Kantian Ethics on Human Rights - Essay Example

Kantian Ethics on Human Rights: An End in Itself Introduction Globalisation has brought cross culture contact into greater focus and has illustrated the necessity of a universal accord that transcends language and places humanity, and the fair distribution of human rights, as the exclusive goal of mankind. Governments, states, international conglomerates, and global organizations all act as moral agents to accomplish their own agenda by utilising their individual sets of principles. It has been argued that the principles are the end and the agenda would therefore become the means. Likewise, the human existence becomes an end in itself and not a tool to be used by others to reach their own personal endpoint. Is there, as Kant argues, a universal set of guiding principles that are applicable in all situations and all cultures? Are human rights and mans existence an end in itself, and not merely a means to reach an end? For the individual, a better sense of responsibility, obligation, and duty have become paramount in a social environment where individuals have the authority to make decisions that have the potential to do great good or intolerable harm. The purpose of this paper is to define and explain the meaning of Kants Categorical Imperative as it applies to individuals and moral agents in todays world of globalisation. The paper will further discuss humanity as an end in itself, rather than simply a means to an end. It will illuminate and demonstrate the paradoxes and challenges that are faced when we attempt to apply Kantian ethics to the modern world of globalisation. Kantian Ethics and the Categorical Imperative As human beings living in a world of interdependence, our actions not only reflect upon our own moral essence, but also impact others. Nobody lives in a vacuum and everything we do involves other people that have an equivalent moral and ethical value. Kant has contended that the treatment that is afforded the other agents in our transactions is not the means that we use to accomplish our goals, but is the goal in and of itself. According to Kant and Paton (1948, p.55), an imperative is categorical if it represents "an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end". The categorical imperative removes any consideration for context and does not mitigate on the basis of time, space, situation, or culture. Kants categorical imperative is a guiding principle that invokes a sense of duty and obligation even when it contradicts the moral agents own feelings and emotions. Kantian ethics additionally contend that there are moral absolutes that must be adhered to without regard for their impact upon the outcome of a decision. In fact, the decision is the outcome. For this reason, moral imperatives, and Kantian ethics, are often closely associated with duty, or deontological, ethics. The nature of Kantian ethics resides in the nature of their structure as commands. Some of the earlier forms of Kantian ethics are the Ten Commandments, where the commandment thou shalt not lie does not condition the action on how the truth may negatively impact the agents involved. It does not offer any choice, variability, or contingency. Kant refers to the categorical moral imperatives as practical laws, while all other acts in which we allow our sense of purpose to be strained by contingencies are known as principles (Saurette 2005, p.40). Principles can be constructed and rendered variable to force a desired outcome, while practical laws are their own concrete subjects; they exist as entities and not merely a means of producing what might be or should be. The difficulty involved with implementing any moral system is gaining the necessary agreement among the moral agents, when some will have the perception of being used or abused. Kants categorical imperative may command that a person tell the truth when asked a practical question in regards to a lady that is sensitive concerning her weight. The remarks may be hurtful and perceived by the lady to be an intentional insult that generates anger, resentment, and embarrassment. According to Kantian ethics the action is not contingent on the context of the situation or the reservations of the speaker, yet the lady will be overwhelmed with feelings. Her response cannot be an imperative, well-reasoned moral reaction, but it will be a composite of tension, mistrust, and shame. Saurette (2005, p.92) contends that "any analysis of feeling as the basis of a supreme principle of morality is therefore doomed by the contingency and variability of its starting point". Kant responds to this dilemma by asserting that humiliation and gratitude are also categorical imperatives that call on a higher sense of imperative duty (Kant & Bernard 1892, p.375). In the above example, the lady would be bound to accept and respond with a practical sense of humiliation. In fact, it is this sense of duty to morality that gives the practical laws their effectiveness. Duty promotes obedience, thus limiting and restraining the inclination to transgress the formalized social norms, or practical laws, of a civil society (Hinman, 1983, p.255). All morality has as its roots, and has its exclusive source, the necessity of duty and the fulfilment of obligation, and "not from love or liking for what the actions are to produce" (Kant1 1996, p.205-06). Thus the fear of humiliation serves to eliminate the inclination to violate the practical law (Kant 1996, p.205-06). Still, there must also be universal agreement to for the action and reaction to remain moral. This is the silent enforcement mechanism that balances the sober morality against the contingency of emotion, while not excluding the agents feelings. Kants Categorical Imperative minimizes and eliminates any regard or implication for the morality from the cause or the outcome of an action. All morality is therefore contained within the motivation of the act, and to be moral it must dictate that we act morally at all times, and in all situations. We cannot judge the value of the outcome or the reason for the cause. We can only demand that the act be humane. Kants Categorical Imperative commands that all action be moral. For example, if one person lies to another, they have acted to deceive. Lying may be effective as a means, but as an end "there is nothing glorious about lying, that it has no intrinsic rightness in it" (Isenberg 1964, p.478). Kants Categorical Imperative reduces all morality to one moral law which states, "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same will that it should become a universal law" (Kant & Paton 1948, p.60) Any other action, if it does not fit the ideals of humane, is immoral. Defining Humanity Kants call for moral behaviour in all situations is further buttressed by the value that he places on the human self. In Kants second formulation of the Categorical Imperative he states, "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means" (Kant & Korsgaard 1998, p.38). In this statement Kant refers to "humanity" and limits it to the human race. He makes a specific reference to person or in the person, and it does not extend to animals, plants, or any other living or inert object, such as the environment. Kants universal law applies only to the treatment of the human race, and the obligation we acquire by being members. Kant further elaborates on the division between man and all other living things and contends, "he must regard himself not only as a person generally but also as a human being, that is, as a person who has duties his own reason lays upon him, his insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon his consciousness of his dignity as a rational human being" (Kant2 1996, p.187). Man is the only living entity that is capable of making a moral judgement, and acting above the framework of necessity. It is of importance that Kant differentiates between the human animal and the rational human being. The rational human being has dignity, while the human animal acts with irrationality and has no expectation of respect or dignity. The rational human, which Kant calls humanity, is characterized by the "power to set an end [...] the capacity and disposition to follow rational principles of prudence and efficiency [... and] humanity is thought to include a kind of freedom which lower animals lack – ability to foresee future consequences, adopt long range goals, resist immediate temptation, and even to commit oneself to ends for which one has no sensuous desire" (Hill 1980, p.86). Kant carefully differentiates what it means to be a rational human from a mere human animal, and indicates that the act of becoming rational and acquiring the characteristics that transcend the human animal is humanity. The act of becoming human is the end that Kant speaks of and is the Categorical Imperative. To become human is the moral imperative that "includes acceptance ("legislating to oneself") of certain unconditional principles of conduct, that is, categorical imperatives, independently of fear of punishment, and promise of reward" (Hill 1980, p.86). The end in itself is the act of practicing humanity and acting humanely without regard for the context or situation. Humanity as an End in Itself Kant further elaborates on the Categorical Imperative when he states, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (Kant & Abbott 1909, p.47). The means that Kant refers to is the use of another person, or the self, as a tool to accomplish some ulterior motive. This eliminates the possibility of using people as a source of manipulation or resource, while neglecting the nature of our actions and their impact on the other person. When we deem the other person, and their humanity, as an end then the action will need to contain all the respect and dignity that is afforded to all men. The action must also be a universal law that is acceptable by both parties without regard to the context of the action or the subjective relativism of the persons values. The humanity, and the law that governs the morality of action, is the end and the only consideration. Therefore, these laws can only be satisfied when "the principles that each would will as universal law are the same principles – that is, only if there is a common set of principles that each would will everyone to act on" (Darwall 1998, p.166). Kant believed that a set of universal laws and principles could be formulated that would apply to all humanity. However, while the differences in culture, education, religion, and experience makes the implementation of the Categorical Imperative problematic, the concept of humanity as an end in itself is a workable concept of morality. Treating humanity as an end in itself merely requires that our actions are humane and moral. Here, there can be some extensive degree of universal agreement. Our actions towards another person need to be honest, transparent, and void of deception and manipulation. Because both parties are equally invested in the exchange, this should be no obstacle. Even if the act is contentious, such as a transgression of a cultural norm, honesty still needs to be a part of the consideration. For example, a person may have a moral objection to paying a bribe to get a building permit from a local government. However, failure to pay the bribe will result in the loss of a project, scores of jobs, and scores of family livelihoods. Whether the bribe is paid or not is not a moral consideration of the exchange. The important aspect is that both parties are open about their activity and state their position and objections. The local government official could have labelled it a licensing fee and in doing so would have misled the other party. This deception could affect the persons decision and manipulated them to act immorally according to their own cultural standards. In this example, there can be respect and dignity afforded another party even when we believe they are acting immorally. When we are given the consideration of our humanity as an end, we are free to act without the constraints of intimidation or manipulation. While it would not be explicitly morally wrong to request a bribe, it would be reprehensible to demand one. In addition, as in the example above, it would be a moral transgression to acquire a bribe through deception or manipulation. The key component of the law is the total honesty that allows both parties to act with their own free will. A second component is to do no harm. While there is always a degree of harm possible in any risk-taking venture, the harm must not be intentional or specific. If the person does not agree to the bribe, then the loss of jobs is a loss due to the inherent risk of doing business. However, the person should also be respected for his decision and not anticipate that he will be punished or intimidated for the decision he makes. There is ample evidence that bribery, kickbacks, and undisclosed gifts are an efficient means of gaining special favours for businesses and corporations from the political machine (Arnold 2003, p.168). However, it is not the action that is at fault; it is the secretive, deceptive, and coercive nature of the act that eliminates the humanity and makes the person a means and not an end. Replacing the secretive aspect with transparency would serve to enhance the morality of the act, treat the person with humanity, and treat the humanity as an end in itself. There is a paradox in the imperative that makes the application problematic. It is intuitive to believe that if an agent acts inhumanely, has not acted to transcend the human animal, and has no self respect for order, law, or conduct, then they do not possess humanity. As such they should not have the expectation of being treated humanely or being afforded the extension of humanity towards them. This reasoning would simplify the implementation of the imperative as the person could then subjectively decide who is worthy of dignity and who is not. While this would simplify our actions, it would serve to discard our own humanity whenever we were confronted by irrationality, as we still have a duty to act morally. While the agent may consider the motive or the outcome, their obligation to their duty must be their sole determination for acting (Herman 1981, p.375). State executions are an example of this reasoning, where the moral worth of the criminal is considered and deemed worthless by the law. Kant maintains that a rational man cannot reject his duty and obligation to act morally no matter what situation they are presented with. Kant argues that a man retains his right to human dignity "and so must be respected, even though he defiles, abases, violates, dishonors, or rejects it" (Hill 1980, p.86). Kant further maintains that the spark of humanity remains in all men, and is impossible to eliminate even in the most depraved, foolish, and mentally ill people (Hill 1980, p.86-87). The duty to act humanely remains as the end, and not simply a means to accomplish our own personal goals. As a human being, man has an obligation and a duty to act in such a way as to elevate themselves from the level of the human animal to the enlightened state of the rational human being. We are not left with a decision on how to act or when, it is placed upon man as an unmalleable duty. According to Gewirth (1991, p.74), "moral principles are involved in fundamental conflicts about how persons ought to act, especially toward one another". However, we cannot consider that the execution of a murderer has given the victims family some temporary relief, that it saves taxpayer dollars, or that it may prevent future crimes. Kant insists that the context is irrelevant. According to Gaus (2001, p.31), "Insofar as these duties are absolute, then it is wrong to violate them, no matter what the costs to what is good". The imperative must be followed at all times, as it is a duty, and end, and therefore offers no alternatives. This adds further complexity to the application of the Categorical Imperative in a diverse world where acceptances of deviation and compromising positions have become the norm. Problems in the Global Context The reasoning of Kant implies that there is a universal, and cosmopolitan, set of principles and values that can be adhered to and applied to all situations and all cultural contexts. There can be no regard for the degree of lawlessness or incivility that the actors may present to the situation. The profound effects of religion will be mediated and be less of an excuse or justification for the split that cultures often experience over the treatment of women or the punishment that is incurred from Gods law. We may have the principle that killing is wrong, but almost all cultures allow killing when it is placed in certain contexts. The allowable context will differ from culture to culture, and gaining an agreement or consensus will be highly unlikely. If we each live by our own moral imperatives, it will mean the allowance of oppression and suffering when it falls outside our own societys borders. The issue of intellectual property rights, and their protection through copyright law, has been a global concern since the Berne Convention in 1883. Its history should be seen as a sign of the difficulty facing globalized morality. Though there was general agreement among the signatory states as to the core of the law, "International copyright lawmaking tended to be slow and unwieldy because it operated by way of consensus among... countries with a diverse range of social and economic perspectives" (Berman 2002, p.394). If the individual states cannot agree upon property law, then how can they be expected to agree on more substantive issues? Issues that have their foundation in the culturally interpreted meaning of religion will be rendered even more unwieldy. In attempting to apply Kants Categorical Imperative to globalisation, the most that can be expected is an agreement on reciprocal common sense. In response to the growing international use of the Internet, in 1992 The Hague Convention attempted to gain a global consensus on where the jurisdiction lies in regards to electronic communications and transactions. At that time, "the United States approached the other countries that belong to the Hague Conference on Private International Law and suggested that the conference attempt to harmonize international rules for enforcement of judgments across borders" (Berman 2002, p.395). This attempt has ended in futility and failure. According to Berman (2002, p.395-396), "these treaties will demand prior consensus among many countries with different social policies and economic interests" and "will tend merely to codify painstakingly developed conventional wisdom about recognized problems". This reliance on conventional wisdom or common sense will inevitably result in a morality that contends that, "sound moral judgements [sic] is to draw upon the moral judgements [sic] and values affirmed by members of their community" (Caney 2000, p.529). Rather than promoting a cosmopolitan point of view of a universal morality, any attempt at consensus merely cedes to the occasional commonality, but more often highlights the regional differences and isolates moral judgments to the local society and culture. To apply Kans principle to the world of globalisation, they must first be shown to function in a useful manner on a national scale. According to Snauwaert (1995, p.135) "every individual has a prime facie right to engage in the deliberation concerning the regulation of the public, for only on the basis of such a right can the integrity of the democratic system and in turn the public be maintained". The liberal democracy is continually asked to undertake the delicate task of balancing the individuals rights against the greater social good. Liberal democracies risk placing too much importance on the value of the individuals rights "in our haste to avoid communal authority" (Saurette 2003, p.14). Communal authority erodes individual liberty and diminishes the freedom of choice necessary to defend private concerns and private property. Hayek, in referring to Kants imperative states that ""liberalism is therefore inseparable from the institution of private property which is the name usually given to the material part of this protected individual domain" (cited in Gill 2002, p.53). Private property in this discourse means "life, liberty, and the possessions of man" (Gill, 2002, p.53-54). Life and liberty are private property and cannot be denied under a liberal democracy. "This illustrates how liberal ethics assert the priority of rights, and how liberals seek principles of justice which do not assume any specific conception of good" (Gill 2002, p.54). Rawls contends that justice is the first virtue of social institutions and "laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (cited in Kraut 2007. p.232). Yet, in the interest of liberty and freedom, liberal democracies are too prone to leave the distribution of health care, wealth, justice, and the basics of life to competition and the ability of the fittest, rather than distributed by a rational morality. The problems incurred by the liberal democracy in regards to the application of Kans Categorical Imperative are magnified, though contrary, in a collectivist society. Serving the public good will often be at the expense of the individuals liberty, privacy, freedom, and well being. Garnett (1964, p.299) contends that Kants moral rules "condemns all choices of a lesser good for self over a greater good for others". The implementation of Kants Categorical Imperative becomes not only problematic, but is an impossibility in the collectivist society. There simply is no means to accommodate the greater good and Kants concern for humanity. A collectivist society implies an emphasis on public rather than private property, and affords no protection for the justice of the individual that is nurtured by a democracy. While democracies fail to distribute justice in the form of the basics of life such as health care and wealth, the collectivist societies fail to honour private property and the rights of the individual to attain and maintain it. Rebuttal Advocates of Kants moral laws and the Categorical Imperative will insist that there is an inherent sense of goodness in man and that there are shared concepts of right and good. They infer that there is a universal law and a universal set of human rights. Yet, as has been shown, these can only be instituted by a democracy, and even that will be a tedious balancing act. Advocates of Kant have persisted in the "position which holds that civil freedoms, human rights and the constitutional state should be guaranteed and implemented on a worldwide basis (the notion of universal civil rights)" (Gorg & Hirsch 1998, p.598). How do we implement a worldwide democracy and inject it into cultures against their will or sovereign rights? How do we enter a foreign country in the hopes of alleviating suffering if we must also make a decision on what sacrifices will be made, and by who, to advance our own ideal of liberty, freedom, and private property? I suggest that Kants Categorical Imperative is too limiting and restrictive to be of use in a globalized world of diverse cultures. While it provides a moral guideline, it is an ideal and not a workable philosophy. Can the world evolve to accept the responsibility that the imperative places on the individual, state, or nation? Possibly, but the world is not likely to soon eradicate the greed, mental illness, and jealousy that continues to perpetuate the oppression of people and the misuse of authority. Kung (1997) makes the observation that ideological secularism has led to a society where "anything that is transcendent, trans-empirical, authoritative and indeed normative, seems to have been banished from life. Each person is his or her own standard" (p.25). Clearly, instead of moving towards a realistic implementation of Kant in the modern world of globalisation, we are moving steadily and surely in the opposite direction. Justice, a necessary component of morality becomes the subject of personal definition and "all the “cultural relativist” argument shows is that if relativism is correct one cannot claim that everyone is bound by cosmopolitan principles of justice" (Caney 2000, p.533). As the social group moves from family to community, and from state and to global, Kants demands become too great and the complexity of implementation become too problematic. Conclusion In conclusion, promoting the sense of the moral imperative in a global network where cultures, ideologies, genders, and traditions clash will be problematic. In privacy, or a semi-public context, there is a risk of damaging a friendship or permanently losing a relationship. However, in the context of globalisation and nations, the stakes become significantly higher. In the world of globalisation, there are several paradoxes that make Kants Categorical Imperative unworkable. There is a paradox that implies that the moral agent runs a significant, if not certain, chance of insulting and frightening their closest allies if they act in a manner that lives up to the highest standards of moral behaviour. There is the paradox that Kant demands equal treatment of all humans, even those that fail to honour their own human rationality. As the world becomes more aware of its own diversity, and the worldviews impacted by tradition and religion, cultural relativism brings a new understanding to the world stage. As such, Kants demand of humanity as an end in itself becomes lost. In fact, humanity merely becomes a means to the end of becoming more cosmopolitan. We accept that which may appear to be immoral based on context, the greater good, and the ulterior motive. In the eyes of globalisation, that which was immoral has become moral, or in the worst case neutral. At the end of the day, Kantian ethics simply do not hold up to the challenges faced in a modern world of globalisation. References Arnold, DG 2003, Libertarian theories of the corporation and global capitalism, Journal of business ethics, vol. 48, no. 2, pp.155-173. 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