Marbury v. Madison: Establishing the Principle of Judicial Review under the US Constitution - Case Study Example

Marbury v. Madison: establishing the principle of judicial review under the United Sates Constitution INTRODUCTION John Marshall (1755-1835) was appointed chief justice of the United States in 1801. He served in that capacity until his death 34 years later. A veteran of the Revolutionary War, he practiced law in his native Virginia in the years just before the 19th century began. Marshall was active in state politics and became the leader of the Federalist Party, a position putting him at considerable odds with the most prominent Virginians, notably Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson. When Federalist John Adams failed of reelection in 1800, he made Marshall a ‘lame duck’ appointee as Chief Justice of the United States. This and other court appointments by the outgoing administration caused considerable consternation among the victorious Democratic-Republicans. During his long tenure, the decisions of the Marshall Court laid down the groundwork for an independent judiciary, the Court’s role as final arbiter of the Constitution, and practical guidelines for the functioning of a nation with distributed domestic sovereignty. THE COURT AS ARBITER OF THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL REVIEW Marshall’s greatest contribution to American constitutional practice was the establishment of the concept of judicial review: the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter in determining whether Acts of Congress and actions of the Executive (i.e., the President) are consonant with the language of the Constitution. This was accomplished through the resolution of an otherwise obscure suit at law brought by a Maryland businessman, William Marbury, requesting the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison, requiring the latter to deliver to Marbury an already signed and sealed appointment as Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. Marbury was one of a group of 42 men appointed justices of the peace by the lame duck Adams Administration. In the ensuing months, 25 had their appointments confirmed by the new administration. Marbury belonged to the denied group. Marbury v. Madison, unlike virtually all other cases before the Supreme Court, was one in which the judges sat as a trial court of original instance. Marbury’s request for a writ of mandamus was brought under the terms of article 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Marbury and the host of other ‘midnight’ appointments were a partisan political issue and Marshall was desperate to keep the court from become politicized, realizing that under such conditions, an independent judiciary could not prevail. Marbury had failed in his attempt to secure documentation from the Senate (i.e., from that body’s executive journal) demonstrating that he had actually been nominated and approved as a JP. The Senate, in a partisan vote, refused to divulge its journal contents. Marbury’s attorney then attempted to build his case on the testimony of two State department officers. They, however, were reluctant to respond, claiming executive privilege. For Marshall, as judge, the case was particularly difficult. Marshall had served briefly as secretary of state before his appointment to the court. It was during his own tenure that he signed and sealed the 42 JP appointments. (Historians believe he was remiss in failing the send them out.) Marshall had no desire to be called as a witness in a case in which he was serving as a judge, knowing this would further inflame an already overblown issue. In coming to a decision, Marshall had to address the issues of Marbury’s right to his commission as a JP; Marbury’s right to seek redress through the courts in the event that he had a the right to the said appointment; the right of the President to place limits on his agents (executive privilege); and, the crucial point, the constitutional authority of the Court to issue a writ of mandamus. Of Marbury’s petition, Marshall ruled that it was not an intrusion on the secrets of the cabinet but merely involved obtaining a copy of a piece of paper to which “the law gives a right upon the payment of ten cents [5 U.S. 137, at 170].” Of executive privilege, in the person of the secretary of state, Marshall determined that “he is the mere organ by whom [the president’s] will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts [5 U.S. 137, at 170].” But it was the determination of the legitimacy of the writ of mandamus that was to set the course of the Supreme Court for the next two centuries. Marshall ruled that the administration’s withholding of Marbury’s commission was “an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right [5 U.S. 137, at 172].” What remained to be answered was the authority of the court to issue the writ in question. The statutory language was clear. At issue was its constitutionality. While the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was determined by congress, the language of the constitution expressly limits its original jurisdiction. “In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make [5 U.S. 137, at 174].” Given the express language of the Constitution, the Court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus in a case of original jurisdiction (as was Marbury). Marshall continued, “It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it [5 U.S. 137, at 177.” CONCLUDING THOUGHT Marshall’s decision solved two problems—one, immediate; and the other, long term. He finessed a situation in which the Court appeared set to become a partisan player in political dispute. The Court found for Marbury, in the sense that it determined him to be rightfully a JP. It likewise ruled that the separation of powers and the language of the Constitution were such that the Supreme Court was not the appropriate venue for a solution to the problem. But it was for the long term that the Marbury v. Madison decision was so important. Marshall established not only the supremacy of the Constitution but also defined a judicial perimeter within which the Court would be supreme. Works consulted in the preparation of this report Smith, J. E. (September 1997), Definer of a nation [chapter 13: Marbury v. Madison], Brief, DuPage County Bar Association Urofsky, M. I. (no date), Marbury v. Madison: background and explanation U.S., Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1803 Read More