The Doctrine of Collective Responsibility - Essay Example

A Parliament with a strong party system, such as that of the UK, is inherently flawed as a means of holding government accountable.’ Introduction In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Parliament is the supreme legislative body. Headed by the Sovereign, Queen Elizabeth II, the British Parliament alone has parliamentary sovereignty, and as such wields ultimate power over all other political bodies in the UK and its territories. Parliamentary sovereignty bestows upon Parliament not only the power to enact laws, but also the power of scrutiny over the Executive to ensure the legal mandate is carried out. This accountability function of Parliament makes it the duty of this august body to ensure transparency in government, and to hold it to account for its official acts. Thus in theory, a strong Parliament keeps the government in check. Whether this is true or not, however, has been the subject of lively, sometimes contentious, debate for more than a century. The Doctrine of Collective Responsibility Marshall (1989 pp. 2-4) was of the opinion that the phrase “Collective responsibility” invokes in the first place that the Crown is advised by a collectivity. Collective responsibility is generally represented as one of the major conventions of the constitution. It involves three sets of practices. The first is the Confidence principle, which requires governments to resign or advise dissolution in case of defeats in the House of Commons (understandably, only defeats on specific motions of no confidence are now thought to compel this consequence). The second, the Unanimity principle, states that all members of the administration speak and vote together and as one in the House of Commons; and the third is the Confidentiality principle, which asserts that members of the administration are entitled to the ministerial prerogative to resist disclosure of information. This last principle has consistently been pleaded as the ground for restricting information that can be given by civil servants to Parliamentary Select Committees, the press, and the public in general. According to Morley (1889, Marshall e. pp. 17-19), the doctrine of collective responsibility is the most important of four principal features of the British system of Cabinet government. The second principal feature is that the Cabinet is held answerable immediately to the majority of the House of Commons, and through them to the electorate. Thirdly, the Cabinet is selected exclusively from one party, which is the general rule, and which identifies the British Parliament as a ‘strong party’ system. Occasionally this rule is breached, but only on the occasion of some ‘uncommon, peculiar, and transitory circumstances’ (Morley 1889). And finally, the Prime Minister is the keystone of the Cabinet arch. While all the members of the Cabinet are theoretically equals, and when voting on critical issues the ‘one voice-one vote’ rule applies, still the Prime Minister, as head of the Cabinet, is primus inter pares, and occupies a position which Morley describes as ‘of exceptional and peculiar authority’. Within the framework of a Parliamentary government, Norton (1991 pp. 298-299) observes that Ministers and civil servants mostly pursue administrative and policy programs for which legislative authority has either already been given or is not necessary (for the most part, policies pursued under prerogative powers). Nonetheless, Parliamentary sovereignty makes it both the duty and privilege of the House of Commons to subject such executive actions to scrutiny and debate. Outside of the debate floor, the most important device employed for the scrutiny of the executive is that of select committees. These committees are charged with maintaining scrutiny of particular departments or sectors of government responsibility. Until the early 1970s, however, these select committees did not operate on a consistent and comprehensive basis, and have had little influence on administration (Norton 1991 p. 302-304). With the foregoing state of affairs, it is easy to see that many have doubted the effectiveness of Parliament as a watchdog of the Government. Many political theorists have written commentaries to the effect that Parliament is little but ‘window-dressing’ on Government’s showcase, in order to lend it a semblance of validation. Arguments for Ineffective Accountability The issue surrounding the effectiveness (or lack of it) of Parliament’s exercise of its oversight functions is probably best summed up by the Economist; it described the most important defect of the British system as “the over-mightiness of the executive and weakness of the legislature.” (Staddon 2007 p.1). The same sentiment was echoed almost a decade earlier by Low when he observed that the House of Commons no longer controls the Executive, but that the Executive controls the House of Commons. “In our modern practice the Cabinet is scarcely ever turned out of office by Parliament. It is very difficult to bring a government to account for anything done in its ministerial work.” (Low 1904 p. 20) As this and many other writers noted, were the Members of Parliament independently minded as to vote according to their convictions, then “…We should find members…occasionally voting with the Opposition, but that scarcely ever happens. Even when a party is broken by internal dissension, members are very reluctant to vote against the official leaders, though they will sometimes abstain from voting with them…” The failure of MPs to assert their individual minds is seen as a result of the workings of the Unanimity principle, where party members vote as one – resulting in the necessary consequence that Parliament validates the Cabinet which is comprised, after all, by their very party mates. “The custom of voting with the party has solidified into a rule, and that rule established, the control of Parliament tends to become sensibly attenuated, till for long periods of time it is almost non-existent for practical purposes.” (Low 1904 p. 21) Peele likewise calls into question the Parliament’s ability to enforce accountability and control of the government, attributing this also to the Unanimity of the party. “The vagueness of the convention of ministerial responsibility makes it highly uncertain when a minister will resign over policy errors.…[A] minister who has the support of his colleagues, especially of the prime minister, is likely to be able to withstand calls for resignation.” Peele’s reasoning is that it is but logical that Parliament could not act as a major counterbalance to the wide discretionary power of the executive, since the dominance of party interests and that likewise moves the executive, renders this incomprehensible. In addition to the innate weakness of Parliament to act according to a mind independent of the party that likewise pervades the executive, other changes have taken place in the wider structure of decision making within the state, changes that have further reduced Parliaments capacity to exert control over the decisions affecting citizens. The scope of the governments own decision-making powers has been curtailed when a certain degree of decision-making power had been transferred to supranational bodies such as the European Union, or to devolved bodies such as the Scottish Parliament. As a result, many policy areas such as the environment are now largely outside not just Parliaments control, but the control of the nation state as a whole. That which Peele calls “the fragmentation of executive structures within the UK” does not in itself weaken accountability. What it means is that responsibility for decision-making has become diffused, and it has become more difficult to follow the trail of a policy or administrative action. The attribution of blame (or credit) becomes more confused, particularly since errors are likely to be discovered the further a decision is taken away from its source. Other changes over recent years, for example contracting out and privatization, have likewise obscured accountability. (Peele 2004 Page 460-462). Another point to consider is whether this weakness in the Parliament’s exercise of its functions is innate in any strong-party-system Parliament, British or otherwise. In a study conducted under the auspices of the Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies by Suranjit Sengupta, MP of the Bangladeshi Parliament, he stated: “In recent years voters all over the world have indicated their concerns over the exercise of more powers by the executive and the continuously declining role of the legislatures over the government, …monitoring and overall reviews. The situation has assumed such proportions that scholars have started calling the Parliamentary System as ‘Prime Ministerial Dictatorship.’” (Sengupta, 2003) The foregoing lends one to believe that similarly, Parliamentary systems patterned after the British model have a tendency towards weak legislatures and strong governments. It is thus possible that the same Parliamentary structure and conventions would likely encourage the ascendancy of the executive over the scrutiny powers of the legislature. The question remaining is whether this tendency may not be addressed by appropriate measures. Arguments for Effective Accountability While there are detractors who belie the effective exercise of oversight by Parliament over government, there are others who assert the opposite. These writers, while not denying that Unanimity once rendered Parliament powerless as the counterbalance agent, insist, however, that this deficiency is not necessarily innate in the strong party system, nor is it without remedy. Norton outlines that developments, particularly after the decade of the seventies, indicate Parliament’s increasing empowerment as government’s watchdog. He categorizes these changes into (1) behavioural, (2) structural, and (3) representational. Behavioural changes. Norton observed that before 1970 the voting cohesion of MPs was so close to 100% that Samuel Beer suggested that there was no longer any point in measuring it. MPs voted loyally with their party: no post-war government ever lost a vote as a result of its own supporters voting with the Opposition. After 1970, however, MPs displayed greater voting independence, with government losing the vote an initial six times in the 1970-1974 Parliament; and again, 42 times in 1974-1979, 23 of which resulted from Labour MPs voting in sizable numbers with the Conservatives, which was unthinkable before the seventies. In April 1972 to April 1979, the Government suffered defeats in the House of Commons. The defeats were important not only because of the issues involved, but because they, like a chain, induced and were induce by a change of attitude on the part of many MPs. Their previous deferential attitude was replaced by a participant attitude towards government, with a greater desire to be involved in scrutinizing government and to flex their political muscle. Structural changes. As a result of the behavioural change, more concrete signs of Parliament’s emerging independence were evidenced by the following structural changes (Norton, 1991): 1. Departmental select committees were created which, unlike earlier committees that were established through the initiative of government, were the creation of the House itself. Members of the Cabinet were hostile or agnostic toward their creation but were not prepared to go against the wishes of an assertive House. 2. In 1983, the House passed the National Audit bill, which established the National Audit Office, responsible for efficiency audits of government departments. 3. In 1988, the House approved, against the wishes of the Prime Minister, the televising of the House on an experimental basis, following the lead of the House of Lords which has been televised since 1985. Thus reports from the House received greater prominence, particularly the live broadcasts of prime minister’s Question Time. 4. The creation of special standing committees with the power to examine witnesses. In 1979, a new system of 12 committees was created on a systematic and continuing basis to conduct more effective scrutiny over the executive. The new committees engendered greater enthusiasm and participation from the MPs. Representational. Norton pointed out further that there was what he referred to as a “representational change”. This describes the greater degree of constituency activity, from the 1980s. It is the “empowerment” of the electorate in venues other than in an election. An MP is now estimated to spend on average about 2 or 3 hours a day on constituency work, primarily correspondence, and to spend most weekends in the constituency, whereas they only use to make annual visits to their constituencies in the 1960s. Most now hold constituency ‘surgeries’, meetings at which citizens can come to discuss problems privately with the member. As a consequence, correspondence from MPs to ministers increased in frequency and regularity, generally yielding concrete results. In the event of an inadequate response, members can table parliamentary questions, seek a meeting with the minister, and put in for a half-hour adjournment debate. (Norton 1991 pp. 307-308) Additionally, there were cases where Ministers have left office because they were not willing to accept collective responsibility for some part of Government policy and some cases where the individual actions of Ministers have been thought impolitic or unworthy. A list of ministerial resignations is shown in Appendix A. (The list does not include resignations made necessary because of private scandals, nor even the most publicized ‘refusals to serve’.) These resignations indicate that Parliament does have the power and capability to hold ministers accountable and to compel their resignation when necessary. (Butler, D.E. and G. 1987 pp. 102-104) Staddon (2007 p. 1) also cites other instances of Parliamentary independence. For example, in November 2005, the UK government was defeated in its attempt to increase from 14 to 90 days the period for which suspected terrorists may be detained for questioning before being charged with an offence. While the government’s proposal was supported by the police and most of the press, as well as enjoying widespread popular support, Parliament was profoundly ill at ease about the impact on civil liberties and, “despite the best efforts of the government’s whips, the Labour government’s comfortable Commons majority of 66 became a large defeat of 31. Forty-nine Labour MPs voted against the measure causing Tony Blair’s first defeat on a whipped vote since becoming Prime Minister in 1997.” (Staddon, 2007) As a compromise, Parliament voted to extend the time limit for detaining suspected terrorists for questioning to just 28 days. In a separate event three years earlier, the Prime Minister broke long-standing precedent and appeared before the Liaison Committee, an important scrutiny committee of the House of Commons comprising all chairs of select committees. On 18 March 2003, the Commons debated the government’s approach to the situation in the Middle East and decided to employ “all necessary means” to disarm Iraq. This decision had obvious national and global implications, but it was also historic in that it was the first time that the House had been asked to vote on a substantive motion for British forces going to war. (Staddon 2007) Conclusion "Legislative strengthening is an important element in ensuring accountability and transparency in government,” and a balanced alignment between the executive and the legislature is crucial for good governance and holding government to account (Staddon 2007 p.2). Lacking a strong legislature, the government is free to use and abuse its powers unbridled, to the possible detriment of the people that empowered it and to whom it must, ultimately, be held accountable to. The mass populace must necessarily turn to its representatives to advance and safeguard its interests. From recent developments, it appears that the modern Parliament has taken this charge to heart, and instituted changes that reversed the negative tendencies of a strong-party system. Its efforts will not go unrewarded. Wordcount: (from Introduction) 2,491 References Butler, D.E. and G. (1987) “Ministerial Resignations”, Ministerial Responsibility, edited by Marshall G., Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 102-104 “Different Systems of Democracy”, as seen at http://www.democracy-building.info/systems-democracy.html. Retrieved on January 17, 2009. Ingle, S. (2000), British Party System, Third Edition. Wellington House, London. Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, London. Lord Morley (1889) “The Principles of Cabinet Government”, Ministerial Responsibility, edited by Marshall G., Oxfor University Press, Oxford. Low, S. (1904), “The House of Commons and the Executive”, Ministerial Responsibility, edited by Marshall G., Oxfor University Press, Oxford. pp. 20-21 Marshall, G., ed. (1989), Ministerial Responsibility, Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Norton, P. (1991), The British Polity, Second Edition, Longman Publishing, New York. “Parliament of the United Kingdom”, Wikipedia Peele, G. (2004), Governing the UK: British Politics in the 21st Century, Blackwell Publishing. Sengupta, S. (2003) “Committee Systems in Asia”, Report of the Conference on Committee Systems, Bangladesh Institute of Parliamentary Studies, as seen in http://www.parliamentofbangladesh.org/IPS_Committee_Conference/ips-27_panel5sengupta.htm. Retrieved January 17, 2009. Staddon, A. (2007) Holding the Executive to Account? The Accountability Function of the UK Parliament. Retrieved January 17, 2009 “The British Government: The Political Party System”, Government in Britain (Information courtesy of The British Information Services), as seen in http://www.britannia.com/gov/gov9.html. Retrieved on January 17, 2009. Weir, S. and Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain: The Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom, Routledge. APPENDIX “A” – LIST OF MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS Read More