To What Extent should our Actions be Guided by Our Theories in Ethics and Elsewhere - Essay Example

Philosophers have long recognised the necessary connection which must exist between the areas of moral philosophy and epistemology. The status of “moral knowledge”, consequently, has been the subject of rigorous debate for hundreds of years, between philosophers trying to isolate the exact nature of such knowledge. In a quote by contemporary philosopher Emrys Westacott, who says that “moral wisdom seems to be little connected to ethical theory as playing tennis is to knowledge of physics”, we witness a great insight into the field of moral philosophy. Such an insight lends support to a recent phenomenon in academic philosophy: a small paradigm shift back to a millennia-old ethical tradition called virtue ethics. In his quote, one possible interpretation has it that “moral wisdom” is not a matter of contemplative, propositional knowledge, but is a fact of immediate perception and action in accordance with human virtue. Thus, he draws a distinction between acting and thinking, and consequently suggests that moral wisdom is not a matter of knowing-that, but of knowing-how. This view of moral philosophy removes the ethical component from moral knowledge, and shifts the paradigm back to simply action. In what follows, the distinction between two categories of knowledge, first coined by Gilbert Ryle, will be introduced. Then this distinction will be applied to Westacott’s statement insofar as it is a claim about moral knowledge. From there, it shall be revealed that there is an analogy to be isolated and evaluated critically. The analogy points at the commensurability of “moral” and “ethical” with “procedural” and “propositional” knowledge, and implies, in the end, that moral philosophy should seek once again to reunite “moral” with “ethical”, if possible. First, however, it may be instructive to investigate just what “wisdom” is. Obviously, Westacott did not utilize the word “knowledge”; his purpose for doing so remains unclear unless we actually question how the two concepts differ. There are indeed many definitions one could offer for the concept of “wisdom”. One might say that the concept denotes epistemic humility, or epistemic accuracy, or one could treat both knowledge and wisdom as equivalent, or one might necessitate the additional condition of action, thereby making “wisdom” equal to knowledge plus action (Ryan). According to the first view, Socrates’ view, wisdom is epistemic humility, insofar as the wise agent is wise iff he believes that he is not wise. Nevertheless, the belief that one is not wise is not a sufficient condition for wisdom, and makes this definition inadequate. Likewise, the view that wisdom is epistemic accuracy fails according to the formulation S is wise iff for all p, (S believes S knows p iff Ss belief in p is highly justified) because one could be justified in believing a proposition, but not realize that he is justified, and hence undermine this conception of wisdom (Ryan). Otherwise, we may treat wisdom as a characteristic which is equivalent to knowledge. Aristotle treated the most wise men as individuals with the most copious amounts of factual knowledge about science, history, philosophy, and so on. However, it is clear that the most knowledgeable men are not wise, for even the most brilliant scientists sometimes cannot handle the day-to-day requirements of real life. However, Aristotle qualifies his conception of wisdom by playing on a distinction between “speculative” and “practical” knowledge—a distinction which will be utilized throughout this discussion. Thus, not only is the wise man knowledgeable insofar as he has “extensive factual knowledge”, but he also conceives of wisdom as “knowing how to live well” (Ryan). Robert Nozick has said that “Wisdom is not just one type of knowledge, but diverse” (Nozick 268). Thus, wisdom is committed neither to the “speculative” nor the “practical”, but is both. However, the question becomes what is moral wisdom? That is, when we qualify wisdom with moral, how do these categorizations change? It is this question that we must now focus on answering. As described previously, there is a distinct difference between “moral” and “ethical”. It is also apparent that this difference in moral philosophy is equivalent to a well-known dichotomy between different categories of knowledge in epistemology. Gilbert Ryle, in his book The Concept of Mind, makes the distinction between so-called procedural and propositional forms of knowledge: in what are essentially knowing-how and knowing-that respectively. For procedural knowledge, knowledge of how to ride a bicycle constitutes knowledge of how to perform a certain action to achieve a certain end. Defined formally, procedural knowledge might be said to be the knowledge applied in exercising some specific task. What is distinct and unique to procedural knowledge is its task-dependency; that is, the existence of such knowledge necessitates ontological priority of some object. For example, the knowledge of how to ride a bicycle requires ontological priority of a bicycle which conforms to the specifications of that procedural knowledge (that is, the bicycle cannot be, say, two hundred feet long) (Ryle). Propositional knowledge, on the other hand, is a category of knowing which is, by nature, expressible only by propositions or, otherwise, declarative sentences. It is with respect to propositional knowledge that most work in epistemology commences: namely, in how one defines knowledge properly and whether knowledge consists of justified true belief (Ryle). Propositional knowledge depends on certain situations and contexts, and is substantiated as a part of a certain contextual framework. When one speaks of moral knowledge which is propositional in nature, he is evaluating normatively some specific circumstance or action which can be judged in accordance with some standard. It is propositional knowledge that some action as “immoral” or “unethical”: knowledge which must be justified in order to be classified as such. Hence, if wisdom is knowledge (categories, “speculative” and “practical”, in Aristotle’s words), then what is the nature of moral wisdom (or knowledge)? Is it procedural or propositional? Returning to Westacott’s observation, we may apply the previously made distinction to the two categories of action which he is speaking of. In his analogy, he compares “playing good tennis” to “knowledge of physics”. First of all, it should be noted that “playing good tennis” requires procedural knowledge in that “good” tennis requires experience and skills in playing the game. Thus, it is not simply a matter of the former not requiring knowledge whereas the latter does. In his analogy, we can appropriately label “playing good tennis” as a matter of procedural knowledge, and “knowledge of physics” as propositional. “Knowledge of physics” should not be interpreted as meaning one is knowledgeable about how to do physics problems or how to think of phenomenon from a physicist’s point of view. Rather, knowledge of physics denotes knowing of the various propositions which are presented by that science. After all, scientific knowledge is essentially knowledge of a set of propositions: it is not knowledge of how to do science. So, in terms of moral wisdom, which epistemic category has primacy? One could make the case for either propositional or procedural knowledge in this case. The argument for propositional knowledge’s primacy could be supported by the fact that this type of knowledge has the power of detailed normative evaluation, as mentioned before. One can believe, justify and consequently know that certain actions are ethical or unethical by forming a set of propositions. This constitutes an ability to theorize what makes an ethical action. However, the problem with giving propositional knowledge primacy is that although it may be an effective tool in evaluating and speculating, it is perfect for someone who is exempt from moral action in reality: it provides no groundwork for real action. Ethics, then, is a matter of a philosopher sitting in an ivory tower, conducting his work with pure reason. This denotes a rejection of the actual circumstances which face moral agents in reality. One might accuse deontology and utilitarianism as being good on paper, but utterly inoperative to the moral agent (Anscombe). But what is the case for the primacy of procedural knowledge when it comes to moral wisdom? The case consists mainly of the dire failures of its counterpart in that procedural knowledge is inherently focused on action and practicality. Procedural knowledge of what is ethical or what is moral in terms of action consists of the ability to do right actions, or knowing how to do right actions. The advocate of propositional knowledge’s primacy, however, would object that his view’s strengths are the opposite view’s faults: namely, procedural knowledge offers no explanatory or evaluative normative framework within which we can either evaluate certain actions for moral content or theorize on the nature of right actions. Nevertheless, this objection fails on the grounds that moral wisdom does not require evaluation: it requires only virtue concepts, which will be discussed shortly. The analogy between “ethical” and “moral” as that of “propositional” and “procedural” illustrates a central point: that these sets of categories are merely two aspects of two separate discussions. Procedural and propositional forms of knowing are simply categories of knowledge, whereas “moral” and “ethical” are simply categories in the realm of right action. Like with the epistemic categories, the moral/ethical categories represent the same dichotomy between theory and practice. Since we have given procedural knowledge primacy over propositional knowledge in the realm of morality, and thereby relegated ethics to a matter of un-practised theory, we must now only see right action as knowing how to act morally or ethically. But the objection posed by the opposition still remains: namely, how to we know what actions are right if propositional knowledge is not allowed? To answer, it cannot merely be that propositional knowledge informs our procedural knowledge, for many non-philosophers have not experience of moral theory, and yet they can still act morally. So, if such moral action is not coincidence, then what is it? I propose that it is virtuous action. The virtues require no evaluation and no propositions insofar as they are agent-oriented. We neither need to evaluate, with propositions, the moral worth of an action nor the moral worth of the agent because virtuous activity is uncodifiable. Philosopher John McDowell defines “uncodifiability” in ethics as an inability to give a comprehensive, strict set of propositions which reflect either act- or agent-oriented right action (McDowell). Thus, without propositions, how is one to know what actions are right and which ones are wrong? The simplest answer is that there is no way to know for sure which actions are ethical, but the best course is to possess a virtuous character. By having a virtuous character, one has procedural knowledge—knowledge without contemplation—of how to act under certain circumstances morally. One has moral wisdom inasmuch as he has an inclination for acting virtuously—where “virtuously” signifies that he can act consistently without evaluating his actions propositionally. Although counterintuitive, it becomes the case that only when the agent has an ability to act without thinking does he possess true moral wisdom, because the knowledge involved in such wisdom is simply procedural, and does not need contemplation. Westacott’s observation about the dichotomy between moral and ethical parallels the corollary epistemic dichotomy between knowing-that and knowing-how. Although acting morally is a matter of knowing-how, knowing-that is a matter of knowing what is right, independent of acting upon that knowledge. Moral wisdom, consequently, is primarily procedural knowledge. When we remove moral action from its theoretical context, and ascribe it simply to action, it must be grounded in a notion of virtue ethics in which contemplative normative evaluation is impossible. Thus, we escape the potentially destructive objection made by those who advocate the explanatory primacy of propositional knowledge in the realm of moral philosophy. Works Cited Anscombe, G.E.M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (1958): 1-19. McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." The Monist, No. 62 (1979): 331-350. Nozick, Robert. "What is Wisdom and Why Do Philosophers Love it So?" Nozick, Robert. The Examined Life. New York: Touchstone Press, 1989. 267-278. Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom. 8 January 2007. 10 November 2008 . Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. 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