Approaches to Equity in Delimitation Jurisprudence - Essay Example

1 Introduction The threat of pollution, over-fishing and s’ security concerns led to a radical review of international maritime law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (1982 LoS)a came into force in 1994. Signatories undertake not to do anything which undermines its principles. States have a 12 mile limit in which they are - in principle- free to enforce any law or exploit any resource they see fit. Further, within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 miles from its shore, a state has the same jurisdiction. Of particular concern is the continental shelf, since Naturally land-locked states also wanted access to such a potentially wealthy resource Disputes are provided for through a separate optional protocol, parties to the Convention are obliged to exhaust the settlement procedure, preferably through direct talks between the parties. If direct negotiation fails, then the parties can submit the dispute to either the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, binding international arbitration procedures or an expert arbitration tribunal. The decisions of the ICJ have spelt out the principle to be found in the Ad Hoc Committee Report, which states that there is “an area of the sea bed and the ocean floor underlying the high seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”1 This falls under the Common Heritage of Mankind principle, adopted without dissent in the United Nations General Assembly and applied to the sea bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (Brown, 1994:262). Therefore, this has spelt out an important principle of maritime delimitation, whereby in some instances it may not be possible for a coastal state to claim maritime territory, which may more appropriately fall within the scope of international jurisdiction and therefore unavailable to any State in particular. 1.1 Nature of the problem The emergence of the EEZ concept and further seaward extension of the outer limit of the continental shelf has focused attention on maritime boundary delimitation in contemporary international law. Equity now plays a greater role in interstate relations and the pragmatic issues of managing the delimitation of natural resources and boundaries. In so far as delimitation of the territorial sea is concerned, the UN Convention of the Sea states that when two countries are adjacent to or opposite to each other, neither one is entitled to “extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.”2 This constitutes the law that is applicable to territorial sea delimitation and single maritime boundaries. Article 6 of the Geneva Convention that regulates delimitation along the Continental Shelf on the equidistance principle. Article 6 (1) and (2) of the Geneva Convention provide that: “1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances (Evans 1989), the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured’ (emphasis added). However the North Sea Continental Shelf case examined this approach and mooted the oriented equity approach over the original principle. This was further refined in the Greenland-Jan Mayen case to a corrective equity approach. 2 Approaches to Equity Over time, two approaches to the equitable principles governing the law of maritime delimitation have emerged. The first approach – which is often referred to as the result-oriented-equity approach – is predicated on the presumption that there is no single obligatory/compulsory method provided under international delimitation law. The law only prescribes that the final solution achieved is ‘equitable. This approach allows the Court to retain flexibility in determining the most equitable outcome for the disputing parties, but requires a subjective and therefore less predictable application of equitable principles. The competing approach is usually described as the corrective-equity-oriented approach. This approach allows the Court to start with a preliminary line of delimitation, based on the equidistance method and retain the right to adjust this line, if all the ‘relevant circumstances’ will ensure that the most objective and equitable solution is achieved. 3 Approaches to Equity in Delimitation Jurisprudence 3.1 Result–Oriented Equity Approach: NCSC (1969) The parties in this despite were Denmark, Germany and Netherlands, which had entered into similar agreements and asked the Court to decide: “What principles and rules of international law are applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to each of them beyond the partial boundary determined by the above-mentioned Convention of 9 June 1965 [in the case of Denmark, and 1 December 1964 in the case of the Netherlands].” Whilst Denmark and The Netherlands were parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention, Germany had not yet ratified the convention. The parties had previously determined equal shares to the area known as the Norwegian Trough using the equidistant principle. Figure 1: Source - Alson, 1969, p. 594 The Court was asked to determine the boundaries (shown as dotted lines B-E and D-E and broken lines B-F, D-F in Figure 4). Francalani and Scovazzi (1994) also examine in detail the problems arising in delimitation due to the drawing of lines in the sea. Figure 2: Source - Alson, 1969, p.596 A particular fear from Germany was that if the equidistant method was used to determine these boundaries, it would lose valuable continental shelf, as illustrated in the possible configurations shown in Figure 5: Figure 3: Source - Alson, 1969, p.598 In this case the ICJ attempted to formulate general principles applicable to a fair allocation of the resources of the continental shelf between adjacent states (Article 83 1982 LoS); namely that as far as possible delimitation should leave as much of the continental shelf to each party, which forms part of a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea (Churchill and Lowe, 1999). The decision also considered background issue to the sources of international law; the formation of custom; the effect of custom upon treaty; and the possible translation of principles formulated in a multilateral treaty into universal custom. The areas situated in the immediate vicinity of the respective coastlines of three countries was not at issue, rather the dispute arose in those areas of the continental shelf lying beyond the partial boundaries established by agreements between the two countries on the basis of proximity to the coastal areas of their respective states3. The Court examined the validity of the equidistant method, wherein the delimitation is done on the basis of the application of an equal distance from the coastlines of the two States. However the Court pointed out that the use of the equidistant principle to delimit the territory between the two states could result in an inequitable outcome for Germany, whose coastline was concave and therefore the line of the boundary would be pulled inwards in the direction of the concavity. As a result, this would cut off access to the Federal Republic of Germany of those areas that fell outside the triangle formed due to concavity, by the lines drawn according to this equidistance principle. Similarly, the drawing of lines on the equidistance principle for a convex coast on the other hand would widen the boundaries and thereby provide a greater area to Denmark than was equitable. Hence the drawing of a median line on the basis of the equidistance principle was rejected y the Court in this case. 3.2 Ratio Decidendi in NCSC (1969) This case is significant because it revealed that the provisions of the 1982 Convention of the Sea may not adequately serve to delimit boundaries on a fair and equitable basis. Therefore, this case resulted in the development of a body of international law that is customarily practices but is independent of the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf. (Jennings 1969). The Court took the view that its task was to adjudicate on the delimitation method, and not on the apportionment of the shares. The Court declared that there was an exclusive, inherent right - and therefore a general norm of international law - that the rights of the coastal state exist ipso facto and ab initio for the ‘natural prolongation’ of its land territory, as enshrined in Article 2 1958 Geneva Convention. This is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of appurtenance. To the question whether Germany had a legal obligation to accept delimitation based upon the equidistant-special circumstances, the Court distinguished the equidistant-special circumstance as a ‘method’ and not a binding equitable principle. It would not accept the contention that since the equidistant method was also an equitable principle of delimitation, it should be applied, and Germany would simply have to accept the ‘extraordinary, unnatural or unreasonable’ result that it would lose some of its inherent, exclusive continental shelf. Whilst the Court conceded that ‘no other method … had the same practical combination of convenience and certainty of application’ that was not the issue under discussion. Further the Court held that Article 6, Paragraph 2 1958 Geneva Convention did not apply in the circumstances. One reason may be that Germany had not demonstrated a ‘very definite, very consistent course of conduct’ indicating an intention to bound by the Convention in these proceedings by taking the simple step of ratifying it. Further, even if Germany had gone ahead and ratified the 1958 Convention, it could have entered a reservation to Article 6, under the provisions of Article 12. Further, Article 6 provides only for adjacent and/or opposite states which did not apply in this case. The Court examined the positive law sides of the proposition that there was now sufficient opinio juris sive necessitates based on the writings of international bodies, evidenced in state practice and the 1958 Geneva Convention. After careful deliberation, the Court concluded that there was nothing in Article 6 to indicate that the equidistant method was to take precedence over delimitation by agreement. Further, relatively few states had ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention, suggesting that insufficient consideration could have been given to it on an international basis for a persuasive opinio juris to have developed sufficient moment at the time of the hearing. As pointed out by Jennings (1969), the very definition of continental shelf is intended only for the purpose of the articles of the Convention, rather than one that has general validity, therefore the low number of signatories further exacerbates the difficulty in arriving at a definition. In the alternate, the argument could be stated that there was a ‘natural law of the continental shelf’ which required that in order to effect the doctrine of the exclusive appurtenance coastal state, there was an a priori element in the obligatory use of the equidistant ‘principle’. The Truman Proclamation enshrined in this area of law the concepts of mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with equitable principles (Jennings 1969). In this sense the NSCS (1969) cases can be viewed as the origin of the result-oriented equity approach.b The ICJ declared itself concerned, not with finding a single method of delimitation to use in all circumstances, but a single goal of equitable solution. The ICJ went on to consider which factors should be taken into account, and held that these included the general configuration of the parties’ respective coasts and ascertainable resources, physical and geological structures, of the continental shelf disputedc. In short, the ICJ left the determination of the boundary to the respective parties, merely providing firmer guidance on how to do so. Subsequent cases such as the Tunisia/Libya (1982) cased and Libya/Malta (1985) case (opposite coasts) judgments have echoed a similar stance. There is also support for this approach in arbitral awards relating to single maritime boundaries, namely, the Guinea/Guinea Bissau (1985)e and St Pierre and Miquelon (1992) awards. 3.3 Critiques of the Ratio Decidendi Kwiatkowskaf argues that an equitable principle should not be given the character of a general guiding principle, but should be applied consistently and predictably since the principles have general application. Charneyg reasoned that the concept of ‘maximum reach’ may have influenced the Republic of Germany’s position in the NSCS (1969) cases. It seems that the principle is based upon ensuring that the parties in dispute are able to maintain limited geographical and status interests, which may be important in participating at international level as an equal, as well as security interests in transportation and mobility. 3.4 The Corrective–Equity Approach: Greenland/Jan Mayen case The corrective-equity approach was first applied by the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf (1977) case. With regard to the Atlantic sector, the Court stated that: “The Court notes that in a large proportion of the delimitations known to it, where a particular geographical feature has influenced the course of a continental shelf boundary, the method of delimitation adopted has been some modification or variant of the equidistance principle rather than its total rejection…. Consequently, it seems to the Court to be in accord not only with the legal rules governing the continental shelf but also with State practice to seek the solution in a method modifying or varying the equidistance method rather than to have recourse to a wholly different criterion of delimitation.”h The ICJ applied a similar approach in the Greenland/Jan Mayen (1993) case referring to the 1977 decision to be regarding as expressing a general norm based on equitable principles that there was sufficient precedent to begin with a provisional median line, and then to consider whether there were any special circumstances which militated against an equitable solution. This was referred to as the “equidistance-special circumstances rule” in that decision, and represents the first time that the ICJ that the corrective-equity approach was recognised as customary law. In the Greenland/Jan Meyen (1993) case, the applicability of a 1965 maritime boundary treaty had to be determined.i Figure 4: Source, Churchill, 1994, p. 5 Denmark sought to delimit Norway’s boundary based on a nautical mile delimitation, whilst Norway argued for a decision based on the equidistant line. The ICJ delimited a line between the respective claims of each country. Although the first Article to that treaty seemed to define the matter by stating that “The boundary… shall be the median line which at every point is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each Contracting Party is measured.” Norway sought to interpret this as meaning the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland, whilst Denmark counter-argued that Article 2 superseded Article 1. Article 2 limited the treaty to the single North Sea maritime boundary. As pointed out by Weil (1989:203,208) in this decision equidistance is taken as “the starting line” and then its equity is assessed. Proportionality was the basis used to determine what would be a just and equitable outcome in the situation. Factors taken into consideration included the fact that there were significant differences as far as the length of the relevant coastlines between the two countries were concerned, the fact that large areas of the coastline became inaccessible due to blocks of ice and the limited areas available for commercial fishing, all of which undermined the utilizable areas available to the countries concerned and therefore had to be taken into account when maritime delimitation became an issue. 3.5 Ratio Decidendi in Greenland/Jan Mayen case `Although the first Article to that treaty seemed to define the matter by stating that “The boundary… shall be the median line which at every point is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each Contracting Party is measured.” Norway sought to interpret this as meaning the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland, whilst Denmark counter-argued that Article 2 superseded Article 1. Article 2 limited the treaty to the single North Sea maritime boundary. The ICJ concurred that Article 2 took precedence, and used the equidistant line based on coastal geography before looking at other circumstances in determining how – if at all – to adjust the line. Although there were a number of domestic and international actions which utilized the equidistant line in the Jan Mayen area, the ICJ considered this to be merely an effort to settle the boarder disputes diplomatically in the interim, rather than a commitment by Denmark to forego the Treaty, and surrender its territory. Churchill (1994) points out seven salient aspects of the Greenland/Jan Mayer decision. One aspect of the decision was a corroboration of the North Sea Continental case finding of the inapplicability of the equidistance principle, and the application of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention in the matter of opposite coasts. Therefore, the Jan Mayen case has further downgraded the importance of the equidistance principle as a principle factor in delimitation. Rather the focus of the decision was in arriving at an equitable outcome for both the countries involved and in this process, employing any corrective measures as necessary to achieve that equitable outcome. Another important aspect of the Jan Mayen case is that for the first time, the Court has taken into account the implications of economic activity along maritime borders and boundary delimitation which takes into account Exclusive Economic Zones (Francx and Gautier,2003). The dispute in this case also included the fishery zones along the coastline of the two countries, which were a source of considerable income. Therefore, the Court arrived at a determination that where opposite coasts are concerned, a median line will first be drawn and adjustments will be made as necessary in arriving at an equitable outcome after taking into account economic factors as well. 4. Conclusions: The historical presumption that each dispute is a unique unicum or monotypic, has dominated the approach to the maritime delimitation disputes. It was therefore assumed that the principle of equidistance as a general or global rule. j Tanaka (2004) has examined the significance of several maritime decisions that were rendered after the North Sea Continental Shelf case of 1969. He discusses in particular, the case of the Cameroon and Nigeria judgment of 10 October 2002, pointing out that this was one of the notable instances where the International Court of Justice adopted the corrective-equity approach that is outlined under Articles 74 and 83 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, and which was first mooted in the Jan Mayen case. Therefore, this case is a milestone in the law of maritime delimitation. In the Jan Mayen case, the differences in lengths of coastlines, utilization and accessibility to coastlines and security were also additional aspects that were taken into consideration by the ICJ in arriving at its final decision. The decision also took into account, small isolated islands lying a large distance away from the disputed territories. Therefore, it may be noted that the Jan Mayen has further strengthened the customary international law principles as a basis for boundary delimitation.nJudge Schwebel’s strict interpretation of jurisprudence in the Greenland/Jan Mayen (1993) k contrasts with those of Judge Jessup who heard many of the NSCS (1969) cases. Whilst in the Greenland/Jan Mayen (1993) case the ICJ had indicated that the only basis to determine boundaries was ‘the possession by the territory concerned of a coastline’, Jessup considered this to be a false basis to determine delimitation of a maritime boundary. He argued that since the real dispute was regarding access to hydrocarbons in the North Sea, this should be deliberated by the Court.l The Court asserted that the equitable method of the median/equidistant line was not a mandatory rule of customary international law, although it could be convenient in yielding an equitable result. This can be shown to be true in disputes between opposite coastal states, such as in the 1985 Libya/Malta case. In the Libya/Malta (1985) case although the Court’s approach was to apply the principle of adjacency as measured by distance as the most suitable equitable criterion and method for provisional delimitation, the Court stressed at length that no single method was compulsory, since this is a multi-stage process, and the most suitable method should be chosen giving regard to all relevant circumstances that could impact the assessment of the equities in each case. The Libya/Malta case also corroborates the Jan Mayen case, since the ICJ similarly stressed upon the relevance of the EEZ in customary international law.(Evans:702). In this case also, the Court followed the same approach it had mooted in the Jan Mayen case – ie, it followed a procedure of delimitation in two stages. During the first stage, a provisional median line was drawn which was an equidistance line and then the equitable factors were taken into account in determining whether or not any adjustments were necessary to this line. Once the relevant circumstances were taken into account, necessary corrections were made to the line depending upon the factors that called for an adjustment or shifting in that line. These may involve economic factors as well, however in the Tunisia/Libya (1982) case the ICJ emphasised a result-oriented approach, but left the floodgates of litigation wide open, as follows: “It is however the result which is predominant: the principles are subordinate to the goal…. It is not every such principle which is in itself equitable; it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness of the solution.” Therefore despite the preponderance of EEZ domestic legislation which states a preference for the median/equidistant line method in maritime boundary delimitation, there is no evidence in the cases that in the foreseeable future the Court will recognise the median/equidistant line method as a mandatory rule, with general applicability.m Tanaka (2003) also discussed the approach of the ICJ in the case of a difficult dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. In this case, it was not only a maritime but also a territorial dispute that was at issue. However in this case the Court moved away from the trend in earlier cases discussed above to reject the equidistance method and specifically applied it in this case. Tanaka states that the significance of the case lies in the fact that the ICJ was able to peacefully resolve a territorial dispute as well as maritime matters by applying the principle of equidistance methods that is a principle of maritime delimitation. Therefore, this shows that maritime delimitation may also be applied successfully in the case of other disputes over territory. The case of El Salvador/Honduras4 involved a dispute over land boundaries and the waters of the Gulf of Fonesca. However in this case, the ICJ held that the Gulf waters were held jointly by both the states with Nicaragua. Access was also an issue in this case and the claims of Honduras were based upon its long time exploitation of the maritime resources in the area. Any delimitation could have resulted in the setting of boundaries that were landward and could have blocked off a considerable part of the access enjoyed by Honduras and caused problems with navigation, access and security. Hence, this is yet another case where equitable principles have formed the guiding factor in maritime delimitation. The NSCS (1969) cases discussed islands and parties with opposite coastlines in very general terms. In the matter of the Anglo-French Arbitral Award case in 1977,n the Tribunal interpreted Article 6 of the 1958 Convention which provides that pertaining to opposite or adjacent coasts where there was no agreement between the parties the basis of the decision of the boundary should be the median or equidistant line, unless special circumstances arise. Those special circumstances have the same objective as the customary rules of law (stated above in the NSCS (1969) cases), which is to delimit the boundary based on equitable principles. The Cameroon and Nigeria judgement of 10 October 2002o, was the first instance in the case law of the ICJ where the corrective-equity approach under Articles 74 and 83 1982 LoS was adopted by the Court. Tanakap argues that “The interpretation of these provisions by the Court is significant in the development of the law of maritime delimitation….Indeed…this is the central issue in the Cameroon/Nigeria decision as well as in the law of maritime delimitation as a whole”. Tanaka points out that factors that may be deemed relevant by the Courts when applying the corrective equity approach will include taking into account whether any adjustments are necessary, such as geographical factors, economic factors and land contours with the implications of delimitation. The relevant sizes of the coastlines was also an issue in the Cameroon case, in a similar manner to the Jan Mayen case, and the precedent set in that case was also applied by the ICJ to introduce a similar corrective equity approach as opposed to the earlier oriented equity approach. On this basis, Tanaka therefore concludes that case law in the area of maritime delimitation is moving firmly and surely towards the adopting of a corrective equity approach in almost every case of delimitation. The Qatar/Bahrain (2001)q case was the first time that the ICJ applied the corrective-equity approach where states were adjacent, as in the North sea case rather than on opposite coastlines as in the Jan Mayen case, therefore explicitly opting to follow the jurisprudence in the Greenland/Jan Mayen (1993) case, which seems to be the modern trend the ICJ is moving towards. Kwiatkowskar denies that the emphasis in the 1982, 1984 and 1985 judgments on ‘equitable solution’ can in itself be taken as conclusive evidence of the ICJ moving from a corrective equity-orientated approach to a more results-oriented, subjective approach, since this was the approach taken in the NSCS (1969) cases. Dicta from the NSCS (1969) cases strongly indicate that the Court intended to evoke ‘the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal regime of the continental shelf”s and whilst it was said in that case that ‘there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of”,t this should be weighed with the exception noted in the Libya/Malta case where the Court stated that only those considerations ‘[T]hat are pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf as it has developed within the law, and to the application of equitable principles to its delimitation, will qualify for inclusion.”u Whilst writers such as Kwiatkowska maintain that there was already sufficient clarity and predictability in the doctrine of equitable principles in this area of maritime law, others – such as Tanaka - have argued the reverse. One of the reasons for the divergence of views, is the emphasis given by some writers to which Article (15, 74 or 83) is being considered in the judgment, and whether the states are adjacent or opposite each other. With the exception of the Tunisia/Libya(1982 (second sector)case, there have been six judgements which seemed to have turned upon whether the delimitation involved opposite coasts, namely; the Anglo-French Continental Shelf (1977) (sectors of the English Channel and the Channel Islands), Gulf of Maine (1984) (second sector), Libya/Malta (1985), Greenland/Jan Mayen (1993), Eritrea/Yemen(1999)v and Qatar/Bahrain cases (2001) (southern sector. In these six cases the judgements adopted, wholly or partly, the corrective-equity approach. Where the coasts have been adjacent prior to 2000 there was a tendency for a result-orientated approach. Of the eight cases identified by Tanaka, the sole exception to this was the corrective-equity approach applied to the Atlantic sector in the Anglo-French case. However, since 2000 in both the Qatar/Bahrain and Cameroon/Nigeria cases, a corrective-equity approach for a delimitation relating to adjacent coasts was selected by the ICJ. Whether this will be consistently followed in forthcoming cases remains to be seen. Viewed from a broad perspective, the law of maritime delimitation thus moves from co-existence of the two different approaches to a unified approach based on corrective-equity. Bibliography 1- Books Brown, E.D. (1994) “The international law of the sea” Volume 1: Introductory Manual” Aldershot: Dartmouth Churchill, R. and Lowe, A.V, 1999. The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Evans, M.D, 1989. Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Franckx, E and Gautier, P, 2003. “”The Exclusive Economic Zone and Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982:2000: A preliminary assessment of State Practice. Brussels: Bruylant Francalanci, G and Scovazzi, T, 1994. “Lines in the Sea.” Dordrecht et al: Nijhoff Tanaka, (2006) Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 120 Weil, P, 1989. “The law of maritime delimitation – reflections.” Cambridge: Grotius 2- Journals Charney, J (1994) Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law. The American Journal of International Law. Volume 88: 227 Chiu, H (1985) ‘Some problems concerning the application of the maritime boundary delimitation provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between Adjacent or Opposite States.’ MD Journal of International Law and Trade. Vol 9. pp. 1-18 Churchill, R.R., 1994. “The Greenland-Jan Mayen case and its significance for the international law of maritime delimitation” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal law, 9(1): 1-30 Evans, A (1969) Judicial Decisions: Boundary between continental shelf areas in the North Sea-effect of Continental Shelf Convention on state not party. North Sea Contintenal Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denamark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ICJ Reports 1969 p. 3 Evans, Malcolm D, “International Court of Justice: Recent cases.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 43 at pp 702 Friedmann, W (1970) ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases – A Critique’. The American Journal of International Law. Volume 64: 229 Jennings, R.Y., 1969. “The limits of continental shelf jurisdiction: Some possible implications of the North Sea Case judgment.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 18: 819-833 Jennings, R (1986) ‘Equity and Equitable Principles’, 42 Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 38 Kwiatkowska, B (1988) Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation – A Legal Perspective. International Journal of Estuarine & Coastal Law. Vol 3, No 4. 287 1988 Nelson, L (1990) ‘The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries.’ The American Journal of International Law. Volume 84: 837 Richardson, E (1988) ‘Jan Mayen in Perspective.’ The American Journal of International Law. Volume 82: 443 Schneider, J (1985) ‘The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result’ The American Journal of International Law. Volume 79: 539 Tanaka, Yoshifumi, 2003. “Reflections on Maritime delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain case” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52(1): 53 Tanaka, Yoshifumi, 2004. “Reflections on maritime delimitation in the Cameroon/Nigeria case.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53(2): 369 3- Cases Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) 1992 ICJ Rep 351 (1969) North Sea Continental Shelf (West Germany v Denmark; West Germany v Netherlands), 1969, 8 ILM 340 (1977) Delimitation of the Continental Shelf United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic reprinted in 18 ILM 397 (1982) Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 21 ILM 225 (1984) Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States) 23 ILM 1197 (1985) Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) 24 ILM 1189 (1985) Arbitral Award The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (1985) 25 ILM 251 (1992) Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France (St Pierre and Miquelon) (1992) 31 ILM 1149 (1992) Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) ICJ. 351 (1993) Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway) (1993) ICJ 38 (2001) Eritrea/Yemen Case: ILM, Vol. 40, 2001 (2001) Qatar/Bahrain Case ICJ (2002) Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 38 ILM 112-16. Documents Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 UST 471, TIAS 5578 499 UNTS 311 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: (A historical perspective). Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm. Last viewed on: Koh, T (1982) ‘A Constitution for the Seas’. Remarks by T Koh, President of the third UN Conference on the law of the sea. Montego Bay. Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf. Last viewed on: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc a/Conf. 62/122 reprinted in 21 ILM 1261, 1271-1354 (1982) Jennings, R (1986) ‘Equity and Equitable Principles’, 42 Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 38. Cited in Kwiatkowska, 1988, p. 2891 Appendix A – Key Cases in the development of maritime boundary delimitation law 1- The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) 2- The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case (1977) 3- The Tunisia/Libya case (1982) 4- The Gulf of Maine case (1984) 5- The Libya/Malta case (1985) 6- The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case (1985) 7- The St. Pierre and Miquelon case (1992) 8- The Greenland/Jan Mayen case (1993) 9- The Eritrea/Yemen case (1999) 10- The Qatar/Bahrain case (2001) 11- The Cameroon/Nigeria case (2002) 12- *The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago award (2006)- not disucssed Read More