On the Genealogy of Morals: An Analysis of Power Friedrich Nietzsche - Book Report/Review Example

I. Introduction For several centuries, humanity has been ruled by a dominant dualism, good and evil. These two plain words bear with them a burden that is almost beyond description, one so grand all kinds of artistic creations have tried to articulate them and religions all over the world are built on them. But the mystifying question is what the origin of these two words is? Quite a few philosophers argue that they are spontaneous, proof of something bigger than ourselves inculcating in us a wisdom and sense of morality. In Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche rebuffs these ideas, even disclaims the concepts themselves. Instead of understanding as being inherent or natural, he argues, they are the instruments of the privileged few to preserve the status quo and keep themselves in power. In Nietzsche’s point of view, this directly undervalues them. I argue that he perceives this notion of good and evil as philosophically worthless and, moreover, something to be removed from human society. We, as well, just like Nietzsche should begin searching for the origin of the words. The argument of Nietzsche is founded on linguistics; he explores the words in several languages, and terms resembling them. He explores initially the German ‘schlecht’ which means bad. He examines parallel words such as ‘schlicht,’ ‘schlechtweg,’ and ‘schlechterdings.’ These three words are deviations of the word simple, guiding Nietzsche to the assumption that the words are connected; that to a certain extent the meaning of ‘schlecht’ was modified, and this modification stands for the ideals of the German society of that period, that the plebeians, average citizens were, blatantly, bad. Likewise, Nietzsche specifies Latin, mentioning particularly malus which means ‘bad’ and melas which means ‘black’ (Leiter 2002, 41). Nietzsche afterwards mentions the structure of the upper and lower classes of Rome. In Roman traditions, he emphasizes, those with black hair were customarily recognized as lower class, whereas the upper class are those with light and blonde hair. He draws the same thought s in Greek and Celtic traditions, generally making the argument that the terms for good and bad varied basically from classiest concepts in which the privileged few had such power they could even exploit the language to function in their own interest and motive (Leiter 2002). However, there is dissimilarity in the words, certainly the thoughts, being made use of now and those that were presented initially. Good and bad are not synonymous as good and evil, and evidently Nietzsche understands this. At this point, Nietzsche demonstrates the concept of the ‘ressentiment’ or the reassessing of an individual’s worldview so as to make his/her life more satisfactory. The concepts of good and evil, as argued by Nietzsche, no longer originate from the privileged few, but the class that is given to its power. The ‘well-born’ sensed themselves to be blissful; they did not have to search for bliss unnaturally by studying their adversaries, Nietzsche argues. For the lower class, nonetheless, this is the single alternative (Berkowitz 1996). Hence, they settle on, recognizably so, that the class that exploits, that impairs them, is evil. This is the explanation which several of those elements which religion regards as evil, such as riches, greed, and others, are the very elements that characterize the ‘well-born’ class. But do these words have any fundamental significance? These concepts, good and evil, which appear to describe the principles and social traditions of the world, are they really useful? Nietzsche firmly says no. If anything, this notion appears to be one of the most essential aspects Nietzsche aims to break out. This, specifically, is the slave morality, the core idea that does not permit the lower or slave class to be emancipated. The privileged few or the upper class, Nietzsche argues, is liberated. They do not have to be apprehensive of their adversaries; actually, they take particular pleasure from having adversaries. Their nobleness, already secured by their power over the language and their material riches, is not threatened. The slave or lower class, however, should try to search for happiness through ‘ressentiment’, through establishing their poverty, their misery, merit something, but in a different life (Solomon & Higgins 1990). For the agnostic Nietzsche, this has perfectly worthless. But this enthusiasm for the ethereal happiness makes an individual yearn for his misery, his slavery. The reality that the slave believes he is good is accurately what puts him off from being emancipated, and as for Nietzsche, this is terrible (Solomon & Higgins 1990). The only means for a slave to be emancipated, then, is to totally get rid of the notions of good and evil as they are at present; to no longer grant control to such elements will clearly harm our earthly existence. For Nietzsche, good and evil, are in a definite manner, accurately the contrary of that they appear to be. Good, when it implies misery and pain, means anything but good, whereas evil, implying that which does damage to individuals who are good, is not anything but the innate condition of existence. Certainly, Nietzsche maintains that good is anything but good basically because it is precisely the reverse of the natural state of mankind. In order to go back to this state, based on Nietzsche, mankind should turn down the concepts of good and evil as they are at present. Humanity should discard the morality of ‘ressentiment’ and see things the way they really are. II. The Concept of Power in On the Genealogy of Morals It is human nature to sense their power that encourages them to be wicked and commit harm and inflict pain upon themselves and others. Throughout Nietzsche’s account of morality in On the Genealogy of Morals there is an existent persistent issue of power, this can be comprehended in the perspective of an individual’s yearning to both exploit and sense his power though actions. This section will discuss the questions that emerge from this theory of aspiration for power, such as the reason for this aspiration for power, the manner this aspiration demonstrates itself in our behaviors and actions and the reason being sadistic grant us the sense of power. This explanation of power can be found initially in the analysis of Nietzsche on the concept of guilt, and then it carries on in the concepts of unkindness and simplicity. In other words, guilt emerges out of the association between the creditor and debtor and is a pretext for the yearning to commit harm. In being a creditor an individual has the power and can commit harm upon a debtor in return for unsuccessfully repaying a debt. Hence, individuals have the yearning to be creditors and hence have the authority, with which they can mete out brutality and hence sense this power which they have. Thus, the relationship between the creditor and debtor goes further than the creation of guilt, but is vital in the recognition of power. But, if one wasn’t successful in achieving the status of a creditor or any powerful position, then one can resort to simplicity or asceticism as an alternative (Bataille 1994). Regrettably, for the one who tries to assert his power through simplicity, this is a self-weakening practice. For the individual who vigorously pursues the objective affirming power over another, it is the status of the creditor that the individual craves for. In having this status of power an individual can wield their own self-autonomy while demoralizing that of another person. The exacting out of harm upon another is the most effectual means in which individual power over another can be revealed. Nietzsche makes the assertion that the infliction of pain as a chastisement for failing to repay debts is for the reason that to make misery was in the greatest extent enjoyable, to the point that the damaged party trade for the loss he maintained, including the discontentment brought about by the loss, and unusual counteracting pleasure: which is of making misery. Hence, for Nietzsche, to be wicked and inflict harm was the culmination of pleasure; he goes on to argue that, “to see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more… and in punishment there is so much that is festive” (Nietzsche 1998, 54). At this conjecture, it should be noted, is an examination of human behavior that based on Nietzsche transpired “when mankind was not yet ashamed of its cruelty” (Nietzsche 1998, 54). Hence, the imposition of pain upon a person is something that individuals have a natural desire to do, hence chastisement functions as a façade that permits humanity to act as they desire and realize this distasteful need. Hence at this point in the analysis, the conclusion can be made that it is primarily that individuals yearn to impose pain upon others, in contrary to the idea that it is due to the fact that they desire to acquire payment from the debtor for his unsuccessful fulfillment of his pledge to honor their agreement. The drive for this yearning to impose pain is fundamental to the account of power introduced by Nietzsche. In a concise analysis I would like to recommend a feasible alternative to the argument by Nietzsche that wickedness is employed by the creditor to acquire compensation for the failure of the debtor to repay. This account is that it is not so much that individuals desire to impose pain upon others, but to a certain extent that they desire to prevent having pain imposed upon them. This is linked to the bond between the creditor and debtor, in which the implication for evading loans, that of the imposition of pain, is a restriction to people who take into account the alternative of evading. Thus, because individuals have an innate loathing to suffering pain, they will be likely to prevent acting in a way that will lead to pain being imposed upon them. Thus, they will make possible attempts not to evade loans, and therefore the creditor will not endure the discontentment of having his credits evaded. Thus, the risk of physical pain functions as a motivation for debtors to fulfill their pledge. This account provides an option to the claims of Nietzsche that “to see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more” (May 1999, 21) and hence, he basically argues that reprimand is an ideal defense for making others miserable, which allegedly grants a person the highest pleasures. This conclusion is not though consistent with the mindset of Nietzsche in the development of his explanation of power, and it does not hold on to another of the perspectives of Nietzsche, that of in naturally cruel nature of human behavior as a decisive factor of human relationship (May 1999). This alternate interpretation of the relationship between debtor and creditor is a sensible assumption, and is one that would be thought of by several philosophers whose judgments on humanity are not that severe, cynical and caste in hard rock as Nietzsche’s are. This explanation, that individuals just want to inflict pain upon others, does not deal with the theme of asceticism. Asceticism is fundamentally the putting into practice of implementing upon oneself a strict self-control, whereby the imposition of pain upon the self functions to grant an individual a certain level of pleasure. It fails to do so for the reason that, in the perspective of the creditor-debtor relationship, individuals aim to pay their debts so as to put off the pain of being castigated. Normally speaking, human nature is typified by the prevention of pain and protection of the self, so there are no obvious grounds why a person would then opt to inflict pain upon themselves (Leiter 2002). The enormous majority of all human existence is intended towards the prevention of pain and thus the search for pleasure; such as the career one has preferred, the acquaintances individuals spend time with. There should hence be a key that resolves both these instances, that of wickedness to another as well as asceticism, where the imposition of pain is a human goal. The key will sooner or later rest in the power that an individual senses when s/he is being wicked. III. Conclusions For Nietzsche to resolve the embedded contradictions of the ascetic principle he reviewed the concept in relation to power in contrast to pleasure, which set apart pleasure accounts of stimulus for human behavior. This was attained through recognizing that people make decisions to behave and act in particular manner such that they are enthusiastically pursuing to boost their power as self-sufficient individuals. Hence, the act of imposing pain is the paramount way in attaining this power, even though that pain is imposed upon oneself. Nevertheless, I would recommend the argument that in mistreating yourself you will mislay the senses of power in that you were unable to safeguard yourself from enduring pain. Hence, while power is the main determining forces for our actions and behaviors, the incapability to put off pain, which is an essential component of human behavior, will definitely weaken our senses of power. Thus, asceticism weakens our capability to obtain power, through the misplacement of power we experience when we fall short in shielding ourselves from pain. Hence, the paramount means to attain power through the exercise of violence would be to impose pain upon others in which you prevent inflicting the pain yourself. It is never in being wicked that provides pleasure; it is the power that you feel that provides pleasure. In order to be powerful it is important to assert your independence and to fundamentally perceive yourself as being valuable. It conceives you as having worth as a human being. It is this lust for power that presides over our behavior towards the oppression of others so as to put the accent on our senses of power. References Bataille, Georges. On Nietzsche. New York: Paragon House, 1994. Berkowitz, Peter. Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Leiter, Brian. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on Morality. London: Routledge, 2002. May, Simon. Nietzsches Ethics and His War on Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998. Solomon, Robert C. & Higgins, Kathleen M. Reading Nietzsche. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Read More