate as the supply of water (Marcic v Thomas Water; 2004; 2 AC 42), regulation of solicitors’ profession (Holder v Law Society; 2003; 1-WLR 1059) and preservation of embryos (Evans v Amicus Healthcare; 2005; Fam 1) are compatible with the European Convention on High Rights. However, in (R (Begum) v Denbigh High School (2006;2 WLR 719) case, the House of Lords held that if, contrary to the view of the majority, a school’s refusal to allow a pupil to wear a jilbab at school interfered with her Article 9 rights, the interference was justified. “Again, for example, the law of libel had been profoundly influenced by increasing recognition of a ‘constitutional right’ of freedom of expression, mirroring Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, even before the Human Rights Act was enacted (Reynolds v Times Newspapers, 2001, 2 AC 127). The common law test for bias has now been adjusted so that it is in line with the approach under the Convention on Human Rights (Lawal v Northern Spirit, 2003, ICR 856). Courts have increasingly been prepared to recognise ‘common law constitutional rights’ similar in content to those found in the Convention on Human Rights but independent of it. For example, the House of Lords’ conclusion in A (No.2) v Home Secretary (2005; WLR 1249) that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, in particular, and courts, in general, could not receive evidence obtained by torture was based not on the Human Rights Act but on common law reinforced by international conventions.” (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review; July 2006). The European Court of Human Rights refused to follow its own decision in Osman v UK (1998, 29, EHRR 245) in relation to negligence claims against the police (Z v UK; 2001; 34 EHRR 97) following consideration of the discussion of Osman by the House of Lords in Barrett v Enfield (2001; 2 AC 550). “In Evans v UK (Judgment 6 March 2006), the European Court of Human Rights, however, upheld the English court’s view that the statutory scheme of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990 was compatible with Article 8 and made express reference to discussion of proportionality in the Court of Appeal. In the R (Daly) v Home Secretary (2003; 1 AC 153, HL) it was held that although the Human Rights Act did not require a court to review the merits of administrative decisions, it did have to apply a test of ‘proportionality’.” (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) However, courts recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the legislature or the executive. “The term ‘discretionary area of judgment’ is now preferred to ‘deference’, as in R (Pro-Life Alliance) v British Broadcasting Authority (2004; 1AC 185, 74-77) but the approach is the same: courts seek to avoid substituting their own views on policy questions for those of the competent authorities. Whether and to what extent courts will recognise a “discretionary area of judgment” depends on the subject matter of the decision being challenged. Policy decisions made by Parliament on matters of national security (Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman; 2003; 1 AC 153, 195), criminal justice (R (Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire; 2004; 1 WLR 2196) and economic policy (R (Hooper) v Pensions Secretary; 2005; 1 WLR 1681) are accorded particular respect. (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review/July 2006) Under Section 6 (3) (a) of the Human Rights Act, courts are themselves “public authorities” which must act compatibly with the Convention on Human Rights. “This has led to some application of Convention rights incases between private bodies and some development of the common law. For example, the rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention have been ‘absorbed’ into the tort of breach of confidence, creating a new private law claim for ‘misuse of private information’ (Campbell v MGN; 2004; 2 AC 457). However, courts have not been persuaded that the Human Rights Act requires development of a new freestanding tort of breach of privacy. Courts are obliged to interpret unfair dismissal in accordance with the Convention (X v Y; 2004; ICR 1634). In general, however, the impact of the Human Rights Act on private law litigation has been very small.” (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) In A v Home Secretary (2005; 2 AC 68) it was held that detention without trial of foreign nationals under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with Article 14 because it discriminated on the ground of nationality or immigration status. “However, all but one of the nine members of the House of Lords decided that the government had been entitled to conclude that there as a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Moreover, the net result under the Human Rights Act was that the applicants remained in detention because courts did not have power to strike down the primary legislation passed by Parliament but only to grant a declaration of incompatibility. On both these issues, the applicants are now pursuing an application to the European Court of Human Rights, illustrating that, whilst the Human Rights Act may have brought forward the moment of decision, ultimately the compatibility of the 2001 Act with the Convention could, in any event, have been tested before the Strasbourg court. However, in Gillan v Home Secretary case (2006; 2 WLR 537) the House of Lords rejected the argument that the stop-and-search provisions of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 were incompatible with the Convention. It was held that the power to stop and search did not involve deprivation of liberty under Article 5, and that Act 8 was not engaged. In any event, if Convention rights were engaged, the interference would be justified.” (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review/July 2006) In Re MB (2006; EWHC 1000; Admin), the judge at first instance held that the procedures for judicial supervision of non-derogating control orders under Section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 were inadequate to comply with Article 6. “In Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ, KK, GG, HH, NN and LL (2006; EWHC 1623; Admin), it was held at first instance that a group of non-derogating controls was unlawfully made because the obligations imposed by them amounted to deprivation of liberty under Article 5. In general, the English criminal law has been found to be consistent with the Convention: both seek to strike a ‘fair balance’ between demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s human rights (Brown v Scott; 2003; 1 AC 681, PC).The established law on delay (Attorney-General’s Reference No. 2 of 2001; 2004 2 AC 72) and entrapment (R v Looseley; 2001; 1 WLR 2060) and the common law offence of public nuisance (R v Rimmington; 2006; 1 AC 459) have all been held to be compatible with the Convention. A Human Rights Act challenge to statutory provisions relating to retention of DNA of cleared suspects was unsuccessful in the case of Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2004; 1 WLR 2196)” (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) The argument that anti-social behaviour orders constitute a “criminal charge” was rejected in the case of McCann v Crown Court (2003; 1 AC 787). In R v Spear (2003; 1 AC 734) it was held that the then existing Court-Martial system was compliant with the Convention. In Stafford v UK (2002; 35; EHRR 1121) the European Court of Human Rights revisited its own earlier case law, and decided that the fixing of tariffs for lifers by the Home Secretary was a breach of the Convention. Thereupon, the House of Lords determined that statutory provisions relating to the determination of tariffs by the Hoe Secretary (Anderson v Home Secretary; 2003; 1 AC 837) and by judges (Hammond v Hoe Secretary; 2006; 1 AC 603) are incompatible with the Convention. In contrast, the regime relating to young offenders held “At Her Majesty’s Pleasure” was compatible (Smith v Home Secretary; 2006; 1 AC 159) A policy allowing prison staff to search a prisoner’s legally privileged correspondence in his absence was incompatible with Article 8 rights (Daly v Home Secretary; 2001; 2 AC 532). The rule restricting a prisoner’s right to publish details of his crimes was not in conflict with the prisoner’s freedom of expression (Nilsen v HMP Full Sutton; 2005; 1 WLR 1028). The decision of the Prison Service to remove the appellant from a protected witness unit was not a breach of Article 2 (Bloggs 51 v Home Secretary; 2003; 1 WLR 2724) (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review/july 2006) It has long been established under the Convention that Article 3 an obligation on a State not to expel someone from its territory (whether by extradition, deportation or any other form of removal and for whatever reason) where substantial grounds are shown for believing that upon such expulsion he will face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country (Soering v UK; 1989; 11 EHRR 439). It has been held under the Human Rights Act that when the treatment is likely to derive from non-state agents, to come within the principle the claimant must show that the receiving country does not provide a reasonable level of protection against such harm (Bagdanavicius v Home Secretary; 2005; 2 AC 668). Furthermore, the principle does not place any “medical care” obligation on the State, so that expulsion of a person to a country where he/she will not receive proper healthcare for a fatal illness is not a breach of Article 3 (N v Home Secretary; 2005; 2 AC 296). “It has been held that the Convention does not impose any obligation on the Home Secretary to consider foreign prisoners for parole (Hindawi v Home Secretary; 2005; 1 WLR 1102). Article 3 requires the Secretary of State to provide support to asylum seekers whose conditions are on the verge of reaching the necessary degree of severity (Limbuela v Home Secretary; 2006; 1 AC 396). Provisions of the Housing Act 1996 preventing local authorities taking into account the needs of children subject to immigration control was declared incompatible with the Convention (Westminster v Morris; 2006; 1 WLR 505) (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.govt.uk) “Statutory provisions restricting the rights of those subject to immigration control to enter into a civil marriage was declared incompatible with Articles 12 and 14, except in relation to illegal entrants (Baiai v Home Secretary; 2006; EWHC 823 and 1454 Admin). In S v Home Secretary (2006; EWHC 1111), the judge’s finding that the Secretary of State’s decision that it was inappropriate to grant discretionary leave to enter the United Kingdom to individuals responsible for hijacking an Afghan plane was unlawful was not primarily based on Human Rights Act considerations. The Judge, however, also found that the policy on discretionary leave did not meet the requirement of ‘lawfulness’ in Article 8 of the Convention (that is, it was not a clear and publicly accessible rule of law) because it gave minister such an open-ended discretion that it could not be foreseen how that discretion would be exercised in any given case.” (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review/julky 2006) In other cases involving Article 8 rights, courts have recognised the need for a fair and effective system of immigration control. For example, in Mahmood v Home Secretary (2001; 1 WLR 140), Laws LJ noted that firm immigration control requires consistency of treatment between one aspiring immigrant and another, such that it would be unfair to allow an individual who has arrived without the required entry clearance to remain unless he can demonstrate some exceptional circumstance which reasonably justifies his jumping the queue. Similarly, in Huang v Home Secretary (2006; QB 1) the Court of Appeal held that Article 8 did not require an immigrant to be favoured for leave to remain, in a departure from the normal rules, other than in truly exceptional circumstances. Power of the court to restrain publicity in cases relating to children has been clarified and recast in terms of Article 8 in Re S (2005; 1 AC 593). The power not derives from the Convention which provides a simple and more direct approach. Statutory provisions preventing a transsexual from marrying were declared incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 in Bellinger v Bellinger case (2003; 2 AC 467). However, the European Court had already declared in the Goodwin v UK case that UK law in this area was incompatible; the House of Lords accepted the government’s argument that it was not for the courts to recast the relevant law which should be left to Parliament, which has now enacted the Gender Recognition Act 2004 to deal with these issues. (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) “It has been held that the procedural obligation inherent Article 2 requires an “effective” independent public investigation into deaths that may have been caused by State intervention or as a result of unlawfulness. Where an inquest was the means by which this was done, it had ordinarily to culminate in an expression of the jury’s conclusion on the disputed factual issues at the heart of the case requiring reinterpretation of the Coroners Act 1988 (Middleton v West Somerset Coroner; 2004; 2 AC 182). The full range of Article 2 obligations extends to life-threatening injuries suffered by persons in custody (D v Home Secretary; 2006; EWCA Civ 143) but not to deaths which arguably result from medical negligence (Takoushis v Inner North London Coroner; 2006; 1 WLR 461) .Also, certain provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 were incompatible with Article 5 as they did not require a mental health review tribunal to discharge a patient where it could not be shown that eh was suffering from a mental disorder (H v MHRT, North and East London, 2002, QB 1). However, the statutory regime for reviewing detention of severely mentally disabled patients is compatible with the Convention (MH v Health Secretary; 2006; 1 AC 441) as is the conditional discharge regime under Section 73 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (H v Home Secretary; 2003; 2 AC 253). Automatic appointment of the ‘nearest relative’ for persons detained under the Mental Health Act and the inability of detainees to challenge that appointment were declared incompatible with the right to respect for private life under Article 8 (M v Health Secretary; 2003; EWHC 1094; Admin). Again, while granting injunctions to remove travellers from sites occupied in breach of planning permission, courts must consider whether, on the facts, such relief is proportionate, bearing in mind Article 8 rights of the travellers (South Bucks Council v Porter; 2003; 2 AC 558). The court in this case emphasised that issues of planning policy and judgment were matters for local planning authorities and the Secretary of State, not the courts. Although Article 8 is engaged in every case where an occupier is evicted, there is a strong presumption that a fair balance has been struck by the English law governing possession proceedings (Kay v Lambeth; 2006; 2 WLR 570) (www.justice.gov.uk/docs/full-review/july 2006) Courts have rejected the argument that full “fair trial guarantees” under Article 6 should apply to all administrative decision. Local authority processes that involve internal reviews and judicial review comply with the Convention (Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets; 2003; 2 AC 430). Similarly, courts have declined to remove from ministers their role in the planning process (Alconbury Development v Environment Secretary; 2003; 2 AC 295). In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza (2004; 2 AC 557; HL) it was held that the Human Rights Act required the Rent Act 1977 to be construed to permit same-sex couples to succeed to statutory tenancies. Most of the other applications based on Article 14 of the Convention have been unsuccessful; they include child support for same-sex couples (Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M; 2006; 2 WLR 637), payment of State pensions and job-seekers’ allowances (Carson v Secretary of State; 2006; 1 AC 173). “The range of potential Article 14 claims has been limited by the decision of the House of Lords in Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire; 2004; 1 WLR 2196) that “other status” in Article 14 is limited to a ‘personal characteristic’ of the claimant. An attempt to claim that a disciplinary expulsion was in breach of the Convention right to education similarly failed before the House of Lords (Ali v Head teacher and Governors of Lord Grey School; 2006; 2 WLR 690). It held that the Convention only guaranteed fair and non-discriminatory access to the educational system as a whole, not education at a particular and did not prevent expulsion on disciplinary grounds provided alternative sources of State education were open to the pupil. And Parliament’s decision in the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 to extend to all schools the ban on corporal punishment was held justified to protect children (Williamson v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; 2005; 2 AC 246) (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk) In R v A (No.2; 2002; 1 AC 45), the House of Lords applied Section 3 to the provisions of Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 which, at the trial of a sexual offence, excluded evidence relating to prior sexual behaviour of the complainant, subject to narrow exceptions. “It was held that this was incompatible with the right to a fair trial under Article 6, but that the provision could be construed in a compatible way by ‘reading in’ an implied provision that evidence required to ensure a fair trial should not be excluded. This radical approach was, however, not adopted in subsequent cases. Thus in Re S (Minors) (Care Order Implementation of Case Plan) (2002; AC 291) the House of Lords clarified that the Human Rights Act reserved the amendment of primary legislation to Parliament, and that any use of Section 3 to produce a result departing substantially from the fundamental features of a statute was not acceptable. A line was thus drawn between legitimate judicial interpretation and an exercise in amendment which must remain province of Parliament. In R v Offen (2001; 1 WLR 253) it was held that imposition of an automatic life sentence under Section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act1997 could be disproportionate, but that the phrase ‘exceptional circumstances’ could be interpreted in a less restrictive way to produce compatibility. The House of Lords has held that a finding of breach is generally sufficient redress under the Human Rights Act; it, therefore, declined to award damages even where the consequence of the breach was that a prisoner served an additional 21 days in prison (Greenfield v Home Secretary; 2005; 1 WLR 673) While on the “right to respect for correspondence” (Article 8), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act 2000 empowers UK authorities to monitor internet traffic data and demand keys to encrypted data. Earlier, “the Interception of Communications Act 1985 had been introduced to clarify surveillance powers after the European Commission of Human Rights had declared phone tapping a breach of Article 8. The 1990s provided a different context for application of human rights legislation. The Human Rights Act came into force in October 2000, by which time it was necessary for the UK State surveillance to comply with the Convention. Emergence of new communication technologies, beyond those addressed by the Interception of Communications Act, had made the limits of the State’s surveillance powers ambiguous. This ambiguity needed to be resolved if the Convention was to be complied with, and it was resolved by bringing in the RIP Act. So, rather than curtailing the surveillance powers, the human rights legislation strengthened the UK government’s hands.” (Starr, Sandy; “Ripping into Our Rights: Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act 2000”; www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006D99E; htm) How far does the Human Rights Act really go to ensure that nobody is deprived of human rights by the State or one of its agencies without due reason and justification? In other words, what if an Act of Parliament breaches the Human Rights Act? Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act says that, “so far as it is possible to do so, primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention’s rights.” (www.nhri.net/2009/summary GB-October/FINAL. PDF) “Where a higher court tries to interpret a provision of the legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights but finds that it cannot, it may make a declaration of incompatibility which states that the legislation concerned is incompatible with Convention’s rights, as enjoined by Section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act. Courts do not, however, have the power to strike down and disapply Acts of Parliament which they consider to be incompatible with human rights. Their powers are limited to making declarations.” (www.ucc.ie/law/doc/UK-Declarations-of-incompatibility. Michael-Farrell. PDF) What good is such a declaration by the higher court which has not been able to ensure implementation of the Convention’s rights? “The responsible Minister may then, with the approval of Parliament, amend the legislation so as to make it compatible with the Human Rights Act. Section 10(2) provides that ‘if a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this Section, he may, by order, make such amendments to the legislation as he considers necessary to remove the incompatibility.” (www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/Kentridge 02.pdf) Isn’t the inference obvious that the said Minister would invariably and unfailingly make such an amendment as may be calculated to remove the incompatibility? “The Minister is not obliged to amend such legislation. If he/she decides not to make such amendments, then the victim of the violation has no remedy at least at the national level. However, it is open to the victim to take the case to the Strasbourg court, challenging the legislation.” (Harris, et al; “Law of the European Convention on Human Rights; 1995) What if regulations or statutory instruments breach the Human Rights Act? “The Act also requires that ‘secondary legislation’, such as regulations, must be read and interpreted in a way which protects the Convention’s human rights, to go by what Section 3(1) says.” (www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/inthenews/2002/16112002.htm) However, “unlike Acts of Parliament, secondary legislation not complying with the Convention’s human rights can be considered to be invalid, and need no longer be applied.” (www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/7cec89369c43abdfc1256a2a0027ba2a) But is that the rule to be strictly followed? “The exception to this rule is that secondary legislation that is incompatible with the Convention’s human rights must continue to be applied if the Act of Parliament under which it is made requires it to breach those Convention’s rights.” (http://beavercute.blogetery.com/2008/01/24/english-legal-system) “Section 3(2) (c) states that the rule requiring interpretation in accordance with the Convention’s human rights ‘does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation, disregarding any possibility of revocation; primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility. In such a case, a declaration of incompatibility could be made in respect of the Act of Parliament.” (www1.umn.edu/humanrts.htm) “Also, there may well be areas where a public authority is compelled to act in a particular way by an Act of Parliament other than the Human Rights Act, even though it knows that acting in that way will breach human rights.” (Gearty-ed; “European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on Human Rights”; 1997) “The Act recognises that such situations may arise, and so it states that where a public authority is compelled by legislation to act in a way that breaches human rights, it will not be held responsible.” (www.asil.org/insigh/71.cfm) References: www.accessmylibrary.com Fenwick, H; “Civil Liberties and Human Rights”; 2007 Coppel, J; “Human Rights Act 1998: Enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights in Domestic Courts”; 1999 www.highbeam.com/doc/IP3-77629772; html www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga/19980042_en_1 www.justice.org/images/pdfs/HRAINT PDF www.hri.org/docs/ECHR_50_htm Buergenthal, Th.; “The Domestic Status of the European Convention on Human Rights: A Second Look”; 7 Journal of the ICJ; 1966 Khol, A; “Influence of the Convention on Human Rights on Domestic Law”; AJCL; 1970 “Issue of Terrorism and Its Impact on Human Rights”; www.Mindrelief.net;2007 Espersen, O; “England and the European Convention on Human Rights”; 18; AJCL; 1970 www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human Starr, Sandy; “Ripping into Our Rights: Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act 2000; www.spiked-online.com/articles/00000006D99E; htm Hunt; “Using Human Rights Law in English Courts”; 1997 www.Solarnavigator.net/embassies/European-convention-on-human-rights www.hrcr.org/docs/Euro-Convention/euroconv.html www.geocities.com/ecnvn/index.html www.nhri.net/2009/summary GB-Oct/FINAL PDF www.ucc.ie/law/doc/UK-Declarations-of-Incompatibility.Michael-Farrell.pdf www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/Kentridge 02 PDF Harris, et al; “Law of the European Convention on Human Rights”; 1995 www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/inthenews/2002/16112002.htm www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/ 7cec89369c43abdfc1256a2a0027ba2a www.beavercute.blogetery.com/2008/01/24/english-legal-system www1.umn.edu/humanrts.htm Gearty-ed; “European Civil Liberties and the European Convention on Human Rights”; 1997 www.asil.org/insigh/71.cfm Lecourt, R; “Interferences Between the European Convention on Human Rights and the Community Law Concerning the Community and National Judicial Control”; Athens Colloquy; n.2 above; 81-107, at 91 Bebr, G; “The Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities; 1981 Evrigenis, D; “Reflections on the National Dimension of the European Convention on Human Rights in Relation to Other International Instruments for Protection of Human Rights”; 1978 Strasbourg court’s judgments in the MARCKX Case, Para 56; and Deweer Case, Para 97 Sorensen, M; “Do the Rights Set Forth in the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950 have the same significance in 1975?”; Proceedings of the 4th International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights; Rome, November 5-8, 1975; Strasbourg, 1976;83-109, at 69 Judge Zekia’s Observations in the Sunday Times Case; European Court of Human Rights Judgment of April 26, 1979; ser.A.vol.30; 58-66, at 63-64 Peaslee. A. J.; “Constitutions of Nations”; 1968; iii; 201 Robertson, A. H.-ed; “Privacy and Human Rights”; 1973; 255-275, at 264 Meyer, J. De; “The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and Communications, in Relations Between Individuals, and the Resulting Obligations for State Parties to the Convention Smith, Herbert; (www.mondaq.com/article. asp.articleid=22421;) February 19, 2004 www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis;submission-to-ICJ-panel. PDF www.nhrcnepal.org/publication/doc/reports/annualreport/English-2004; PDF http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk www.justice.govt.uk/docs/full-review/july 2006 Read More