Individualism: What Is the Proper Criterion for Inherent Worth - Essay Example

Individualism: What is the Proper Criterion for Inherent Worth? Inherent worth is a term that is commonly recognized as referring to a specific type of value something has simply because it exists. This value is not assessed based upon outward measures and differs from every other type of value one might think of, including inherent value. However, this is a fine distinction that many people never have need to truly investigate or understand. When studying environmental ethics, however, it becomes clear that how we feel about these distinctions can play a significant role in how we make our decisions. There are several views on the issue that differ from one another to various degrees. The major schools of thought can be broken down into biocentrism, sentientism, ratiocentrism and anthropomorphism (weak and strong). In attempting to discover which of these views is most justified, it is necessary to understand the basic ideas each school of thought represents. Biocentrism is, roughly speaking, a system in which the criterion for inherent worth is based upon the simple-seeming criterion of whether one lives or not. Because all living things have the right to exist, we, as thinking beings, hold moral responsibility to ensure that we do not interfere with this right. “[Taylor] contends that in addition to our moral obligations toward our fellow humans, we also owe duties to wild living things in their own right … He agrees with Goodpaster’s argument that one can deny that non-humans have rights and yet hold that they are moral patients toward whom moral agents have duties and responsibilities” (Kocer, 2001). Being the center of a life force is grounds enough to fulfill to the biocentrist viewpoint, but this introduces problems as one must consider that all life forms must hold inherent worth equally – the human as well as the cockroach – despite obvious differences in understanding and awareness. As even Taylor hints, there must be something more to the question than simply the idea that one respirates and reproduces. This is where the ideas of sentientism arise. While philosophers such as Singer suggest that this term is applied to any creature that demonstrates capacity to feel pleasure or pain, “the term ‘sentient’ refers more broadly to consciousness of something or other, rather than to consciousness of pleasure and pain specifically” (Jamieson, 2003: 192). However, when it is applied in this sense, it is usually limited to the view of something being able to express it is feeling pleasure or pain. Under this view, things gain inherent worth based upon their capacity to feel and to be aware of things outside of themselves. In this view, all things that act on their own free will are considered to have inherent worth which would include fish, birds, mammals and reptiles. While the biocentrist approach seems to be too broad in its environmental ethics application, being applicable to all living things, this approach seems to exclude consideration for the importance of the ecosystem as a whole as a means of acting in morally responsible manner toward other creatures with sentience. Anthropocentrism is a concept discussed by Kant in which the central question is whether or not the being is of the Homo sapiens species. If the object in question is a member of the human species, it is considered to have inherent worth. If it is not, its worth is either not recognized at all or is recognized as existing, but at a much lower level than the worth of the human. This is the essential difference between strong and weak anthropocentrism. While strong anthropocentrism argues that humans and only humans matter and all other things exist only in relation to their value to the human race, weak anthropocentrism suggests that humans are the central concern and should be considered first before any other thing. “This suggests that nonhumans intrinsically matter some, and thus weak anthropocentrism is not compatible with strong anthropocentrism for it claims only humans matter” (Hettinger, 2005). Under this view, it might be argued that we need to do what is necessary to save the planet in order to make sure that we, as humans, have someplace to live, air to breathe, water to drink and food to eat. It is also quickly and easily applied and directly appeals to our naturally selfish and egocentric natures. However, there is little to no concern or recognition that other animals, perhaps less evolved or perhaps just differently evolved (the true capacity of plants is still a controversial subject much less other creatures such as whales, dolphins, apes and elephants), may have value as well. Taking this view precludes any open-mindedness concerning these values or potential values and provides no evidence or justification for the elevation of one species over all the others. Under the ratiocentrist approach, even fewer beings are included in the list of creatures possessing inherent worth as only those individuals with the capacity for reason are considered to be of high enough moral standing. This view narrows responsibility as it implies that a being’s inherent worth is contingent on its awareness of having a value just because it exists. Not all humans can be said to have this capacity. Those who are incapable of having these types of thoughts, for example, would be considered to have less inherent worth under this viewpoint than those who spend their days contemplating the possibilities. While this approach is helpful in establishing a hierarchy of worth assigned to individuals according to specific ideals, these ideals remain highly subjective depending upon the values of the society. In considering these various viewpoints, it is discovered that none of them are capable of perfectly addressing all of the issues and concerns that must be addressed in discovering the necessary criterion for inherent worth. Despite its problems, though, the ratiocentrist approach appears to be the most justified. This approach considers that inherent value is proportional to the being’s ability to value itself. Thus, the rational man is able to recognize his own inherent worth to a greater degree than the unthinking man who has never considered what his value might be which is still greater than the man’s dog that likely thinks no further ahead than the next activity. While it does have its problems, this approach also allows for more possibilities as the exact degree to which animals may or may not experience a sense of inherent worth cannot presently be tested. As a result, this approach answers some of the concerns of the anthrocentrist approach. Because it acknowledges that creatures capable of expressing pleasure or pain may have a sense of their inherent worth, this approach also acknowledges that we are morally responsible for these beings as well and must respect their right to live. Thus it answers the sentiocentrist approach while still providing a justification for hierarchy. Finally, it meets the needs of the anthropocentrists in that the most reasoned individuals recognize the need to protect an entire ecosystem as a means of saving a single species while still introducing reason into the subject when and where two needs collide, such as when humans need a new place to live but the only suitable land interrupts the migratory patterns of a specific type of bird. Works Cited Hettinger, Ned. “The Question of Moral Standing or Intrinsic Value and the Anthropomorphic Answer.” Environmental Ethics. Spring, 2005. May 26, 2009 Jamieson, Dale. A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003. Kocer, Banu. “Reading Summary: Paul Taylor Respect for Nature.” (March 9, 2001). May 26, 2009 < http://web.utk.edu/~nolt/courses/646/Taylor1.htm> Read More