Xerxes The Great, 'Ahasuerus' - Essay Example

XERXES Introduction It is often presented as a truism that the winners write the history books. But when the is a figure of controversy, with both dark and light sides, it is often difficult to really see what happened in a way that highlights veracity. Looking at Xerxes I of Persia, one faces such a situation. On the one hand, Xerxes’ invasion of Greece was massive in scale, represented ingenious engineering, and resulted in the fruition of the goal of its general: a victory at Thermopylae, and the capture of Athens. On the other hand, taking Athens was essentially Xerxes’ last successful move: he faced nothing but a series of embarrassing defeats afterwards, and after the withdrawal of forces from Greece, was treated very harshly by Greek historians. The basic assumption of the current research investigation is that Xerxes, leading the Persian army after Thermopylae, represents a different and more unstable sort of commander than Xerxes before this seminal battle: after burning Athens, Xerxes seems to make nothing but poor strategic decisions. Up until his eventual murder in a court intrigue, when he was essentially disgraced as a general, and was focusing mainly on building projects, Xerxes showed a slippage of rationality and good judgment, along with an increasing inability to take counsel from his advisors and military planners. Perhaps due to a mixture over-emotionalism, frustration, and arrogance, Xerxes broke from the successes of his Egyptian campaign and, after taking Athens, embarked upon a path of general failure. This failure eventually led to instability at home as well as in the Greek campaign, which was abandoned. Post-Thermopylae Xerxes the Great In the famous Battle of Thermopylae, Xerxes saw his forces held back by a few hundred Spartans and other Greeks supporting them. Due perhaps to the abovementioned tendency of the winners to write the hisotry books, most think of this battle in terms of the heroic stand of the “300.” But ultimately, despite the heroics of the Spartan warriors, Xerxes won this battle, after the betrayal of Ephialtes, and moved on to surround and capture his main goal: Athens. Capturing Athens was something that had long been a dream for Xerxes, and was one of the foci of his invasion campaign. Therefore, it can be assumed that having achieved this goal or dream, and having driven the Athenians and Spartans back to Corinth, Xerxes saw the fulfillment of a lifelong wish. However, because of the heroic stand put up by the Spartans during Thermopylae, Xerxes’ victory over Athens was complicated by the fact that once he got there, the city had basically been abandoned. During the following actions as well as previously, Xerxes showed a lot more instability and irrationality in his Greek campaign than other campaigns such as that of Egypt. Instead of occupying the virtually empty city, he lashed out at it in anger, in a continuation of a tendency shown in the Greek campaign to vent his rage through hasty action. Enraged at storms early in the invasion, for example, “He further insisted that the sea itself should be punished with three hundred lashes for failing to cooperate with the wishes of the king. His men reportedly struck the waves with chains while shouting” (Porter, 2005). Although the taking of Athens was an initial victory, in reality it was the first important domino in a chain of unstable decisions, which perhaps saw Xerxes responding more emotionally to events, rather than taking the time to effectively incorporate them into strategy. Whether it was because of frustration at the stand taken by the Spartans, or the complication of his dream of taking Athens being marred by the fact that it was an empty city at the time of his invasion, Xerxes reacted to the turn of events emotionally. He didn’t react by showing the behavior of someone who had reached the apex of their dreams, but rather, reacted in a way that showed increasing instability and a tendency to vent his wrath. In any case, burning Athens and visiting excessive violence on its population, may have been the first in a series of disastrous decisions made by Xerxes after Thermopylae. “The Persian soldiers, exasperated with the resistance which they had encountered, slew the soldiers of the garrison, perpetrated every imaginable violence on the wretched inhabitants who had fled there for shelter, and then plundered the citadel and set it on fire” (Califf, 2002). Looking at Xerxes before this major battle, one sees a decision-maker who, while at times perhaps arrogant, is able to remain confident, cool and relaxed about major policy issues as well as battlefield decisions. This works to Xerxes’ advantage, until after Athens, when he begins a tendency to second-guess himself and his decisions. This situation represents a different and more unstable sort of leader, who does things like going back on his decision to burn the city, only to start rebuilding it the next day. In any case, the mists of time have somewhat obscured who actually put the torch to the city. However, this matters less when one considers that the burning of Athens is almost universally attributed to Xerxes, and represents what many see as his first poor decision militarily. The battle of Salamis stemmed from this decision, and represented a different and more unstable sort of military command, in which Xerxes broke advice, turned his back on Themistocles, and went to attack the Greek naval fleet under circumstances that were quite risky. The actions of the invader were looking more and more desperate at this juncture. This desperation is a stark contrast to the earlier Xerxes, who did not take huge risks at the onset of a battle when he did not have some sort of way of overcoming them, and who actually listened to the wise counsel of his associates, instead of going against the grain. Salamis shows a more hasty, more indecisive sort of Xerxes, who is having trouble making decisions and communicating with his advisers as well, and is perhaps even panicking. The result, a major loss, was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of his change as a general, from a winning Persian campaign leader before Thermopylae, to a hesitant, over-emotional, and increasingly impressionable decision maker after this seminal battle. At this point, Xerxes’ problems were still just mounting. Having suffered a defeat at Salamis, he again faced a decision: whether or not to split up his forces to quash a home rebellion. According to one source, at this point, “His confidence had been shattered as effectively as his fleet, and now he was terrified that the Greeks would set sail across the Aegean Sea in order to destroy his Hellespont bridges, thus cutting him off from much-needed supplies and reinforcements” (Porter, 2005). At this juncture, instead of focusing more troops on problem areas that were right before his eyes, Xerxes continued his pattern of rash decision making, representing a different and more unstable sort of thought process that further divided his forces, leaving Mardonius in charge of the army in Greece. In other words, Xerxes could not even stay with this army at the time and continue to inspire it; he basically left it behind in a huff of frustration, and as a result, there was the defeat at Plataea, the burning of the remaining Persian fleet, and the isolation of the Persians from supply chains that were necessary to keep the army in Greece. In modern parlance, Xerxes at this point appears to have simply dropped the ball. The result was a sort of domino effect which resulted ultimately in the withdrawal of the Persian forces from Greece. Even in the beginning, before this shameful withdrawal, there had been clues that Xerxes would not be as sure-handed in his Greek campaign as some other campaigns, such as the subjugation of Egypt. In fact, according to one resource, the Perisan leader, “seems to have been undecided about whether or not to proceed against Greece. His cousin Mardonius urged attack, but his uncle Artabanus argued that numerous obstacles stood in the way of success and that any attack would ultimately end in failure” (Porter, 2005). His increasing instability and emotionalism during the campaign was a further sign, perhaps, of his basic insecurity about the endeavor on which he was engaged. Going into Greece unsure, Xerxes exuded a sort of suspended indecision in many of his key moments, which showed a commander who was not acting reasonably and rationally, but rather who was over-emotional. One can only imagine the effect of being made to whip a body of water with iron chains by their general, on the morale of the average Persian soldier. One cannot reasonably say, however, that it was all Xerxes’ fault that a chain of disasters seemed to follow him after the burning of Athens. The Greeks had made their own preparations for the invasion, including what appears to be measured and rational communication among generals, in a confluence of communication that was not realistically expected from the frequently-warring city-states of ancient Greece. “Spies were dispatched to monitor the preparations of the Persians, and the Greek commanders discussed battle strategies… They tried to set aside their political feuds, both within Athens and among competing states. To that end, Aristides was recalled from exile to assist in leading the campaign” (Kelly, 2003). One must also take into consideration that the Greeks were not an invading force as Xerxes was, and were fighting for their lives as well as for their homeland. The fact that their generals seemed to be able to communicate better than Xerxes, and were less mired in emotionalism, added to this advantage. Ascribing blame for historical events is relatively easy from the perspective of hindsight, from the present. In other words, it is simple to read the history books written by the winners, and then level charges against those who are seen to be bad, versus those who are seen to be good. But in reality, the situation is often much more complicated than a polar opposition would imply. Looking at the example of Xerxes, post-Thermopylae, one can take a look at this opposition. From a Greek perspective, Xerxes, the Persian invader, is a villain, and so it may be more likely that Greek historians will focus on this leader’s character flaws. “In the Laws, Plato compares Xerxes to Cambyses in that, as him, he was victim of his education at the court, unlike his father Darius, who was not a son of king” (Califf, 2002). But from another perspective, Xerxes may be seen as a heroic conqueror who, even though his campaign ended in failure, achieved his main goal of taking Athens. Whatever view one takes of the situation, one thing can be agreed upon: after Athens, Xerxes’ campaign in Greece went rapidly downhill. Whether this was because of his character flaws, over-emotional decision making, not being born outside of the court aristocracy, not taking the advice of his counselors, or simply bad luck, it cannot be denied that after Thermopylae, Xerxes saw his invasion of Greece basically fall apart at the seams. It is also hard to deny that after this defeat, Xerxes, who went back to Persia and never again invaded another country, evinced a downhill slide in reputation, ending with his murder in a court intrigue including a eunuch advisor under whose advice and sway he had reportedly fallen under, Aspamitres. “In August, 465 B.C Artabanus assassinated Xerxes with the help of Aspamitres. Greek historians give contradicting accounts on the full story. According to Ctesias (in Persica 20), he then accused the crown prince Darius (Xerxes’ eldest son) of the murder” (Xerxes, 2002). Xerxes, who forced his way into Athens on a tide of slaugther as a vindictive occupying force, did not come home in glory. Conclusion There were many factors which contributed to Xerxes’ gradual downfall after the battle of Thermopylae. Marching back to Persia, “That swift retirement took its toll, as plague, dysentery, famine and cold weather descended on his men. Only a fraction of his army made it to the Hellespont, where they the bridges swept away--not by the Greeks, but again by a storm” (Porter, 2005). Aside from natural factors, Xerxes was also plagued by poor decision making post-Thermopylae. He broke from his success in Egypt by showing an increasing tendency towards emotional reaction rather than strategic planning. In focusing too much on Athens, he turned a blind eye towards the gathering Greek forces elsewhere. Thermopylae marks a definite high water mark in the career of Xerxes as a leader and commander. REFERENCE Califf, D (2002). Thermopylae: The Immediate Aftermath. Marathon. New York: Hyperion. Kelly, T (2003). Persian propaganda. Iranica Antiqua 38(3). Porter, B (2005). Xerxes’ Greek Campaign. Military History 22(4). Xerxes I (c. 519-465 BC) (2003). Hutchinsons Biography. New York: Norton. Read More